Filipino fishermen have complained that Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships are preventing them from fishing in parts of the Philippines’ 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Marcos said he and Xi were in agreement that geopolitical problems should not be the defining element of the two countries’ relationship. Since taking officeContinue Reading
In 2011, former president of the United States Barack Obama lauded the South Korean education system, where teachers are seen as “nation builders.” Inspired by the commendable commitment and quality of educators in South Korea, this praise captivated many within the country.
But a decade later, the landscape is vastly different. Thousands of schoolteachers have rallied against the South Korean government following the tragic death of a young teacher in July 2023.
Having recently been appointed to a primary school in an affluent part of Seoul, the late teacher found herself ensnared in a distressing situation involving a parent accusing her of child abuse. Several teachers across the country have taken their own lives due to conflicts with students and their parents.
In the aftermath of these incidents, teachers across the nation united. Unlike past protests, which were often orchestrated by teacher associations or labor unions, these demonstrations saw many teachers voluntarily participate, share information and gather regularly. Their demands centered around enhanced protection at their workplaces.
They called for amendments to the Child Welfare Act and the ability to discipline students without fear of facing child abuse accusations. About a month after the teacher’s death, the Ministry of Education released a set of legal amendment proposals to help alleviate teachers’ worries.
The legislature is also swiftly enacting legal reforms to establish an improved foundation for teachers to educate their students with the confidence that they will be protected if any disputes arise.
In September 2023, the National Assembly unanimously passed legislative amendments that included provisions that restrict the dismissal of teachers without justifiable reasons if abuse allegations arise. It also included measures for parents who interfere with educational activities to receive special training, with fines imposed if they fail to comply.
Still, teachers continue to demand more concrete measures for protection, such as the ability to file criminal charges against parents if their child abuse report results in acquittal.
But what matters more is looking at the underlying causes that drove South Korea’s “nation builders” to engage in this movement. This crisis has resulted from the long-standing clash between teachers’ rights to educate and discipline, students’ rights and parents’ rights to protect their children. In this dilemma, teachers have emerged worse off.
Over the last 15 years, there has been a decline in public confidence in the country’s education system and private education has become increasingly popular.
As parents seek to give their children an advantage within an already competitive education culture, education has been transformed into a commoditized service. Teachers have become service providers and are even subjected to ratings by students and parents.
Parents who now typically raise only one or two children and as a result tend to overprotect their children, becoming extremely concerned if they believe their child has been unfairly treated by teachers.
Poor quality of teaching and unethical practices, particularly in public schools, in the past partially explain the decline in public confidence.
The rapid increase in teacher numbers during the post-Korean War education boom led to an influx of unqualified instructors, some of whom engaged in abusive practices. The students who experienced this have now grown up to become parents.
Possibly as a result of these memories, the due respect that was once immediately afforded to teachers based on Confucian ideas, has lost its ground.
The end goal of education is typically admission to prestigious universities. In an increasingly stratified education system and a prestige-driven hierarchy of higher education, students and parents are tempted to downplay the importance of a holistic learning experience at primary and secondary levels.
Amid this backdrop, teachers are increasingly seen not as educators but as graders, instrumentalized within a public education system geared towards university admission.
But because the government rushed to address the concerns of upset teachers, few of its proposals address these core issues or consider how to recover public trust in the education system.
To re-establish social trust, the government should formulate and implement a comprehensive consensus-building process and framework. Unlike other service-oriented sectors, education requires a longitudinal perspective, where the cultivation of knowledge and values is a gradual process.
But South Korea has demonstrated a proclivity for frequent educational policy modifications, which often reflect the prevailing political inclinations, and this has contributed to diminished public confidence.
A more sustainable approach will require a re-evaluation of the pervasive culture of intense competition in the education system and a concerted effort to rekindle trust among educators, parents and students.
It is essential to recognize that education, particularly in East Asia, transcends the boundaries of formal contractual agreements formulated within legal or regulatory frameworks.
The primary purpose of school education should not be solely to facilitate entry into prestigious universities – but this perspective warrants a significant shift in the collective consciousness of South Korean society.
Kyuseok Kim (Mick) and Eunyoung Shin are PhD students in the Department of Education at Korea University.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
PUBLISHED : 18 Nov 2023 at 11:41
A renowned radio broadcaster, Trin “DJ Ko” Ruangkitratanakul, fell to his death from a hotel in Bangkok on Friday afternoon in what is believed to be a suspected suicide.
