US readies huge tariffs on solar cells from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia | FinanceAsia

In a further escalation of the US trade war, the US Department of Commerce has placed antidumping duties ( AD ) and countervailing duties ( CVD ) on crystalline photovoltaic cells ( solar cells ) arriving into the US from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, according to an April 21 announcement.  

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Trade war has caught Wall Street between a rock and a hard place – Asia Times

The trade war between China and the US has spiraled into uncharted territory. On April 10, the Trump administration imposed a tariff of 125% on all Chinese imports. China called the actions unfair and responded with similar measures.

Within the broader debate around unravelling economic ties between the US and China, where economic interdependence has increasingly been viewed as a threat to US national security, this escalation raises questions about whether global finance is also reducing its presence in China.

After all, the risks of financial connectivity with China have been discussed prominently by US policymakers in recent years. And many financial analysts have spent much of the past year discussing whether China has become “uninvestable” due to rising geopolitical tensions.

However, as I show in a recently published study, most global financial firms have continued to expand their presence in Chinese markets over the last decade, even as tensions have intensified.

Crucially, they have done so on China’s terms, operating within a system that prioritizes government oversight and policy goals over liberal market norms. This pragmatic accommodation is quietly reshaping the global financial order.

China’s capital markets, which have historically been sealed off from the rest of the world, have been opening up in recent decades. This has prompted global financial firms to expand their footprint in China.

Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have taken full ownership of local joint ventures. And asset managers like BlackRock or Invesco have established fund management operations on the Chinese mainland.

Yet China has not liberalized in the way many in the west expected. Rather than conforming to global norms of open, lightly regulated markets, China’s financial system remains largely guided by the state.

Markets there operate within a framework shaped by the policy priorities of the central government, capital controls remain in place, and foreign firms are expected to play by a different set of rules than they would in New York or London.

Foreign investors have been allowed to buy into mainland markets, but through infrastructure that limits capital outflows and preserves regulatory oversight.

Rather than adapting China to the global financial order, Wall Street has accommodated China’s distinct model. The motivation behind this is clear: China is simply too big to ignore.

Take China’s pension system as an example. Whereas pension assets in the US amount to 136.2% of GDP in 2019, in China these only amounted to 1.6%. The growth potential in this market is enormous, representing a trillion-dollar opportunity for global firms.

Consequently, index providers such as MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P Dow Jones – key gatekeepers of global investment – have included Chinese stocks and bonds in major benchmark indices.

These decisions, taken between 2017 and 2020, effectively declared Chinese markets “investment grade” for institutional investors around the world. This has helped legitimize China’s market model within the architecture of global finance.

America strikes back

In recent years, Washington has sought to curtail US financial exposure to China through a growing set of measures. These include investment restrictions, entity blacklists, and forced delisting for Chinese firms on US stock exchanges. Such actions signal a broader effort to use finance as a tool of strategic leverage.

The moves have had some effect. Some US institutional investors and pension funds have declared China “uninvestable” and are reducing their exposure. American investments in China have roughly halved since their US$1.4 trillion peak in 2020.

But attributing this solely to geopolitical pressure overlooks another key factor: China’s underwhelming market performance. A protracted property crisis, a government crackdown on tech companies and a weak post-pandemic economic recovery have made Chinese markets less attractive to investors in purely financial terms.

More strategically oriented investors from Asia, Europe and the Middle East have invested more into Chinese markets, filling gaps left by US investors. Sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East, especially, have engaged in more long-term investments as part of broader efforts to strengthen economic cooperation with China.

And at the same time, many Western financial firms have doubled down on their presence in China, expanding their onshore footprint. Since 2020, institutions such as JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and BlackRock have opened new offices, increased their staff, acquired new licences and bought out their joint venture partners to operate independently as investment banks, asset managers or futures brokers.

It has become more difficult to invest foreign capital in China. But Western financial firms are positioning themselves to tap into China’s huge domestic capital pools and capture its long-term growth opportunities – even as they tread carefully around geopolitical sensitivities.

Fragmenting financial order

It is too early to predict the long-term effects of the current geopolitical tensions. But Wall Street is trying to placate both sides. On the one hand, it is adapting to capital markets with Chinese characteristics. And on the other, it is trying not to antagonize an increasingly interventionist America.

