“PEACE IN MANIPUR” Gandhi, 53, is the son, grandson and great-grandson of three former Indian premiers. He spearheaded the parliamentary attack on the government Wednesday, condemning what he said was Modi’s inaction over the deadly Manipur violence. In a speech to lawmakers, Gandhi had charged that Modi was “killing MotherContinue Reading
The EU and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have recognized the strategic potential of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR) to revolutionize Eurasian trade. In particular, they have identified a “Central Trans-Caspian Network” (CTCN), running through southern Kazakhstan, as the most sustainable of three container-transit options for linking Central Asia and Europe.
The TITR is sometimes assumed to be or treated as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), simply because it runs from Asia to Europe. However, this is not the case.
The geopolitical weight of the TITR lies in the fact that it provides a viable alternative to the BRI by focusing on a “Middle Corridor.” This corridor, which includes a trans-Caspian segment, bypasses the BRI’s northern route through Russia and its southern, maritime route.
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been working intensively on the Middle Corridor segment of the TITR since the mid- to late 2010s.
The CTCN newly identified by the European Union and EBRD is in essence a detailed specification of the TITR’s segment in Central Asia. The Middle Corridor is the segment of the route that stretches across the Caspian Sea from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, and thence through Georgia (and Armenia if there is peace) to Turkey.
In June, the EU and the EBRD presented a detailed joint study of the CTCN and associated projects in Almaty, projecting a sevenfold increase in transit volumes by 2040. The study proposes a range of facilitating measures, from digitizing transport documents to enhancing public-private partnerships and liberalizing markets.
It also outlines key actions for integrating the CTCN with the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network.
In contrast to the EU’s coherent focus on Central Asia’s participation in the CTCN, Brussels lacks an equivalent focus on participation by the South Caucasus countries. Here, a suggestion recently made by the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) for a more flexible approach toward Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries could be complementary.
The CoR suggests fostering closer ties with local and regional authorities in the region. Implementing this idea holds the potential to increase capacity and transparency of local governments. The TITR provides the ideal opportunity for such a strategy.
That is because the EBRD’s involvement, in particular, signals a green light for international financial institutions to contribute to the corridor’s development. Its work identifies specific infrastructure investment needs across Central Asia. These include such projects as railway expansions and port capacity upgrades. The document in effect represents and provides a preliminary feasibility study for each project.
At present, in this context, Azerbaijan is the moving force that is promoting trade and investment ties to extend the CTCN into the South Caucasus and westward to Europe. It has completed significant advancements in ferry, port, and other transport infrastructure. Oil from Kazakhstan may be delivered through Azerbaijan’s pipelines.
At the same time, Azerbaijan is pursuing discussions about high-speed Internet connectivity and projects in energy, transport and agriculture with Uzbekistan, and discussions about energy cooperation and infrastructure upgrades with Turkmenistan. With the backing of the EU and EBRD, and the proactive approach of countries such as Azerbaijan, the CTCN has the potential to revolutionize the trade landscape of the region.
The TITR, implemented in Central Asia as the CTCN, offers a viable alternative to existing trade routes. It would drive dynamic economic growth and foster long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation.
Realizing the CTCN as a transformative project, not just expediting and streamlining trade but also providing growth opportunities and innovation to the participating countries, requires thinking seriously about how to extend it through the South Caucasus via the Middle Corridor.
Previous attempts to improve Eurasian transport links, such as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) program, established in 1993, have had their limitations. Indeed, TRACECA took part in the Second EU-Central Asia Economic Forum, held a week before the EU-EBRD conference in Almaty in May.
However, TRACECA was never focused on a comprehensive, integrated program like the TITR, CTCN or Middle Corridor. TRACECA fell into disuse after the Western enthusiasm of the 1990s and early 2000s dissipated, particularly as less expensive transport routes between Europe and Asia evolved.
Yet the CoR’s opinion, as mentioned above, suggests that it may now be time for the EU to engage more proactively in supporting Eurasian connectivity, including the Middle Corridor, albeit on a different basis.
It may therefore be appropriate to consider the creation of a new, permanent body for this purpose, which could play a role similar to that catalyzed by Baku’s project for the Southern Gas Corridor, now vital for European energy security.
Second Thomas Shoal is about 200km from Palawan, and more than 1,000km from China’s nearest major landmass, Hainan island. The incident has fanned tensions between the countries, which have a long history of maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Beijing claims almost the entire waterway, through which trillions ofContinue Reading
The difficulty in comparing America’s and China’s influence in the Middle East is that the two operate on entirely different planes. [Note: The Chinese use the term Western Asia, rather than the Middle East, to refer to a region that includes the Levant, Iraq, the Gulf, Turkey and Iran.]
