Indonesia’s president- vote, Prabowo Subianto, won February’s presidential vote in a flood triumph of almost 59 % of the global vote, more than double his nearest challenger.
However, Gerindra, his party, was unable to win any seats in the same legislative votes. Jokowi founded Gindra, and both of its political fortunes are correlated with his personal reputation. Yet, the party won just 14.8 % of the seats in Indonesia’s House of Representatives ( DPR ).
And even adding all the political parties that backed Probowo’s presidential campaign to his total votes only increases his total to 48 %. Additionally, this support is not a given when it comes to passing laws or approving fiscal measures.
After the fresh president and legislature take the oath of office in October, is this a recipe for conflict and tumult?
What’s on Prabowo’s objective?
Under Indonesia’s political method, Prabowo does not need a parliamentary majority to stay in business, but a difficult parliament would be a major barrier for his authorities.
The legislature can be a search on executive power and the government’s governmental initiatives, as well as a resource for contesting his parliamentary system. So, Prabowo will need to form a coalition of events to support him.
In the previous two votes he lost to Joko” Jokowi” Widodo in 2014 and 2019, he waged controversial activities. He positioned himself as a highly nationalist strongman figure and mobilised the most serious members of Indonesia’s predominately Muslim community.
Some analysts thought this strategy threatened Indonesia’s typically inclusive politics and society.
In this year’s election, but, Prabowo projected a more reasonable image and mostly committed himself to a progression of Jokowi’s plans. He did not launch campaigns for significant structural changes or new policy activities.
Jokowi’s plans have mostly emphasized economic growth, particularly equipment, such as the development of a new capital city, Nusantara, on Borneo.
Jokowi has even fought fervently for Jokowi’s economic nationalist policies. These include restrictions on the transfer of corn and other agricultural products to help local manufacturing, as well as restrictions on the trade of minerals to promote local river running.
In Prabowo’s prefer, the new parliament’s content is extremely comparable to the one from the previous year.
Previous President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s group, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle ( or PDI- P), will be the largest in the legislature to be inaugurated in October, with 110 tickets. Following up are the 102-seat Golkar Party and 86-seat Prabowo Gerindra, which is the party’s successor.
None of the events are in favor of the economic nationalist discussion that has longer, including under Jokowi, dominated Indian policy.
The parties ‘ even real policy debates are those involving contentious issues involving the state’s involvement in religious matters, particularly those involving the status of women in both public and private life.
Controversial protection
Given these factors, is Prabowo’s absence of a legislative lot really a problem?
It can be. It may cause soreness and even obstructiveness if Prabowo and his ministers do n’t properly manage their relationships with politicians.
Legislators are famous for being most concerned with pork-banging and support in their own constituencies, and party loyalties can become fragile. They frequently use their votes to improve their own personal business goals.
For instance, Prabowo might have issues with one of the two areas where his administration might produce a statement: procurement and protection policy. He appears to be committed to strengthening Indonesia’s defense might as a former military commander and defense minister and playing a major role in provincial protection and the ASEAN bloc.
His management will need to persuade strong lawmakers who are connected to home contractors and other parties who profit from military spending when it comes to significant defense budget allocations.
His questionable decision as defence secretary to obtain outdated fighter planes from Qatar in 2023 was shelved after receiving criticism in congress. His seemingly off- the- hem request for a Russia- Ukraine peace plan at a conference in June 2023 was criticized, as effectively.
Let the politicking begin
So, how will Prabowo manage the problem of the parliament?
He will almost certainly acquiesce to his predecessors ‘ strategy by entice as many parties as possible into his tent by distributing attractive ministerial positions.
Politicking for cabinet positions and cabinet contests are directly related to this. A party’s numbers in the parliament are its main bargaining chip for a seat in the cabinet. And the establishment of a ministerial position is the secret to the president gaining support from his rivals.
If experience can be used, the majority of parties will if a ministry is offered to them join his alliance. The majority of parties did this under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration from 2004–14, as well as during Jokowi’s time in office. When Jokowi gave him the defense portfolio in 2019, Prabowo gained a lot for himself.
So far, no parties have come forward to publicly lobby for a post in Prabowo’s government, but this is undoubtedly part of the game of playing hard- to- get.
It is possible that Megawati’s party, PDI- P, may stay out of the cabinet and attempt to lead a parliamentary opposition. She probably feels jilted by Jokowi, a former PDI-P, after choosing to support Prabowo over his own party’s presidential candidate during the campaign.
However, it’s possible that other parties will be open to cabinet positions. Most Indonesian parties are drawn to a portion of the government’s assets more than the idea of holding the opposition accountable, which is true, but a healthy legislature necessitates a healthy opposition.
So, from now until the October inauguration, we will witness a flurry of backroom discussions, flirtations, and negotiations between Prabowo and the party leaders to put together a cabinet.
Then, for Prabowo, comes the even harder task of trying to govern with such an unwieldy coalition, while maintaining some semblance of policy coherence and coordination.
Stephen Sherlock is Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University
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