Philippines hopeful but openly hedging on Trump – Asia Times

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Following a number of contentious remarks made by senior US officials during the most recent Munich Security Conference and this week’s decision to support Russia over Ukraine at the UN, the Trump administration has purposefully put the future of America’s relationship with Europe in fear.

However, the following Trump president’s signals toward transatlantic allies have been more soothing, hinting at a harder US plan line to appear on China. The presence of both the prime ministers of Japan and India at the White House in recent weeks highlights the generally good speed under Trump with like-minded Indo-Pacific power.

As for infantry friends such as the Philippines, it has been constantly reassured by high-level activities with Trump’s top defense and foreign policy leaders. Among the first contacts that US Secretary Marco Rubio made in his first time in business was Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Eduardo Manalo, who was also notable and notable.

On the occasion of the Munich Security Conference, the two top diplomats met in person to reiterate their shared commitment to upholding a “rules-based” attempt in Asia and working together to stop China’s assertive behaviour in neighboring lakes, including the South China Sea.

In addition, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro was one of the first international best officials to join US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who has broadly agreed with Rubio’s assessment of China as the greatest threat to America’s international management.

However, frontline Pacific supporters are quietly preparing for” the evening after”, especially when Trump’s America becomes a more isolated and possibly crazed power.

Trump’s unwaveringly transactional approach to foreign policy and his apprehension of autocrats in Beijing and Moscow have given Asian allies fresh motivation to develop their own skills and develop relationships with one another under a so-called “multi-alignment” hedging plan. &nbsp,

Major Spanish officers and leading specialists are usually cautiously optimistic about the prospects for continued strong diplomatic relations under Trump. The current freeze of USAID and the wider upending of the US federal bureaucracy are expected to cause US defense aid to the Philippines to be unperturbed.

A multi-billion defense aid package earmarked for the Philippines over the next five years is still a strong bipartisan vote in Congress for military support for important Asian allies. &nbsp,

During the US-Philippines special meeting in Munich, the US diplomatic chief &nbsp, “reaffirmed US commitment to the United States-Philippines alliance]and ] noted his enthusiasm for building an even more invested and enduring relationship”.

The two sides also discussed&nbsp, ways to enhance “ongoing bilateral coordination on addressing China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, and increasing economic cooperation on infrastructure, critical minerals, information technology, and energy, including through civil nuclear cooperation”.

Additionally, the Philippines is in a good position to restart long-stalled bilateral trade negotiations due to its relatively low exports to and trade surplus with America.

Although the Trump administration’s protectionist agenda has largely opposed traditional free trade agreements, it is reportedly looking into sectoral trade agreements with an emphasis on geopolitically sensitive industries like semiconductors, precious minerals, and even digital trade with trusted allies.

As neighboring Taiwan faces the real possibility of conflict with China and Japan ramps up its own semiconductor industry, the Philippines has actively promoted itself as a” China-free” supplier of critical minerals and as an alternative site for semiconductor production.

Manila’s security partnership and economic ties to the US will continue to be the foundation of its international strategy in the long run. For almost a century, Manila’s elite have effectively outsourced their external security needs to Washington.

However, with rising speculation of a US-China grand bargain, what some are already referring to as a” Mar-a-Lago Accord”, the Philippines is also hedging its bets by actively pursuing minilateral cooperation with other like-minded middle powers.

The rivalry, which serves as a middle power, in some ways gives rise to efforts to reach out to nations in similar circumstances and work with them, which is what we’ve been doing, according to Philippine diplomatic chief Manalo.

In April, Manila will be hosting as many as 14 similarly-minded middle powers as it rapidly strengthens defense ties with Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, South Korea and India.

General Nakatani, the Philippine defense chief, and his Japanese counterpart discussed strengthening defense ties and discussed concerns over China. &nbsp,

Nakatani told his Filipino counterpart Teodoro,” The security environment surrounding us is getting worse and that it is necessary for the two countries as strategic partners to further improve defense cooperation and collaboration to maintain peace and stability in]the ] Indo-Pacific.”

The Philippines and Japan’s recently ratified Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA ) has prompted Manila to pursue similar agreements with other similar-minded nations like Canada, France, and New Zealand.

A historic joint drill between Philippine and French naval forces took place last week in the South China Sea. Shortly after, the French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, docked in Subic Bay, the former site of America’s largest overseas naval facility, in a sign of rapidly growing bilateral defense ties with Manila.

The French ambassador to the Philippines, Marie Fontanel, declared on the carrier’s flight deck,” We want to strengthen our cooperation with regional partners with whom we share common values, such as upholding international law and ensuring freedom of navigation in shared maritime spaces.”