Despite China’s impressive naval construction program, China cannot challenge American dominance of the seas within any definable time horizon. There is no indication that China has or soon will develop the capability to put boots on the ground in the region.
At the same time, China’s economic and technological presence has jumped during the past several years, and the United States cannot compete with China in critical areas such as broadband infrastructure.
China’s military presence in the Middle East remains small. Its 200 marines at the Djibouti naval base are on standby for anti-piracy and civilian rescue operations. China reportedly has sponsored the creation of a joint maritime force including Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Oman, but has committed no ships to the project.
A February 2013 note from the American Enterprise Institute observes, “Current Chinese basing capacity and force commitment in the region seem insufficient to support the level of economic and diplomatic engagement that appears to be Beijing’s new normal, so Washington should prepare for further expansion.”
There have been rumors about plans for a Chinese naval base in the UAE, so far unconfirmed. The latest Pentagon assessment of China’s military does not predict an expansion of China’s expeditionary capability. China has just 30,000 marines versus America’s 200,000, and perhaps 12,000 special forces versus America’s 70,000.
In August 2014, US President Barack Obama complained that China was a “free rider” in the Persian Gulf, letting the United States bear the cost of a blue-water fleet that protected China’s oil supplies The charge was fair: Although China has dramatically increased its military spending, its commitments to the Middle East remain de minimus. China remains a free rider.
If the American commitment to protect shipping lanes erodes, China may step in, but that remains hypothetical. For the time being, China will devote the bulk of its military resources to coastal defense, including medium- and long-range missiles, the J-20 interceptor, satellites, electronic warfare and submarines.
In the meantime, China’s position is that its interests in the region do not conflict with America’s.
Pan Guang of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences told the “Observer” website in 2022: “China’s economic investment and US military investment can complement each other in some places, such as in the Gulf countries. It is very simple. Several major overseas military bases of the United States are there. The largest military base is in Qatar, there are two in Saudi Arabia, and there are also in the United Arab Emirates. However, the infrastructure construction in these countries is not done by American workers, but by Chinese workers. And laborers from Southeast Asian and South Asian countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and India are doing it.”
China’s exports to Saudi Arabia at the end of 2022 and early 2023 reached an annual rate of about US$45 billion, roughly double the pre-Covid volume. By contrast: In 2014, European Union exports to KSA peaked at $45 billion, but fell to just $33 billion in 2022.
US exports peaked at $19 billion in 2015 and fell to $11.5 billion in 2022. China has displaced the US and Europe as the leading supplier of industrial goods to Saudi Arabia, including telecom infrastructure, solar power, mass transit and other high-tech items.
China’s exports to Israel doubled between 2018 and 2021 and have held steady since (though remain at a level far below Europe’s exports). Interestingly, China’s exports to Iran are a small fraction of their 2014 level, perhaps reflecting the impact of sanctions on Iran.
Also notable is the surge in Chinese exports to Turkey and Central Asia. These have nearly tripled from pre-Covid levels, for several reasons, including Turkey’s role as an intermediary between China and Russia, especially for sanctioned goods.
A key component of the economic relationship with Turkey and Central Asia is China’s commitment to building land transport—railroads and pipelines—across Asia. Given the possibility – however small – of US interdiction of China’s trade with the Gulf in the event of war, China is building alternative means of transport. It’s cheaper to build railroads than navies.
China’s goals are in part guided by long-term strategy and in part reactive and opportunistic. Its long-term interests in the region, in descending order of importance, are these four:
China has other, smaller objectives, for example, more access to Israeli technology. China has no strategic interest in the Palestinian issue. Its offer to mediate an Israeli-Palestinian peace is a diplomatic fishing expedition. The proposal puts pressure on Israel at no cost to China, and may build Chinese bargaining chips in future negotiations with Israel.
American analysts often look for a hidden Chinese plan to parlay economic power into political or military influence. This misses the salient point. China’s influence stems from raw economic power, in particular from a near-monopoly on critical technologies that the region requires.
Huawei is a better provider of mobile broadband than Ericsson or Nokia. The United States produces no broadband infrastructure at all. In the case of solar power, a technology of enormous interest to the Gulf states, China exercises a near monopoly on the production of solar cells.
