SINGAPORE: The Teachers’ Day school holiday for this year has been rescheduled from Sep 1 to Sep 11 following the announcement of key dates for the upcoming Presidential Election. GCE N-Level examinations scheduled for Sep 11 will also see a change of dates, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and theContinue Reading
SINGAPORE: Polling Day for Singapore’s Presidential Election will be on Friday, Sep 1 if more than one candidate qualifies to run for the post. Nomination Day is set for Aug 22. The dates were announced by the Elections Department on Friday (Aug 11) when it said that Prime Minister Lee HsienContinue Reading
SEOUL: Heavy downpours continued to soak South and North Korea on Friday (Aug 11) as tropical storm Khanun swept over the peninsula after pummelling Japan, putting Pyongyang on high alert for flood damage. The storm weakened into a tropical depression as it crossed into North Korea overnight, and military andContinue Reading
That includes the prospect of a visit to the US by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, which could pave the way for a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Going by past transits, Lai is likely to meet the chair of the Virginia-based American InstituteContinue Reading
On Wednesday, Beijing raised the toll of flood-related deaths to 33 after Typhoon Doksuri ushered in the heaviest rain to hit the city in 140 years. This week, in southwest Sichuan province, seven tourists taking photographs at a water conservation area died after being swept away in a surge ofContinue Reading
Ong’s daughter, who did not have a driving licence in Singapore, made a U-turn along Tampines Avenue 2 without stopping and hit a motorcycle that had the right of way, leaving him with a fractured wrist, multiple abrasions and a broken motorcycle.
However, instead of letting his daughter bear the consequence, Ong told the police repeatedly that he was behind the wheel.
He repeated his lies to the court and was sentenced to five days’ jail for causing grievous hurt in a negligent manner in 2020, which he served.
The law firm representing the motorcyclist in a personal injury claim discovered audio from Ong’s in-car camera that cast doubt on who the driver was.
The ruse was unravelled two-and-a-half years after the incident, when the lawyers wrote to the police, who reopened the case.
Ong’s daughter had admitted to her involvement and was sentenced to 17 weeks’ jail, a fine of S$500 and two years’ driving ban in June.
On Friday, Ong pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiring with his daughter to intentionally pervert the course of justice and one charge of allowing his daughter to drive his car when there was no insurance policy in force for her use of the vehicle.
Deputy Public Prosecutor Jean Goh called for four to six months’ jail for Ong, along with a fine between S$500 and S$700 and 12 months’ disqualification from driving.
She said the offence went against “the very institution of justice itself” and contaminated the rule of law.
She also pointed to the detailed planning and persistence in perpetuating the conspiracy, with lies that were “layered and complex”.
She disagreed with the defence’s claim that the offences had occurred “in the spur of the moment”, saying that Ong had been thinking about how he could cover up his lies.
She asked the court not to take into consideration the five days’ jail Ong had already served, as this was “part of the criminal scheme” he perpetrated.
In mitigation, defence lawyer S S Dhillon said this was a father and daughter relationship, where the daughter had committed the crime.
“The accused indeed committed no crime. If the daughter didn’t meet with an accident, he won’t be here today,” said Mr Dhillon.
“As a father, his fatherly love for the daughter made him decide to assume liability and to take the rap. There was no intention to cause harm or other consequences to any third parties,” said the lawyer.
“He is the author of his own misery, therefore he accepts the punishment. He is not complaining,” said Mr Dhillon. “He is pleading with your honour to note that his intentions were merely to save his daughter. He could not bear (the) fact that his daughter, who had just graduated with a degree from the United States of America, to be sent to prison. That’s his mistake in life.”
He said Ong had “certain pointers” as to what he did morally and ethically, but conceded that he was “absolutely wrong” in the criminal aspects.
“When the accident occurred and the police arrived at the scene, David spontaneously and instinctively told the police he was the driver. As a father, all he wanted was to protect his daughter. (Those) were his noble intentions – which had criminal consequences,” said Mr Dhillon.
He said that because the pair told the first lie, “they had to tell the second lie and the third lie”, adding that “they are connected lies, not additional lies”.
Mr Dhillon asked for three months’ jail, saying his client was remorseful and regretful.
“He has seen his daughter going to prison, and now he’s going to prison, for a crime he never committed,” he said.
In response, the prosecutor said it was not true that Ong had not committed a crime.
“His crime was to allow an unlicensed driver to drive a motorcar, an individual with no valid insurance policy,” said Ms Goh.
On the defence’s point that Ong had acted “purely out of fatherly love”, Ms Goh pointed to a statement Ong had given, where he said: “I had taken the rap for my daughter because my vehicle was a rented car and only I was allowed to drive the car.”
