Fresh missile systems boost the US Navy’s troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) agency’s power, but questions remain about whether enhancements can unlock its costly, troubled reputation.
During the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum in Washington, DC, US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro made significant improvements to the LCS ship.
The enhancements include the installation of the Mk 70 Payload Delivery System ( PDS ) and containerized Mk 41 vertical launching systems, enabling the LCS to launch larger missiles like the SM-6 and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, according to USNI News. The report says these modifications aim to boost the LC S’s coastal strike features, addressing earlier criticisms of the -class’s restricted power.
The report says the Freedom-class USS Beloit (LCS-29 ) and USS Nantucket (LCS-27 ) are among the first to receive these systems. It is noted that during its most recent licensing, the USS Nantucket displayed the Mk 70 PDS.
USNI News mentions the program is part of the Over-the-Horizon Weapons System update, which seeks to enhance the US Navy’s operating freedom and technical advantages, especially in the Indo-Pacific area.
Del Toro emphasized the strategic significance of these modifications, noting that they have the potential to significantly improve US marine skills around the world, including in the Persian Gulf and the Pacific. According to the document, this action is in line with the US Navy’s continued efforts to modernize its ships and keep its advantage over rivals.
The LCS was designed to target the US Navy’s “green waters” potential space, reflecting a shift in marine design philosophy from mission-specific ships to a multi-function platform. However, the program has a troubled history, marred by multiple issues since the first vessel, USS Freedom (LCS-1 ), was commissioned in 2008.
In a November 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Christian Orr mentions that the LCS program has faced significant criticism due to high costs, maintenance dependencies, and limited survivability.
Orr says that early models, such as the USS Freedom (LCS-1 ) and USS Independence (LCS-2 ), have been decommissioned despite their intended 25-year service lives. He states the LCS has been plagued by engine system problems, contractor-dependent preservation, and trouble swapping vision combinations.
He mentions that LCS reviewers claim the boats are ineffective and underarmed. According to him, the originally planned ships of 55 LCSs was reduced to 35, reflecting the agency’s problems.
Due to these problems, the LCS software has been called for to be discontinued. Anthony Carrillo claims that because of its many shortcomings and higher costs, it should be abandoned in an April 2023 Proceedings content.
Carrillo points out that despite over a century of creation, the LCS has failed to meet aspirations, with earlier models like the USS Freedom and USS Independence being decommissioned after only 13 and 11 years of service, both.
He argues that the ships have been plagued by propulsion system failures, high maintenance costs, and minimal endurance, mainly due to their metal hulls, which are prone to cracking and deterioration. He points out that the LC S’s operational range is also restricted, requiring frequent refueling, which hampers its ability to conduct missions effectively.
Additionally, Carrillo says the program’s high costs, estimated at over USD 60 billion for 35 ships and 44 mission modules, do not justify its limited capabilities.
Further, he states that the US Navy’s decision to retain only 21 of the 35 planned ships further underscores the program’s failure.
Given these problems, Carrillo believes that the LCS program drains resources because its ships are better suited to cannibalize other naval assets. He contends that the US Navy should concentrate on more affordable and capable platforms like the Constellation-class frigates to meet its operational requirements.
In an August 2024 Proceedings article, Pete Pagano claims that the LCS program’s concept warrants reconsideration because it has the potential to play important roles in contemporary naval warfare despite its initial flaws.
Pagano acknowledges the program’s rough beginning, but he claims recent improvements in mission and propulsion show promise. He mentions that the propulsion issues with the Freedom variant, as well as the validation of the mission packages for surface warfare and mine countermeasures, have been addressed.
Pagano mentions that advancements in over-the-horizon antiship missiles and Hellfire Longbows have shown otherwise despite criticisms that the LCS cannot contribute to high-end combat.
Additionally, he claims that the LC S’s large flight decks and mission bays make it suitable for supporting US Marine Corps missions and amphibious operations. He also mentions that the LCS can act as fleet scouts by deploying manned and unmanned aerial systems to quickly position and engage enemy forces.
With the right enhancements, Pagano says the LCS can become a valuable asset in the US Navy’s fleet, capable of executing various missions in diverse operational environments.
While the Constellation-class frigates were developed in response to the LCS program’s earlier failures and a capability gap brought by the retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, the Constellation-class program has its challenges.
Robert Farley mentions that the program has had significant difficulties despite the Constellation class ‘ promise of advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities and a multi-role platform with 32 vertical launching system (VLS ) cells and modern sensors in a 1945 article this month.
Farley points out that the cost of adapting the European FREMM frigate design to the US Constellation class increased from USD 800 million to USD 1.3 billion, with construction delays and workforce issues made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic.
He states that the first ship’s delivery has been pushed to 2029, raising concerns about speed, affordability, and scalability.
Farley adds that the ship’s weight may have increased as a result of the concurrent construction and design process, which could lower its speed below 25 knots and complicate upcoming modifications. Further, he says Marinette Shipyard, the Constellation class’s builder, has workforce problems that have delayed the program, creating a capability gap as the US Navy retires Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
The push to repurpose the LCS may follow the same lines of effort with its problematic Zumwalt-class destroyers, with the US Navy trying to justify a sunk-cost fallacy.
Perhaps the saving grace of trying to revive the LCS would be having the US have more hulls to match China’s People’s Liberation Army – Navy ( PLAN), which is currently the largest navy in the world in terms of hull numbers, in order to increase its hull numbers.
Asia Times has previously noted that historical evidence indicates that the larger fleet side typically prevails in naval conflicts and that sheer numbers frequently triumph over short-lived technological advantages.