The most immediate impact would be that sales volumes would fall, as the revised ABSD rates have made it prohibitive for investors and foreigners to buy, said Ms Catherine He, head of research at Colliers. Prices are likely to moderate for a few months, benefitting owner occupiers and first-time buyers. “GenuineContinue Reading
For someone who thinks of himself as a champion of Europe, Emmanuel Macron certainly enjoys provoking divisive arguments for the continent.
His latest came on the flight back from Beijing, where he had been treated to a red-carpet reception by Chinese President Xi Jinping. With much of the West nervous that Xi might use the chaos unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to make a grab for Taiwan, Macron made things worse by implying Europe and the United States should take different approaches to Taiwan.
“The worst of things would be to think that we Europeans must be followers on this subject and adapt ourselves to an American rhythm and a Chinese overreaction,” he said. That would make Europe a “vassal” of the US, rather than a potential third pole in the world.
Then, this week, came a row about the sovereignty of Crimea.
Asked in a TV interview whether Crimea was part of Ukraine, Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, appeared to cast doubt not merely on Crimea, which is occupied by Russia but remains part of Ukraine under international law, but other ex-Soviet countries as well.
“These ex-Soviet Union countries do not have effective status … under international law,” Lu said.
Unsurprisingly, the first to protest were Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, three ex-Soviet countries that feel threatened by Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
Both blunders, or mini-crises, have exposed something that most in Europe and Asia understand but, especially in the context of the Ukraine war, it suits Europeans not to ponder too deeply: For better or worse, Europe has a “fractured glass” policy on China.
Policies that look united and coherent from a distance turn out, on closer inspection, to have significant splits.
Macron’s comments are, of course, the most notable of these splits. Coming after he had barely left Chinese airspace, his words weren’t interpreted as the philosophical musings of a statesman with a grand vision of European autonomy, but as a sign that Europe and the US can be divided over Taiwan.
But Lu’s comments, or rather the response from European countries to them, perhaps better illustrate the fractured glass.
Those countries that fear Russia most led the charge against the comments in the most forceful language; Latvia called them “completely unacceptable,” Estonia “incomprehensible,” and summoned the Chinese ambassador.
But for others, the response was more muted. Germany asked for “clarification” and Italy’s foreign minister said he disagreed with the remarks. Neither appeared to have summoned the respective Chinese ambassadors for an explanation. The message was the same, but the way it was conveyed varied widely.
For Beijing, such fractures, though small, are important.
The country’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, a term used to refer to Chinese diplomats who speak in an unguarded and confrontational manner, is often seen as a reflection of China’s growing confidence in the world.
Certainly, such language from representatives of a nation-state, especially when amplified by Chinese “troll” accounts, serves to frighten and cow critics. But it also serves to highlight divisions between allies, and offer up a sense of how some countries may react to other divisive Chinese policies.
It is hard to interpret whether Lu intended to provoke or simply misspoke – as with Macron, both are experienced in their roles and it’s safe to assume they knew what they meant to say.
For wolf warriors like Lu, continuously provoking at the edges of established understandings is itself valuable; it weakens the sense that the rules of the international order that are meant to constrain countries apply to China.
For all the criticism of Macron, however – one major US newspaper wrote, “If President Biden is awake, he ought to call Mr Macron and ask if he’s trying to re-elect Donald Trump” – it’s not obvious that he is telling China something it does not already know.
The divisions between Europe and America on some issues are well known – and Macron, more than any other European leader, has been open about saying so.
He did this toward the end of last year when he went to the US and criticized America’s policy that raised gas prices in Europe. France felt that Europeans were bearing the brunt of a forceful American pro-Ukraine policy.
Macron’s economy minister said something similar when he argued that the US was asking European countries to decouple from the Chinese economy – at the same time as US-China trade is increasing.
“We don’t want to be the village idiots,” Bruno Le Maire said in direct language, “who get screwed and let other powers trade with China while we would no longer have the right to do so.”
This points to a major difference in how these divisions are used by Macron and Lu. For Macron, musing out loud provokes an internal conversation among European countries. For China, it’s not merely the splits per se that it benefits China to notice; it’s the process of making them public.
If the West wants to look at its differences with China through a glass, darkly, it suits Beijing to make sure, on the contrary, that all the fractures of the glass are plain to see.
