Ukraine mineral deal is no US security guarantee – Asia Times

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The US vice-president, JD Vance, just told Fox News that” the very best protection assurance” to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine once was” to provide Americans financial benefit in the future of Ukraine”.

The assumption is that the much-debated minerals package, in which an investment portfolio managed by Kyiv and Washington did acquire revenue from Ukraine’s natural resources, would make American financial interests in Ukraine. National surveillance interests, it is suggested, could quickly follow.

Vance’s remarks came with the offer hanging in the balance. A conference at the White House on February 28, where the package was expected to remain signed, turned into a shouting match between Vance, the US senator, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky.

Zelensky has since attempted to patch up relations with the Trump administration, announcing that he is ready to sign the deal at “any day and in any suitable format”. And Vance, when asked whether an agreement was still on the board, said Trump “is also committed” to reaching a bargain.

Having access to Ukrainian nutrients is an important option for America’s weapon system electronics and electronic vehicle industries. Ukraine is, for instance, home to around one-third of all German sodium payments, the key element in batteries.

This exposure is especially important now that China, which now accounts for a large proportion of particular US nutrient imports, has imposed a ban on exporting unique minerals to the US in retaliation for Trump’s tariff policies.

But, while Ukraine’s minerals are tempting to the US and other world powers, a deal with Trump won’t help Ukraine’s security situation.

The US vice-president, JD Vance, and House Speaker Mike Johnson ahead of Trump’s speech to Congress on March 4. &nbsp, Photo: Shawn Thew / EPA via The Conversation

Trump’s approach has two main flaws. First, research shows that investment typically follows security commitments, not the other way around. Investors seek markets that are stable and protected, rather than hoping their investments create those conditions.

Previous US presidents have touted similar strategies without success. President William Howard Taft ( 1857-1930 ) championed “dollar diplomacy” in the early 20th century, promising that American investments would create stability across Latin America by” substituting dollars for bullets”.

The reality proved quite different. Throughout this period, the US frequently used military force to protect oil interests in Latin America. But, because these interventions focused on extraction sites rather than defending entire countries, instability continued elsewhere in the region.

Trump’s” America first” mantra suggests a similar pattern of defending American assets, and not necessarily the countries in which the assets reside.

Second, the overall US commitment to protect American assets abroad is uncertain. The US has, since the end of the cold war, been selective about when and how it uses military force to protect overseas assets.

Since 1991, the US military has intervened to protect American property in only four documented instances: Haiti in 2004, Lebanon in 2006, Egypt in 2011 and Yemen in 2012. These cases involved embassies and other smaller properties during periods of civil unrest, rather than defending economic interests.

Recent presidents, including Trump, have been reluctant to use force to protect threatened American investments. US agribusiness giant Cargill, for example, had to close its operations in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region following Russia’s invasion in 2014.

Building state capacity

That said, economic relations with America can indeed bolster a partner state’s security. But my own research shows that this is largely through indirect channels, rather than the threat of military intervention.

For example, US government departments, such as the US patent and trademark office, provide comprehensive training to partner states. Programs involve training judges, police officers, prosecutors and policymakers to enforce intellectual property protections, administer land registries, combat counterfeiting and develop legal frameworks that protect investments.

This capacity building not only helps American investors in these countries, but also improves the partner state’s overall capacity. More effective and capable bureaucracies are better able to manage and finance their military capabilities.

Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the US launched the agriculture and rural development support program. The initiative aimed to develop Ukraine’s institutional capacity for managing property rights and attracting diverse investments.

The US Treasury brought in loan advisory firm First Financial Network to help Ukraine navigate its financial crisis after the invasion, while simultaneously building frameworks for foreign investment.

By 2020, this partnership facilitated US investment firm Allrise Capital’s purchase of Odessa’s Chornomorets football stadium. This deal was described by John Morris, the president of First Financial Network, as demonstrating Ukraine’s ability” to sell assets to the international community”.

These efforts did not deter Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. But they helped the Ukrainian government implement several administrative reforms in the years leading up to the invasion, including more efficient tax collection and professionalisation of civil servants. The government was better prepared for war than it would otherwise have been.

A Ukrainian soldier standing guard in a war-damaged town.
The Ukrainian and Russian armies have been locked in battle for over three years. Photo: Kutsenko Volodymyr / Shutterstock via The Conversation

If the US wants to enhance Ukraine’s security through economic means, the Trump administration would need to make two drastic changes.

First, it would need to reinstate programs that promote American investment abroad. After assuming office, Trump froze and began dismantling the United States Agency for International Development ( USAID ). The agency’s capacity-building efforts have security consequences.

Second, for the US to have both an economic and security impact, Trump needs to reassure America’s allies. Assurances are not Trump’s specialty. On February 26, for example, Trump declined to say whether the US would defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China.

Research suggests that investments follow alliances. But markets do not care about agreements alone. They respond to other signals too, like explicit statements of support. These statements of support also help to reassure allies and deter rivals.

Unless Trump changes how he operates on the international stage, the economics of the mineral deal will not help Ukraine’s security situation.

Patrick E Shea is senior lecturer in international relations and global governance, University of Glasgow

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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China ‘mass produces’ semiconductor-related papers – Asia Times

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China has become the nation’s No. 1 country in publishing semiconductor-related papers, more than the following three ranked countries combined, according to a report published by the Emerging Technology Observatory ( ETO ) at Georgetown University. &nbsp,

The ETO report said that from 2018 to 2023, Chinese scholars published 160, 852 academic articles, more than the US ( 71, 688 ), India ( 39, 709 ), Japan ( 30, 401 ), and South Korea ( 28, 345 ). Regarding the number of quotes per article, the US achieved 17.6, compared with China’s 14.8. &nbsp,

All the leading 10 research institutions were based in China, except France’s Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, which ranked No. 3. &nbsp,

From 2018 to 2023, the Chinese Academy of Sciences ( CAS ) published 14, 387 chip-related articles, followed by the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (7, 849 ), the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (5, 446 ), and the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (5, 237 ). &nbsp,

Nevertheless, China just ranked five globally regarding the number of documents published by device makers.

Samsung published 1, 940 articles from 2018 to 2023, followed by STMicroelectronics ( 1, 070 ), Intel ( 951 ), Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp ( TSMC, 611 ) and China Electronic Technology Group Corp ( CETC, 594 ).