The body of Trin, 36, fell into an area of a house adjacent to the hotel on Soi Sukhumvit 20 in Klong Toey district, said Pol Lt Col Kittichet Kitisarn, investigation chief at Thong Lo police station. His fall was reported to police about 1.30pm.
Police and rescue workers rushing to the scene found the body lying near the kitchen door of the two-storey house.
Hotel staff told police that they heard a loud noise at the fence of the house adjacent to the hotel. They went to check and found the body.
Police said DJ Ko checked into the hotel alone before the fatal fall. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage at the hotel showed him waking alone to the rooftop of the hotel and nobody followed him. The footage showed him entering and leaving the fire exit door five times before going to the rooftop, where he fell to his death.
The officers found his mobile phone, a hotel’s blood-stained bathrobe, a keycard, cigarettes and a lighter at the scene. They believed he jumped to his death and were investigating.
His parents and his elder sister said they did not know why Trin took his own life. The family still had doubts about what drove him to make such a decision.
His mother said her son had no chronic diseases nor work problems, and she could not come to terms with his sudden death.
DJ Ko of 106.5 Green Wave radio won the Nataraja Award for best radio entertainment and music programme host.
There were smiles for the camera, handshakes, warm words and the unveiling of a couple of agreements.
But beyond the optics of the first meeting in over a year between the leaders of the world’s two biggest economies, not an awful lot had changed: There was nothing to suggest a “reset” in US and China relations that in recent years have been rooted in suspicion and competition.
President Joe Biden hinted as much just hours after the face-to-face talks, confirming that he still considered his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, a “dictator.” Beijing hit back, with foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning telling reporters Biden’s remark was “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation.”
As a scholar of US-China relations, I believe the relationship between the two countries can be best described as an “enduring rivalry” – a term used by political scientists to denote two powers that have singled each other out for intense security competition. Examples from history include India and Pakistan, France and England, and the West and the Soviet Union.
Over the past two centuries, such rivals have accounted for only 1% of the world’s international relationships but 80% of its wars. History suggests these rivalries last around 40 years and end only when one side loses the ability to compete – or when the two sides ally against a common enemy.
Neither scenario looks likely any time soon in regards to China and the US.
China “is a communist country … based on a form of government totally different than ours,” Biden said after his meeting with Xi.
That comment gets to the heart of why diplomacy alone cannot reset the US-China relationship. Washington and Beijing are not rivals due to any misunderstanding that can be sorted out through talks alone.
Rather, they are rivals because of the opposite reason: They understand each other only too well and have come to the conclusion that their respective world outlooks cannot be reconciled.
The same is true for many of the issues that divide the two countries – they are framed as binary win-lose scenarios. Taiwan can be governed from Taipei or Beijing, but not both. Similarly, the East China and South China seas can be international waters or Chinese territory; Russia can be crippled or supported.
For the United States, its Asian alliances are a force for stability; for China, they’re hostile encirclement. And both countries are right in their respective assessments.
Diplomacy alone is insufficient to resolve a rivalry. At best, it can help manage it.
Part of this management of the US-China rivalry involves finding areas of agreement that can be committed to.
And on November 15, Biden and Xi announced deals over curbing China’s production of the deadly drug fentanyl and the restoring of high-level, military-to-military dialogue between the two countries.
But the fentanyl announcement is very similar to the one Xi gave to then-President Donald Trump in 2019. The US administration later accused China of reneging on the agreement.
Similarly, committing to restarting high-level dialogue is one thing; following up on it is another. History is dotted with occasions when having an open line between Beijing and Washington hasn’t meant a whole lot in times of crisis.
In 2001, when a US surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese jet over Hainan Island, Beijing didn’t pick up the phone. Likewise, during the Tiananmen Square massacre, then-President George H W Bush urgently tried to call his counterpart Deng Xiaoping but was unable to get through.
Moreover, focusing on what was agreed to in talks also highlights what wasn’t – and is unlikely to ever be – agreed to without a substantial shift in power that forces one side to concede to the other.