By openly discussing its own potential grand strategic bargain with the Asian superpower, the Philippines is also signaling its strategic autonomy and reopening communication channels with Beijing in a deeper hedge.

In exchange for easing tensions and China’s eventual withdrawal from the Southeast Asian nation’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, Philippine President Marcos Jr. made the offer to withdraw the American mid-range Typhon missile system from the northern Philippines last month.

China has voiced serious concerns about the US missile system’s positioning on Philippine soil, which makes Manila able to strike the country’s mainland, and raises concerns that Beijing sees it as a threat in light of a potential US-to-US conflict over Taiwan.

” Let’s make a deal with China —stop claiming our territory, stop harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our boats, stop water-cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and stop your aggressive and coercive behavior, and I’ll return the Typhon missiles”, Marcos said.

” Stop all their aggressive acts and I’ll return everything”, he added, underscoring Manila’s own autonomous decision to leverage its alliance with Washington to deter foreign aggression.

Ultimately, however, the Philippines is investing in its own capabilities, allocating close to$ 1 billion for acquisitions of modern weapons systems this year, with a focus on modern missile defense systems, drones and fighter jets.

Manila is growing more confident that it can and should pursue a more “multi-aligned” foreign policy that lessens its historical reliance on the US against external threats, a trend that will likely increase in the Trump 2.0 era.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Rich Heydarian

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Trump wants Ukraine minerals because China put its own off limits – Asia Times

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Donald Trump is requesting compensation from Ukraine for the help the US provided to Kyiv during the Russian invasion. Trump has demanded Ukraine mark a US$ 500 billion package that would offer the US exposure to, and profit from, Ukraine’s rare and essential minerals, an important tool in the 21st-century economy.

Trump has stated that this will be a part of the US’s settlement of Ukraine aid. Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, has so far refused to sign such an arrangement – stating that the help, as agreed by Trump’s father Joe Biden and the Republican-controlled Congress, was a give and certainly a product.

The US rely on unique minerals like chromium, which is essential for advanced security technologies but is not readily obtainable internally, is a key reason behind Trump’s push for this mineral deal.

China, a major distributor of chromium, has used its dominance of the tool to defy the US. In response to rising US taxes on Chinese goods, it has imposed a moratorium on rare materials being exported to the US.

For military technologies, including electric vehicles, electronics, and missile systems, other materials are important. In Ukraine, there are payments for 22 of the 34 materials identified by the European Union as important.

The US’s issue is that China now accounts for a large portion of some crucial metal imports.

Trump therefore views a solution to the Ukraine war as an opportunity to safe other sources of essential vitamins, lessening US dependence on China, and allowing him to get a more intense stance on it. He might not have anticipated that China would retaliate against US tariffs by imposing limits on these crucial commodities so fast.

The reliability and durability of chromium are what the defence industry values. In particular, the ingredient is seen as a vital tool enhancing sensor, satellite communication methods, and electronic warfare techniques. It is also used in multi-chip components used by tracking and air traffic control methods.

In addition to chromium, Ukraine has vast sources of carbon, an aspect that is used in the development of electric vehicles and nuclear reactors, and a third of Europe’s source of potassium, which is used in batteries.

Trump’s interest in Greenland, which has significant reserves of critical minerals, could be an alternative to Chinese-controlled resources because of its emphasis on critical minerals.

Why is China so important?

Trump’s concern for China is also a major force in his negotiations with Russia. One of Trump’s core concerns is China’s partnership with Russia. China is undoubtedly the mainstay of the Sino-Russian alliance right now.

Given the increasing cooperation between the two nations in military, economic, and technological areas, Trump believes that China’s influence in global affairs needs to be countered aggressively. The Trump administration has attempted to undermine the alliance by softening its relationship with Russia, a move that has shocked European leaders.

Given that China is America’s biggest economic rival and a significant obstacle to making the nation “great again,” Trump has long viewed it as the major threat to the US.

His economic policies have focused on geopolitical maneuvers, supply chain dependencies, and Chinese trade practices. One of his principal trade advisors claimed that American businesses are at a disadvantage due to China’s state-controlled economy, intellectual property theft, and trade imbalance.

The US recently imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese imports in an effort to boost US products ‘ competitiveness by causing more Chinese imports to cost more, thereby entice businesses and consumers to instead purchase domestic goods.

Trump also attempted to slam China’s export economy by making it harder for Chinese companies to sell goods in the US. His tariff policies extended to countries other than China, with other measures being considered for Europe.

Trump aimed to shift global supply chains and solidify the US as a manufacturing powerhouse by targeting multiple regions. Trump thinks that by halting the conflict in Ukraine, the US can use US funds and resources to redirect investments and resources used in Europe to combat China’s growing influence.