In terms of the number of citations per article, Intel achieved 17.3, followed by Samsung ( 16.8 ), IBM ( 15.4), and Samsung ( 16.8 ). CETC ranked simply 10th. &nbsp,

The South China Morning Post (SCMP), owned by Alibaba’s co-founder Jack Ma, reported on the ETO statement with the article” Tech battle: China leads US in number, quality of silicon research, record finds”. It referred to “quantity” as Foreign experts’ large number of quotes per post.

Zachary Arnold, a lead analyst at&nbsp, the ETO, told Nature publication that although the study’s results do not think that China is currently leading the chip-making area, “it’s showing us where items are headed”.

The ETO statement added that if China develops its analysis work into professional applications, the US may soon find it impossible to apply export controls to maintain its competitive advantage in high-performance device design and production.

Chen Yunji, a co-founder of AI-chip architecture firm Cambricon, told Nature that China’s ability to make high-end cards lags behind its chip architecture, largely according to US export controls. &nbsp,

However, the quality of some scientific papers in China is in fear due to the activities of “paper mills”, which refer to businesses that produce false or low-quality manuscripts&nbsp, and promote author.

On December 31 last month, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued instruction calling for a crackdown on “paper mill”. It also called for lower courts to bite down on “paper business bars” and severely punish those who committed research scams.

US export controls

In 2019, the Trump administration asked ASML, the world’s largest chip equipment supplier in the Netherlands, to stop shipping extreme-ultraviolet ( EUV) lithography machines to China. EUV lithography can make 7nm chips in a single exposure and 2-3nm chips in multiple exposures.

Since then, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp ( SMIC ) has tried making 7nm chips using deep-ultraviolet ( DUV) lithography machines and multiple exposure techniques. It&nbsp, successfully made Kirin 9000s chips for Huawei Technologies ‘ Mate60 smartphones, which were launched in September 2023.

At the beginning of 2024, the Dutch government stopped granting licenses for ASML to export its NXT: 2000i and subsequent DUV immersion systems to China. &nbsp,

” China’s scientific and technological innovation has more than once defied people’s imagination”, Minister Wang Yi, member of the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Foreign Minister, said in a press conference in Beijing on March 7.

” This journey has not been smooth. Be it missile technology, space science or chip making, unjustified external suppression has never stopped. But where there is a blockade, there is a breakthrough, where there is suppression, there is innovation”.

Citing an ancient Chinese verse,” No mountains can stop the surging flow of a mighty river”, Wang said blockade cannot stop China’s technological advancement. &nbsp,

He said science and technology should not be used to create an iron curtain but be shared by all, China is ready to share its technology with the Global South. &nbsp,

He stressed that “high fences and small yards”, a policy that forbids China from obtaining US high technology during the Biden era, could not suppress China’s spirit of innovation. He said decoupling and disruption of supply chains will only lead to self-isolation.

US President Donald Trump, who began his second term on January 20 this year, also thinks Biden’s “high fences and small yards” &nbsp, policy does not work.

White House officials have recently met with Japanese and Dutch officials to discuss stopping Tokyo Electron and ASML from maintaining semiconductor gear at Chinese chip fabs.

They said Japan and the Netherlands should ask their firms to match the limits the US has placed on its own companies, including Lam Research Corp, KLA Corp and Applied Materials Inc.

Surpassing South Korea?

China has been trying to make its lithography for a decade by pouring tens of billions of dollars into the semiconductor industry. However, the program failed to achieve the expected results due to corruption. In July 2022, a dozen top Chinese officials and executives of a national investment fund and related companies were arrested.

China now focuses on chip design and packaging technologies, which do not rely on EUV lithography.

The Korea Institute of S&amp, T Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP), a think tank in South Korea, said in a recent survey that China has overtaken Korea in nearly every major area of semiconductor technology.

The survey, which interviewed 39 industry experts, said China now leads in high-intensity and resistance-based memory technology, scoring 94.1 % compared to Korea’s 90.9 %. The highest benchmark is 100 %.

Resistance-based memory, or resistive random access memory ( ReRAM or RRAM ), is a future technology suitable for deep learning computations. It will eventually replace traditional flash memory.

KISTEP also found that Korea lags behind China in high-performance, low-power artificial intelligence ( AI ) chips, scoring 84.1 % compared to China’s 88.3 %. &nbsp,

It said the rise of China’s chip technology is a wake-up call for Korea, which must accelerate its technological innovation with government and private-sector support. &nbsp,

Last year, Huawei struggled to make enough Kirin 9100 chips for its new flagship smartphone, Mate70, due to SMIC’s limited production capability of 7nm chips. &nbsp,

A Henan-based IT columnist said China could use its 14nm chip processing and 3D packaging technology to make chips with performance equivalent to 3nm and 5nm chips. This would involve stacking up some mid-end chips to increase computing speed.

Yong Jian is a contributor to the Asia Times. He is a Chinese journalist who specializes in Chinese technology, economy and politics. &nbsp,

Read: Huawei’s Mate70 to flex high-end chip self-sufficiency

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Noose tightens as Europe confronts its dependence on US technology – Asia Times

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Like a casino immediately realizing that the house always wins, Europe is waking up to the harsh reality of its dependence on British strength. For years, the peninsula relied on US security guarantees, not questioning the strings that may occur attached.

As&nbsp, German leaders&nbsp, find themselves scrambling – both to protect Ukraine and to protect themselves from Washington’s shifting desires – one great fear is a looming threat of US tech liquidity.

Beyond the degradation of the safety awning, the US is also proving that its industrial monopoly poses yet another danger to Western security.

Reuters previously&nbsp, reported, citing three unamed options, &nbsp, that US diplomats pressured Kyiv to mark a critical materials deal, yet suggesting constraints on Starlink, the SpaceX-owned satellite system, after President Zelensky rejected an initial plan from the US.

The report sparked controversy, prompting&nbsp, Poland&nbsp, to understand that it funds Ukraine’s Starlink exposure and will proceed to do so. Since Russia’s invasion, Poland has provided 20, 000 Starlink models and covered their repair costs, despite information that the US floated the possibility of cutting exposure while pushing for a materials offer.

Musk responded to the statement on social media, &nbsp, commenting,” This is false”. While his rejection may be right as far as it goes, it is also correct that Musk didn’t try to ease concerns by going beyond his brief reply to give assurances that the US would not in the upcoming attempt to destroy US tech against Europe.