This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. Follow him on Twitter @FaisalAlYafai
SINGAPORE: Wanting to enjoy the benefits of being vaccinated without actually receiving the COVID-19 jabs, a man paid S$6,000 to a doctor linked to anti-vaccination group Healing the Divide group.
In exchange, he and his unsuspecting wife received two injections that were recorded in Singapore’s National Immunisation Registry as Sinopharm COVID-19 jabs, but in reality, they contained just saline.
Australian national David Christopher Newton, 44, was sentenced to 16 weeks’ jail on Thursday (Apr 27).
He pleaded guilty to one charge of being party to a criminal conspiracy with Dr Jipson Quah and Quah’s assistant Thomas Chua Cheng Soon to cheat the Health Promotion Board (HPB) that he was fully vaccinated against COVID-19, when he was not.
A second charge involving his wife was taken into consideration.
The court heard that Newton joined the Healing the Divide group on Telegram around December 2021 and obtained Chua’s contact number from there.
Chua worked as a logistics supervisor for Quah, a 34-year-old Singaporean registered medical practitioner who owned several clinics.
Newton told Chua that he had a job offer in Australia, but that he would face significant difficulty entering the country as he was unvaccinated. He asked if he could get certified as vaccinated without actually taking the jab.
He also wanted his wife to be certified as being medically ineligible to receive any COVID-19 vaccine.
Chua said he would consult Quah, and later arranged for Newton and his wife to get fake vaccines at Mayfair Medical Clinic in Yishun for S$6,000.
Newton agreed, and the pair received saline injections, although his wife was under the impression she had gotten the Sinopharm vaccine.
The injections were given over two days to comply with requirements – Dec 29, 2021 and Jan 15, 2022.
Newton paid Chua S$6,000 in three parts – in advance, and after each set of injections. According to the prosecutor, Chua and Quah split the payment between themselves.
Quah documented in his clinic’s medical records system that Newton and his wife had received the Sinopharm vaccine and the records were sent to the National Immunisation Registry.
The Ministry of Health later alerted the police to Quah’s alleged role in enabling patients to be falsely certified as having been vaccinated with the Sinopharm vaccine.
Police investigations revealed that Newton was one of at least 17 such patients who instead received saline injections from Quah.
The prosecutor sought 16 to 18 weeks’ jail for Newton, while defence lawyer Paul Loy sought a fine instead. In the alternative, he asked for four to eight weeks’ jail.
Mr Loy said his client was swiftly arrested, even before his TraceTogether records had been updated. He said Newton’s wife had a “condition” and his client was looking for an exemption.
District Judge Soh Tze Bian took issue with many of the arguments put forth by the defence. He told Newton’s lawyer that there are clear rules for exemption that everyone has to comply with instead of going to “do things on your own”.
“These rules apply to all, whether you are citizens or foreigners working here,” he said.
Mr Loy said Newton’s motivations should be contrasted with the motivations of his co-conspirators.
“You mean the doctors?” interjected the judge. “They have made their money. Assuming S$6,000, by 17. The doctor has been suspended, right?”
Mr Loy said his client was not a criminal and just had “a serious lapse in judgment”. He added that Newton would not reoffend.
Judge Soh said there was no way to be sure about this. “What if there’s mandatory vaccination for all again? We don’t know. In Rome, you do as Romans do,” he said.
The lawyer persisted and asked if it was fair to “throw the book” at a single patient, adding that there were at least 17 involved, but only his client had been charged.
The prosecutor jumped in to clarify that while Newton is the only patient who has been charged at the moment, the prosecution has yet to rule out charging others.
“The prosecutor talks about public disquiet,” said Mr Loy. “Public disquiet doesn’t arise because of press reports. Public disquiet is when people are talking about how things have happened and how the authorities were cheated.
“I daresay public disquiet might arise more if it transpires that everyone else is let off and this one individual is not.”
Deputy Public Prosecutor Etsuko Lim said Newton was not the same as the other patients, as he was the only one who applied to leave the country, bringing some urgency to this case.
The diplomatic spat surrounding China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ma Zhaoxu’s visit to Suva in April 2023 captured shifting geostrategic developments in Fiji.
Ma’s meeting with Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was canceled due to a bereavement in Rabuka’s family. Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica was instead put forward to meet with Ma.
Chinese officials initially rejected the proposition, insisting that Ma would only meet with the Fijian prime minister. Ma’s visit was ostensibly to deliver a message directly to Rabuka about the importance of “treading carefully on Taiwan” and respecting Beijing’s “red line.”
