China is rapidly creating a high-tech “blue pressure” to imitate US forces during combat training, utilizing cutting-edge electronic tools to strengthen its naval might and challenge US dominance in the Pacific.
This month, the US Naval War College published a report on China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s ( PLAN ) development of a “blue force” for more realistic combat training.
According to the report, China has been using the online effort to improve its naval fight readiness since the mid-2010s, emulating the administrative strategies of American militaries.
According to a report from the US Naval War College, PLAN’s orange force offers manned and unmanned networks, with particular emphasis on virtual reality and electronic warfare capabilities. It says a synthetic opposition force ( OPFOR ) simulates potential real-world adversaries, including the US Navy.
According to the US Naval War College statement, PLAN’s orange force has grown increasingly sophisticated in recent years as a result of President Xi Jinping’s request for more reasonable military training, integrating uncrewed automobiles, simulated electric environments, and innovative training systems.
It points out that the initial orange force of the PLAN was makeshift and ready, but advancements in digital technology and training integration have made the exercises more realistic and effective.
The report claims that PLAN will be able to coach more effectively against the US and its allies, increase its combat readiness, and possible destroy the US’ naval dominance and deterrence in the region by creating a competent and reasonable orange force.
China has been integrating a number of cutting-edge digital technologies to create realistic combat environments, helping the PLA to bridge education gaps and get ready for upcoming issues.
In a May 2022 Foreign Military Studies Office ( FMSO ) article, Kevin McCauley says that the PLA is exploring the creation of a “battlefield metaverse” to enhance its training methods and combat capabilities.
According to McCauley, this metaverse aims to simulate future warfare environments using advanced technologies such as virtual reality, AI, quantum technologies, brain-computer interfaces and the Internet of Things ( IoT ).
He notes that the PLA believes this universe can give troops with interactive, realistic combat experiences, compensating for their lack of actual battle knowledge.
He claims that the metaverse makes it possible to test new strategies and technologies, including those that might apply to novel concept weapons like autonomous “blue armies” and weather weapons.
This approach, according to McCauley, is essential for preparing for and winning upcoming military conflicts because it provides a dynamic and rigorous training environment that the so-called” Battle Labs” of today cannot entirely replicate.
In addition to the high-intensity conflict cases against the US, including a conflict scenario over Taiwan, China has been conducting advanced models to test cutting-edge military strategies and strategies, according to Asia Times ‘ multiple accounts.
Researchers at North University of China conducted a combat sport modeling in May 2023 to demonstrate the effectiveness of China’s fast weapons against the USS Gerald Ford supercarrier and its girls. The modeling involved a three-wave assault using 24 fast missiles, which effectively sunk the provider and its five girls.
The model posited that the US fleet defied warnings and continued to cruise a South China Sea island owned by China. The fast missiles, with ranges of 2, 000 and 4, 000 kilometers, had great strike probabilities and were launched from different locations in mainland China. Due to the assumed lack of satellite targeting in a conflict scenario, the simulation highlighted the PLA’s reliance on sea-based surveillance.
In July 2023, Asia Times reported on China’s simulated total sea war scenario with the US, highlighting the PLAN’s challenges in a high-intensity conflict.
The simulation tested new naval weapons under a “Z-day” scenario involving nearly 50 Chinese destroyers facing attacks from a hypothetical “blue alliance” with advanced capabilities, including Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
However, the total sea war simulation revealed significant Chinese vulnerabilities, such as reduced radar detection and compromised air defense capabilities.
Elsa Kania asserts in an April 2019 Jamestown Foundation article that the PLA faces challenges due to officer inexperience and command structure rigidity.
Kania claims that the transition from simulated to actual combat is challenging, even though the PLA’s National Defense University and other institutions are developing AI systems like” Prophet 1.0,” which have defeated human counterparts.
China argues that the PLA’s lack of combat experience can be made up for by complex simulations, but institutional obstacles like an underdeveloped non-commissioned officer (NCO ) corps could stifle the impact of these innovations, Kania contends.
Matt Tetreau mentions that NCOs shouldideally perform tactical-level tasks because they are essential to maintaining survivability and carrying out meaningful military missions in a January 2023 article for the Modern War Institute ( MWI ).
Tetreau points out that junior commissioned officers delegate these duties when competent and empowered NCOs are absent, frequently without the necessary expertise, authority, and intellectual capacity to do so.
He says that while the PLA has been modernizing rapidly, its efforts to professionalize its NCO corps face challenges, including low retention rates, inadequate training and socio-economic disparities.
Despite improvements, he claims that PLA NCOs lack the experience and leadership training of their Western counterparts, which may hinder their effectiveness.
However, Tetreau says that the PLA’s unique approach to NCO development, influenced by its socio-political context, may not align with Western military paradigms but could still meet China’s strategic goals.
In keeping with that, David Roza mentions in a May 2022 article for Task &, Purpose that the PLA has been implementing a targeted training program for NCOs since 2012 in an effort to develop its enlisted force into a more knowledgeable and educated body capable of operating modern military equipment.
Roza mentions that, unlike traditional NCOs who rise through the ranks, China’s “made-to-order” NCOs are intended to fill technical roles rather than leadership positions. He points out that while this approach may work in opposition to the US developing NCOs through years of service and experience, it may help to address the PLA’s recruitment and retention issues.