That chance remains, especially as the Trump administration aligns more closely with&nbsp, Vladimir Putin&nbsp, and Putin ‘s&nbsp, position&nbsp, on Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

On March 5, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski warned that canceling Starlink access for Ukraine may cause an international issue with the US. Gawkowski stressed that a move to reduce Poland’s Starlink deals would significantly strain relations, &nbsp, stating,” I cannot imagine a scenario where a business partnership between Poland and a US company is immediately stopped”.

Musk’s role in controlling access to Starlink had sparked controversy earlier. He had&nbsp, admitted&nbsp, to refusing to activate Starlink over Crimea, claiming he wanted to avoid complicity in what he called a “major act of war” as Ukrainian sea drones attempted to strike Russian naval assets. &nbsp,

Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed that the country is&nbsp, exploring&nbsp, alternatives to Starlink for frontline communications, although details remain undisclosed.

Ukrainian soldier setting up a Starlink for a drone mission in 2024 during the battle for Chasiv Yar. Photo: David Kirichenko

Starlink has acted as the backbone of Ukraine’s frontline communications. At the war’s outset, Russia launched cyberattacks on&nbsp, Viasat&nbsp, to cripple Ukrainian military networks, showing the importance of satellite communications for command and control.

However, to reduce dependence, Ukraine has already been&nbsp, integrating&nbsp, alternative satellite systems like Kymeta for its sea drones.

Andrii Kovalenko of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council&nbsp, stated&nbsp, that the front line is now&nbsp, stocked with fiber-optic cables, high-speed modems and satellite services from Swedish and German providers, for use in the event Starlink goes offline.

Serhiy, a drone unit leader from the 23rd Mechanized Brigade, told me that a shutdown would no longer have the same impact as before, due to improved internet re-transmitters.

Musk’s refusal to activate Starlink for Ukraine’s Black Sea drone operations should have been an early warning for Europe. The continent cannot afford to depend on a system controlled by one individual who has shown a willingness to cut service based on personal whims or political pressure.

Adding fuel to the dumpster fire, Musk took to social media to&nbsp, advocate&nbsp, for the US to withdraw from NATO.

The gun isn’t pointed only at Ukraine. If Russia were to invade Europe – especially the Baltics – there is no guarantee that Musk wouldn’t restrict Starlink access to aid Moscow. Having previously limited access over occupied Crimea, he could do so again, justifying it as a move to prevent nuclear escalation. Trump, after all, has already threatened 25 % tariffs on EU imports, &nbsp, claiming&nbsp, the bloc was designed to “screw” the US.

Italy is now&nbsp, reconsidering&nbsp, a €1.5 billion deal with Starlink for military and government use, citing shifting US commitments to the security of Europe including Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Franco-British satellite operator Eutelsat is emerging as a potential&nbsp, alternative&nbsp, for Europe and Ukraine. Eutelsat ‘s&nbsp, shares&nbsp, have skyrocketed as a result of the rumors. &nbsp, However, it may take years before&nbsp, Eutelsat&nbsp, can match Starlink’s connectivity for both military and civilian use.

<a href=”https://www.wired.com/story/starlink-replacement-ukraine-eutelsat-oneweb-project-kuiper-amazon-iris2-elon-musk/”>Replacing Starlink presents significant logistical and financial challenges. OneWeb, which merged with Eutelsat in 2022, charges approximately$ 10, 000 per terminal, compared with Starlink’s$ 600 per unit, making widespread adoption a costly endeavor.

Ukraine currently relies on roughly 40, 000 Starlink terminals, whereas Eutelsat has only a few thousand in stock and would need to rapidly scale production to meet demand. Compounding the issue, Eutelsat does not manufacture its own terminals, instead relying on industry partners to produce both consumer and military-grade devices.

Meanwhile, &nbsp, Trump&nbsp, attempted to tell Americans to worry less about Putin and more about migrants so the country doesn’t end up like Europe. Once Trump cut off&nbsp, intelligence&nbsp, and military aid to&nbsp, Ukraine, it became clear that his administration would be willing to weaponize whatever it might take to achieve its goals.

This is not the America Europe once knew – and that goes for European populist and nationalist counterparts of Trump. Dutch populist Geert Wilders, affirming his support for Ukraine, called Trump’s Oval Office clash with Zelenskyy “fascinating TV, but not the best way to end the war”.

French far-right leader Marine Le Pen condemned the US aid halt as “brutal” and” cruel”, while Britain’s Nigel Farage criticized Vice President JD Vance for dismissing UK peacekeepers in Ukraine, calling him “wrong, wrong, wrong”.

Europe is now awakening to the reality that American support can no longer be taken for granted. Trump’s disregard for traditional alliances has forced Europe to act with unprecedented urgency.

Ironically, his actions have done more to galvanize European defense efforts than three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now &nbsp, Europe&nbsp, is working to generate €800 billion of additional defense spending in the coming years.

Much of what is spent, of course, will go for military tech. The European Union in 2024 approved a €10.6 billion investment for IRIS² in 2024, a European satellite broadband initiative designed to reduce dependence on US providers. However, cost and time remain significant challenges in Europe’s effort to catch up and establish a more self-sufficient infrastructure.

The only viable path forward is for Europe to reinforce its own defenses while ensuring a strong Ukraine to deter future Russian threats. As the world order fractures, Europe must act faster than ever to secure its future.

David Kirichenko is a Ukrainian-American journalist-activist and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on the social media platform X @DVKirichenko.

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EU spending billions more on defense won’t do much for Ukraine – Asia Times

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On March 3, US President Donald Trump paused all US military aid to Ukraine. This move was apparently triggered by a heated change a few days before between Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.

In response, European Union leaders have now committed to rearm Europe by mobilizing €800 billion ( about US$ 867 billion ) in defense spending.

Of the EU leaders, 26 ( excluding Hungary ) signed an agreement that peace for Ukraine must be accompanied by “robust and credible” security guarantees.

They agreed there can be no discussions on Ukraine without Ukraine’s membership. It was also agreed the EU may continue to give regular defense and non-military aid to Ukraine.

At the same time, the United Kingdom has committed to the biggest increase in military saving since the Cold War.

The EU’s united front may produce powerful threats and hinder a direct assault on EU countries.

But, for Ukraine, it will not lead to a military victory in its war with Russia. While Europe has stepped up money, this is not enough for Ukraine to fight Soviet troops now occupying about 20 % of the country.