For example, China wants the US to stop selling arms to Taiwan. But Washington has no intention of doing this, as it knows that this will make the disputed island more vulnerable to Beijing. Washington would like China to end its military displays of strength over the Taiwan Strait; Beijing knows doing so risks seeing Taiwan drift toward independence.
American policymakers have long said what they want is China to “change” – by which it means to liberalize its system of governance. But the Chinese Communist Party knows that doing so means self-liquidation – every communist regime that has allowed space for alternative political parties has unraveled.
Which is why American attempts to engage China are often met with suspicion in China. As former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin commented, engagement and containment policies have the same aim: to end China’s socialist system.
For similar reasons, Xi has shunned attempts by the US to bring China further into the rules-based international order. The Chinese leader saw what happened when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to integrate the Soviet Union into the Western order in the late 1980s – it only hastened the demise of the socialist entity.
Instead, Xi calls for a massive military buildup, the reassertion of Chinese Communist Party control and an economic policy based on self-reliance.
The encouraging words and limited agreements hammered out in the latest meeting between Xi and Biden should also not distract from the actions that continue to push the US and China further apart.
China’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait has been sustained for three years now and shows no sign of abating. Meanwhile, Beijing’s navy continues to harass other nations in the South China Sea.
Similarly, Biden has continued the US path toward military alliances aimed at countering China’s threat. It recently entered a trilateral agreement between the US, Japan and South Korea. And that came two years after the establishment of AUKUS, a security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK that has similar aims.
Meanwhile, the US administration will continue to tighten the screws on China’s economy through investment restrictions. Biden is well aware that easy-flowing money from Wall Street is helping China weather choppier economic waters of late and is keen to turn off the tap.
This isn’t to say that diplomacy and face-to-face talks are pointless. They do, in fact, serve a number of interests.
For both men involved, there is a domestic upside. For Biden, playing nice with China projects the image of a statesman – especially at a time when, due to US positions on Ukraine and the Middle East, he is facing accusations from the political left of being a “warmonger.”
And encouraging Beijing to tread softly during the US election year may blunt a potential line of attack from Republicans that the administration’s China policy is not working.
Meanwhile, Xi is able to showcase his own diplomatic skills and present China as an alternative superpower to the US and to potentially cleave the Western business community – and perhaps even major European nations – from what he would see as the US anti-China coalition.
Moreover, summits like the one in San Francisco signal that both the US and China are jointly committed to at least keep talking, helping ensure that a rocky relationship doesn’t descend into anything more belligerent – even if that doesn’t make them any friendlier.
Michael Beckley is Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
One of the most important criticisms of the Biden administration’s efforts to oppose serious challenges coming from Chinese government behavior is that the strategy is vague and dangerous because it does not sufficiently reassure China.
Such criticism is unrealistic and at odds with past US success in following similar policies against Chinese challenges.
The Biden government’s efforts resemble the Asia-first strategies – explained below – that were used successfully by the Reagan and George W Bush administrations to curb Chinese challenges and assertiveness.
Biden’s main objectives focus on strengthening America at home and establishing power and influence abroad to change circumstances influencing Chinese interests, thereby prompting Beijing to curb its challenging behavior.
Calling for a clear end-state in these efforts is unrealistic as the process is subject to unpredictable changes over a prolonged period of acute competition.
The record this time around shows growing US achievements in strengthening against China with impressive momentum for six years. The policies have sustained backing from two very different US administrations and bipartisan majorities in Congress, along with broad approval in pubic opinion and US media.
The Biden administration has successfully completed a first stage of strengthening America at home and building power and influence abroad with a growing array of allies and partners.
The passage of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill in 2021 and two massive bills in 2022 were important in competing with China, especially in high technology.
With strong congressional backing, the administration in 2022 imposed a ban on the export of US advanced computer chip technology to China. In 2023 an Executive Order with broad congressional support proposed restricting high technology investments by US companies in China.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s strong military reaction to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 advanced US strengthening aboard.
Biden and his aides built on US-backed NATO resolve to counter Russia and its partner, China. They connected NATO with Japan and other Indo-Pacific powers like Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand.
Led by Biden, the G-7 countries and NATO showed unprecedented concern with China’s adverse impact on Asian security, including coercive behavior over South China Sea disputes and Taiwan.