The episode reflected growing tensions between China and Fiji. Under its new coalition government, Fiji is showing signs of greater alignment on security matters with its traditional partners — Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
Rabuka is appearing to tilt Fiji away from his predecessor’s approach of “friends to all, enemies to none.” Rabuka even went as far as to suggest that this approach, taken by some Pacific nations, should be reconsidered. Fiji’s friends are watching closely.
Early signs of Fiji’s dismantling of its security relationship with China began under former prime minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama. Bainimarama was concerned about the regional implications of last year’s Solomon Islands–China Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation and Beijing’s proposed — and rejected — multilateral security and trade pact.
But in previous years, security cooperation between Fiji and China had been deepening significantly. In 2011, Fiji’s Ministry of Defense, National Security and Immigration and China’s Ministry of Public Security signed the now obsolete policing cooperation memorandum of understanding (MOU). This was thrown out by Rabuka earlier in 2023.
The MOU is worth considering for what it reveals about security cooperation and strategic autonomy in the Pacific. The MOU focussed on bilateral cooperation to address transnational crime, intelligence exchanges, police capacity-building and technology and equipment exchanges.
Numerous security cooperation activities fell under the MOU’s remit. These included China’s secondment of four officers to Fiji and two Fijian officers were attached to the Guangzhou Bureau for Public Security in 2014.
Fijian police attended courses in China that year. China donated roughly AU$654,000 (US$432,665) worth of vehicles, communication, surveillance and anti-riot equipment to support Fiji’s 2014 elections.
The 2011 MOU provided the bilateral framework for enhanced operational capabilities and cooperation including, in 2016, efforts to acquire Chinese drones. In 2017, this culminated in a joint operation between Fiji and China, which saw several hundred Chinese police arrive in Fiji to arrest and deport 77 Chinese nationals.
In 2021, a Chinese Police Liaison officer was based in Fiji — signalling China’s shift towards a more networked approach to security in the region.
Fast forward to Fiji’s election in December 2022. Sandra Tarte argues Rabuka already signaled his discomfort with China’s involvement in Fiji’s affairs. Rabuka’s coalition member, the National Federation Party, made an oblique reference to reducing dependence on China in 2018.
The then-leader of another coalition member, the Social Democratic Liberal Party, Viliame Gavoka, stated he wanted Fiji’s foreign relations to be closely aligned with Australia and New Zealand.
Members of Fiji’s new government were quick to signal Fiji’s geopolitical shift. Deputy Prime Minister Viliame Gavoka and Minister for Home Affairs Pio Tikoduadua tweeted their respective meetings with Taiwan’s representative in Fiji.
In March 2023, Fiji reinstated the Taiwanese mission’s name to Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Fiji, after it was downgraded in 2018 to Taipei Trade Office.
In January 2023, Rabuka terminated Fiji’s policing MOU with China. He stated there was no need for Chinese state security personnel to continue working in the Fiji Police Force. This, coupled with Rabuka’s public support for AUKUS — a surprising move given strong regional criticism of the arrangement — signals a shift towards overt strategic alignment with Australia and the United States.
It is less clear how Fiji will reconcile this shift with its foreign policy stance of “friends to all, enemies to none” and its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement.
A key question is whether Fiji’s strategy of balancing its security and economic priorities can withstand both coalition politics and regional calls to take a firm line against the militarization of the Pacific. This is notable considering concerns that AUKUS goes against the Pacific’s principal nuclear non-proliferation agreement, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga.
As a member of the sub-regional bloc, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), questions surround how Fiji will reconcile its stance on China with potential Chinese security assistance negotiated under the MSG Regional Security Strategy.
The coalition government’s rejection of China as a security partner disrupts China’s growing role as a security stakeholder in the Pacific. It also challenges China’s approach to security assistance, including raising questions about China’s credibility as a security partner and presenting an obstacle to China’s pursuit of a multilateral security pact.
In the case of Fiji, China was focused on enforcing Chinese law against its diaspora with little demonstrated interest in assisting regional efforts to combat transnational crime. This leads to critical areas becoming siloed and lacking oversight and coordination.
While the coalition government supports a shift in security policy, it would be a mistake to assume this extends to undermining Fiji’s broader bilateral relationship with China. Rabuka has reaffirmed Fiji’s One China policy and called for China to play the role of “development partner.”