Trump has attempted to refute Trump’s claim that Chinese manufacturers are to blame for the massive fentanyl production, which is then routed into the US via various channels. Trump has suggested more stringent regulations, including tariffs and sanctions against Chinese companies allegedly engaged in its production, to halt the flow of fentanyl.

Following China’s retaliation, Trump needs peace in Ukraine and the consequential mineral agreement with Kyiv before China’s ban on exports to the US affects critical US manufacturing. With less repercussions, such a deal would then enable him to adopt an even more aggressive posture toward China.

However, Zelensky recently claimed that Russia has taken control of 20 % of Ukraine’s minerals since the invasion. Because there hasn’t been much investment in Ukraine’s minerals sector for almost a decade, it’s possible it won’t be years before any American investors will receive any returns.

Trump will have to wait a while before the minerals from Ukraine will be able to meet all of the US’s needs, even if he does get the deal he wants.

At the University of Portsmouth, Dafydd Townley teaches abroad.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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If Trump attempts World Bank retreat, China-led AIIB could step in – Asia Times

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Donald Trump is well known for his hostility toward internationalism and international businesses. The US senator made the announcement to leave the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the World Health Organization shortly after taking office on January 20, 2025.

Was the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund follow? Surely, supporters of the twin organizations – that have formed the backbone of world economic order for 80 years – are concerned. A Trump-ordered evaluation of Washington’s support for all international organizations has sparked fears that the US will endow more money or withdraw it immediately.

But any receding of U. S. authority in international financial institutions may, I believe, run counter to the president’s apparent political goals, creating a suction for China to move into and get on a bigger international role.

In particular, weakening the World Bank and any other multilateral development banks, or MDB, that has a large US presence may present an opportunity for a little-known, fairly new Chinese-led global business: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank– which, since its inception, has supported the pretty diplomacy the U. S. is attacking.

AIIB’s contradictory function

Nine years ago, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB ) as a means of investing in infrastructure and other related sectors in Asia while promoting “regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.”

Since then, it has provided an example of an international organization that is willing to cooperate closely with other significant international organizations and adhere to global growth banking standards and standards.

This may conflict with the portrayal of Beijing’s global efforts that are frequently portrayed by China eagles, of whom there are many in the Trump presidency, who frequently envision a China that is determined to undermine the progressive, Western-led world order.

However, as some researchers and other Chinese experts have suggested, Beijing’s policies in international monetary management are frequently nuanced, with actions that both support and denigrate the liberal world order.

As I explain in my new guide, it is apparent that the AIIB is a paradox today: an institution created by an authoritarian government but connected to the rules and standards of the progressive global order.

A group of men and women sits during a forum.
Foreign Finance Minister Lou Jiwei addresses the audience at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank signing ceremony on October 24, 2014, in Beijing. Photo: Takaki Yajima / POOL

The AIIB has a strong connection to the rules-based system, as demonstrated by its numerous joint relationships with other significant multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank under the leadership of Japan.

In this context, the AIIB might offer a Taiwanese opposition in a country where US leadership is waning.

The AIIB’s collaborative pattern

Multilateral development banks have been providing the crucial role of lending billions of dollars annually to promote economic and social development for years.

They can be important sources of funding for poverty reduction, inclusive economic growth and lasting development, with a newer focus on climate change. These global lenders have also been remarkably resilient in the current climate of discord and crisis, with member countries earnestly looking into ways to improve their standing.

At the same time, MDBs frequently receive criticism from civil society organizations because they point out areas of poor performance and are concerned about potential negative effects of the main MDBs ‘ greater focus on working more closely with the private market. Big” MDBs were built around a set of geopolitical and economic strength relationships that are disintegrating before our eyes,” according to MDB professional Chris Humphrey.

There was a lot of concern among key countries about China’s motives when Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 the establishment of the AIIB to aid in the development of infrastructure in Asia.

The Obama administration responded by urging different nations to abstain from joining. Its priority was that China may use lending to expand its influence in the area without upholding strict environmental and social standards.

However, all the other main nonborrowing countries, with the exception of Japan, joined the new lender. Now, the AIIB is the second-largest international development banks in terms of member states, behind simply the World Bank. It now has 110 member governments, which translates to over 80 % of the world population. With US$ 100 billion in cash, it is one of the medium-sized international loans.

From the get-go, the AIIB was designed to be collaborative. Jin Liqun, the first president of the bank, has a long history of multilateralism, having spent many years working for the Chinese banking department, the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility, and vice president of the Asian Development Bank.