She said that whether or not offenders are related cannot be an excuse for them to commit offences.
“No signal ought to be sent by this court that it is alright for one to assume criminal liability on behalf of another, whatever that particular motivation is,” she said. “It’s not a case where he was compelled to lie, rather a situation where he allowed the lies to build up.”
In sentencing, Judge Chin said he could not ignore the aggravating factors in the case, which includes the seriousness of the main offence Ong’s daughter had committed.
In assuming criminal liability for his daughter, Ong had himself evaded liability for his own offences, which include allowing his daughter to drive without insurance and a licence, said the judge.
Ong’s lies resulted in a miscarriage of justice, requiring a criminal revision in the High Court to quash his erroneous conviction and disqualification order and leading to “a significant delay and wastage of state resources”, said Judge Chin.
“If you want to find out if it is true, you will have to find the article. For social media, sometimes it is not true, sometimes it is true. I do not believe 100 per cent,” he told CNA.
Despite the importance of such social media tools, politicians still go back to the basics by going on the ground to get up close and personal with their supporters.
But all the messaging and outreach, whether in person or online, are only important if voters are motivated to go to the ballot box.
One key election concern this time round is voter apathy.
Some fear that not many Malaysians working overseas would return for the local polls, while others are worried that voters are getting tired of elections and politicians’ rhetoric.
The North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO) is a decentralized online volunteer movement with no central command structure that focuses on combatting Russian propaganda and disinformation surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Most famous for its social media accounts featuring Shiba Inu avatars, NAFO volunteers use memes to mock, troll, and discredit Russia’s propaganda and its war effort. Considered a force in information warfare – Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense singled it out for combatting Russia in the information space – NAFO has harnessed the power of memes and social media platforms to impact the information battlefield.
NAFO also lays out a potentially replicable blueprint for future conflicts. As digital information warfare, the NAFO experience could be instrumental in a future fight for Taiwan, which finds itself on the frontlines of similar disinformation wars. NAFO and its potential successors represent a new age of digital activism, and will continue to have an influence, no matter how small, within informational warfare in the future.
In a notable early victory, NAFO’s decentralized Twitter group successfully exposed and discredited Russia’s top diplomat in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, for spreading disinformation. Ulyanov’s response to a NAFO tweet with the infamous phrase “You pronounced this nonsense, not me” further backfired, transforming him into an internet joke and propelling NAFO’s slogan to viral fame.
Russia has employed a variety of tactics to undermine support for Ukraine, including the dissemination of false stories, manipulation of social media platforms, and the utilization of state-controlled media outlets such as RT to spread their propaganda. Since – as research conducted by MIT reveals – fake news on Twitter spreads six times faster than the truth, it must be assumed that the impact of this dissemination has been significant.
NAFO emerged, Shiba Inu avatar and all, in May 2022 when an online artist created it. He later incorporated the idea into efforts to raise funds for the Georgian Legion, which was fighting against the Russian invaders in Ukraine.
By September of last year, the meme reportedly had “tens of thousands” of associates. Unlike Russia’s reliance on paid troll factories, NAFO relies on global volunteers who have the freedom to respond creatively. The low barrier to entry ensures that anyone can join and its decentralized structure enables quick adaptation in the ever-evolving landscape of information warfare.
NAFO’s success has been so significant that RT, the Russian state media outlet formerly known as Russia Today, attempted to undermine NAFO by labeling it a pro-Ukrainian “bot army.” In July 2023, Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman even took the time to create a post attacking NAFO – which goes to show just how much mental real estate NAFO occupies inside the heads of Kremlin propagandists.
NAFO is making an impact on the battlefield as well. The NAFO fellas helped raise over US$250,000 to help fund naval drones through United24 in 2022. The NAFO Squad drone fundraiser has also gathered over $420,000 to help purchase 240 attack drones to strike Russia. This fundraising helps the larger effort. Ukraine has been using aerial and sea drones to constantly attack Russian positions in Crimea and in the Black Sea.
In an era when authoritarian regimes like China and Russia heavily invest in manipulating the narratives absorbed by their citizens and the global audience – especially during instances of social upheaval like wars, protests, and revolutions – the lessons gleaned from NAFO’s successes in Ukraine’s information warfare provide valuable insights into how to navigate this battlefield of disinformation going forward.
The success of NAFO’s approach prompts us to question its viability in different geopolitical contexts. Perhaps most urgently, could this model be instrumental in tackling Chinese disinformation campaigns that will continue to increasingly target Taiwan more aggressively in the future?
Perhaps it could – or it might very well morph into something else to address the future need. In any case we can expect more decentralized communities to engage in digital warfare in the future.
