Can China’s PLA fight a modern war? – Asia Times

China’s failures to reform its army may be rooted in a military skepticism that does n’t fit with contemporary needs.

Can the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) fight? In that case, how do they battle? They were in Korea under the individual waves, and they gave Taiwanese guerrilla warfare advice, but how would they fare in a contemporary war? &nbsp,

Officially, General He Weidong, the second-ranked vice president of the Central Military Commission, denounced “fake fight capabilities” in&nbsp, the defense, which experts believe are related to the current corruption investigation involving weapons purchasing.

But, Kenneth Allen and other foreign experts think that staff is the PLA’s weak link. His key results are the following:

  • The PLA has made significant changes to its joined power since 1999. These include creating a 30-year joined power, enlisting college students and graduates as two-year conscripts, switching from a one-cycle to a two-cycle per year recruitment system in 2021, and hiring immediately personnel with specific technical skills as NCOs.
  • The turnover of conscripts each month affects the yearly training period, for that units are missing a considerable number of personnel for months at a time.
  • The officer regiment has also undergone significant changes, including the elimination of the National Defense Student plan, which started in 1999, a 34-year reduction in the number of officer educational institutions, and a direct recruitment of college graduates as officers.
  • When addressing personnel issues, one must examine each service, force, and branch because they do n’t have equal conscript and NCO percentages and officers ‘ annual turnover.
  • Males may get married until they are 25 and girls until they are 23, but the soldier power consists almost wholly of young personnel”.
    Given the issues that were identified in each of these initiatives, the PLA will most likely make more significant adjustments over the coming generation. [i]ii ]

These are present issues, however they may include complicated and serious cultural roots.

Administrative legislation is opposed in Analects 2. 3 as Moss Roberts pointed out. Legge translated zheng ( make it right with a cudgel ) into law. Confucius sees zheng, along with punishment, as external force, arguing rather for de- virtuous officials who, as role models, keep conscience/sense of shame&nbsp, chi&nbsp, 恥&nbsp, ( things like having an ear to the brain ) alive in the people — a more dependable foundation of social order.

Mozi disagrees and contends that external influence on behavior is necessary, and that virtue and conscience alone are insufficient. The internal factors are forcefully recovered in Mencius ‘ theory of xing ( the personal character, what is engendered from the heart ) as inherently good. Then, Xunzi admits the existence of xing but argues that it is evil which brings us back to the need for external force pushing people to comply.

The proverb from chapter 112.5,” All men are brothers,’ makes the same point. We discover a significant correlation between li and de in chapter 2 and 3. 3. Lead the people with law/governmental administration and keep order with punishments, then they will act so as to evade punishment, losing their sense of shame. If you lead them with virtue ( de ) and maintain Ritual, the people will maintain their sense of shame and observe discipline as well. iii]ii ]]ii ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ]

Rituals like brotherhood have a hierarchy. Although classes are not universally accepted, not everyone is equal. However, there are xiao ren, little people, and junzi, lords who give orders. Ren仁” benevolence, “respect among equals holds the ranks.

Mozi replaced ren with jianai jianai ( comprehensive love ), which redefined filial service by saying that you should serve other people’s parents so that they will serve yours. iv. That is, &nbsp, jian ai &nbsp, ( jian= two hands holding tight a grain stalk, and ai sentiments between a claw and a cudgel, indicate feelings strongly controlled and held together ) has no hierarchy.

There are no differences in the way people are treated. People must come together as a single entity that respects their masters ( shang tong ), adheres to rules above, and does n’t coerce others ( xia dang ). This gradual social transformation was the premise of how Levy saw the army as a perfect projection of society as a whole ]v].

This situation is criticized by Albert Gavalny in a critical manner. A precise economic dimension to war exists. Conflict is not profitable, it’s wasteful, and it puts its survival at stake

Any military expenditure equals the equivalent of ten annual harvests in terms of waste and losses. Few states are able to form and take part in a military coalition because of the possibility of similar expenditures. ” ( Zhanguo ce 12: 672 ). Plus, incorporating new people and land within the current state was not a carefree exercise.

Greek armies made different movements. They pillaged the land, divided the spoils among the victors, and imposed a’ command’ empire on the” victi” who paid taxes, tributes to Rome but famously kept their laws and religions.