Previous executive managers and staff from the IMF and other development bankers were among the international group of experts who assisted in the creation of the AIIB, as well as two American with much careers at the World Bank who played key roles in the creation of the company’s articles of agreement and its environmental and social model.

How the AIIB influenced people to learn from them

In a variety of ways, the bank fits into the international development environment. The Asian Development Bank’s mandate, which promotes “regional cooperation and collaboration in addressing growth challenges,” is directly related to the Asian Development Bank’s base.

The AIIB has environmental and social norms in line with other important multilateral development banks, as well as its conventions and policies.

The AIIB collaborates closely with its classmates, besides stealing fundamental ideas. The World Bank originally ran the AIIB’s government functions. In its early years, the AIIB co-financed a significant portion of its assignments with other bilateral development institutions.

In a recent sign of cooperation, in 2023, a deal between the AIIB and World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD ) saw the AIIB issue up to$ 1 billion in guarantees against IBRD sovereign-backed loans. This increased the IBRD’s capacity to provide more money, while diversifying the AIIB’s payment collection.

As of February 6, 2025, the AIIB had 306 approved initiatives totaling$ 59 billion. Its two biggest lending sources are transport and power. Recent projects that have received approval include funding for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s wind power plants and an Indian solar power plant. India, which has a slippery partnership with China, is one of the company’s largest consumers, together with Turkey and Indonesia.

collaborating and competing with China

From its conception until recently, the bilateral AIIB has frequently distinguished itself from China’s diplomatic efforts. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a framework for network borrowing by Chinese corporations that has been criticized for lacking transparency and accountability, is one of them.

However, some Belt and Road-linked initiatives have faced problems about problem, costs and the transparency of the loan contracts.

The AIIB has made more mention of the benefits of working with Belt and Road lenders in recent years, and the lender now houses the Secretariat of a service called the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance, which provides grants and assistance to developing nations seeking to finance equipment in nations where Belt and Road lending takes place. This may blur the distinction between loaning under Belt and Road and AIIB, but it doesn’t appear to lower the company’s standards.

No fresh concerns about the impact of the Chinese government at the AIIB. In June 2023, Canada froze its ties to the bank in a pending investigation into a French employee’s dramatic resignation after claiming that the bank was ruled by Communist Party users.

No additional member countries expressed their concern, and Canada has not yet released a report on the situation. An internal review by an AIIB executive director contained no findings to support the claims.

It would be wise for the new US administration to consider the variations in China’s strategies in global economic leadership as its formulation of its policies toward China may require more complex responses. Recognition of areas of assistance, competition, and conflict calls for more complex responses. The US will cooperate with China in many areas while competing with China.

Interestingly, any actions by the Trump administration to reshape multilateral organizations could put the AIIB in a better position to collaborate than the world’s leading multilateral development banks and the US, regardless of whether or not it is an anomaly. role.

At American University, Tamar Gutner is an associate professor.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US foreign policy overlooks human rights as national security – Asia Times

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Through taxes, financial sanctions, and military partnerships, the US is making more and more of its military and economic countermeasures against North Korea and China. However, one essential strategy remains ignored – individual rights. Not just a moral imperative, it is also necessary to address human rights violations as risks to national security. It is a proper necessity that enhances alliances, destabilizes authoritarian regimes, and promotes global stability.

According to former US Vice President Mike Pence,” a nation that oppresses its own citizens seldom stops there.” Oftentimes, human rights violations fall under the umbrella of philanthropic and intellectual issues rather than pressing issues of national security. In truth, they are interrelated.

The US has long acknowledged that systems that violate human rights frequently repress their anger abroad. This tenet served as the foundation for the United States ‘ desire for Japan’s unconditional surrender during World War II, enabling a rebuilding of the country’s political system to stop future physical brutality.

How human rights violations become threats to safety

When the right of an entity or a small party are violated, it is a human rights violation. When a whole country’s rights are violated, it becomes a threat to national security. The crucial difference is the size of the infraction.

Human rights abuses usually start on a smaller scale but, when organized, escalate into federal security threats. A state that defies the rights of its own citizens is unlikely to honor those of other countries. Treating human rights as a secondary problem ignores how they directly affect international stability and security.

Totalitarian governments ‘ weaknesses

Totalitarian systems, or “fear cultures”, maintain authority by instilling anxiety and isolating their people. However, history demonstrates that when people realize they have worldwide support and a place to hide, their power weakens.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, which tied US trade ties with the Soviet Union to immigration right, was one of the most successful tactics against authoritarian regimes. This strategy weakened Russian power and led to the USSR’s eventual demise.