The Biden administration’s success saw the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam advance ties with the United States despite risks of Chinese retaliation. The absence of traditional trade agreements giving greater access to US markets was offset as the US accommodated allies and partners using multi-billion-dollar high technology and climate change expenditures and other measures under the Indo-Pacific Economic Policy Framework.
What came to be called the US Asia-first policy emerged after two years during the first term of the Reagan administration. It countered Chinese efforts to leverage acute concern by US leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s in sustaining strong Chinese backing as the United States faced powerful challenges from the Soviet Union.
Beijing repeatedly threatened to downgrade the US relationship over continued US arms sales to Taiwan and a host of other issues. Also making leading US leaders nervous, Beijing began talks with Moscow to ease tensions.
In response, US policy under the leadership of Secretary of State George Shultz (1982-1989) and backed by senior Asia policymakers Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Gaston Sigur reversed the heretofore top US priority of advancing closer ties with China.
Thus Washington’s previous policy, which had been followed since the Nixon administration, was tagged with the newly derogatory term “China-first policy.”
Shultz’s predecessor Alexander Haig and Haig’s subordinates had strongly advocated the old policy of accommodating Chinese demands to ensure Beijing’s alignment with the United States against the USSR.
The new US policy leaders took advantage of a massive buildup of US military strength and stronger alignment with allies, especially Japan and NATO powers, to deal effectively with Soviet expansionism.
The new leaders downgraded China’s importance as they rebuilt strong relations with Japan and other allies and partners including Taiwan. They remained unmoved by Chinese demands. Countering longstanding Chinese pressure against the sale of fighter aircraft, they went forward with the sale and assembly in Taiwan of 130 advanced fighter aircraft.
The result was a Chinese grudging adjustment, leading to much smoother US-China relations for the rest of Reagan’s term.
A second episode of the Asia-first policy occurred at the outset of the George W Bush administration.
Incoming administration leaders included veterans from the Reagan years like Wolfowitz and Armitage. They viewed the Clinton government as passive and intimidated by Chinese pressures that might lead to a repeat of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96.
Taking advantage of Clinton administration preoccupations, Chinese leaders advanced military assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait and stridently exerted pressure against US missile defense, NATO expansion and security ties with Japan.
Bush policymakers enhanced US military strength along with strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific as they scrapped Clinton’s approach. China recalculated, resulting in Beijing’s new “peaceful rise” approach, which gave top priority to reassuring the United States.
Authoritative Chinese experts told this interviewer that there was a genuine concern that to do otherwise would have risked a repeat of the US response to Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. Beijing stuck to the peaceful rise approach until the end of that decade, although the unsuccessful US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq tended more and more to confirm a Chinese assessment of declining US power and resolve.
China is much more powerful today than it was in the 1980s and the 2000s. Nevertheless, China had profound leverage in those periods, which it employed to have its way at US expense. US strengthening and firm resolve effectively curbed Chinese assertiveness in those instances.
Against this background, the Biden administration’s impressive strengthening at home and building of power and influence abroad represents a proven approach that has strong momentum for sustained competition in the period ahead.
On the recent complaint that the United States is not sufficiently reassuring China, it is notable that US reassurance on Taiwan and other sensitive issues was infrequent in the first episode of Asia-first policy and was not much evident in the second.
Among other negative consequences, special reassurance of China risked weakening resolve in the United States and among allies and partners. The Biden government avoided such measures even when the crisis posed by China’s military actions after the Pelosi visit prompted a spike in commentators’ urging of greater accommodation of Chinese interests.
That crisis passed after a few weeks and US hardening to counter Chinese challenges intensified.
An added reason for the Biden administration to avoid special reassurance to China is the likelihood of strong criticism from Congress, threatening the bipartisan unity on China policy that has sustained a strong and unified America facing the Chinese challenges.
Past experience and current conditions argue against special reassurance of China at this time.
Robert Sutter ([email protected]), a former US national intelligence officer for East Asia and the Pacific, is a professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington University. This assessment draws from his new book: Congress and China Policy: Past Episodic, Recent Enduring Influence.
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission.
SAN FRANCISCO: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Friday (Nov 17) that he had invited China’s Premier Li Qiang to visit, as a long-stormy relationship improves. Albanese, who visited Beijing in early November, saw Chinese leader Xi Jinping for the second time this month at a Pacific Rim summit inContinue Reading
The main opposition Move Forward Party (MFP) is struggling to live up to its name as it is mired in internal strife, which is eating away at its popularity, according to political analysts.