We are in completely different circumstances in ancient China because war is viewed as risky, expensive, and less than it could possibly bring. It is waged to ensure one’s political future, but not to ensure the economic growth of the Greek-Roman armies.

The generals and the strategists become very important.

What matters now are abilities demonstrated in acurate assessment of the circumstances and the circumstances of combat, accurate identification of enemy forces, the creation of plans, the development of intelligent strategies adapted to the needs of the adversary, and so on…
The soldier, an unidentified member of a large army, must follow the commander’s orders, making sure that his body consistently performs the automatic movements that are required of him. What is demanded of him is not so much bravery as docility.

In this novel theory of war, mechanical passive subservience emerges as the ineluctable prerequisite for victory as well as being able to compete for it. The main goal of the art of warfare is to remove from each soldier a docile, obedient, and useful submission through the persistent, constant, analytical, and thorough application of a tenacious disciplinary technique that is intended to completely neutralize any resistance these individuals might initially harbor.

Strictly speaking, the meaning of war no longer pertains to the person who wages it, to the person whose blood is spilled in the heat of combat. Human nature itself is the determining force of discipline. [vii ]]vii]

Here, the primary tool of control of the soldier is fear. Fighting a war in Greece involves greed and self-preservation of the “polis,” the” res publica” to which each soldier feels he belongs. Then, it is about his friends, agape, brotherly love, which he created by standing next to each other while wearing a spear or shield.

Conversely, in ancient China, we have this:

The masses are typically just manipulable, objects, unable to resist or oppose, as they are known to be. Although human beings are living organisms governed by natural laws, they automatically recoil from any situation in which they might lose their lives and would therefore put up the utmost resistance against going to battle on the battlefield if these strategic and authoritarian thinkers are correct and that humans do indeed have a natural inclination to desire with all of his might something that might benefit him, and to avoid by every means possible anything that might adversely affect him, the theory appears to hit a major stumbling block or

The survival instinct, these authoritarian and military thinkers managed to invert and capitalize on the situation by making fear of death their best ally. Fear at the idea that losing one’s life would offer or at least serve as the foundation for two different kinds of solutions. The first was straightforward coercion, meaning that any commander who attempted to flee would simply face execution ( Shangjunshu 10: 70 ) and those who were not bellicose or otherwise in the mood would be punished. ” &nbsp, ]viii ] &nbsp,

The Chinese capitalized on the familial vibe to accomplish that. The family will be compensated if a soldier, a member of a large family with many children, passes away. If one shrinks duties, the family will be punished.

losing men to defeat the king

The new peasant-soldier, who has lost the heroic, virile qualities of the traditional warrior and has no chance of acting as a free agent, is transformed into a simple disciplined object act, which is an inherent logic of the interchangeability of soldiers in mass-based warfare, the introduction of a logic of “replacements” as an axiom of the new way of conceiving the military arts, which connotes the abandonment of initiative in favor of passivity, calm, and ” ]ix ]

On the other hand. Everything develops differently if it is not about losing one or a few men but rather putting the country’s survival at risk:

” Because war is extremely expensive and wastes much more than it gains,” Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost ( Billeter 1984: 49 ) … Ideally, at least, the perfect military action is that which, so to speak, has zero energy cost ( Billeter 1984: 49 ) … The confrontation is not, for Chinese strategic thinking, anything but the consequence of symmetry or, at least, an insignificant difference between the warring factions because, otherwise, there would be a manifest, irreversible imbalance between the two camps, which would give rise to two possibilities. First, when the conflict finally occurs, it would be an unfair fight between a strong side and a weak side, which would quickly end in favor of the latter to avoid the undesirable effects of a drawn-out battle.

The weak side might abandon its aggressive plans and concede defeat as a result of the dissuasive nature of the conflict between the strong and weak sides. In both cases, confrontation, understood as a process of reciprocal wear and tear, is ruled out…it is necessary to extend the logic of war to other human activities, including the ostensibly peaceful ones. Politics, economics, and diplomacy become the ideal extension of war, which is no longer viewed as a conflict or conflict but rather as a domination process.