In Korea, contemporary cases are also present. South Korean President Park Geun-hye made a direct appeal to North Koreans in 2016 asking them to” travel to the breast of freedom in South Korea.” A number of North Koreans eluded North Korea and sought independence in South Korea as a result. Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, publicly pledged in 2024 to never send dissenters back to North Korea, strengthening the notion that South Korea is a haven for those who are fleeing oppression.

Retaliation against individual rights campaigning

North Korea retaliated by ordering its supporters in South Korea to reduce Park’s and Yoon’s governments after acknowledging the existential threat posed by people right campaigning.

Communist politicians with a majority in the National Assembly attempted to sue Yoon for election fraud, punish Chinese spies under the Espionage Act, and obstruct him in his efforts to strengthen relationships with the US and Japan.

They slashed state expenses and impeached 29 important officials. Yoon’s management was left with a non-functioning state. Given these difficulties, President Yoon was left with the option to impose martial law as a last resort.

Strategic advantages of individual rights advocacy

Addressing human rights issues provides important benefits.

Second, it offers general validity. Making animal rights advocacy a rare bipartisan issue, yet leftists struggle to defend it.

Next, it strengthens US-Japan-ROK assistance through common earth. While South Korea’s devotion to the US-ROK empire is strong, its connection with Japan remains unstable. Socialists in South Korea often make use of past conflicts to thwart participation.

However, placing North Korea’s human rights violations as a shared problem offers an opportunity to improve relationships without giving adversaries a pretext to stoke section.

Human rights politics in motion

Between 2017 and 2021, I attended Chinese government-hosted events advocating for the release of Chinese captives held by North Korea. Although these occasions were planned by Japan, Otto Warmbier‘s home was generally present, demonstrating cooperation between the US and Japan while putting pressure on North Korea.

The North Korean Ministry of Unification has also been addressing the violence of both South Korean and Japanese people by North Korea. The ministry’s complete section addresses Chinese citizens who have been abducted by North Korea, which demonstrates its handle to address this issue.

Both Korean and Japanese nationals who have been abducted by North Korea are addressed by the UN Human Rights Office in Seoul ( in English ). Multilateral efforts may be significantly strengthened by a coordinated strategy between the US, Japan, and South Korea.

expanding multilateral cooperation between China and North Korea

The next step should be to address human rights abuses in China now that US-Japan-South Korea have successfully collaborated to address human rights violations committed by North Korea. While strong apologies and escape routes are effective for North Korea, China’s methods for China must concentrate on strengthening civil world efforts, political force, and economic measures.

Human rights campaigning is not just a social responsibility, it is a proper imperative. We may:: acquiesce to human rights violations as threats to national security by:

  1. Strengthen partnerships with authoritarian regimes
  2. Improve the diplomatic presence in Northeast Asia
  3. undermine the legitimacy of China and North Korea

Animal rights may no longer be viewed as a secondary issue in international relations. Instead, they should be key to global surveillance method. Addressing human rights abuses is not just about morality—it is about ensuring long-term political security.

Hanjin Lew&nbsp is a former foreign spokesman for North Korean traditional parties and a political commentator with an emphasis on East Asian matters.

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Taliban’s ‘gender apartheid’ could be its undoing – Asia Times

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Last week, the Taliban announced it was withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC), rejecting the court’s authority and accusing it of political bias.

In a public statement, the Taliban claimed it had no obligation to the ICC because it was incompatible with the regime’s interpretation of Islam, and that it was being unfairly targeted after the court’s failure to address accusations of war crimes committed by United States-led forces between 2001 and 2021 in Afghanistan.

This comes after ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for arrest warrants in January for Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for crimes against humanity committed against women in Afghanistan.

Khan claimed Taliban leaders were responsible for persecuting Afghan women and girls since the group’s return to power in August 2021. This includes the severe deprivation of physical integrity and autonomy, freedom of movement and expression, education, private and family life and freedom of assembly. 

The Taliban undeniably treats Afghan women and girls abysmally, denying them an education and most jobs. According to the United Nations, 2.5 million school-age girls have been denied their right to education.

Women have even been banned from working with aid organizations, leaving many Afghan women out of work or unable to access lifesaving humanitarian assistance.

The Taliban have also instituted “vice and virtue” laws forbidding women from showing their faces in public, looking at other men or taking transport without a male chaperone.  This comes after the Taliban banned women from using beauty parlours and visiting national parks last year, completely removing women from public spaces.

The situation for women has gotten so bad that the UN declared it the “worst globally” last year, while the UN’s representative in Afghanistan – Richard Bennet – labeled the Taliban’s actions “gender apartheid.”

Khan’s request for warrants is the latest attempt to hold the Taliban accountable for its treatment of women and girls.