However, while holding its breath amid further escalation and having scaled back some of its activities, Wall Street has not left China. It is instead learning how to work within the constraints of a system shaped by a different set of priorities.

This does not necessarily signal a new global consensus. But it does suggest that the liberal financial order, once defined by Anglo-American norms, is becoming more pluralistic. China’s rise is showing that alternative models – in which the state retains a strong hand in markets – can coexist with, and even shape, global finance.

As tensions between the US and China continue to rise, financial firms are learning to navigate a world in which existing relationships between states and markets are being reconfigured. This process may well define the future of global finance.

Johannes Petry is CSGR research fellow at the University of Warwick.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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A psychopath wouldn’t hesitate to trigger global financial crisis – Asia Times

Would you want a psychopath looking after your pension? Or what about your shares? In a recent talk at the Cambridge Festival of Science, I spoke about the latest research relating to a psychopath’s love of money, greed for power and willingness to harm other people financially for personal gain.

Since I began researching corporate psychopaths and the global financial crisis, the idea of the financial psychopath, an employee in the financial sector acting ruthlessly, recklessly, greedily and selfishly with other people’s money, has gained traction.

The theory won support because psychopaths are more commonly found in financial services than in other sectors. It has even been argued that up to 10% of employees in financial services could be psychopathic. That is to say they have no empathy, care for other people, conscience or regrets for any damage they do.

These traits make them ruthless in pursuit of their own agendas and entirely focused on self-promotion and self-advancement.

But my ongoing research goes even further. It has found that psychopaths are willing to knowingly cause financial harm to the entire global community in order to receive a financial bonus for themselves. Personal greed outweighs the immense social and community costs of implementing that greed.

This aligns with earlier perceptions of some captains of finance or leading politicians as psychopaths. Previous research found that their selfish philosophy of life and their trivializing of other people free them from the restraints of being evenhanded, truthful or generous.

This new research also shows that a majority of psychopaths would even be willing to cause a global financial crisis – if they personally would profit from, for example, falling stock prices. This willingness holds true even when they could be personally identified as being the source of the crisis. Only a tiny minority of non-psychopaths would be willing to do this.

Race to the top

Financial insiders appear to agree with the assumption that psychopaths have always been prevalent in the sector. Many psychologists and other management commentators have come to the same conclusion.

Researchers have also found that interpersonal-affective psychopathic traits – such as deceitfulness, superficial charm and a lack of remorse – were associated with success in the finance sector.

Employees at financial institutions in New York scored significantly higher on these traits than people in the wider community. They also had significantly lower levels of emotional intelligence (as would be expected of psychopaths).

What’s more, having psychopathic traits has also been linked to higher annual incomes – as well as a higher rank within the corporation.

In other words, it looks like the more psychopathic an employee is, the farther up the corporate finance ladder they will go. This corresponds with findings that show there are more psychopaths at the tops of organizations than at the bottom.

Creating destruction

This is not to say that personal success in climbing the corporate ladder equates to professional success when someone reaches the top job. Quite the opposite. In fact, my research has shown that psychopathic leadership is associated with organizational destruction.

This includes a greater propensity to take risks with other people’s money, a greater willingness to gamble with someone else’s money and lower returns for shareholders.

In one study over a ten-year period, psychopathic fund managers were found to generate annual returns that were 30% lower than their less psychopathic peers.

The research team concluded that among elite financial investors, psychopathy and its appearance of personal dominance and competence may enable people to rise to the top of their profession. But this does not translate into improved financial performance at the organizational level, where the presence of the psychopathic is actually counterproductive.

Fraud has always been associated with the psychopathic – so much so that in one study 69% of auditors believed they had encountered corporate psychopaths in relation to their investigations.

Years ago, one bank reportedly used a psychopathy measure to recruit staff. But I would advise against hiring people who score very highly, because they are totally concerned with personal success. They are not bothered about long-term organizational growth or sustainability. As such, decisions will be made to suit the psychopathic worker and not the organization.