For a party which has secured a solid footing in politics over a relatively short time, the MFP has established itself as a visionary party of the present and the future, which defies conventional norms, challenges the status quo and is driven by a young, reformist mindset.
It has championed a high standard of morality in staunchly defending fundamental values and rights, at the forefront of which lies gender equality and non-tolerance for transgressions, including sexual harassment. However, it is this very problem that the party has addressed poorly.
The MFP has consistently been dogged by accusations of misconduct by its members. None have been more damning than the sexual harassment allegedly committed by two of its constituency MPs, and how the MFP has handled the politically explosive scandals has backfired.
It all started with juicy revelations by an anti-MFP webpage called Wannee Kao Klai Kohok Arai (What Lies Have the Move Forward Party Been Telling Today?) that the party harboured two lawmakers who made indecent advances on their female volunteer assistants during the election campaign.
The expose instantly launched serious digging into the allegations by netizens, and before long, the identities of the two male MPs were revealed — Wittiphong Thonglour of Prachin Buri and Chaiyamphawan Manpianjit of Bangkok. The party started a probe, under duress, against the two MPs and at a snail’s pace.
A growing number of supporters and admirers then began losing patience over what they thought should have been a straightforward probe, arguing the evidence against the MPs — which mostly found its way onto social media in the form of online chatroom records — was clear as day.
Already, talk had swirled about the party dragging its feet to protect its own members and not being prepared to forsake its cherished stance of not being sidetracked from its moral high ground.
Some MFP supporters spoke via social media channels to express disappointment with the slow progress of the investigation.
Increasing pressure on the party prompted it to finally release an MP-executive panel decision on Nov 1 that begged even more questions than answers.
The party declared both Mr Wuttiphong and Mr Chaiyamphawan guilty of sexual harassment. However, despite facing identical allegations, the men were treated differently.
A vote saw the axe fall on Mr Wuttiphong. But while he was kicked out of the party, Mr Chaiyamphawan survived expulsion since there were not enough votes against him, as required by the party’s constitution, to oust him.
However, he was given an ultimatum: publicly admit to the alleged sexual misconduct and apologise to his three alleged victims and the public by Nov 3, or else. He was given only one day in which to do so.
As part of the ultimatum, the party also ordered him to compensate his alleged victims and stop any form of communication that would further damage their reputation, both directly and indirectly.
In addition, Mr Chaiyamphawan was warned not to engage in any further acts of sexual harassment.
But as it turned out, it was found that although Mr Chaiyamphawan said he accepted the party’s resolution passed on Nov 1, he had presented more damaging information against the victims in a bid to absolve himself. As a result, a meeting was convened again on Nov 7 to purge Mr Chaiyamphawan.
Even though Mr Chaiyamphawan was on the receiving end of indignation unleashed against him from within and outside the party, critics noted that the MFP was being trapped in a quagmire it had set for itself.
They argued that if the party executives and MPs had applied the same yardstick in the votes on Nov 1, both men would have been expelled, leaving no room for accusations of double standards. After learning of his expulsion, Mr Wuttiphong attributed his being booted out to his lack of connections within the party.
Days later, Mr Wutthipong held a bombshell press briefing in which he revealed he had accused an assistant of a high-profile party MP, who also sits on the MFP executive board, of pocketing kickbacks from a landfill company in Prachin Buri. He insisted this expose cost him his party membership.
According to Nuttaa “Bow” Mahattana, an activist and political commentator, the MFP’s internal probe, which was decidedly instrumental in handing what amounted to a political death warrant for the two MPs, was shrouded in secrecy.
She questioned the procedure the party adopted in considering the cases against the two men, suggesting that if they failed to measure up to standards, the MFP risked being labelled as having crucified its members in a kangaroo court. This would be most unhelpful to the party, which desperately needs to repair the damage to its image.
Srettha: Facing criticism over loan plan
When Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin dropped a bombshell on Nov 10 about the government’s plan to borrow 500 billion baht to finance the 10,000-baht digital money handout, a chorus of criticism erupted from all corners.
Along with concerns about the massive amount of debt the scheme would create and doubts over whether the stimulus plan can do as intended, critics zeroed in on whether the loan bill would meet the criteria outlined in the law governing fiscal and financial discipline.