Taiwan shares a commonality with Ukraine as a democracy constantly menaced by a neighboring authoritarian regime – in Taiwan’s case, the People’s Republic of China. Despite the scant geographical, cultural or historical ties between Taiwan and Ukraine, the parallels in their experiences suggest that lessons from Ukraine’s resistance could be adapted to Taiwan’s situation today.
China’s disinformation strategies bear a striking resemblance to Russia’s, incorporating “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, historical revisionism, cyberattacks and a brigade of state-backed online trolls known as the “50 Cent Army.”
Backed by the Chinese state, these internet commenters, estimated to number somewhere over 500,000 – strategically escalate their activities during prominent patriotic events or to eclipse unfavorable state news. Their goal is to create an illusion of widespread support through deceptive writings.
There have long been suspicions that the Chinese government hires as many as 2 million individuals to anonymously insert deceptive writings, masquerading as the genuine opinions of ordinary people, into real social media discussions.
Unlike typical trolls, they refrain from engaging in debates on topics like jailed dissidents or territorial disputes. Instead, they saturate the internet with unremarkable positive content. A Harvard study revealed that hardly any of the Chinese government’s “50 Cent Army” posts involve debate or argument.
This air of positivity is not used across the board, however. When Tsai Ing-wen was elected Taiwan’s first female president in 2016, a campaign on the Chinese search engine forum Baidu aimed to flood her social media accounts with anti-Taiwan comments. Within just 12 hours, her Facebook page received 40,000 negative comments.
The “50 Cent Army” actively participates in online discussions and shares a substantial number of supportive posts that express positive sentiments toward the PRC government and its policies.
In the Indo-Pacific region, there may arise a need for a potential NAFO variant or a decentralized community to address the issue of China’s “50 Cent Army” trolls.
Whenever there arises a post lauding China’s effort to integrate Taiwan or a Chinese official disseminating misinformation on Western media, the community should counteract swiftly. The response could involve circulating satirical memes and humorously challenging such statements.
As in NAFO’s modus operandi, future decentralized communities could harness their collective power to recognize, expose, and debunk such misinformation.
The strength of this crowdsourcing approach lies in the sheer number of individuals who can be stood up to detect and denounce misinformation instantaneously. The group would also be able to serve as a sort of counter-intelligence agency, helping educate others to spot and report members of China’s info warriors across various platforms.
Moreover, it would be beneficial to conduct campaigns that directly counter disinformation and simultaneously educate Western audiences about the fallacious narratives promoted by the Chinese state.
However, it’s crucial to comprehend that while such a movement can make a significant difference, it is unlikely to be a comprehensive solution against state-backed disinformation on its own. Instead, it should serve as one integral component of a broader, multi-pronged strategy to combat Chinese disinformation effectively.
As China’s preparations for a potential operation in the strait become more apparent, its aim to have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027 adds to the escalating concerns. It can be expected that Chinese online information warriors will intensify their efforts to aggressively target Taiwan, seeking to undermine its independence through social media and influence Western perceptions. This emerging battleground will be the primary focus of their online endeavors.
Presently, China is actively attempting to subdue Taiwanese media and tighten its grip on Taiwan’s information channels. This trend is likely to extend beyond Taiwan’s borders, with China seeking to exert control over Western media spaces concerning Taiwan.
Online information warriors on Taiwan’s behalf will need to be prepared to fight a more well-resourced and determined Chinese state troll machine. It will need to carry out efforts to consistently debunk propaganda and refute attempts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty.
With its emergence as an important vector in the fight against disinformation, NAFO serves as a potential blueprint for future conflicts such as China’s increasing aggression toward Taiwan. Perhaps NAFO was just the start in the evolutionary process of how decentralized communities in the democratic world will fight against authoritarian disinformation in the complexities of digital information warfare.
David Kirichenko ([email protected]) is a freelance journalist and an editor at Euromaidan Press. He tweets @DVKirichenko.
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. Asia Times is republishing it with permission.
PUBLISHED : 11 Aug 2023 at 12:29
Politicians, military and police top brass as well as close associates extended their best wishes to caretaker Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon who celebrated his 78th birthday on Friday.
The event took place at the Five Provinces Bordering Forest Preservation Foundation on Vibhavadi Rangsit Road, Bangkok.
Caretaker Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and caretaker Interior Minister Anupong Paojinda were among the well-wishers.
Gen Prayut and Gen Anupong had breakfast with Gen Prawit and presented him with a wind-up miniature carousel of eight blue horses. The trio are known as the “Three Por” generals.
Gen Anupong told reporters that the carousel horses symbolise everlasting happiness.
Senate Speaker Pornpetch Wichitcholchai also joined them for breakfast.