Fiji’s new geopolitical tilt is a testament to the ways in which Pacific states — who are increasingly concerned that the pursuit of national interest and strategic choice is under threat — seek to balance against strategic competition.
Jose Sousa-Santos is a Senior Fellow at the Australia Pacific Security College, The Australian National University. Anna Powles is Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a a Creative Commons license.
The law does not define what falls under China’s national security or interests. It expands the definition of espionage to include cyber attacks against state organs or critical information infrastructure, state news agency Xinhua reported. The revised law allows authorities carrying out an anti-espionage investigation to gain access to data,Continue Reading
It’s not often I have the occasion to quote myself while boasting about a spot-on prediction, but here is what yours truly posted on Facebook this week, a day ahead of the report that Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News had “parted company” with toxic talk-show host Tucker Carlson.
(I spelled his surname differently because I like to call him Cucker Tarlson, in recognition of what’s happened to the verb “cuck” thanks to racists like him.)
‘Although I like the prediction that Fox will drop him eventually, I’m afraid Tarlson’s next step would be to run for president.’
Right so far. Now that one shoe has dropped, let’s start getting used to thinking about the barely thinkable: A Tarlson presidential run – even a Tarlson presidency.
First, a brief note for readers outside the United States who haven’t paid attention: Tarlson is a Trump pal, an America-first isolationist and white supremacist who has praised the British Raj in India as a golden age and who with constant repetition persuaded his millions of adoring viewers to change their term for Covid-19 to “the Chinese virus.”
Just so you don’t think mistakenly that he hates foreigners uniformly, let’s note that he’s a big fan of Vladimir Putin and an apologist for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
But keep reading for more on that. Let’s talk first about how – very quickly after the Fox firing news broke – political prognosticators more astute than I began claiming to hear the sound of that second shoe dropping.
Rick Wilson, a gadfly and political strategist who is one of the godfathers of the Never Trump movement and remains firmly in the former Republican camp, may have been first off the blocks. Wilson tweeted:
“Many people on the right have adopted a position that may be wishcasting; ‘Tucker will be back on a new streaming channel tomorrow and you’ll rue the day, libtards!’ Maybe not. Fox probably has a pretty stiff noncompete in his contract, so I wouldn’t count on the Tucker Carlson White Power Hour on the Blaze or Daily Wire any time soon.”
Which, Wilson continued,
“leads us to a fascinating prospect … What if he runs? He’s rich enough. He’d instantly have an online fundraising juggernaut second only to Trump, and perhaps surpassing him. He’s polarizing, terrible, and utterly amoral … in short, better than Ron DeSantis for the base.
“I’d argue he’s the only Republican who presents a material danger to Donald Trump in a primary. Celebrity, money, mental acuity, cynicism, pro-Putin isolationism, and an overt love of authoritarianism are a pretty strong secret sauce for the MAGA base.
“Celebrity got Trump the WH. It could certainly do the same for Tucker. And spare me your “That could never happen. Even Trump’s GOP would never vote for a former TV host pushing white replacement theory.” That’s PRECISELY who they’d vote for.”
Others besides Wilson are more inclined to see the former Fox host as Trump’s vice presidential running mate. For that he’d have to beat out Georgia’s equally crazy but dumber Representative Marginal Trailer-Greede. (OK, that also is my idiosyncratic spelling. She claims that her real name is Marjorie Taylor Greene.)
Personally I doubt Cucker would go for the number two job. He’s too arrogant, wants the band to play “Heil to the Chief” just for him. But regardless of the office, if he jumps to politics we’re going to have to worry even more about his policies. There’s still time to do that thoroughly and meticulously before US election day 2024, so let’s just conclude this early warning missive by looking very briefly at his role as a Putin apologist.
Here’s what he said in February 2022 about the overwhelming American revulsion at Putin’s invasion of Ukraine:
“Might be worth asking yourself since it is getting pretty serious. What is this really about? Why do I hate Putin so much? Has Putin ever called me a racist, as he threatened to get me fired for disagreeing with him? Does he eat dogs? These are fair questions, and the answer to all of them is no. Vladimir Putin didn’t do any of that.”
Tarlson explained:
“The Russians don’t want American missiles on their border. They don’t want a hostile government next door. Ideologues within the Biden administration did not want a negotiated peace in Ukraine. They wanted all along, and it’s very clear now, a regime-change war against Russia.”