Huawei offers an AI-controlled solar cell with enhanced efficiency. China also produces port management technology; its fully-automated Tianjin Port was designed as an export product. Market dominance in key technologies creates long-term dependence on China.
Another consideration for China is the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Authorities in China (as well as Russia and India) are worried about Muslim radicalism in Central Asia, and China’s diplomatic and economic emphasis on the region to some extent is an attempt to fill the gap left by the United States – and if possible draw the Taliban regime into a more business-oriented mode (based on Chinese development and exploitation of Afghani natural resources).
The Ukraine war, moreover, has enhanced China’s influence in several ways. First, US sanctions against Russia – especially the unprecedented seizure of hundreds of billions of dollars of its foreign exchange reserves – have made China’s RMB more attractive as a reserve and trade-finance currency.
Second, Turkey’s position as a trade intermediary for Russia (both for Russia’s imports of sanctioned goods and exports of hydrocarbons) has enhanced Turkish standing. Third, India’s emergence as the leading customer for Russian oil has vitiated America’s effort to enlist India in an anti-China coalition, indirectly enhancing China’s strategic position.
More generally, China’s exports to the Global South are having a transformative effect on many countries. Broadband infrastructure is a game changer, enabling a whole range of technologies ranging from micro-finance to telemedicine.
There are numerous areas in which Israel’s pockets of expertise – in agriculture, environmental technology, water management, medicine, and AI – could find synergies with China’s infrastructure-building campaign.
For example, Israeli expertise in water management, environmental controls and desert agriculture dovetails with China’s initiatives in the Global South. I have argued elsewhere that the United States should initiate a Western consortium to compete with China, but this remains purely hypothetical.
Iran remains the greatest source of uncertainty. The Iran-Saudi deal mediated by Beijing has not led to any improvement in the extremely depressed state of Sino-Iranian trade. It is important for Beijing to understand that if Iran comes close to readying nuclear weapons, Israel will be forced to act in its own strategic interests, and the consequences of such action may be detrimental to China’s economy.
China is not challenging America’s military presence in the Middle East nor is America challenging China’s leadership in trade and infrastructure investment.
Although China’s direct military involvement remains minimal, its economic influence will strengthen and shape relationships in the region, for instance, the Chinese-built infrastructure that enhances Turkey’s relations with Central Asia.
Meanwhile, America’s attempt to contain China technologically is ineffective and fundamentally misguided, as I have argued elsewhere, posing problems for America’s traditional allies in the region.
Israel has no alternative to this alliance but should explore opportunities with China that do not undermine it. Israel should continue to find ways to work with China and its regional trading partners in non-military areas, despite American pressures to the contrary.
David P Goldman is Deputy Editor of Asia Times. He was global head of debt research at Bank of America 2002-2005. His most recent book is You Will be Assimilated: China’s Plan to Sino-Form the World.
This article first appeared in The Jerusalem Strategic Review and is republished with kind permission. Read the original here.
PHNOM PENH: Outgoing Cambodian ruler Hun Sen on Thursday (Aug 10) unveiled the country’s new government, headed by his eldest son and including his youngest son and his nephew in senior roles. Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won all but five of 125 seats in the lower house in JulyContinue Reading
UNITED NATIONS: The United Nations Security Council will meet publicly to discuss human rights abuses in North Korea next week, a move requested by the United States, Albania and Japan that is likely to anger Pyongyang and face opposition from China and Russia. It will be the first formal publicContinue Reading
Suspects used of using Chaipattana Foundation’s name to lure victims
PUBLISHED : 10 Aug 2023 at 21:02
Police have arrested suspected members of a gang that they say defrauded people into investing in non-existent development projects in the Northeast since 2021 using the name of the royally established Chaipattana Foundation.
Investigators had gathered evidence and found 10 suspects who were complicit in the scam, Pol Maj Gen Montree Theskhan, the Crime Suppression Division chief, told journalists on Thursday.
This week, police teams were dispatched to search locations where the fraud took place in Chaiyaphum, Maha Sarakham, Roi Et, Kalasin, Chiang Mai, Lampang and Suphan Buri, he said.
Police have so far captured seven suspects and charged them with fraud, he said.
They were identified as Somchai Namsom, 59; Suriyaphan Sattayapitak, 61; Aukkarawat Promkamnoi, 59; Prasan Saengsawang, 65; Niphon Phukongka, 61; Warapon Suwankammun, 58; and Somsak Khanthong, 51. They all denied the charges.
Police said they had confiscated documents containing the details of 20 projects used to lure victims, 18 passbooks, three ATM cards and four mobile phones.
