Donald Trump’s and his Republican Party’s overwhelming success in the US election on November 5 certainly signals a significant shift in the world’s role, at least for the next four decades but also likely for many more.
Trump’s presidency in 2017 and 2018 cannot be characterized as being inconsistent with the standard international authority pattern of the United States. We must now accept the absurdity and the fact that Trump is defining a new standard with his partial restoration of the well-known style of American management.
However, despite what it may be, acknowledging this does not provide an immediate understanding of how the new classification of American leadership will affect the country or the earth in the wake of the 2028 presidential election or elsewhere.
Let’s set aside Trump’s and his supporters ‘ potential impact on America’s judicial system and its institutions of government, though important, on a domestic level. This will have an impact on America’s reputation as a democracy and liberal society, but it wo n’t have an impact on foreign policy unless unavoidable internal conflict arises.
We are certain that the new Trump administration will approach foreign affairs with a aggressive, transactional, and based on the guiding principle of” America First” if that phrase is truly regarded as a rule. In many respects, the management will also be unstable, as it is well known that President-elect Trump is a guy who typically changes his mind, yet quite abruptly.
But beyond that, much is sure.
Two factors lie behind this confusion. One is just the distinction between regulating and fighting. To plan is to inspire and to get recognition, to manage, as the old saying goes, is to choose. Despite any significant inconsistencies in his promises, Trump’s fighting style has a crucial quality: his determination to say something that he thinks will appeal to voters or keep him in the spotlight. When governing, decisions may be avoided.
The second reason is that besides having the largest economy in the world, America also has a lot of international financial and security concerns and exposure. Due to this truth,” America First” is much more difficult to put into practice than it might have appeared on the campaign trail. The depth and breadth of America’s global safety and business interests make this a distant possibility, despite the widespread concern that many people will turn to isolationism and detachment in the 1930s.
Look only at Elon Musk, the billionaire who backed Trump’s plan most conspicuously and who since the poll has stuck close to his part: Musk’s electronic vehicle business, Tesla, builds cars and components in factories in Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and China as well as the United States, his Starlink satellite-based internet business is world, and his SpaceX business has customers worldwide too, all depend on global supply chains for their manufacturing. ” America First” means much to him, and could even pose a threat to his companies.
The fighting and the guarantees are thus riven with contradictions. Trump’s repeated demands that allies in NATO and bilateral security alliances in Asia may add more to security wasting and military capabilities, and his declarations that he plans to implement higher tariffs on American imports from Japan, Europe, and other countries, are at odds with what is most important with international affairs. Because Europe and other countries rely on them for a lot of crucial supplies, this may make it harder for those allies to add more and raise America’s personal defense procurement costs.
Another contradiction is that Trump campaigned fervently for the idea that he may seek “peace through strength” by increasing America’s unique defense spending and confronting China in every way required, but his plans threaten to erode that really strength by eroding America’s alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
The American defense sector relies heavily on co-production with allies and partners, particularly Japan and South Korea, to meet the country’s current military needs.
Even Republican Party strategists believe that convincing neighboring nations in the area to at least stay neutral or ideally lean toward America has long been a key part of America’s China strategy. Slapping high tariffs on goods from India, Vietnam, the Philippines and other” strategic partners”, in the preferred diplomatic jargon, is hardly the best way to seduce them.
Therefore, much depends on how these contradictions are resolved and what America First actually means. Trump’s campaign pledge to “end” Russia’s war in Ukraine by negotiating a peace raises a serious issue. He will also need to consider Russia’s strategic partnership with China and its use of soldiers and munitions from North Korea. He and his national security team will need to determine how to compete with China while engaging in trade wars at the same time.
Even the most zealous of America Firsters cannot deny the significance of US military installations in Japan and Japan’s own defense development, so there may be room for compromise in the case of Japan. However, many nations that do n’t have such close ties to the US will view recent moves to join China-led alliances like the BRICS as prudent bet hedging.
There is no denying that the Trump administration will face China with the same level of brutality as the Biden team. The contradictions concern the potential effectiveness of that policy, not its direction. In exchange for Taiwan’s support and protection, the Trump administration wo n’t knowingly attempt to entice a Chinese takeover. We can anticipate Trump trying to meet with Kim again despite his previous discussions with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, whose conflict with Russia is likely to be slowed down by any attempt at personal communication.
The re-election of Donald Trump spells the end, for now, of the old form of American leadership. With the world’s largest economy and military force, and with interests all around the globe, America will still, however, remain a leader. Where and how long-term it will be possible is something we have n’t yet learned.
Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist,  , Bill Emmott , is currently chairman of the , Japan Society of the UK, the , International Institute for Strategic Studies , and the , International Trade Institute.
The Mainichi Shimbun published an English version of an article from November 17 that was originally published in English as the original. It is republished with permission.