In January, the United Kingdom joined several other countries in referring the regime to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging it had violated the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Twenty-four countries have now threatened to refer the Taliban to the courts.

While the regime can and has easily rejected the authority of the world’s courts, it does pose a problem for the Taliban.

The Taliban needs legitimacy to remain in power over the long term and craves recognition that would validate its strict interpretation of Islam. But despite some countries informally recognizing the regime – such as China – the broad consensus has been a refusal to accept the Taliban as the official government until it treats women and girls more humanely.

The Taliban has hoped the world would run out of patience and meekly accept its hardline regime, but United States President Donald Trump’s recent aggressive rhetoric against the Taliban makes this scenario unlikely.

Indeed, if the Taliban wants to take its place in the community of nations, it needs to play by the world’s rules. This includes the ICC, which Afghanistan joined in 2003 under then President Hamid Karzai, giving the court clear jurisdiction over crimes committed in Afghanistan.

But when the Taliban accuses the court of double standards, it has a point. No American politician or soldier has been handed a warrant for war crimes against Afghan civilians. Trump’s recent sanctions against the ICC in response to arrest warrants for Israeli leaders for crimes in Gaza also highlights the unequalness of the international “rules-based order.”

But this does not absolve the regime for how it treats women, and international law is something the Taliban will need to accept if it wants to officially represent Afghanistan at the United Nations.

The warrants have also exacerbated tensions within Taliban ranks. In January, Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Abbas Stanikzai publicly demanded an end to the ban on women’s education, calling it a “personal choice” and rebuking the regime’s claim its position on women was consistent with Sharia law.

The warrants also come at a time when the Taliban is under significant pressure. Islamic State continues to carry out deadly attacks throughout Afghanistan, claiming responsibility for the assassination of Taliban minister and powerbroker Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani in December.

The regime’s relationship with former ally Pakistan is also fraught, leading to border skirmishes and air strikes on Afghan soil that have humiliated the regime. All in all, the Taliban looks weak and arrest warrants for its leaders have only worsened its position at home and abroad.

Stanikzai gets what many Taliban do not: that the world is not just budging on how the regime treats women and girls; rather, it is doubling down on demands for better treatment.

Oppressing 20 million Afghan people is neither sustainable, nor is it consistent with any tenets of Islam. The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls is about power, but that power is now fracturing from within. And disunity is death in Afghan politics.

Make concessions on women and girls and the Taliban will get its coveted seat at the table and the international legitimacy it craves.

This would be a boon for the regime and enable it to work with the international community to solve the myriad of problems Afghanistan faces, particularly on terrorism and the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

The alternative is isolation and a reliance on cruelty, both of which brought on the Taliban’s last downfall in 2001.

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China puts Philippines on hypersonic nuke alert – Asia Times

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Due to rumors that China is developing a new underwater capable of carrying nuclear-tipped hypersonic missiles especially to neutralize the missile threat, China’s conflict with the Philippines appears to have reached a disturbing new phase.

A semi-official military newspaper reported this month that a Chinese invasion submarine that is currently being developed at a factory in Wuhan might be used to strike Philippine medium-range weapon defense systems.

The report indicates that the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has not yet confirmed if the submarine class is under development.

However, SCMP notes that a publication from Naval &amp, Merchant Ships, owned by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation ( CSSC), a PLA Navy ( PLA-N) supplier, mentions details about its design and features, thus validating its existence and reasons for its development.

The release mentions that the US Typhon missiles, which have been stationed in the Philippines since April 2024, may launch missiles from Luzon, a northern Philippine area, into island China.

The PLA can launch attacks from outside enemy lines, according to the report, and it has the option to use nuclear missiles if important. China’s most recent submarine is capable of carrying hypersonic missiles.

The YJ-21, which is used on its Type 093 nuclear attack submarines ( SSN), is likely to be used for the new submarine. The YJ-21 has also been deployed on China’s Model 055 ships, and its estimated collection is 1, 500 to 2, 000 km with an estimated velocity of Mach 10.

The underwater, first spotted in mid-2024, appears to have Vocabulary and an X-shaped tail fin for better athleticism and security, according to SCMP. Additionally, the report mentions that the submarine is anticipated to have AIP (air-independent propulsion ) technology.

Tensions between China and the US Typhon weapon system have gotten worse. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in September 2024 that the Typhon’s implementation “undermines regional peace and stability,” adding that it “is not in the interests of local locations.”

But, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro hit up at the notes, stating that China is using “reverse philosophy” to prevent the Philippines from building its security features.

