Putting Myanmar’s 1027 in realist perspective – Asia Times
Eight months after the rebel offensive dealt a surprise hammer blow to the coup-installed State Administration Council ( SAC ) military regime, operation 1027 has resumed in northern Myanmar.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance ( TMA ), a rebel coalition made up of the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ), Arakan Army ( AA ), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ), hit multiple targets in Shan state on October 27, 2023.
They were joined by insurgent allies from the Mandalay People’s Defense Force ( PDF), the Bama People’s Liberation Army ( BPLA ) and factions of the communist People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ).
The 3BA seized 18 cities and 36 military installations, including battalion-sized ones and Military Operations Command 16, in the course of more than four weeks of fierce battle. The insurgent operation killed some hundred Myanmar Army troops and compelled over 4, 000 soldiers, including some major generals, to retreat.
Additionally, most of the land north of Lashio to the Chinese border was taken, as well as essential Shan state borders cities. Most significantly, the MNDAA recaptured Laukkai area on the China borders, which the rebels had lost to the Myanmar Army in 2009.
By all records, Operation 1027 has reinvigorated and emboldened the pro- SAC weight. Comparable escalations were reported throughout the nation in the weeks following the shock offensive.
Those combined Karenni and anti-coup File forces captured the most attention during Operation 1111 in Kayah position. After in November, the AA announced that 1027 was being extended to Rakhine State. Similar to, if not more serious, AA’s following military victories in Rakhine overshadowed the operation’s initial phase in the north.
Militants have since taken control of Rakhine position and Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin condition, with some even capturing the country’s Thandwe airport due to the AA’s military operations.
Operation 0307 was launched in the north by the insurgent Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) in early March and has since accelerated steadily throughout Kachin and the state’s northern border.
After China brokered the” Haigeng Agreement” in January, fighting started to wane in northern Shan state. As an apparent peace, the deal was largely ineffective, with numerous SAC breaches in the form of airstrikes and ordnance bombardments. The TNLA resumed its side of Operation 1027 on June 25 as a result of these breaches of the agreement.
Naungkhio on the Mandalay- Lashio roadway, way between the military base of Pyin U Lwin and the Goteik Viaduct, has recently been taken over by the TNLA. Additionally, there has been intense battle in the northeast of Kyaukme. In response to numerous aircraft and strikes on TNLA camps in the town, Naungkhio’s seizure was ordered.
Since October, SAC forces have been unable to move troops up the main highway, but they have managed to move items for many days around Lashio, where the government’s Northeastern Command is headquartered, as well as the Shan state city of Hispaw to the north. In Mogok and Mong Mit, the military is even strengthening its forces.
On the eight- month celebration of 1027, it is worthwhile considering eight essential lessons: four good and four warning for the anti- SAC opposition. The first is operating security’s significance. The first victory of 1027 owed mostly to its recipient surprise.
That the unpleasant itself, plus the movement of troops and equipment over a long period, caught the SAC off- protect illustrates the limitations of its field intelligence, both people and signals. It is obvious that keeping attack plans to “need to know” inner circles is effective.
The second concerns planning and logistics. Clearly, the offensive was meticulously organized and phased.
Nyo Twan Awng, the deputy commander of the AA, claimed that the alliance had been “preparing for almost five years to launch this large-scale operation” in the best analysis of 1027 so far, which was released by the Myanmar Peace Monitor in April. With the adequate preparations for this operation, we were able to plan it secretly. In Operation 1027, we were able to carry out attacks in a strategic, collective, surprised and synchronized manner”.
There is merit to this: the 3BA staged a “mini- 1027” in 2019 in the same area as the current fighting. That the alliance could assemble the correct force structure, arms and ammunition, and conduct tactical training on attacking specific targets, illustrates a level of strategic maturity.
The third lesson emphasizes the power of productive alliance-building. In just 15 years, the 3BA has grown from the runt of the ethnic armed organization ( EAO ) litter to the rebellion’s top dog which many PDFs are striving to emulate.
The three main members of the alliance have been successful in some ways, if not most of them are natural antagonists. The AA has no real claim to territory in Shan state, and the MNDAA and the TNLA seek to control contiguous territory ( even though tensions have grown between the two in recent months ).
