According to official readouts and media reports, Iran’s Chabahar Port appeared to be off the two leaders ‘ broad agenda when Indian Prime Minister Narendra met with US President Donald Trump at the White House.
While Modi and Trump agreed to de facto restore diplomatic relations, including India’s pledge to develop broad trade links and buy more American goods, including weapons, oil, and gas, India’s continued involvement in Chabahar has the ability to turn into a major sticking point.  ,  ,
The interface, which India is developing and running under a 10-year deal signed in 2024, is crucial to New Delhi’s effort to bypass Pakistan’s foe Gwadar interface and open trade with Central Asia and the Middle East.
China has made significant investments in Gwadar and continues to do so in the name of trade protection, giving Beijing a foothold in the Indian Ocean area, where India has long enjoyed corporate influence.
In the run-up to Modi’s journey to Washington, in a surprise walk, Trump issued an executive order on February 6 instructing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to “rescind or change restrictions discounts” on Chabahar.
The order obviously aims to begin Trump’s past administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign on the Islamic Republic but will also push India’s vital strategic interests.
India’s efforts to expand its influence in Central Asia are at the heart of Chabahar, which is situated in southeast Iran, by avoiding Pakistan’s standard land-trapping and facilitating communication to Afghanistan and above.
The Port &, Maritime Organization of Iran and Indian Ports Global Limited ( IPGL ) signed a deal last year in Chabhar, under which IPGL agreed to invest about US$ 120 million. An additional$ 250 million in financing will bring the contract’s total value to$ 370 million, the two sides said last year.
According to an American government official who was quoted by Reuters, IPGL initially took over the port’s operations in 2018 and has since handled container traffic exceeding 90 000 Posting and large and general cargo exceeding 8.4 million tonnes.
A railroad and free trade zones are also included in the large project, which includes India having already invested billions of dollars and plenty of political capital.
The port is more than just a financial lifeline for India: it is a strategic asset that balances China’s growing influence in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East with strengthening economic ties to a historically volatile neighboring region.
The inclusion of India in the International North-South Transport Corridor, which promotes trade between India, Iran, Russia, and other countries, reinforced its strategic significance for New Delhi.  ,
Under the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, Iran agreed to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. However, the first Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018 and reimposed severe sanctions, though some were waived for Chabahar projects because of the port’s prior contribution to facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction while it was de facto under NATO control.
The waiver made it possible for India to carry on its port investments without incurring sanctions. Trump’s decision to modify or revoke these waivers, however, poses a risk to undermine both India’s strategic position in the region and the dynamics of the Quad security partnership.
The Quad, which includes Australia, Japan, India, and the US, was established to counterbalance China’s ascendancy in the Indo-Pacific, but has been rendered ineffective by India’s neutrality regarding the Ukraine conflict and its crucial role in helping Russia dodge Western sanctions on its energy exports.
Significantly, at a time when Trump is disengaging the US from various multilateral commitments, bodies and fora, Rubio met with Quad counterparts during the president’s first day in office and reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the format and its goals. In this way, they suggested that India hold a new Quad summit this year.  ,
On one level, the sanctions waiver move is a clear reaffirmation of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. It comes as Iran is rumored to have plotted to murder Trump, who has already voiced strong support for Israel, its archrival. Iran is being isolated and forced to engage in new negotiations on its nuclear program by the punitive sanctions policy.
The immediate goal may be that, but the wider effects of terminating the waivers could conflict with US strategic objectives in the area.
India’s reaction to the waiver decision, so far muted and not mentioned during Modi’s February 13 press conference with Trump in Washington, is still a wildcard. That may be because Modi’s emissaries are negotiating the waivers for its specific investments and activities in Chabahar from the inside out.
If those negotiations fail, New Delhi will likely react to what it perceives as unwarranted US interference in a crucial and important regional strategy.
India has long given its non-aligned autonomy precedence in its foreign policy, and New Delhi has placed a high value on the development of the port, particularly in light of its regional security concerns, such as those posed by Pakistan’s conflict, and China’s great power struggle.
Indeed, India might have to reevaluate its options as a result of the revocation of sanctions waivers. India might have to reconsider its long-term commitment to a project in which it has made a sizable investment, both diplomatically and financially, if the waivers are completely revoked without modification or compromise.
In turn, this could reduce India’s standing in the Central Asian region and undermine its ongoing cooperation with the US in light of its wider Indo-Pacific strategies, including balancing and checking China’s expansionist designs.
The Quad might be impacted by the waivers being revoked, too. By protecting trade routes and encouraging rules-based stability in the region, one of the Quad’s main goals is to create a free and open Indo-Pacific.
India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean region, where the Chabahar Port is crucial, helps ensure India’s security and trade access in Central Asia, is underlined by its strategic positioning in that region.
By nipping India’s Chabahar ambitions, Trump risks torpedoing the Quad. The US may argue that reaffirming Iran’s sanctions policy is necessary to restrain its ability to exert power across the region, but the long-term cost of weakening India’s strategic position may outweigh any advantages in the short run.
The Quad’s success relies on maintaining a unified front against China’s growing assertiveness, and any discord within the partnership, especially between the US and India, would shake its cohesion at a crucial juncture.  ,
Many in New Delhi believe that China will ultimately benefit from Trump’s de facto support of India’s role in Iran, Central Asia, and the Middle East as a whole.
Additionally, it will give Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which has been inactive for a while and where China has invested comparative amounts of billions, a comparative boost. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor ( CPEC ), part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is a key counterpoint to India’s initiatives in the region.
Trump’s decision to impose a ban on Chabahar thus runs the risk of erupting a string of cascading events that could ultimately reset the region’s balance of power to China’s and India’s favor.
A weaker Quad and strained US-Indian relations will be the immediate results of undermining India’s strategic interests. At a time when the US is supposedly pivoting from Europe to Asia in order to challenge China’s influence, the long-term outcome will be a more powerful, not less, China in Central and South Asia.
Trump’s decision to punish Iran has also negatively impacted a key partner in India, potentially putting the future cohesion his administration will ultimately need to effectively check and balance China across the wider Indo-Pacific and beyond.
The University of AJK is enrolling Haris Gul in an international relations program. He may be reached at [email protected].