For Ukraine, the departure of US support did greatly tension the ability to keep fighting. Ukraine will probably want to find a way to freeze the issue this year. This may mean a temporary ceasefire that does not fully lose Russian country to Russia.

A Trumpian view

The greatly different methods of the US under Trump and the EU level to a deeper philosophical break.

While the Trump administration has acted more quickly and confidently in international politics than many expected, its view is hardly surprising.

Since Trump won the US presidential election in November last month, Europe and Ukraine have known that a change in US scheme would be on the cards.

Trump’s method to Ukraine is not only about financial issues and withdrawing US military support. It is about a deeper, more substantial clash of viewpoints.

Trump ( and, it appears, his core support base ) hold a “great power politics” approach to world affairs.

This technique assumes we live in a competitive world where states are motivated to maximise profits and dominate. Results can be achieved through sanctions or rewards.

Countries with greater military or financial power” matter” more. They are expected to establish their will on weaker locations. This stance underpinned much of the imperial action of the 19th and 20th centuries.

This view expects conflict – and it expects stronger nations to “win”.

Regular with Trump’s perspective, Russia is a local authority that has the “right” to command smaller states in its village.

Trump’s method to Ukraine is not an aberration. Nor is it a short-term and unexpected measure to get the worldwide spotlight.

Trump’s view leads to the logical and consistent assumption that Russia will seek to control nations within its sphere of influence.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented an attempt to impose its will on a militarily weaker state that it considered to be in its lawful area of control.

The EU option

Opposed to this view, the EU is founded on the idea that nations can work together for shared profits through cooperation and compromise. This method underpins the function of what are called the Bretton Woods Institutions created in the aftermath of World War II.

This view expects cooperation rather than conflict. Socially useful and collaborative solutions are found through dialogue and negotiation.

According to this view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is about a conflict between the values of a democratic politics and those of an oppressive authoritarian regime.

Zelensky has himself constantly framed the issue as being about a fight of values: liberty and democracy than authoritarianism and manage.

A mix of both?

Since Trump’s subsequent opening, Western leaders have presented a united front, motivated by facing a planet where US military support cannot be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, there is inner division within Western countries. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in anti-EU attitude within EU member states. The UK’s return from the EU is an example of this trend.

EU officials recently followed a course of participation with Russia, with minimal success. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, France and Germany helped resolve the Minsk Agreements. These contracts, signed in 2014 and 2015, were designed to prevent further attacks by Russian-backed parties into Ukrainian sovereign place.

This did not prevent Russia’s full-scale war of Ukraine in 2022.

In an emerging new world order, management may involve going beyond the apparent contradiction of a concentrate on defense strength or assistance. Officials may need to combine both.

Jessica Genauer is a senior lecturer on foreign connections at Flinders University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Ukraine says it wants to negotiate ‘peace framework’ in Riyadh – Asia Times

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If the US and Russia want a bargain on Ukraine, Zelensky will need to engage. That is far from specific. The outcome could be that President Trump may not be able to communicate a Ukraine arrangement with Russia and the Ukraine war will continue.

The US and Ukraine may have their&nbsp, second meeting in Riyadh&nbsp, next week to consider and weed out a “peace framework”. If something appropriate and acceptable is agreed upon, therefore President Trump will have something he can get to the Russians. If nothing is accomplished, or the “peace model” is impossible, therefore Trump is left with an unoccupied handbag and would have trouble moving forward with the Russians on Ukraine.

In any bargaining the starting position is a starting point to a bargain. It is strange that one part may determine any arrangement.

What we know is that the US wants a bargain on Ukraine to end the war. Apparently the Russians reveal that stance, although evidently they want a&nbsp, fast deal&nbsp, or none at all.

The Russians may continue the war in Ukraine, taking advantage of the strengthening of Ukraine’s troops, the&nbsp, absence of supplies&nbsp, that may arrive from Europe, and the danger that the&nbsp, US army is depleted&nbsp, and limited.

A HIMARS during a coaching practice in Okinawa, Japan, in September 2021.

One of the more negative aspects for the US has arisen from the use of British entrance line weapons in Ukraine. Over time the Russians have learned how to&nbsp, intercept some US arms, such as HIMARS and ATACMS. Do they share what they learned with their Taiwanese and Egyptian peers? Possible.

There also is information that extremely sensitive information on HIMARS and other systems was &nbsp, sold to the Chinese by an active duty US Army sergeant&nbsp, ( himself of Chinese ethnicity ). We don’t understand in any detail what was contained in the stolen details, but apparently it was quite extensive as an overall Top Secret painful travel was stolen.

China, of course, is interested in HIMARS because the US Marines are positioning HIMARS on the&nbsp, area of Yonaguni, close to Taiwan, with the objective of interdicting any Taiwanese getting army attacking Taiwan. Also, Taiwan&nbsp, is starting to get HIMARS, although sales were delayed for some time ( a wrongdoing of considerable sizes given the growing threat of invasion from China ).

What this means is that the US faces a possible hostile China that can threaten Taiwan– perhaps even Japan, which houses important US Air Force and Navy bases. It should not be overlooked that Okinawa, which has US Marine and Air Force foundations, is Chinese territory.

US M142 HIMARS MRL and a US MC-130J plane. 2022. Latvia. Photo: Latvijas Armija

Zelensky has found it necessary ( thanks to the US hands supply closure ) to seem like he is advocating a peace model, but no doubt he will insist on Russia pulling most of its troops out of Ukraine. On top of that he did like security guarantees from the United States. He calls it a” safety relationship” with the United States.

The idea that the Minerals Agreement is a walk in for a security promise is, at best, a poor reed from Ukraine’s point of view. What the Ukrainians want is US boots on the ground, anything President Trump has, so far, ruled out.

Zelensky was promoting a meeting with President Trump that would include both himself, Keir Starmer from the UK and Emanuel Macron from France. Right now it seems Washington has vetoed for a meeting, preferring a leaders meeting in Riyadh without President Trump in enrollment.

That undermines the one piece of real utilize Zelensky has, which is to use Europe and NATO against the US. Yet, what he misses is that doing so has the perverse effect of taking a wrecking ball to NATO if the US finds itself profoundly estranged from its NATO allies. There are already critical mutterings as the Trump presidency tries to&nbsp, offload its NATO responsibilities&nbsp, on Europe.

