China’s rapid economic growth, accompanied by an equally swift expansion of its military over the past 30 years, has elevated it from a regional power to a global powerhouse.
The 2023 US Department of Defense Annual Report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” acknowledged China as the only competitor with the capacity to reshape the international order, cementing its status as a superpower.
At the heart of China’s strategy for national rejuvenation lies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to expand global transportation and trade linkages essential for its sustained growth and development. This strategy is intertwined with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) concept, ensuring that economic advancements can simultaneously bolster its military capacity, creating dual-purpose applications.
Among the six economic corridors under the BRI, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor—later rebranded as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—is pivotal. CMEC links China’s Yunnan province to the Chinese-built Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, providing direct access to the Bay of Bengal.
This corridor is a cornerstone of China’s efforts to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma,” ensuring secure energy supplies and the steady flow of natural resources vital for its economic stability. CMEC also aligns with China’s “String of Pearls” strategy—a network of logistic support points in the Indian Ocean—and complements its “Two-Ocean” strategy.
Given this, it is imperative for China to maintain Myanmar within its sphere of influence to keep CMEC operational, regardless of who governs the country. However, recent developments suggest that China may be placing its bets on the wrong horse.
History of hedging
Historically, China has hedged its influence in Myanmar by simultaneously supporting the Myanmar military (MM) and various ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) along its border.
For decades these EROs have fought MM for greater autonomy and at times China has brokered ceasefire agreements between them all just to maintain a stable trading environment and to safeguard its investments in the region.
Initially, following the Myanmar military’s coup in 2021, China refrained from openly backing the junta (State Administrative Council – SAC). However, as Myanmar’s Spring Revolution gained momentum and battlefield dynamics shifted, China’s position evolved.
The emergence of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across the country forced Myanmar’s military to stretch its troops thin, simultaneously battling multiple EROs and PDFs.
The turning point came during Operation 1027, where the military lost significant territory in northern Shan state to the EROs. Simultaneously, the Arakan Army (AA) gained substantial ground in Rakhine state, surrounding the strategic Kyaukphyu port. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) achieved unprecedented success against the military.
Faced with these developments, China adjusted its approach and began openly supporting the military regime. This shift was marked by Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in August 2024 and culminated in junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China in November 2024—his first since the coup.
China has also pressured border-sharing EROs, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), by closing border gates and disrupting trade, urging them to avoid collaborating with PDFs or National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel exile government.
Additionally, China agreed to deploy private security forces to protect its economic investments in Myanmar, akin to other mercenary groups like the Wagner Group.
Risks of backing the junta
China’s support for the SAC could backfire in the long run. The Myanmar military regime is teetering on collapse—it’s only a matter of time. EROs that don’t share borders with China, such as the AA, Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and Chin groups, remain beyond China’s direct influence.
Even border-sharing EROs like the TNLA and MNDAA have continued fighting the military despite ceasefire agreements. This persistence stems from the military’s repeated failure to honor agreements, eroding trust.
Furthermore, EROs recognize that true autonomy and security are unattainable under any Myanmar military regime. Many see their best chance in a federal democratic Myanmar.
Unofficial reports suggest that EROs and the NUG may have reached a consensus on this vision, even if geopolitical sensitivities have delayed a formal announcement.
The SAC is deeply unpopular among Myanmar’s citizens. Beyond its illegitimacy, life under its rule has become increasingly unbearable due to economic hardships. For the first time in 60 years, the Myanmar military is despised even by the Bamar ethnic majority in central Myanmar.
NUG a better bet
In contrast, the NUG has taken a pragmatic approach to China, publicly committing to safeguard Chinese investments through its 10-point “Position on China” released on January 1, 2024.
Aligning with the NUG, which enjoys widespread domestic support, would not only stabilize Myanmar but also create a conducive environment for trade and investment, bolstering China’s BRI objectives. Moreover, such a move would earn China goodwill from ASEAN countries, which largely shun the SAC.
Min Aung Hlaing is an unreliable ally for China. He has previously courted Russia to counterbalance China’s influence, only to return to Beijing when Moscow couldn’t meet his needs. He has also covertly encouraged ultranationalists to stage anti-China protests in Myanmar, highlighting his duplicitous nature.
The Myanmar military, as an institution, harbors historical animosity toward China due to its battles against Chinese-backed Burmese Communist Party troops in the 1970s and 1980s.
Strategic opportunity
With the prospect of a hawkish US administration under Donald Trump, China would benefit from cultivating broader international alliances. Aligning with the NUG, which possesses greater legitimacy than the SAC, could enhance China’s global image and reputation.
China’s ambition for national rejuvenation and modernization by its centenary in 2049 demands long-term strategies over short term solutions. History demonstrates that regimes like the SAC, which lack popular support, are ultimately unsustainable.
China would do well to heed the adage, “He that lies down with dogs rises with fleas.” By recalibrating its stance on Myanmar, however, China has a rare opportunity to earn the goodwill of the Myanmar people at a pivotal moment—and at a bargain price.
Now is the time for China to act decisively. By distancing itself from the failing junta and embracing the NUG, China can secure its better global standing as well as a more stable and prosperous future for both itself and Myanmar.
For China, to borrow Voltaire’s timeless wisdom: “With great power comes great responsibility.”
Than N Oo is a Myanmar analyst and activist