The 3BA initially struggled to support post-coup resistance, but it has since benefited from the training and arming of the Mandalay PDF and other anti-coup proxies.
The fourth lesson, an intangible element of any war, concerns plain serendipity. As the old saying goes, “luck is where preparation meets opportunity”.
Operation 1027 was launched at a time when China was trying to stop the scam organizations that had spread along its border with Myanmar. It was evident that the 3BA had some support to launch the operation when it did.
Having said that, it is equally important for the alliance to learn from mistakes and difficulties that pre-exist or have developed as a result of the 1027. To the alliance’s detriment and risk of extinction, some of the cautionary lessons from the operation have been suppressed or downplayed.
The first concern is the devastating disparity in firepower between the military and its ruthless use of the armed advantage, including through its grotesque massacre of civilians.
The SAC has increasingly attacked cities that have been destroyed by the resistance since 1027 with airstrikes, heavy artillery, naval bombardment, and drone strikes. The SAC regime has deployed both” counterforce” and” countervalue” targeting to the extent that the distinction between combatant and civilian has fundamentally broken down.
The National Unity Government ( NUG) has made a complete failure to assume a more prominent leadership position in the anti-SAC war of national liberation. A Shan intellectual quipped soon after 1027 “you know the NUG was not involved for two reasons: one, it was a surprise and two, it was a success”.
Claiming an unwarranted leadership role in 1027 further dented the exiled government’s credibility. The unfortunate NUG actually only had Kawlin, a Sagaing town, to show for its limited role in 1027.
However, SAC forces recaptured the town several weeks later and essentially destroyed it. Nor have the gains of 1027 been matched by progress in the crucial Anya theater in the country’s central region, which is still chaotic, competitive and increasingly out of the NUG’s influence.
The administration’s enormous challenge has been reflected in the third incident after a military victory. EAOs with a long history of “governing” populations and territory, with established and capable” civilian” departments and usually robust civil society networks, are fully cognizant of the challenges of keeping towns functioning after seizure.
But for a group like the 3BA’s TNLA, the fast and major expansion of the territory it now operationally controls since 1027 has come with grave responsibilities of how to administer towns with little experience and limited resources for water, electricity, livelihoods, law and order, transport, education and health.
Even though some of the regions of the Karen and Kachin states are accustomed to insurgent-led administration, these experienced organizations are responding to urgent humanitarian needs as the territory under their control grows. By some estimates, Myanmar now has as many as three million displaced civilians.
The Karenni Interim Executive Council (KIEC ) has a legal system in place, but it also benefits from having a relatively small territory. Northern Shan state’s dynamics are much more enraging.
In addition, 1027 has revealed inter-group tensions between EAOs in northern Shan state, particularly between the Kachin and Ta’ang, long-standing territorial dispute, and issues involving local populations ‘ treatment by each armed group, including over the controversial issue of forced recruitment.
Unresolved conflicts between armed Shan groups and 3BA members could divert attention and resources from sustained combat against the SAC.
The United Wa State Army ( UWSA ), which hosts numerous 3BA leaders as well as EAO and NUG leaders, is perceived as expansionist, adding to the tensions. A more thorough understanding of the causes of internecine tensions must counteract the claim that 1027 demonstrated unprecedented “unity.”
Another overarching lesson from 1027 is the folly of prediction. Nearly all commentators made up their minds prematurely about the SAC’s imminent demise and a collapsed military across the country.
Some now discredited outfits were irresponsibly rash to predict” three to six months” of imminent large-scale, coordinated urban attacks on SAC positions and to the fact that various “tipping points” toward regime collapse had already been reached.
Longer forecasts of conflict and more accurate depiction of the multiple challenges that will arise from an insurgent military victory will result from careful and honest analysis over jingoistic triumphalism.
As Operation 1027 moves into its next stage, its leaders and strategists will have to carefully consider the lessons learned from October 2023 and adapt their strategies and plans for the most likely still-unfinished battle ahead.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst who studies human rights, conflict, and human rights in Myanmar.