Well, no, they didn’t want that. CNN’s Erin Burnett spoke for many of us when she retorted: “Maybe they just wanted no war, right? Just respect the border.” Burnett was moved to comment thanks to another bizarre twist in this story: Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s top foreign-policy official, spoke to the United Nations and said, through an interpreter:
“Perhaps it would be useful to consider how things are with freedom of speech in the United States. I’ve heard that Tucker Carlson has left Fox News. It’s curious news. What is this related to? One can only guess. But clearly, the wealth of views in the American information space has suffered as a result.”
Just in case he wants to stay in the business of doing his big-time lying as a media personality rather than as a politician (and can get around any non-compete agreement with Fox), Cuck has what looks like a job offer from his Russian friends:
“Hey @TuckerCarlson, you can always question more with @RT,” Russia Today tweeted.
Japan-based journalist Bradley Martin – who grew up, fascinated by politics, in northwest Georgia – considered returning home to run against incumbent Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene in the 2022 election. Instead he has spent the winter in Louisiana. Follow him on Twitter @bradleykmartin.
As India is about to overtake China to become the most populous in the world, The New York Times promises a future series of articles speculating on how India might change the world as China has in the last 40-plus years.
I am certain that India being the largest democracy in the world will be mentioned ad nauseam, but other considerations might be overlooked. I would like to provide a broader framework in the interest of a comprehensive discussion.
As my teacher and good friend Martin Jacques has repeatedly argued, China is a civilization state unlike any nation as defined by the West. India can also be considered a civilization state, but with major differences.
Also read: The myths and realities of the population sweepstakes
In the 3rd century BCE, China had a brutal and cruel leader with a vision that united all seven warring states. Qin Shi Huang became China’s first emperor. He standardized the spoken and written language, the currency, the weight and other measures and even the width of the wagon axles on the roads. He wanted to live forever, but at least his legacy survived.
Most important, the first emperor established a national identity for all the ethnic peoples living in China. In time, these people responded to the Chinese culture and assimilated into the Chinese way of life, gradually discarding their own original heritage.
Today, we say China is made up of nearly 92% ethnic Han, the remainder being 50-some other identifiable minorities. Actually, the Han Chinese are made up of a mixed gene pool of many other tribes that have faded into history. There is no “purebred Chinese” per se.
Missing in India’s history is that one strong unifying figure to rally the disparate groups of people and establish a national identify. India still recognizes 16 official languages along with other unofficial ones, and people many cannot communicate with another. Contrary to popular impression, only 10% of the population can speak English.
The closest to a national identity is the one imposed by the British rule on the Indian subcontinent for nearly 100 years between the 19th and 20th centuries. The Brits, of course, were not there to construct an Indian identity. They were there to exploit, colonize and enslave the indigenous people.
Consequently, Indians today have a much weaker sense of who they are as compared with the Chinese. It’s harder for them to know their ethnicity, other than the idea of attaining the mythical stature of a white Aryan as nirvana.
India continues to be hobbled by the caste system, a legacy of its culture. This means that by virtue of their parentage, more than 300 million Indians will be socially stigmatized and economically marginalized with no hope of realizing their potential. Their children and grandchildren suffer the same fate.
Another reflection from the mindset of the caste system is that India’s elite schools are reserved for the privileged few. Quality of the non-elite universities is not high. Most, especially women, cannot get into India’s better schools for lack of seats.
China has about four times as many universities as India, and some have been placed among the world’s top 100 institutions of higher learning. Functional literacy is over 90% in China and about 60% in India. In Chinese culture, education is life’s highest priority.
The difference in the two countries’ systems of government is one the West loves to extol. India is the world’s largest democracy, while China is not a (Western style) democracy.
What is that supposed to mean? From my perspective, India is constrained by all the limitations of a Western democracy. The government talks a lot but does not get much done. Corruption is rife at every level. The poor are condemned to stay poor. Come to think of it, it reminds me of another democracy, the United States.
However, given its huge population, India can boast about its relatively small group of brilliant and talented people, those who are fortunate enough to have realized their full potential. One obvious example is the corps of business executives originally from India who are dominating corporate America.
For India to realize its full potential as a nation, it needs to stop seeing itself as an Anglo-Saxon country, and join the Global South to contribute to the wealth and well-being of the coalition of people of color.
India needs to raise the quality of higher education and open access to every citizen. Only by allowing every person the opportunity to realize his or her full potential can India become another emerging pillar of technology and industry.