For example, new hires would be likely to be people who can help the psychopath achieve their personal aims and objectives rather than aid the company. Anyone astute enough to potentially be a challenge to the psychopathic employee would not be hired in the first place.

Without exception, psychopathic people love money and they are more motivated by it than other people are.

Unlike the rest of the population, psychopaths are uninterested in higher values, such as close emotional connections with family and friends, and much more focused on money and materialism. Seen through this lens the appeal, to people with these traits, of the corporate banking sector and the salaries and bonuses it offers soon becomes clear.

Clive Roland Boddy is deputy head of the School of Management, Anglia Ruskin University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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FinanceAsia Awards 2025: Southeast Asia winners announced | FinanceAsia

As the world is still yet out of the tariff woods, leading financial institutions across Asia Pacific (Apac) continue to navigate the uncertain tides and have made waves in the uncertain time. In the meantime, It was another challenging year for institutions in Asia as the global economy continues to recover after the Covid-19 pandemic, with sluggish economic growth. 

It is worth pausing to celebrate people, teams and organisations that have withstood the test of another challenging, if not difficult, year. Not only does geopolitcal complexity persist, each market is on their unique mission towards recovery, sustainability, digitalisation, restructuring, or innovation. 

The FinanceAsia team invited banks, brokers, ratings agencies and other financial institutions, to showcase their capabilities when supporting their clients. Our awards process celebrates those institutions that showed determination to deliver desirable outcomes, through the display of commercial and technical acumen.

 This year marks the 29th iteration of our FinanceAsia awards and celebrates activity that took place during the 12 months of 2024. 

Read on for details of the winners and finalists (entrants whose submissions were ((Highly commended by our jury) for North Asia. Full write-ups explaining the rationale behind winner selection will be published the Awards edition of FinanceAsia, with subsequent syndication online.

Congratulations to all of our winners in the Southeast Asian (SEA) markets: 

BRUNEI DOMESTIC

 

BEST BANK

 

Baiduri Bank

 

INDONESIA DOMESTIC

 

BEST BANK

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

Highly commended – Bank BRI

 

BEST BANK FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION

 

Bank BRI

 

BEST BROKER

 

PT CGS International Sekuritas Indonesia

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

Bank BRI

 

BEST CORPORATE BANK – LARGE CORP & MNCS

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

BEST CUSTODIAN BANK

 

Bank BRI

 

Highly commended – PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

PT Indo Premier Sekuritas

 

BEST ESG CONSULTANT

 

UMBRA – Strategic Legal Solutions

 

BEST LAW FIRM

 

UMBRA – Strategic Legal Solutions

 

BEST PRIVATE BANK

 

Bank BRI

 

BEST RETAIL BANK

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

BEST STRATEGIC INITIATIVE – BANKS

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

Highly commended – PT Bank Syariah Indonesia Tbk

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – BANKS

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

MOST DEI PROGRESSIVE – BANKS

 

 PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

 

Highly commended – Bank Saqu

 

INDONESIA INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

BNP Paribas

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

OCBC

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

DBS Bank

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

Deutsche Bank

 

Highly commended – UBS

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

 UBS

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

DBS Bank

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF)

 

MALAYSIA DOMESTIC

 

BEST BROKER

 

CGS International Securities Malaysia

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

Alliance Bank Malaysia

 

BEST CORPORATE BANK – LARGE CORP & MNCS

 

Maybank

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

CIMB

 

Highly commended – Maybank Investment Bank

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

CIMB

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

CIMB

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

CIMB

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

 Maybank Investment Bank

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

AmInvest

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad

 

MALAYSIA INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

 UOB Malaysia

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

OCBC

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

UOB Malaysia

 

MYANMAR DOMESTIC

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

KBZ Bank

 

PHILIPPINES DOMESTIC

 

BEST BANK

 

BDO Unibank

 

Highly commended – Bank of the Philippine Islands

 

BEST BANK FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION

 

BPI Foundation, Inc.