In reality the only real advantage Zelensky has is to drop on and continue to oppose significant concessions to Russia. While he has played the Europeans pretty well, US opposition to supporting Ukraine and outcry on several ideas from the UK, France and, to a lesser degree from Germany, has not yielded anything so far useful to Ukraine’s position.

It would be amazing if there were a positive outcome in Riyadh. Washington has to be alert to the fact that Zelensky agrees to one thing, but often does the reverse. Having said that, President Trump needs a package he can put on the table with Russia. Those negotiations with Russia look stalled until the US can work out a deal with Zelensky.

Meanwhile Russia continues pressing Ukraine’s army, gaining ground. If Russia forces Ukraine’s army into surrendering, the game is over. Then it is Russia’s problem figuring out what to do with a hostile population and a wrecked infrastructure.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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A little disturbance? – Asia Times

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Subscribe now&nbsp, with a one-month trial for only$ 1, then enjoy the first year at an exclusive rate of just$ 99.

A small disturbance?

David Goldman assesses the mounting challenges of a US economic downturn, with the Atlanta Fed forecasting a 2.85 % contraction in Q2 GDP. Trump’s suggested tariffs could further undermine the market, with estimates suggesting a 5 % rise in consumer prices if foreign producers pass on half the prices.

DeepSeek going global in China

Scott Foster analyzes the growing importance of DeepSeek, China’s open-source AI design. Now integrated into at least 20 state-owned enterprises spanning power, telecoms, financing, and design, DeepSeek is also being adopted for defense applications.

The conclusion of the European debt split and Europe’s military build-up

Diego Faßnacht analyzes a traditional change in Germany and the EU’s fiscal and defence policies, marked by extraordinary loan development and military spending. &nbsp, At the EU levels, Ursula von der Leyen’s ReArm Europe strategy proposes up to €800 billion in security investment.

How the US-Ukraine split boosts Russia’s place

James Davis explores the consequences from a devastating Oval Office conference between Trump and Zelensky. With Europe able to completely remove US support, Ukraine then faces a precarious proper place as Russia prepares for further increase.

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US-Russia detente would dent de-dollarization drive – Asia Times

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The&nbsp, three-year-long NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine&nbsp, contributed to the belief that the international community had bifurcated into the West and the&nbsp, World Majority, &nbsp, between, with the results the fight determining which tent will most profoundly shape the global structural change.

This model predisposed observers to think that BRICS, which possibly represents the World Majority, is constantly coordinating de-dollarization policies in order to detach themselves from the West’s economic clutches.

That belief persists to this day despite previous October’s BRICS Summit achieving&nbsp, everything of substantial significance&nbsp, at all, including on the de-dollarization entrance, and leading members like&nbsp, India and Russia&nbsp, immediately confirming in response to&nbsp, Trump’s tariff threats&nbsp, that they’re not creating a new currency.

As it turns out, even before Trump initiated the&nbsp, nascent&nbsp, Russian–US&nbsp,” New&nbsp, Detente“, the international community wasn’t as divided over the past three years as many multipolar enthusiasts thought.

Complex&nbsp, interdependencies&nbsp, kept most of the main players together, including Russia and the West, after Russia continued selling oil, gas, and critical minerals like uranium to the West in spite of their proxy war.

Similar interdependencies account for why Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar declared in mid-November that” India has never been for de-dollarization” and then reaffirmed this position last week when he said that” we have absolutely no interest in undermining the dollar at all“.

He also said,” I don’t think there is a unified BRICS position on]de-dollarization]. I think BRICS members, and now that we have more members, have very diverse positions on this matter. So, the suggestion or the assumption that somewhere there is a united BRICS position against the dollar, I think, is not borne out by facts”.

The reason why it’s important to draw attention to his latest words is because of the global context within which they were shared as regards the nascent Russian-US” New Détente”.

Putin ‘s&nbsp, recent invitation&nbsp, to American companies to cooperate with Russia on strategic resources, including energy in the&nbsp, Arctic&nbsp, and even rare earth minerals in Donbas, will lead to Russia using more dollars in international trade if anything comes of this.

That would in turn discredit the perception identified earlier in this analysis of Russia actively de-dollarizing, which Putin himself&nbsp, always said&nbsp, that it was forced by sanctions into doing and thus wouldn’t have ordinarily happened on its own.

A thaw in tensions brought about by the US brokering an end to their Ukraine proxy war in a way that meets most of Russia’s interests would therefore naturally see Russia using the dollar again.

To be sure, it’ll still support the creation of platforms like BRICS Bridge, BRICS Clear and BRICS Pay, but these would be aimed at preventing dependence on the dollar more so than advancing de-dollarization per se. The ruble will also continue to be used as Russia’s preferred currency in conducting international trade.

Nevertheless, any breakthrough in Russian-US relations would inevitably disappoint those multipolar enthusiasts who bought into ideologically dogmatic narratives of the&nbsp, New Cold War&nbsp, and consequently believed that Russia would persistently eschew the dollar on principle.

Those who previously criticized India’s pragmatic approach towards the currency, particularly Jaishankar’s comments from mid-November, would then eat crow if Russia ultimately ends up following India’s lead.

Even if Russia is just partially returned to the dollar’s global ecosystem through the lifting of US sanctions on the dollar’s use for facilitating the strategic resource deals that Putin has proposed, then it would likely result in the rest of BRICS moderating their de-dollarization policies as well, if they even had them.

China alone might continue making the most progress in this regard, but even it too has been hesitant to go all-out, also due to its complex interdependencies with the West, including its massive US Treasury holdings.

Russia, India and China’s diverse views towards the dollar show that de-dollarization was always more of a political slogan than a pecuniary imperative, one that only Russia made tangible progress on but only because it was forced to.

They collectively form RIC, the core of BRICS, so whatever they say or do will influence comparatively smaller countries in the bloc. There’s nothing wrong with that though, neither in general nor in this context.

Comparatively smaller countries can’t make major impacts on the global economic or financial systems on their own, and in this particular context, almost all of them with few exceptions still have close trading ties with the US that necessitate them remaining within the dollar’s global ecosystem.

They couldn’t realistically de-dollarize in the way that the most dogmatic ideologues imagined without immense cost to themselves or replacing their dependence on the US dollar with the Chinese yuan.

The most pragmatic approach has always been the one pioneered by India, whereby countries strive to use their national currencies more in trade while diversifying their foreign currency baskets in order to avert dependence on any single unit.