To create jobs for the growing body of educated youth, India needs to attract foreign investment. This means less red tape and a total absence of corruption, and, of course, prompt completion of infrastructure projects.
Contrary to the Western idea that conflict is the way to peace, India should proactively approach China to resolve their border dispute. So silly to argue over a Line of Control drawn by a Brit more than a century ago (the McMahon Line).
For India truly to overtake China and become a new emerging world leader, it would need to learn two essential lessons from China.
One lesson, relatively easy to do, is to greatly improve the quality of education and boost the quantity of the workforce. The government then would have to eliminate corruption at every level and bureaucratic red tape to make foreign direct investment easy and attractive. FDI creates jobs and raises GDP.
The second lesson, much more challenging, is to launch a cultural revolution on a scale that surpasses even the one in China, but with a constructive end-point rather than a destructive one. The objective of an Indian revolution is to truly eliminate caste, liberate women, and give all the opportunity to realize their potential.
George Koo retired from a global advisory services firm where he advised clients on their China strategies and business operations. Educated at MIT, Stevens Institute and Santa Clara University, he is the founder and former managing director of International Strategic Alliances. He is currently a board member of Freschfield’s, a novel green building platform.
Meanwhile, the Malaysian Medical Association (MMA) said that there is “no need for a face mask mandate in schools”. “Only students with symptoms or a medical condition that may put them at high risk, should be wearing face masks,” said MMA president Dr Muruga Raj Rajathurai in a statementContinue Reading
Getty ImagesChinese defence minister Li Shangfu is set to attend a key security summit meeting in India amid strained ties between the countries.
Mr Li will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence ministers’ meeting on Thursday and Friday in Indian capital Delhi.
This is the first visit by a Chinese defence minister to India since a deadly clash between troops in 2020.
At least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers died.
Both sides have also had other confrontations since then, with the most recent flare-up happening in December at Tawang in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The root cause of the tensions between the countries is an ill-defined 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border in the high-altitude Himalayan region. Rivers, lakes and snowcaps along the frontier mean the line can shift, bringing soldiers face to face at many points, sparking a confrontation.
China’s defence ministry said on Tuesday that Mr Li will address the conference in Delhi and “meet with the heads of delegations from relevant countries to communicate and exchange views on the issues of international and regional situation as well as defence and security cooperation”.
Local media has reported that Mr Li and Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh may also hold a bilateral meeting in Delhi. Both countries have not officially confirmed this.
Mr Li’s visit comes days after India and China concluded the 18th round of military talks to try and resolve the border dispute.
India became the chair of the SCO in 2023. The organisation was formed by China, Russia and four Central Asian countries in 2001 as a countermeasure to limit the influence of Western alliances such as Nato. India and Pakistan joined the group in 2017.
Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu will also attend the meet in Delhi, while Pakistan’s Khawaja Asif is expected to join virtually.
Next week, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari will attend an SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in India – it’s the first visit by a top Pakistani government official to India in years.
BBC News India is now on YouTube. Click here to subscribe and watch our documentaries, explainers and features.
Japan is determined to uphold the international order in the Indo-Pacific but cannot achieve that goal alone.
Therefore Tokyo enhances its partnership with allies through minilateral arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (with the United States and Australia).
Some even advocate Japan’s cooperation with another minilateral, the Australia-US-UK (AUKUS) pact, in high-tech areas like hypersonics or cybersecurity. The rise of such minilateral frameworks among like-minded countries can make the region more stable and resilient.
Yet another potential framework also merits attention: trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and Taiwan.
Pacific Forum recently published “The World After Taiwan’s Fall,” attracting attention throughout the region. In the volume, David Santoro, Ralph Cossa and other scholars emphasize the significance of Taiwan in maintaining the current rules-based order.
The United States is undoubtedly the biggest supporter of Taiwan – especially in military terms. The Taiwan Relations Act has since 1979 allowed for the transfer of defense articles, something the United States has honored across both Republican and Democratic administrations.
However, during a contingency on Taiwan, Washington would struggle to stave off an attack without Japanese help, chiefly because it has no military bases and deployments on the island. For the US military to rescue Taiwan, it needs proximate locations for operations.
Guam, the US territory with Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, could be a starting point for the US military. A more effective missile defense plan is also needed to protect Guam and continuously project power. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, has also offered the US military four additional bases which could be used in a contingency.