 

BEST BROKER

 

First Metro Securities Brokerage Corporation

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

Security Bank Corporation

 

BEST CORPORATE BANK – LARGE CORP & MNCS

 

Bank of the Philippine Islands

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

First Metro Investment Corporation

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

BPI Capital Corporation

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

 BPI Capital Corporation

 

Highly commended – Security Bank Capital Investment Corporation

 

BEST RETAIL BANK

 

 Bank of the Philippine Islands

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

Bank of the Philippine Islands

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – BANKS

 

Bank of the Philippine Islands

 

PHILIPPINES INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

HSBC

 

BEST BANK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR CLIENTS

 

Citibank N.A

.

BEST CORPORATE BANK – LARGE CORP & MNCS

 

 Citibank N.A.

 

BEST CORRESPONDENT BANK

 

 Citibank N.A.

 

BEST CUSTODIAN BANK

 

HSBC

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

UBS

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST STRATEGIC INITIATIVE – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

 FinVolution Group

 

SINGAPORE DOMESTIC

 

BEST BANK

 

 United Overseas Bank

 

BEST BROKER

 

 Maybank Securities Singapore (MSSG)

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

OCBC

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

United Overseas Bank Limited

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

DBS Bank

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

DBS Bank

 

BEST LAW FIRM

 

Allen & Gledhill

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

United Overseas Bank Limited

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

DBS Bank

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

OCBC

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

UOB Asset Management

 

SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

 Citi Singapore

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

 UBS

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

Citi Singapore

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

 UBS

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

ANZ

 

MOST DEI PROGRESSIVE – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

Aberdeen Investments

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

 CIMB Singapore

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

 Aberdeen Investments

 

Highly commended – Marex Solutions

 

THAILAND DOMESTIC

 

BEST BROKER

 

CGS International Securities Thailand

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

KASIKORNBANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

Kiatnakin Phatra Securities Public Company Limited

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

Kiatnakin Phatra Securities Public Company Limited

 

BEST LAW FIRM

 

Weerawong, Chinnavat and Partners

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

Kiatnakin Phatra Securities Public Company Limited

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

Bangkok Bank PCL

 

THAILAND INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

HSBC Thailand

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

 UBS

 

Highly commended – Maybank Investment Bank

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

UBS

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

UOB Thailand

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – BANKS

 

UOB Thailand

 

VIETNAM DOMESTIC

 

BEST BANK

 

Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Techcombank)

 

Highly commended – Asia Commercial Bank

 

BEST BANK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR CLIENTS

 

Saigon-Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank (SHB)

 

BEST BROKER

 

SSI Securities Corporation

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

SSI Securities Corporation

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

SSI Securities Corporation

 

BEST LAW FIRM

 

YKVN LLC

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Techcombank)

 

Highly commended – OCB

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

Techcom Securities Joint Stock Company

 

VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL

 

BEST BANK

 

HSBC

 

BEST COMMERCIAL BANK – SMES

 

Citi Vietnam

 

BEST CORPORATE BANK – LARGE CORP & MNCS

 

Citi Vietnam

 

BEST DCM HOUSE

 

HSBC

 

BEST ECM HOUSE

 

 HSBC

 

Highly commended – UBS

 

BEST INVESTMENT BANK

 

UBS

 

BEST M&A HOUSE

 

UBS

 

BEST SUSTAINABLE BANK

 

Citi Vietnam

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – BANKS

 

HSBC

 

BIGGEST SUSTAINABLE IMPACT – NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

 

Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG)

 

MOST INNOVATIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGY – BANKS

 

HSBC

 


¬ Haymarket Media Limited. All rights reserved.

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The coming US-China financial divorce – Asia Times

The United States and China’s economic ties no longer pose a hazard in the future. It is formalized, moving, and deeply disruptive around. Understanding this novel time is crucial for investors because it is not recommended.

More than just a business skirmish, the broad tariffs on Chinese imports have now been passed into law. They represent a traditional shift in the world’s supply chains, scientific ecosystems, and capital flows.

It’s not just about economy here. Control and financial power are both at play here. Investors may then adjust to a world where the fundamental principles of international commerce are being restored quickly and under pressure.

President Trump signed a broad common 10 % tax on all imports on April 2, which would increase to an extraordinary 60 % on Chinese products. These new taxes are atop an already formidable 85 % tax roof, which results in total costs of 145 % on Chinese exports to the US.