This enables them to strengthen their sovereignty in a meaningful and realistic way without risking the ire of major players by actively dropping their currency and/or actively adopting their rival’s. It’s this balance that will come to define financial multipolarity processes in the future.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Can China keep winning without fighting? – Asia Times

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China’s international rise under President Xi Jinping reflects Sun Tzu’s process of” subduing the army without fighting”.

Alternatively of direct military discord, China relies on socioeconomic, political and industrial influence. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI), economic coercion and cyber operations, China has reshaped the geopolitical landscape.

However, this method is facing rising weight. The United States and its allies have increased economic dispersion and military measures.

At the same time, China’s domestic challenges, including an economic downturn and socioeconomic drop, raise questions about whether this strategy remains responsible.

As conflicts rise in the Indo-Pacific and global energy swings continue, is China keep its fall without provoking the very problems it seeks to avoid?

Sun Tzu emphasized winning through plan, fraud and emotional battle rather than brute power. Xi has embraced these suggestions, using monetary dependencies and political moving to increase impact without direct clash.

Unlike his successors, who prioritized careful economic development, Xi has taken a more aggressive approach in asserting China’s supremacy on the planet level.

Military clash with the US would certainly be costly. War may disrupt trade and economic security, the two columns of China’s rise.

Alternatively, China uses direct means to undermine adversaries while at the same time presenting itself as a peaceful world energy. This determined strategy has allowed China to avoid provoking a strong military response to its movements while steadily advancing its political objectives.

Financial development via debts diplomacy

China’s BRI is key to this method. Large equipment opportunities in Asia, Africa and Europe have created financial relationships. While China presents these tasks as mutually beneficial, they usually leave reader places financially burdened.

One notable example is Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR ). China funded the SGR linking Mombasa and Nairobi, with intentions to expand to Uganda.

However, the task faces difficulties like stalled development and reduced consumption, raising concerns about its economic sustainability and Kenya’s debt load.

This style of loan politics grants China long-term effect over essential regions. Some nations accepting Chinese opportunities now find themselves caught between financial relief and social obligations.

While these tasks bring growth, they likewise strengthen China’s political reach, so ensuring that countries remain aligned with its passions.

At the same time, China has used industry as a tool against states that challenge its laws.

When Australia called for an inspection into Covid-19’s roots, China retaliated with tariffs on American wine, wheat and fuel. South Korea faced related treatment after deploying the THAAD missile defense system by restricting commerce and trade.

However, these techniques are not flawless. Australia properly redirected its export to other businesses, while South Korea strengthened its economic relations with the US and Europe. In contrast, many governments are now diversifying business partnerships to minimize reliance on China.

While economic force has worked in the past, its success is diminishing as more nations push back against Beijing’s pressure tactics.

At the same time, China is forcefully expanding its dominance in systems, especially in 5G, artificial knowledge and security.

Huawei’s global growth in 5G and other communications has given China a crucial edge in modern facilities. But it has also raised concerns over data security and espionage, resulting in bans and restrictions in many Western nations.

China also employs cyber warfare as a key part of its strategy. It has launched disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks against adversaries, especially in Taiwan. These operations aim to weaken enemy defences and control narratives without direct confrontation.

As technology becomes an increasingly powerful tool in global conflicts, China’s ability to manipulate digital landscapes will remain a crucial element of its strategy.

Diplomatic manipulation

China has placed officials in key positions within the United Nations, the World Health Organization and other global bodies.

By influencing international policies, China ensures that global governance aligns with its interests. This allows it to shape narratives, control regulatory frameworks and sideline opposition without resorting to force.

One of Beijing’s most significant diplomatic moves has been isolating Taiwan. China pressured several nations to sever ties with Taipei while increasing military provocations in the Taiwan Strait. The combination of diplomatic pressure and psychological warfare has made Taiwan’s international standing increasingly precarious.

The US was initially slow to respond to China’s economic and diplomatic expansion. However, in recent years, Washington has ramped up efforts to curb China’s influence. It has imposed tariffs, restricted Chinese technology companies and reinforced alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Initiatives like the QUAD alliance and the AUKUS security pact signal a coordinated effort to contain China. The US has also increased military patrols in the South China Sea and provided arms to Taiwan. These measures indicate that Washington is no longer willing to let China expand unchecked.

Despite its successes, China faces mounting challenges. Economic growth is slowing, and an aging population threatens long-term stability.

Beijing’s real estate crisis and mounting debt add to its vulnerabilities. If China’s economic power weakens, its ability to sustain global influence may also decline.

Furthermore, China’s aggressive policies have alienated key trading partners. Countries that once saw China as an economic lifeline are now exploring alternatives.

The US dollar remains dominant in global finance, limiting China’s ability to reshape the economic order. As China grapples with internal and external pressures, maintaining its current strategy is becoming increasingly difficult.

Risk of military confrontation

China’s expansionist ambitions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait could provoke a military clash with the US. While China has so far avoided direct war, its increasing military presence and confrontational tactics are heightening tensions.

The US and its allies have repeatedly warned against unilateral actions in the region. If China oversteps, it risks a conflict that could derail its long-term ambitions.

China’s leadership understands these risks. However, rising nationalism, domestic pressures and trade tensions could push Beijing toward more aggressive moves.

If China miscalculates the response of the US and its allies, it could find itself embroiled in a conflict it is not prepared to fight.

China has successfully expanded its influence so far without engaging in direct warfare. Sun Tzu’s principle of winning without fighting remains a core pillar of its approach.

However, growing global resistance, economic instability and military risks threaten the long-term sustainability of this strategy. The US and its allies are increasingly countering China’s moves.

Trade diversification, military cooperation and technological restrictions are making it harder for China to operate unchallenged. Meanwhile, internal struggles ranging from a fast-aging population to an economic slowdown may further limit China’s ability to project power.

The coming years will determine whether China can continue expanding without triggering the conflicts it seeks to avoid. While it has demonstrated that war is not the only path to dominance, sustaining this approach in a shifting global order will be its greatest challenge yet.

Tang Meng Kit is a master’s student in international relations at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies ( RSIS ) in Singapore.

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Trump trade wars making stagflation great again – Asia Times

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The 2.8 % recession in US economic development that the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is flagging for the first quarter is dreadful news for Asia and the wider world economy.