Section 53 of the State Fiscal and Financial Discipline Act allows the Finance Ministry to propose a law for borrowing only in an urgent case where there is a need for continued spending to resolve an economic crisis and when waiting for the regular budget process would be too slow.
While the government views the current situation as a crisis, critics do not see eye to eye with them and insist that there is no economic crisis justifying the handout.
Senator Kamnoon Sidhisamarn argued that the loan bill, which has been sent to the Council of State, the government’s legal arm, to be vetted, did not satisfy any of the criteria in Section 53.
First and foremost, the loan bill must undergo a lengthy scrutiny process in the House of Representatives and the Senate, not to mention that it might be submitted to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. If the borrowing is urgent, why not opt for an executive decree which can be issued by the cabinet?
The digital wallet policy is a one-time handout to some 50 million people who must spend it within six months, so it does not require continued spending. Next, the country is not currently facing a crisis, at least not to the extent experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, according to the senator.
Moreover, the budget bill for the 2024 fiscal year has yet to be deliberated by parliament, and the government can incorporate the digital wallet project into it, the senator said. If the giveaway is included in the annual spending plan, it will match with the Pheu Thai Party’s clarification to the Election Commission regarding the funding source for the flagship policy.
It was reported that the government’s loan bill caused jitters among those who attended the Nov 10 meeting of the digital wallet committee chaired by Mr Srettha.
Near the end of the meeting, Pakorn Nilprapunt, secretary-general of the Office of the Council of State, was said to have expressed concerns about legal issues and possible ramifications if the policy failed to comply with the law.
It was reported that at one point, Bank of Thailand (BoT) governor Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput mentioned the National Anti-Corruption Commission’s (NACC) interest in the policy. He reportedly asked the meeting to record his remarks.
Some committee members, especially those from the coalition partners, appeared visibly anxious.
It remains to be seen how the Council of State will advise the government.
Several political observers believe even if the Council of State rules the loan bill can proceed, there is a slim chance it will be passed by parliament, no matter what the prime minister says.
Before leaving for Apec meetings in San Francisco early this week, Mr Srettha said he had complete confidence that the government’s partners would back the loan bill.
“I am confident the government has the solid support of 320 votes in parliament [to ensure passage of the loan bill],” he said.
Given that the digital wallet policy is on the NACC’s radar and triggering complaints and calls for its scrutiny, MPs from the coalition parties may have second thoughts about giving it the go-ahead, observers said.
They said that, eventually, the loan bill would end up in the Constitutional Court, and if it is found to be unlawful, the ruling Pheu Thai Party and its coalition partners could be held accountable. Even if the bill manages to sail through the House, it will hit a roadblock in the Senate.
Senator Chalermchai Fuengkhon revealed that several fellow Upper House members disagreed with the borrowing plan, and they could petition the Constitutional Court to rule on the legality of the bill. One-tenth of senators, or 25 of them, can initiate the process.
According to some observers, Mr Srettha’s fate is tied to the loan bill. As a financial law sponsored by the government, if it fails to clear the House, the premier must choose between resigning and dissolving the House.
However, they say this could prove to be an exit strategy for Mr Srettha, whose popularity rating during the first two months is lower than expected, and he may not last a full four-year term.
Stepping in to take his place would be none other than Pheu Thai leader Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who brought herself into the inner circle by attending a coalition get-together dinner on Nov 8, according to observers.
The main opposition Move Forward Party (MFP) is struggling to live up to its name as it is mired in internal strife, which is eating away at its popularity, according to political analysts.
For a party which has secured a solid footing in politics over a relatively short time, the MFP has established itself as a visionary party of the present and the future, which defies conventional norms, challenges the status quo and is driven by a young, reformist mindset.
It has championed a high standard of morality in staunchly defending fundamental values and rights, at the forefront of which lies gender equality and non-tolerance for transgressions, including sexual harassment. However, it is this very problem that the party has addressed poorly.
The MFP has consistently been dogged by accusations of misconduct by its members. None have been more damning than the sexual harassment allegedly committed by two of its constituency MPs, and how the MFP has handled the politically explosive scandals has backfired.