Beijing launched the initial volleys of retaliation, including banning the trade of crucial minerals that are vital to the American tech and aerospace sectors, as soon as supply chains started to splinter, and cost pressures raged across industries.

The two largest economy of the world are currently at odds with one another structurally, not in terms of strategy. Although the term” Cold War” is frequently overused, it is becoming more difficult to ignore the parallels. Realizing this is the end of the long-held notion that economic integration would act as a buffer against political issue.

What do a full-fledged economic divorce entail?

First, cash flows will become more and more polarized. Will more and more restrictions and attention been placed on dealings between American and Chinese entities, which were once thought to be routine. Actions with a dollar denomination may be restrained. US pension finances, university endowments, and index-linked ETFs could confront direct restrictions or growing political pressure to sell from Chinese goods.

This could lead to a flood of delistings from US exchanges, more stringent CFIUS reviews, and more inbound investment controls aimed at specific industries. Trump’s officials are now sending out clear warnings that the US government should not be “funding China’s fall.”

Next, the technological gap may grow and grow bigger. Firms like Huawei, ZTE, and DJI were put under a lot of stress in the past. Focus is now turning more and more toward AI, semiconductor manufacturing, clean energy platforms, and the next-generation industries. Washington is moving to wall away full innovation ecosystems, not just to limit exports.

Hope tighter registration standards, more stringent investment restrictions, and more drastic sanctions against Chinese businesses as well as those of allies that have close ties with Beijing. This is about granting China access to fundamental capabilities while imposing technical dominance.

Third, the very foundation of international funding is being challenged. The dollar-based method has been the natural arbitrator of global commerce for decades. That independence is diminishing.

China is aggressively promoting the yuan internationalization in anticipation of limits on its currency’s exposure. Its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System ( CIPS) is being touted as a SWIFT alternative, aiming to make a competing financial system less reliant on Western sanctions.

The development of parallel financial systems will alter the flow of capital, restructure trade agreements, and add new layers of complexity to currency markets.

This transition may bring volatility but even opportunity for investors.

On the one hand, nations that are close to the United States will be a source of corporate capital. As businesses expand their manufacturing operations away from China, there are already important outflows from India, Vietnam, Mexico, and some parts of Eastern Europe.

Reshoring and friendshoring, once considered commercial words, have evolved into obvious government policy, supported by strong economic bonuses and political will. On the other hand, China is repositioning rather than retreating.

President Xi Jinping’s effective romance of the Global South highlights Beijing’s plan to strengthen relationships with developing countries that are under pressure from American isolationism.

Through partnerships in 5G, AI, clean energy, and superior production, Xi’s new visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, which are nations that are directly impacted by Trump’s tariffs, highlight Beijing’s effort to integrate these nations into its sphere of influence.

Buyers must be aware that this is no longer about military tariff fights or headline-driven ruckus.

It’s about a fundamental restructuring that will affect every aspect of index content, foreign exchange approach, ESG frameworks, and capital allocation. The outdated notion that industrialization was a push invincible is being broken down in front of us.

The speed behind the economic divorce suggests it is about to become inevitable, even though it is not yet final. And like with any sloppy isolation, fortunes will be made not by those who react physically, but by those who anticipate where assets, impact, and opportunities may flow when the ancient household is split.

The discerning investment will be guided by a mastery of the fresh rather than a return to the old.

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The real bond vigilantes hounding Trump are Asian – Asia Times

TOKYO – The dollar extended its biggest plunge in three years on Friday after China raised tariffs on the US to 125% from 84%, a tit-for-tat step that has gold surging, markets everywhere gyrating and investors more uncertain than ever about the global economic and financial outlook.

It’s now US President Donald Trump’s move. Does the Trump 2.0 White House double down and increase its own tariff rate, now at 145%, on Asia’s biggest economy? Trump, after all, has threatened before a 200% levy on certain Chinese products.

Perhaps most interesting about this week is what global investors learned about the Trump 2.0’s pain threshold. Punters learned – to their horror – that Trump is willing to stomach epic stock market losses but not telltale signs of distress in the bond market.