The Atlanta Fed’s projection clashes with hotter-than-expected prices in the country’s biggest market. That, at a time when Donald Trump seems keen on imposing ever-bigger levies on US allies&nbsp, and enemy everywhere, exacerbating prices challenges.

Trump’s obvious determination to make recessions great suddenly comes as Japan also faces an inflation-rising-while-growth-slows situation. The US following suit significantly ratchets up the margins for the global financial system.

” A industry war, by definition, is a downturn impact: Higher rates and lower income”, says Torsten Sløk, chief economist at Apollo Global Management.

Jeffrey Roach, chief analyst at LPL Financial, adds that, for then, tariff-induced prices amid slower growth may send the economy extremely tight to stagflation.”

Friday’s US career record for February is broadly expected to show the degree to which US development is experiencing a rapid brake.

” Data and activities in the coming year could turn these flashes of problem into a true fire,” says Anna Wong, an scientist at Bloomberg Economics.

This year, 10-year Chinese provides rose to 1.5 % for the first time since June 2009. This comes as borrowing fees from Germany to Australia wave, also, as governments raise governmental expenditures to fight development risks.

In Tokyo, officials including Deputy Bank of Japan Governor Shinichi Uchida suggest rising yields make it less likely the central bank will hike rates as assertively as markets expect.

Yet in China’s case, America’s flirtation with stagflation complicates the outlook for 2025. In particular, China’s ability to meet this year’s recently announced 5 % GDP growth target.

As January consumer inflation comes in hot, employers have added far fewer jobs. Unemployment claims were worse than expected this week. The staffing measures in the ISM manufacturing survey, meanwhile, showed a sizable jump in prices paid.

The US falling into a 1970s-like inflationary recession is the last thing Asia needs. Trump’s tariffs will inevitably boost inflation, while uncertainty over his tariff policies will further depress investment needed to hasten growth and increase productivity.

” Perhaps the biggest risk about tariffs is a self-fulfilling slowdown due to corporate paralysis,” says Savita Subramanian, a top Bank of America equities strategist.

Subramanian adds that BofA’s trade uncertainty tracker” continues to hit new records, eclipsing 2018. But earnings transcripts reveal far fewer negative versus we ‘ve-got-this-style tariff commentary, especially among importers with the benefit of experience.”

Dominique Dwor-Frecaut, chief US economist at advisory Macro Hive, says” Trumponomics has substantial upside, political and economic, but entails substantial implementation risks. For instance, supporting stronger wage gains risks igniting a wage-price feedback loop.”

Managing these risks, Dwor-Frecaut notes”, requires strong competition policy and a strong, independent central bank. Lower energy prices would mitigate these risks by engineering real wage growth with constant nominal wages. Deportations of illegal migrants could shrink the workforce, depress consumption and trigger stagflation if migrants do not work out of fear of deportation.”

Dwor-Frecaut adds that” maintaining a ‘ good enough’ equity market performance while shrinking profit income share would require a strong growth rate. Lower energy prices would also help maintain profits and equity performance outside of the energy sector.”

This puts US Fed Chairman Jerome Powell in quite a bind. Trump is demanding lower interest rates, even as his trade policies— and plans for another giant tax cut — militate against Fed easing.

The Fed’s” helicopter money “approach to supporting US consumption is no longer a workable growth strategy. With US inflation risks spooking world markets, demand for US Treasury securities is sure to take a hit.

This directly complicates Trump’s fiscal stimulus ambitions. It also could make it harder for Xi Jinping’s economy to grow at 5 %. That target, unveiled at this week’s annual National People’s Congress, is the same as 2024’s growth goal.

It’s a sign that China’s growth model isn’t getting the traction as previously. Trump’s 20 % tariff on mainland goods has Team Xi feeling greater urgency to pivot from a longstanding investment-led growth strategy to a consumption-driven one.

On the bright side, Chinese leaders looked quite confident at this week’s” Two Sessions “meeting. At the closely-watched annual event, China adopted a” moderately easy “monetary policy posture to boost consumption. That and hoped for gains in productivity from artificial intelligence, have Xi’s men exuding optimism about China’s 2025.

China, after all, has been battening the hatches to prepare for Trump’s trade war. Still, moves to build a bigger social safety net that incentivizes spending over saving have been slow.

Overcoming tariff risks and domestic headwinds may require more stimulus than markets expect. Earlier this week, Xi’s Communist Party unveiled plans to raise its fiscal deficit to” around 4 %” of GDP, China’s biggest since 2010.

The rare rise signals a material shift in Beijing’s stance toward the severity of risks zooming its way. It’s hard not to connect the dots between this increase from 3 % of GDP last year and Trump’s escalating trade war.

In October, Chinese Minister of Finance LanFo’an said Beijing’s latitude for a deficit increase is” rather large. ” A month later, China deployed a 10 trillion yuan ( US$ 1.4 trillion ) economic support package aimed largely at helping local governments overcome debt burdens.

China’s property crisis has imperiled a significant generator of revenue for local governments. Meanwhile, Xi’s government is expected to triple the quota for special sovereign bond sales to 3 trillion yuan ($ 410 billion ) this year.

Larry Hu, chief China economist at Macquarie Bank, thinks Beijing will boost the quota for special local government bond issuance to 4.5 trillion yuan ($ 621 billion ) from 3.9 trillion yuan.

The People’s Bank of China, the central bank, has scope to ease further amid weak pricing power in Asia’s biggest economy. Especially with China suffering from deflationary forces. Fears of” Japanification “abound as China lowers its inflation target to 2 % from 3 % in 2024.

Thus far, the PBOC has been slow to add liquidity out of fear that it might send the yuan tumbling. The central bank also wants to preserve the progress Beijing has made in deleveraging the financial system in recent years.

PBOC Governor&nbsp, Pan Gongsheng&nbsp, worries that cutting rates might incentivize bad lending and borrowing decisions. A weaker yuan might trigger defaults among property developers as they find it harder to make payments on offshore debt. Already, global investors are keeping close tabs on liquidity problems at property developer China Vanke.

Putting&nbsp, yuan internationalization&nbsp, in jeopardy is another concern. For nearly a decade now, Xi’s government has been working to increase the yuan’s use in trade and finance.

Beijing has recently stepped up cooperation with the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa— and Global South nations to pivot away from the dollar-centric world order.

Reverting back to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the past might alarm international funds and tarnish the yuan’s chances of securing reserve-currency status.