It all started with juicy revelations by an anti-MFP webpage called Wannee Kao Klai Kohok Arai (What Lies Have the Move Forward Party Been Telling Today?) that the party harboured two lawmakers who made indecent advances on their female volunteer assistants during the election campaign.
The expose instantly launched serious digging into the allegations by netizens, and before long, the identities of the two male MPs were revealed — Wittiphong Thonglour of Prachin Buri and Chaiyamphawan Manpianjit of Bangkok. The party started a probe, under duress, against the two MPs and at a snail’s pace.
A growing number of supporters and admirers then began losing patience over what they thought should have been a straightforward probe, arguing the evidence against the MPs — which mostly found its way onto social media in the form of online chatroom records — was clear as day.
Already, talk had swirled about the party dragging its feet to protect its own members and not being prepared to forsake its cherished stance of not being sidetracked from its moral high ground.
Some MFP supporters spoke via social media channels to express disappointment with the slow progress of the investigation.
Increasing pressure on the party prompted it to finally release an MP-executive panel decision on Nov 1 that begged even more questions than answers.
The party declared both Mr Wuttiphong and Mr Chaiyamphawan guilty of sexual harassment. However, despite facing identical allegations, the men were treated differently.
A vote saw the axe fall on Mr Wuttiphong. But while he was kicked out of the party, Mr Chaiyamphawan survived expulsion since there were not enough votes against him, as required by the party’s constitution, to oust him.
However, he was given an ultimatum: publicly admit to the alleged sexual misconduct and apologise to his three alleged victims and the public by Nov 3, or else. He was given only one day in which to do so.
As part of the ultimatum, the party also ordered him to compensate his alleged victims and stop any form of communication that would further damage their reputation, both directly and indirectly.
In addition, Mr Chaiyamphawan was warned not to engage in any further acts of sexual harassment.
But as it turned out, it was found that although Mr Chaiyamphawan said he accepted the party’s resolution passed on Nov 1, he had presented more damaging information against the victims in a bid to absolve himself. As a result, a meeting was convened again on Nov 7 to purge Mr Chaiyamphawan.
Even though Mr Chaiyamphawan was on the receiving end of indignation unleashed against him from within and outside the party, critics noted that the MFP was being trapped in a quagmire it had set for itself.
They argued that if the party executives and MPs had applied the same yardstick in the votes on Nov 1, both men would have been expelled, leaving no room for accusations of double standards. After learning of his expulsion, Mr Wuttiphong attributed his being booted out to his lack of connections within the party.
Days later, Mr Wutthipong held a bombshell press briefing in which he revealed he had accused an assistant of a high-profile party MP, who also sits on the MFP executive board, of pocketing kickbacks from a landfill company in Prachin Buri. He insisted this expose cost him his party membership.
According to Nuttaa “Bow” Mahattana, an activist and political commentator, the MFP’s internal probe, which was decidedly instrumental in handing what amounted to a political death warrant for the two MPs, was shrouded in secrecy.
She questioned the procedure the party adopted in considering the cases against the two men, suggesting that if they failed to measure up to standards, the MFP risked being labelled as having crucified its members in a kangaroo court. This would be most unhelpful to the party, which desperately needs to repair the damage to its image.
Srettha: Facing criticism over loan plan
When Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin dropped a bombshell on Nov 10 about the government’s plan to borrow 500 billion baht to finance the 10,000-baht digital money handout, a chorus of criticism erupted from all corners.
Along with concerns about the massive amount of debt the scheme would create and doubts over whether the stimulus plan can do as intended, critics zeroed in on whether the loan bill would meet the criteria outlined in the law governing fiscal and financial discipline.
Section 53 of the State Fiscal and Financial Discipline Act allows the Finance Ministry to propose a law for borrowing only in an urgent case where there is a need for continued spending to resolve an economic crisis and when waiting for the regular budget process would be too slow.
While the government views the current situation as a crisis, critics do not see eye to eye with them and insist that there is no economic crisis justifying the handout.
Senator Kamnoon Sidhisamarn argued that the loan bill, which has been sent to the Council of State, the government’s legal arm, to be vetted, did not satisfy any of the criteria in Section 53.
First and foremost, the loan bill must undergo a lengthy scrutiny process in the House of Representatives and the Senate, not to mention that it might be submitted to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. If the borrowing is urgent, why not opt for an executive decree which can be issued by the cabinet?