Posterity will show that it wasn’t the US Congress, the judiciary or voters that forced the US president into a more relational tariff policy. It was bond traders.

In Asian trading hours on April 9, the so-called “bond vigilantes” pushed the yield on 30-year US Treasury bonds above 5%, Bloomberg reported. That — and memories of events from the mid-1990s, mid-2000s and the Silicon Valley Bank bust in 2023 — saw Trump beat a hasty and rare retreat on most tariffs.

Yet it’s concerns about the next round of vigilantes to take on the Trump White House that made him blink: Asian central banks.

Central banks in the region hold roughly US$3 trillion of US Treasuries, with Japan and China, the top holders, sitting on a combined $1.9 trillion. If they were to start selling on a significant scale, who could pick up the slack? Other than the largest global banks buying steadily, arguably no one.

That’s why chatter in bond trading pits this week that Japan, China and other Asian monetary authorities might be selling so alarmed top US Treasury Department officials. For years, traders feared China might dump its trove of US T-bills in retaliation against US sanctions and restrictions. That day may have arrived.

China, after all, has an incentive to show that “it won’t hesitate to cause turmoil in the global financial market in order to improve its negotiating power against the US,” says strategist Ataru Okumura at SMBC Nikko Securities.

Reporting was that dire warnings from household name financiers like Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase & Co broke through the Trumpian bubble.

The years Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent spent working in hedge fund circles came in handy. For all Trump’s public bluster, another Long-Term Capital Management-like crash could have been catastrophic for global markets and the US economy.

LTCM’s 1998 collapse was partly due to surging Treasury debt yields. Triggering a repeat in 2025, with Trump’s tariffs upending all asset classes and China flirting with deflation, could make the 2008 Lehman Brothers crash look tame by comparison.

Yet the risk that Trump’s policies might repel Asian central banks is growing by the day. This threat is imparting a unique leverage point for the Bank of Japan, the People’s Bank of China and other top Asian monetary authorities.

Asia’s main leverage over Washington right now is bonds, currencies and trade in services. This latter category refers to America’s deep dependence on Asian markets for exports of financial services, technology and intellectual property.

The mechanics of Trump’s tariff-heavy trade war suggest an imperfect understanding of the US economy’s Asia-related vulnerabilities.

Bond traders, the kinds that take matters into their own hands when a government’s policy mix seems out of whack, are all over the debt and currency realms.

“The bond vigilantes have struck again,” says Ed Yardeni, founder of Yardeni Research, who coined the phrase. “As far as we can tell, at least with respect to US financial markets, they are the only 1.000 hitters in history.”

Even though “the stock vigilantes were clearly telling President Donald Trump that his tariff policy was misguided late last week, his advisers touted falling oil prices and bond yields as ultimately helping Main Street America,” Yardeni notes. “That changed as the 10-year Treasury yield surged.”

Yardeni has been a keen observer of this phenomenon for decades. In 1983, Yardeni said, “bond investors are the economy’s bond vigilantes. … So if the fiscal and monetary authorities won’t regulate the economy, the bond investors will. The economy will be run by vigilantes in the credit markets.”

A decade later, James Carville, then a strategist for US President Bill Clinton, made his famous observation about how he’d like to be reincarnated as the bond market. “You can intimidate everybody,” he quipped.

This was back during balanced-budget negotiations. At the time, debt investors were hypersensitive to the slightest hint, good or bad, about zigs and zags in Washington’s fiscal policy debates.

Today, as the US national debt approaches US$37 trillion, Asia has very valid reasons to worry about Washington’s fiscal health. Trump’s Republican Party, for example, is angling for another multi-trillion tax cut that could hasten the path to the $40 trillion national debt mark.

At the same time, disarray in Congress has lawmakers playing politics over the debt ceiling and funding the government even more so than in 2011. That was the year S&P Global Ratings yanked away Washington’s AAA credit rating.

That market-rattling step came two years after then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao voiced concern about Washington’s trustworthiness to safeguard vast Chinese state wealth sitting in dollars. Wen was particularly worried about the scale of bailouts amid the Lehman Brothers crisis.
 