Teodoro challenged China to “lead by instance”, saying that it should kill its nuclear arsenal, reduce its ballistic missile features, “get out of the West Philippine Sea”, and get out of Mischief Reef, a contested element in the South China Sea.

However, China conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) test since 1980, flying an ICBM from Hainan to French Polynesia, just outside France’s Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ ) around the country, in a thinly veiled signal of displeasure the same month.

Undaunted, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr highlighted in January 2025 that China’s missile systems substantially exceeds the Philippines. In exchange for halting anger in the South China Sea, he suggested removing the US Typhon missile program.

China appears determined to take a radical stance despite the strong words from Spanish leaders. In February 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesperson Guo Jiakun emphasized that the Philippines is “placing its safety in the arms of people” and that China” does not stand idly by when its passions are threatened.

If China’s assertion that its new submarine carries hypersonic missiles is confirmed, the Philippines lacks reliable air and missile defense capabilities to counteract such a threat.

As of 2022, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the US arsenal that can intercept hypersonic missiles, and even that capability is described as “nascent”. The US Glide Phase Interceptor ( GPI), designed to destroy hypersonic missiles in their glide phase, is still under development.

Should the Philippines strengthen its extended deterrence strategy with the US and use the Typhon as a foundation, it may purchase military equipment that will support the Typhon missile system in its own backyard.

While the Philippines operates SPYDER surface-to-air missile ( SAM ) batteries, they are not designed to engage hypersonic threats. In addition to SPYDER, the Philippines plans to buy additional short-range SAMs, possibly India’s Akash missile system. But, as with SPYDER, Akash is not designed to engage or neutralize hypersonic threats.

Given the Philippines ‘ capability shortcomings, it may be up to the US to defend its Typhon batteries against China’s hypersonic arsenal. The US deployed Patriot missile launchers to the Philippines in May 2024, with the Patriot successfully intercepting a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile over Kyiv in May 2023.

However, Russia’s propaganda may have overhyped the Kinzhal’s capability, and China, having much more resources than the former, can likely afford more sophisticated hypersonic missiles.

Aside from attempting to intercept China’s hypersonics, US submarines in the South China Sea could try to track and hunt their Chinese hypersonic-armed counterparts.

In the South China Sea in 2023, 11 US SSNs and two nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) were discovered, according to a report from the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI ) in March 2024.

China may launch a nuclear response if it believes its underwater nuclear deterrent is in danger because it may be using the South China Sea as a protected bastion for its SSBNs. The Philippines runs the risk of being caught in a nuclear conflict between the US and China because of nuclear-armed submarines from opposing sides patrolling nearby. &nbsp,

However, in a May 2024 National Bureau of Asian Research ( NBR ) report, Herman Kraft argues that the Philippines does not view China’s nuclear arsenal as a direct threat but rather as a factor in US-China competition. According to Kravit, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has not until recently resulted in the threat of nuclear weapons.

Manila is also developing relations with other countries, including Japan and Australia, while the Philippines acknowledges that the US might use its military installations and forces to target China. He claims that this strategy allows the Philippines to expand its defenses without being involved in US-China nuclear dynamics.

Kraft claims that while the Philippines advocates a normative, diplomatic approach to nuclear weapons, it is constrained by its longstanding dependence on the US.

Although the US Typhon missile system makes the Philippines a potential target for China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, it is improbable whether any president of the Philippines will permit US offensive strikes from its territory, unless the Philippines ‘ main islands are attacked.

If a leader of the Philippines approves such strikes, it runs the risk of making China, which will always be present nearby, a long-standing adversary.

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China’s largesse was always a better deal than USAID’s – Asia Times

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As part of a wider plan spearheaded by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency ( DOGE ), US President Donald Trump has shut down USAID, the country’s top international aid organization.

USAID has been harshly criticized by the Trump administration for perpetuating errors and oddities through its support to developing nations. Musk called USAID” the most crooked establishment” and declared that “it deserves to die”.

While USAID has long claimed to focus on humanitarian aid, health services and growth, Trump has said that it has rather facilitated political interference, problem, opaque governance and unwarranted interference in the inner affairs of recipient countries.

Trump and Musk’s claims would seem to corroborate accusations that recent unrest in Bangladesh and Ukraine’s 2014 “orange revolution” —an event that ultimately led to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022—are evidence of USAID’s role in orchestrating” color revolutions”, a modern form of regime change akin to a military coup around the world.

The US international coverage framework has three columns: security, politics, and growth. By promoting international policy and expanding effect, USAID purports to support the interests of the US, but it doesn’t always address the real needs of the sender nations.

Only a small portion of the allocated budgets are used to reach the intended recipients, as a significant portion of USAID money is absorbed by administrative costs, high wages, obligations for intermediaries, and highly expensive consultants ( many former USAID senior officials ).