Police are searching for two more suspects — identified as Kittisak Saiprom, 58, and Metta Khanthong, 53 — in connection with the case.
Another suspect, Lerdpong Chaiwonglerd, 60, is currently serving time for another criminal offence.
Pol Maj Gen Montree said police were first alerted to the gang’s activities by the Chaipattana Foundation in 2021.
The gang had duped more than 20 victims out of a combined 1.5 million baht, which they said would be invested in 90 non-existent kaem ling (monkey cheeks) projects for water retention in the Northeast, he said.
The suspects claimed to represent a construction company contracted by the foundation, he added.
Support will be ‘unconditional’, even though military-linked party has not been approached to join coalition
All 40 MPs from the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) will vote for the Pheu Thai prime ministerial candidate unconditionally because the country urgently needs to have a government, says a party MP.
Pai Leeke, a Palang Pracharath MP for Kamphaeng Phet, said on Thursday that the party had not been formally approached by Pheu Thai since key figures of the two parties met at Pheu Thai headquarters on July 23.
Pheu Thai was given the chance to form a government, with the blessing of the election-winning Move Forward Party (MFP), after the latter conceded it could not win enough support in parliament for its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat.
Pheu Thai, which came second in the May 14 election, later dumped Move Forward and moved to form its own coalition. It said that all the parties it spoke with had identified Move Forward’s insistence on amending the lese-majeste law as a major obstacle.
Mr Pai said PPRP members had discussed the situation and concluded that it was necessary for the country to have a government as many problems need to be urgently tackled.
The country has gone nearly five months since the dissolution of the House on March 20 with a caretaker government that has limited authority under the constitution.
The 2024 fiscal year starts on Oct 1 but there is no budget in place, which is beginning to cause deep concern among business leaders and investors.
“We had discussed with Pheu Thai (during the previous meeting) about policies that we wanted to jointly push for them such as Sor Por Kor land reform, the drought problem, an increase in the elderly allowance and the continuity of Pracharat welfare cards,” said Mr Pai.
“All (policies) received a positive response. More importantly, we used to work with Pheu Thai. I also came from Pheu Thai.
“Therefore, the party agreed that all of its 40 MPs will vote for a prime ministerial candidate from Pheu Thai.”
The PPRP is willing to help the country sail through the political crisis, said Mr Pai.
However, there have been no talks about joining a coalition government led by Pheu Thai, he added.
Numbers game
As of Thursday, the Pheu Thai-led coalition had a total of 238 MPs. The votes of the PPRP would bring the total to 278, meaning it would still need the support of 97 senators in a vote for the Pheu Thai prime ministerial candidate. Move Forward, now headed for the opposition benches, is still deciding whether to vote for the Pheu Thai prime ministerial candidate but most of its supporters oppose the idea.
Political commentators say that bringing the military-linked PPRP into the coalition would be seen by many Pheu Thai supporters as a betrayal and cost the party dearly at the next election.
Palang Pracharath was established in 2019 as a vehicle for Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the 2014 coup leader, and Gen Prawit Wongsuwon to remain in power. The majority of its original members were defectors from the Pheu Thai Party. Gen Prawit is the current leader of the PPRP.
Though it finished second to Pheu Thai in the 2019 polls, the PPRP ultimately prevailed as the lead party in the coalition government. Over time, however, factional squabbling intensified and many MPs left the party. It won 40 seats in the May election, down from 116 in 2019.
Mr Pai also claimed on Thursday that he had been contacted by Move Forward, when it was still putting together its coalition, to vote for its prime ministerial candidate.
But MFP secretary-general Chaithawat Tulathon hit back at Mr Pai’s claims, saying his party had never held talks with the PPRP to seek its support for anything.
“The MFP has never thought of taking part in anything with the PPRP, which was a mechanism set up to prolong the power of the coup-makers,” said Mr Chaithawat.
Move Forward has a clear stance that it would not join any government with the PPRP and/or the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party and its stance has never changed, added the MFP secretary-general.
ISLAMABAD: The wife of former Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan said that her husband was well after seeing him on Thursday (Aug 10) for the first time since his jailing, his lawyer said. Khan was jailed last week after being convicted of corruption. He was then barred from politics forContinue Reading
Wu Chunlei, 42, whose two-storey house and factory were ruined, said villagers guided rescue groups to flood-stricken rural areas because government workers were not present. “At the time there was no phone signal and we couldn’t contact any local officials. We could only save ourselves,” Wu said. Reuters tried toContinue Reading