“We have made a huge amount of loans to the United States,” Wen said in 2009. “Of course, we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am a little bit worried.” He urged Washington “to honor its words, stay a credible nation and ensure the safety of Chinese assets.”

At the time, the US debt was less than $12 trillion, two-and-a-half times lower than when Fitch Ratings downgraded the US in 2023. Today, Moody’s Investors Service is mulling whether to maintain Washington’s last AAA rating with the US debt three times what it was in 2009.

There are long-standing fears that Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s government might dump dollars as a retaliation play against Trump’s tariffs, now at 145% after a series of escalations.

It would be a Pyrrhic victory, of course. Any surge in borrowing costs would boomerang back China’s way as US households suddenly consume less.

Nor would it be in Beijing’s interest if global investors decided the US budget deficit is a train wreck in slow motion. The potential contagion effects could make the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis seem tame by comparison.
 
Even so, Xi’s Communist Party may have calculated that the US has far more to lose in the event of a Global Financial Crisis 2.0. China pulling the plug now would catch US markets decidedly off-balance, amplifying the fallout.

In 1997, then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto admitted to a New York audience that “several times in the past, we have been tempted to sell large lots of US Treasuries” to make a point. One such episode was the heated auto negotiations a few years earlier.

This time, the intrigue involves the Trumpian turmoil already on full display.

“Why is this happening?” Yardeni asks. “Fixed-income investors may be starting to worry that the Chinese and other foreigners might start selling their US Treasuries.” The bond market, he adds, worries “the Trump administration may be playing with liquid nitro.”

Count the ways this White House might damage the dollar’s credibility and the perceived sanctity of Treasuries, the linchpin of global finance.

They include: sticking with an inflationary tariffs arms race; meddling with the Federal Reserve’s independence; neutering the Internal Revenue Service; and seeking trillions of new tax cuts that Trump World assumes Washington’s Asian bankers will dutifully finance.

This last assumption is highly dubious considering reports Asian central banks are already limiting their exposure to the US. But eyeing Trump’s exploits — which could easily imperil America’s credit rating — from 7,000 miles away is causing serious anxiety among Asian policymakers.

One irony is Asia watching Trump’s government do many of the things the US chastised Asia for a quarter of a century ago. Back in 1997-98, when Hashimoto was spooking bond traders, US officials were counseling Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Seoul against crony capitalism, oligarch-dominated economic systems and extreme opacity.

Now it’s Asia’s turn to watch Washington torch its once-vaunted financial institutions with bewildering speed. This has policymakers busily gaming out how Trump’s tariffs and general erraticism might upend their economies. For now, it seems the trauma that Trump has delivered to stocks might be less than it will be for debt.

“Though stocks rose following Trump’s pause, Treasury yields haven’t fully recovered from the sharp moves of earlier this week, reflecting some potential damage to the US economic brand,” notes Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group.

“The dollar has continued falling, too. The political ramifications of this are potentially more widespread than any market drops, as the higher yields make it more difficult for small businesses to access loans, with knock-on effects for the US economy,” Bremmer said.

The ways Trump is imperiling US growth as alarm bells ring about a possible recession would normally cheer debt markets. But given the inflation fallout from tariffs, bond traders are viewing Trump 2.0 policies dimly.

Markets worry the Trump administration has “arguably shown a greater tolerance for causing a recession than many might have thought,” notes Thomas Mathews, head of Asia-Pacific markets at Capital Economics. But the bond-market fallout is forcing Team Trump to turn tail.

The question is when the biggest of the bond vigilantes – central banks – start actively selling Treasuries. Japan and China are Washington’s biggest bankers, followed by the UK, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Switzerland, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

If markets got a whiff of any of their central banks either aggressively selling debt or just halting new purchases, the result could be bedlam in global credit markets. If Trump understands this risk, he’s done little to demonstrate it to the Asian central bankers who effectively hold the deed to the US economy.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Pentagreen, BII and ib vogt Singapore team up with m renewable energy financing | FinanceAsia

In collaboration with international renewable energy development platform ib vogt Singapore, Pentagreen Capital and British International Investment ( BII ) have reached a joint funding of$ 80 million to support the rollout of solar and battery storage projects across Southeast Asia ( SEA ).

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