A weaker yuan might have Japan, South Korea and other top Asian economies believing they have a green light to drive down with their currencies to maintain export competitiveness.

That would not go unnoticed by Trump’s White House, which is now threatening the biggest trade war in world history. If the White House concludes Beijing is manipulating the yuan exchange rate, &nbsp, Trump might target China with even bigger tariffs on the scale of the 60 % he frequently threatened on last year’s election campaign trail.

Japan also has cause to fear. Corporate Japan is already reeling over hints of a 25 % import tax on all foreign-made automobiles.

” Fear of&nbsp, stagflation – due to Donald Trump’s tariffs and other policies– has caused a drop in US interest rates and, thus, a sharp narrowing of the gap” with Japan, says economist Richard Katz, author of” The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future.”

Friend or foe, all in Asia are starting to feel the pain of Trump’s” America First “tariffs.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US eyes fighter drones to contain China’s surging air power – Asia Times

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The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A autonomous warrior prototypes mark a tectonic shift in US air combat strategy, but cost overruns, production delays and commercial constraints threaten to shop America’s push for cheap mass to counter China’s rising defense force.

This month, Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine reported that US Air Force Chief of Staff General David Allvin unveiled the government’s breakthrough warrior robots at the AFA Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado.

Developed by US defense contractors General Atomics and Anduril Industries, respectively, these Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA ) are part of the Air Force’s Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) portfolio, marking a pivotal shift toward manned-unmanned teaming in aerial combat.

The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, designed to function as “loyal wingmen”, may follow crewed soldiers like the F-35, enhancing air supremacy at reduced prices and within small timeframes.

Employing prototype designation codes —” Y” for prototype,” F” for fighter, and” Q” for unmanned—the announcement underscores a strategic evolution toward integrating semi-autonomous aircraft into contested environments.

Anduril hailed the growth as a revolutionary step in atmosphere superiority, emphasizing value, mass production and increased capabilities. General Atomics echoed this, noting the YFQ-42A’s important role in expanding vision powers alongside current and future plane.

Allvin framed this innovation as necessary to modernization, offering the Trump administration’s Pentagon flexible options for addressing emerging world security challenges in an extremely dangerous and powerful era.

In framing US military imperatives to quicken CCA growth, Heather Penney mentions in an October 2022 record for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that CCAs boost combat mass, creating a more attrition-tolerant force that enables riskier yet more significant operations.

Penney says that by teaming with piloted aircraft, CCA can serve as decoys, missile sinks or electronic warfare platforms to disrupt enemy targeting and extend the survivability of human pilots.

She adds that their autonomous features, such as AI-based threat detection and adaptable movements, improve operational agility in challenging contexts while compensating for the decline of human skills during extended combat since their performance relies on software enhancements instead of lengthy pilot training.

Such attritable, semi-autonomous mass may be critical in a near-peer adversary conflict in which the US may be seriously outnumbered.

In a March 2024 article for Air &amp, Space Forces Magazine, Daniel Rice mentions that China could produce 100 J-20 airframes a year, compared to the US F-22, which the US stopped production in 2011 at just 187 irreplaceable planes.

Rice says China has stepped up production of other fighter variants, producing 100 J-16s and 40 low-end J-10 fighters annually. He contrasts that with US F-35 production, pointing out that while the US produces 135 F-35s yearly, 60 to 70 planes are sold to allies.

While the development of unmanned fighters has led some, such as Elon Musk, to question the utility of manned fighters, AI in this area still faces significant hurdles.

In a December 2024 SOFREP article, Brigadier General Doug Wickert, commander of the 412th Test Wing, mentions that fully robotized warfare is still far off, saying it could be “centuries” before AI pilots replace humans.

Wickert says these systems are far from flawless, as shown by test flights revealing inconsistencies necessitating rigorous safety measures and fallbacks for human intervention. &nbsp,

Moreover, the US may be facing debates regarding the direction of its CCA program. In a December 2024 National Defense Magazine article, Andrew Hunter, the US Air Force’s acquisition chief, highlights trade-offs between cost and capability, emphasizing user engagement and thorough analysis.

Hunter says that affordability demands sacrificing certain features, while capability enhancements require accepting higher costs. He also mentions that sustainment costs promise reductions due to limited training needs and shorter operational lifespans, but achieving balance remains crucial for future force design and industrial competition.

Apart from AI limitations and debates regarding the direction of the US CCA program, cost-death spirals and constraints of the US defense industrial base may leave much to be desired in creating the affordable mass the program promises.

Gregory Allen and Isaac Goldston mention in an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) think tank that the CCA program faces two significant concerns: cost escalation and production delays.

Allen and Goldston point out that CCA’s projected unit price has soared from US$ 3 million under the Low-Cost Attritable Aircraft Technology (LCAAT ) program to$ 25–30 million. That, they note is still 10 times cheaper than the NGAD.

They also say that while the CCA program aims for 1, 000 units, only 100 units are expected for delivery by 2029, which is far behind the urgent timeline suggested by intelligence assessments warning of a possible Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan by 2027.

In line with rising costs, The War Zone ( TWZ ) reported in January 2025 that cost concerns loom over the second batch of CCAs, making them 20-30 % more expensive than the first.

While TWZ mentions that US Air Force officials have resisted the idea of acquiring “exquisite” stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV ) in favor of CCAs that could be acquired in more significant numbers, affordability questions loom over major projects such as the NGAD, Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) and B-21 Raider bomber fleet.

Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall mentioned that while the CCA should not be an exquisite platform, it is difficult to see how the US Air Force could afford any combination of NGADs, CCAs and stealthy tankers.

A September 2024 US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report outlines the US defense industry’s systemic challenges. The report notes that the US defense industrial base is a highly consolidated market, where a handful of large defense contractors dominate production, thus limiting competition and innovation.

The CRS report points out that supply chain vulnerabilities—exacerbated by reliance on foreign sources for critical materials and components —raise concerns about resilience, particularly when the US is involved in great power competition with China and Russia.

In addition, the report says workforce shortages in specialized fields, long production lead times and unpredictable procurement cycles contribute to inefficiencies. It adds that regulatory complexities and acquisition policies slow the integration of emerging technologies into defense systems.

Further, this month’s report by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute says that while China continues to outproduce the US, the US is stuck in a self-perpetuating cycle of budgetary and appropriations dysfunction, eroding its advantage.

However, the report stresses that while those challenges are significant, they are not immutable. &nbsp,

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