Just a few days after the public vote, on July 26, 2023, Thai bodybuilder Hun Sen announced that he would resign and be succeeded by his son, Nun Manet. He declared that the vote was the turning point in the sequence, demonstrating that Hun Manet had the backing of the populace to succeed his father as prime minister.
Following the historic 2013 election, which was the most competitive general election in recent memory, Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party ( CPP) received a clear indication that political change was required to resurrect their waning support.
After more than 40 years of CPP law, the new legitimization method, which saw the children of party officials succeed their fathers as state leaders, was anticipated to provide the nation’s expanding youth population with the energizing social shakeup it so desperately needs. & nbsp,
However, the generational change didn’t begin until after the results of the aggressive elections. If aggressive elections can return, it will depend on Hun Manet and his new administration’s ability to make Cambodia an upper-middle money nation by 2030, which was a target set by HuN Sen.
Hun Sen and the CPP had the assurance that a transfer of power may eventually take place thanks to the brutal repression and co-optation of democratic opposition.
By ensuring that there was no Pakatan Harapan-like coalition that would remove them from power, the CPP was determined to spare the United Malays National Organization ( UMNO ) – Barisan Nasional ( BN ) coalition in Malaysia. & nbsp,
In an election without the disbanded Cambodia National Rescue Party( CNRP ), the CPP won all seats in the National Assembly in 2018 after Pakatan Harapan decisively defeated the UMNO-BN coalition.
Thus, political scientists Dan Slater and Joseph Wong believe that since 2008, Cambodia has avoided” embittered authoritarianism ,” a paralyzing state in which an unreliable regime has found itself. In actuality, the government endures and prospers, and a once-in-a-generation power change has been approved.
In Hun Manet’s Cambodia, dynamic votes may be revived if they perished to make room for the change in leadership. It is likely that Western governments, especially the United States, will continue to play a part in Cambodia’s resumption of aggressive elections. & nbsp,
However, the United States may need to use compelling rather than aggressive strategies to persuade Cambodia to ease its repression of social opposition as it tries to hit a delicate balance between political competition and democracy promotion.
Another possibility is Cambodia liberalizing on its own terms, according to Slater and Wong’s democracy through power hypothesis, which contends that Asian autocratic regimes concede politics in order to maintain power. & nbsp,
This would necessitate the new state achieving significant evolutionary success as a prerequisite for relaxation. The state of Hun Manet will need to produce outcomes. & nbsp,
Hun Manet must base his legitimacy on modernizing Cambodia with a narrowing success space rather than relying solely on red GDP growth figures as the thermometer, if Husband Sen’s validity was based on his claims of liberating the land from the Khmer Rouge program.
Because he is unable to access the state-building validity that his father was, that may be the only source of legitimacy left for him to obtain. & nbsp,
Hun Sen and the CPP were able to monopolize the use of force over Cambodia’s place by 1998 by putting down armed resistance put up by the last of the past regimes and assimilating the military pressure devoted to the adversary FUNCINPEC party. It was a feat of” stateness” that had long eluded Cambodia.
Hun Manet is not a part of this historic legacy and don’t use it to support his rule. What he can do is show that the CPP deserves to run the state — not because it was built, but rather since it is capable of doing so more effectively than other parties. & nbsp,
When a political opening is required to maintain social legitimacy, competitive elections may be tolerated. Hun Manet and Nun Sen are assured that performance legitimacy may give the CPP enough strength to contend with the opposition for majority support.
However, a lot would also depend on the younger population of Cambodia’s enthusiasm for reviving aggressive elections. Because they are powerful, authoritarian rulers do not simply permit dynamic elections. & nbsp,
Young people in Cambodia, who are expected to become more challenging as their lifestyle conditions improve, will need to put pressure on liberalization.
They must convey that the CPP’s legitimacy would depend on the level of social conflict and economic development that it offers, as well as the extent to which popular opposition parties cannot continue to be denied voting rights.
The political playing field is likely to be greatly skewed in favor of the CPP as it was prior to the CNRP’s breakdown in 2017, even if competitive elections return. & nbsp,
The CPP could use performance legitimacy and unfair elections as part of its new ruling strategy, which has worked well for Malaysia’s UMNO for four decades and still does for the & nbsp, the Peoples Action Party in Singapore, if it achieves high levels of economic development.
Mun ( Mark ) Vong is a lecturer at Griffith University’s School of Government and International Relations.
This post, which was originally published by the East Asia Forum, has been republished with a Creative Commons license.