The closest US bases to Taiwan, however, are in Okinawa, part of the Japanese archipelago and the First Island Chain. Kadena Air Base is one such facility that would play a crucial role in a Taiwan contingency. It is 400 miles from Taipei and the only significant US base from which the Taiwan Strait can be reached without refueling.
Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan grants the US military use of facilities and areas not only for defending Japan but also for “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”
However, US bases are located on Japanese sovereign territory and Japan’s consent is not automatic. Prior consultation, before US military combat operations commence, is therefore critical in responding to a contingency in Taiwan.
Japan has its own reasons for concern over a Taiwan contingency. If Taiwan should fall, Okinawa would then be vulnerable to PRC takeover, as the Pacific Forum report warns.
Yonaguni, the westernmost island of Okinawa, is only about 70 miles from Taiwan. In 2016 the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) established a camp on the island. The following year, then-commander of USPACOM Harry Harris and then-chief of staff of the Joint Staff Katsutoshi Kawano jointly visited the brand-new camp.
In December 2021, the late former prime minister Shinzo Abe insisted that a Taiwan contingency is the equivalent of a contingency for Japan. This should come as no surprise: In addition to strategic considerations, bilateral ties between Japan and Taiwan are underpinned by a deep friendship.
Japan is by far the most liked country among the Taiwanese public. Thousands of ordinary people in Taiwan expressed deep condolences for the assassination of Abe, due to his deep commitment to Taiwan.
The 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami hit Japan in 2011, The Taiwanese people enthusiastically expressed solidarity with their Japanese friends. Taiwan, an island of just 23 million people, contributed the second-highest amount of donations following this disaster, behind only the United States.
Japan has tried to enshrine the Taiwan issue as the priority of the US-Japan alliance. In February 2005, the US secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese foreign and defense ministers held a ministerial 2+2 meeting. Already at the time, common strategic objectives of the joint statement included the Taiwan Strait.
The joint statement of the 2+2 meeting in June 2011, “Toward a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue.”
During then-prime minister Yoshihide Suga’s visit to Washington in April 2021, the joint statement underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at the summit level for the first time since the end of formal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Following the leaders’ meeting, the G7 shared their concerns over the Strait.
At an incoming summit in Hiroshima in May, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is expected to coordinate the G7 nations to express continued concern.
Notwithstanding, there is no platform to coordinate the efforts of the three sides. As Beijing takes more assertive actions, these three governments should act now. In my view, the three parties should discuss trilateral security cooperation.
Thinking about the triangle security-wise, the weakest side is the tie between Japan and Taiwan. The first challenge for trilateral cooperation is strengthening the security linkage between Tokyo and Taipei.
This new minilateral should start with modest steps. The framework should be functional during a contingent scenario, and establishing a communication channel will be critical, especially at the beginning, to plug the lack of contact.
Another gap to fill is cooperation in the maritime domain. Unlike in Ukraine, this would be a significant battle theater, but Taiwan’s navy and coast guard are far less – or not at all – integrated with their US and Japanese counterparts.
A big picture is definitely needed. But a small step is suitable for creating momentum, especially to avoid antagonizing Beijing too much and too soon. There could be several measures to take for practical use.
In 2022, it was reported that Japan was considering sending active-duty personnel from the JSDF instead of retired personnel. Someone with an active connection with the JSDF will be an essential channel between the two militaries.
As China steps up its efforts in the East and South China Seas, cooperation between the two island countries in the maritime domain is also critical. The memorandum of understanding regarding the collaboration between the US Coast Guard and its Taiwanese counterpart could be a good example to follow.
Based on the tangible results of security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, a trilateral partnership could be established. In fact, trilateral collaboration has already been built up in Taipei. President Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly touched on “GCTF” – the Global Cooperation and Training Framework – to advance cooperation in practical areas, including training, public health, and digital economy.
Honolulu could be another acceptable location to smooth communication among the three parties. The tropical city is host to US Indo-Pacific Command, and active personnel from the JSDF and other militaries are dispatched there.
As discussed above, Japan should pursue another minilateral framework in the Indo-Pacific to stabilize the region; it is high time to forge trilateral security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. And some minor steps would be fitting for the very beginning.
Masatoshi Murakami ([email protected]) ) is an associate professor at Kogakkan University in Japan and a visiting fellow with the Air Command and Staff College of Japan and the Nakasone Pease Institute. He previously worked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a career diplomat and has conducted research as a visiting fellow at Pacific Forum this spring.
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