Bhumjaithai Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul and his deputy Chada Thaiseth arrived at 10am, followed by Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) secretary-general Thamanat Prompow and all PPRP MPs at 11pm.
Gen Prawit’s close associates from various circles and other politicians were also present to mark the occasion.
Caretaker Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsowon and Interior Minister Anupong Paojinda at the Five Provinces Bordering Forest Preservation Foundation for Gen Prawit’s 78th birthday. Below, a set of miniature carousel horses presented to Gen Prawit as a birthday gift by Gen Prayut and Gen Anupong. (Photos: Wassana Nanuam)
The increased penetration of the private sector by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is causing widespread concern.
The establishment of party branches within private companies is perceived as a potential lever of control, alongside financial and regulatory tools, that the government could wield to keep businesses in line. But while the increasing centrality of the CCP in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is evident, its role in private companies remains less obvious.
Party units in private companies are not a new phenomenon. Since the 1980s, the CCP has stressed its willingness to affirm its presence in the growing private economy, especially in foreign joint ventures.
In 1992, the CCP charter included “companies” in its list of structures where a party organization should be set up if they host three or more party members. The 1993 Company Law required all companies based in China to allow the establishment of units to “carry out the activities of the CCP.”
The CCP’s infiltration of the private sector gained momentum after former president Jiang Zemin’s call in the early 2000s for the CCP to represent “the advanced productive force” and welcome China’s emerging private entrepreneurs.
The private sector is still seen as a frontier for party-building, with Chinese President Xi Jinping making it a priority. In 2012, the CCP’s organization department called for the party to “comprehensively cover” the private sector.
This new wave of party-building efforts includes sending “party-building advisors” to private firms without party branches and creating party-building supervisory bodies.
According to the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), the ratio of private businesses hosting a party unit has risen from 27% in 2002 to 48% in 2018, with a bias towards the northern part of the country and the manufacturing sector.
Most of the companies without a party branch do not meet the basic requirement of hosting three party members.
Yet according to the CCP’s own numbers, 73% of private firms had established party units in 2017. The difference in figures might be explained by the existence of various forms of coverage. Joint party branches covering more than one firm are established for the ones that do not have their own embedded CCP unit.
Looking at larger firms, over 92% of China’s top 500 private enterprises host party units. It has been mandatory since 2018 for domestically-listed companies to establish a party entity.
Historically, these party branches are tied to the recruitment and management of party members among employees. In contrast to SOEs, the CCP charter gives a somewhat circumscribed role for party units in private businesses. They are mainly charged with ensuring the company complies with the laws and promoting its “healthy development.”
In most businesses, party branches tend to focus on “business-friendly” activities and do little more than organize study sessions or social gatherings for party members. Yet that may be changing as Xi has called on the private sector to “unite around the party.”
Following a requirement initiated in 2015 for SOEs to enshrine the role of CCP entities in their articles of association, an increasing number of private companies, mostly those with mixed ownership or political connections, have also implemented such amendments.
The CCP’s objective is to “cultivate a team of private economic persons who are resolute in walking with the party” and can be relied upon “in times of crisis.” Entrepreneurs are expected to undergo further education and monitoring to make sure they remain in line with the party’s objectives and “cultivate a healthy lifestyle.”
ACFIC vice-chairman Ye Qing said in 2020 that private firms should not only recognize the leading role of the party in their corporate charters but also dedicate specific funding to the party branches’ activities.
In addition to the dues they collect from members, the CCP units can often rely on funding from the firm, generally around 1% of the total personnel-related expenditures.
The ACFIC also calls for the CCP to “exercise leadership over personnel management,” aiming to avoid “professional managers promoting whomever they like.” It also recommends that firms establish a monitoring structure under CCP leadership to surveil employees, detect “abnormal behavior” and deal with disciplinary violations.
Assessing the extent to which these guidelines regarding party-building in the private sector are implemented remains very difficult, especially as fieldwork-based research faces growing challenges in China.
While party-building varies greatly across businesses (depending on their sector, size or region of operation), in most cases, the party units remain populated by company employees, which limits the CCP’s leeway as these employees cannot easily challenge the firm’s leadership.
The appointment of the CCP secretary within the company hierarchy matters greatly. When the business owner or CEO holds this position, there is a clear alignment between the CCP unit’s and the firm’s priorities. This can even lead to CCP branches becoming family clubs as the company head appoints family members to top party positions.
Things become more complicated when someone else from the firm’s management is appointed as CCP secretary: it can directly impact the internal balance of power by strengthening this person’s position within the firm.
Firms’ internal power dynamics are vital to understanding how the party’s top-down approach to private businesses may materialize on the ground.
Jerome Doyon is a Junior Professor at the Centre for International Relations (CERI) at Sciences Po Paris.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.