The digital wallet policy is a one-time handout to some 50 million people who must spend it within six months, so it does not require continued spending. Next, the country is not currently facing a crisis, at least not to the extent experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, according to the senator.
Moreover, the budget bill for the 2024 fiscal year has yet to be deliberated by parliament, and the government can incorporate the digital wallet project into it, the senator said. If the giveaway is included in the annual spending plan, it will match with the Pheu Thai Party’s clarification to the Election Commission regarding the funding source for the flagship policy.
It was reported that the government’s loan bill caused jitters among those who attended the Nov 10 meeting of the digital wallet committee chaired by Mr Srettha.
Near the end of the meeting, Pakorn Nilprapunt, secretary-general of the Office of the Council of State, was said to have expressed concerns about legal issues and possible ramifications if the policy failed to comply with the law.
It was reported that at one point, Bank of Thailand governor Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput mentioned the National Anti-Corruption Commission’s (NACC) interest in the policy. He reportedly asked the meeting to record his remarks.
Some committee members, especially those from the coalition partners, appeared visibly anxious.
It remains to be seen how the Council of State will advise the government.
Several political observers believe even if the Council of State rules the loan bill can proceed, there is a slim chance it will be passed by parliament, no matter what the prime minister says.
Before leaving for Apec meetings in San Francisco early this week, Mr Srettha said he had complete confidence that the government’s partners would back the loan bill.
“I am confident the government has the solid support of 320 votes in parliament [to ensure passage of the loan bill],” he said.
Given that the digital wallet policy is on the NACC’s radar and triggering complaints and calls for its scrutiny, MPs from the coalition parties may have second thoughts about giving it the go-ahead, observers said.
They said that, eventually, the loan bill would end up in the Constitutional Court, and if it is found to be unlawful, the ruling Pheu Thai Party and its coalition partners could be held accountable. Even if the bill manages to sail through the House, it will hit a roadblock in the Senate.
Senator Chalermchai Fuengkhon revealed that several fellow Upper House members disagreed with the borrowing plan, and they could petition the Constitutional Court to rule on the legality of the bill. One-tenth of senators, or 25 of them, can initiate the process.
According to some observers, Mr Srettha’s fate is tied to the loan bill. As a financial law sponsored by the government, if it fails to clear the House, the premier must choose between resigning and dissolving the House.
However, they say this could prove to be an exit strategy for Mr Srettha, whose popularity rating during the first two months is lower than expected, and he may not last a full four-year term.
Stepping in to take his place would be none other than Pheu Thai leader Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who brought herself into the inner circle by attending a coalition get-together dinner on Nov 8, according to observers.
MANILA: The death toll from a magnitude 6.7 earthquake in the southern Philippines has increased to six and authorities are searching for two missing people, local disaster officials said on Saturday (Nov 18). The offshore quake struck off Mindanao island on Friday afternoon at a depth of 60km, according toContinue Reading
George “Funky” Brown, the co-founder and longtime drummer of Kool & The Gang who helped write such hits as Too Hot, Ladies Night, Joanna and the party favourite Celebration, died Thursday (Nov 16) in Los Angeles at age 74.
Brown died after a battle with cancer, according to a statement released by Universal Music. He had retired earlier in the year, nearly 60 years after the band began, and revealed that he was diagnosed with stage 4 lung cancer.
Kool & The Gang has sold millions of records with its catchy blend of jazz, funk and soul, what Brown liked to call “the sound of happiness”. In 1964, Brown helped launch the Grammy-winning group, originally called the Jazziacs, along with such friends as bassist Robert “Kool” Bell, brother Ronald Bell on keyboards and guitarist Charles Smith.
After years of relative obscurity, name changes and personnel changes, Kool & The Gang broke through in the mid-1970s with Jungle Boogie and Hollywood Swinging among others songs and peaked in the late 70s-mid 1980s, with hits ranging from the ballads Cherish and Joanna to the up-tempo, chart-topping Celebration, now a standard at weddings and other festive gatherings.
In 2023, Brown produced the band’s latest album, People Just Wanna Have Fun, and released his memoir Too Hot: Kool & The Gang & Me.
He is survived by his wife, Hanh Brown, and his five children. In lieu of flowers, his family has asked for donations to be made in his honour to the Lung Cancer Society of America.