Therefore, it would seem logical to include a chapter titled” Civil Offensives” ( wenfa ), which describes up to twelve non-violent subversion strategies that can be used, among others, to sabotage social cohesion by inciting insurrection, discredit him in the international sphere, bribe his officials, etc., in order to ensure his complete submission ( Taigong Liutao 14: 88–93 ). ” ]x ]

If it is about projecting fear and intimidation, it is crucial to “keep moving and continue to advance through the “empty” points, or the gaps in the enemy’s ground ( xu), while avoiding his stronger, more consistent, or “full” areas ( shi), as well. xi]

Controlling the light

Keeping the enemy too bright or too dark is still a two-way method of blinding it, though. Because one loses sight, being too bright makes it more effective. The West then has a strategic advantage here.

Everything is constantly changing, and it keeps everything in flux. Consider the 2024 drama about President Joe Biden for instance. In early July 2024, nobody knows for sure if he will keep running for president or if he will win or lose.

China, on the other hand, casts everything into the distance. Although blinding, light gives a sense of freedom that darkness does not.

Moreover, present US military actions are limited ( not an all- out war ) and frequent. They do n’t pose a threat to life and aim to balance advantages with costs. Similar to Greek-Roman customs, their soldiers are not passive instruments but increasingly active, entrepreneurial players looking for their gain.

The recognition of private property fits this. The advantages derived from war ca n’t be challenged or taken advantage of by anyone. The cultural pillar of this conflict is Achilles turning against Agamemnon and refusing to fight after Agamemnon, the Greeks ‘ commander, seizes Achilles ‘ spoils of war.

This memory may have been set aside for a while, as we had Napoleonic armies with large masses of disposable people. However, in contemporary wars, significant battles are no longer fought by closed-rank armies but by units led by superiority, which have a high degree of independent judgment of shifting circumstances.

The initiative left to individual units, or operatives is held together by a shared sense of purpose, which includes a desire not to be a single man but to a cultural-ideal project, polis as a physical space, and political project. If the general or the president does n’t fit the project, the soldier can turn against him either through proper internal channels or by voting against the president at the next elections. Nothing like that can be found in China. Unwavering loyalty is to the party and its top leader, who cannot be dissented or questioned without putting a dent in the entire socio-political edifice on the line.

The Western dynamic starts a complex dialectical relationship with one’s superiors and generals. Generals are not expected to motivate soldiers as they become replaceable tools. Starting this dialectic produces levels of freedom of expression and what we might refer to as “democracy,” challenging a monolithic hold on power. Soldiers must be kept happy or they will revolt and topple the power.

Soldiers must not have freedom if all power is held in one place. Then they are passive, not proactive, and unsuited for contemporary war conditions.

Plus, a fully disposable army fits a social model where families agree to sacrifice a young man for their collective benefit and have more young men who enjoy the sacrifice of their sibling. This requires a large number of unattractive young men in a family, or children. However, because of the one-child policy, that pool no longer exists, and families only receive damages if their single child is dead, burned, or shell-shocked.

One might have imagined fighting a modern war was like playing a video game, guiding from afar toy- like drones. However, that dream is disproven by the World War I-like casualties on the battlefields in Ukraine or Gaza. To risk their lives and well-being, China would need millions of volunteers. Maybe China does n’t have them.

In essence, modern wars demand various degrees of freedom for a man to risk his own return and the rights of his followers. The traditional Chinese army and state are in trouble with this.

Moreover, while posturing and threatening might work with countries similarly cautious about war, it can backfire with countries more ready to engage in conflict. The US Army’s intention when it calls on the PLA to reduce its rhetoric is to create a situation where it wo n’t feel forced to act in response.

That is, if China expresses its anger through symbolic gestures and words, the US might respond by silently and effectively instead of by backing away ( as China might expect ). Still, China ca n’t back down from this trend because its domestic structure would see it as a loss of face. In Chinese politics, losing a face signifies losing everything and losing power.

Due to the two defense ministers ‘ firings and the PLA’s overall shaken, this is the deep-seated challenge of the 3rd Party Plenum, which will focus on both the economy and perhaps also the army.

In summary, China needs a different kind of state organization and a different economy to have a modern fighting army. Perhaps this is the issue. Despite the enormous domestic headwinds, President Xi Jinping is moving in this direction, and it’s unclear what will happen next.

In the meantime, one could argue that the king is naked, the PLA is possibly far less fierce than it claims to be and it could be easily challenged. Even making this claim could have ominous consequences: it could make China lose face and, in turn, lose everything. China could start a devastating war if it takes the risk of losing everything. Then: damn if the PLA is strong, worse if the PLA is weak.

This article was originally published on the Appia Institute and is now republished with permission. Read the original right here.