Studies reveal that for every 100 US dollars USAID spends, a mere 12.10 money reaches reader places. Additionally, funding from USAID has been accused of undermining local laws and regulations, causing bribery and opaque governance in host nations. Criticisms contend that the company generally benefits the country’s ruling political elite and its US-educated offspring rather than the less fortunate.

Trump’s” America First” coverage, which is apparently trying to stop the theft of US taxpayer funds domestically and internationally, includes the decision to close USAID. The disclosures of Trump-Musk information have also made the Global South countries have to consider the effects of American support and take the necessary steps to increase financial independence, sovereignty, and progress.

American foreign aid acts as a double-edged weapon for several developing countries. While it claims to bring about growth in the terms of the recipients ‘ nations, it entails dominance and undermines their economic sovereignty and independence.

Western donors first disburse sizable grants, but after recipient nations become more dependent on external aid, they switch to smaller grants.

The recipient countries ‘ economic independence is restrained by the severe economic policy conditions of Western loans ( bilateral and multilateral, such as from the World Bank and IMF), which keep them stuck in a never-ending vicious cycle of borrowing to pay off outstanding debt.

It undermines the foundation of people’s employment and sustainable development by using a more limited government budget to pay off debt and suppress home agriculture and young industries.

American support typically has a relationship to the political objectives of the donor countries, making the recipient countries have to connect their guidelines with those of their donors. In consequence, the receiving nations are unable to develop their own economic and trade techniques.

Moreover, according to Musk, American aid has been linked to promoting fraud and errors in recipient nations by shutting down USAID. Some funds are lost there or mismanaged by help administration, failing to achieve their original objectives.

While frequently well-intentioned, including initiatives to distribute gratis food, grains, and other essential services, USAID’s assistance frequently tramples local crops and companies by displacing domestic producers and deteriorating local knowledge and skills.

Instead of fostering long-term financial self-sufficiency, for investment breeds dependence symptoms, making nations centered on outdoor aid. Some academics contend that American aid fosters resentment and hopelessness rather than promoting real growth.

It is now a very good idea for developing countries to move to financial freedom and independence. Trump’s discovery on USAID calling for a conscious effort to build local business, cut down on imports and boost local production.

Investment in training, technology and equipment is crucial to developing the ability to grow effectively. Development-focused countries must collaborate with lenders who offer enhancement funds without having to meet any social or policy requirements in order to accomplish these objectives.

The Global South has a promising future ahead of geographical trade and assistance. The Global South must abandon the notion of getting rich by exporting cheap products to Western markets or relying on foreign support for national development as the US embraces protectionist policies, which are more demanding than even the Smoot-Hawley Tax Act of 1930.

Rather, it should concentrate on fostering local partnerships and business contracts. To protect themselves from raw materials and manpower exploitation, American nations can use pan-African assistance and collective bargaining.

South America may improve frameworks for local partnership, while ASEAN countries should take advantage of the opportunity to build similarly bold local initiatives. The integration of the Asian economies to produce tangible outcomes is essential under the leadership of Russia.

To implement its stalled free trade agreement (FTA ), South Asia should revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ). These local efforts can be strengthened by a reinforced BRICS framework, which will encourage greater cooperation among the Global South countries.

More important, these nations need to regain possession of their natural sources. By regaining control over their separation, miners, utilization, and trade, developing nations had put an end to wealthy nations ‘ use of their resources. This will increase the value added from these resources by allowing nations to offer their resources fairly.

Through shared and regional discussions with China, there might be a good chance of achieving this objective. Compared to the zero-sum sport usually promoted by the West, China’s “win-win” trade and development method emphasizes common benefit. Cooperating with China may help China achieve its goals while avoiding the numerous negative effects of American support.

Under the American support model, which is defined by the conditionality of grants and loans, political and economic passions of donor countries are given precedence. American aid often comes with needs for democratization, social reforms, animal rights improvements and stress to meet alliances against rival nations.

It is a type of interference in the domestic affairs of the receiving nations, making them to adhere to American economic, political, and social norms, which are frequently incompatible with their social values and traditions.

China, in comparison, favors trade and investment over social engineering. Through procedures like the Belt and Road Initiative, China invests in large-scale infrastructure projects, including ports, railways and bridges, in recipient places. For numerous emerging countries, these activities are the foundation of long-term monetary expansion.

For example, Chinese investment has accelerated Africa’s clean energy transition and online and transport infrastructure. Interestingly, because China’s design does not impose monetary policy, social systems or cultural requirements, it permits nations to preserve financial policy-making and social autonomy. In this way, it has surpassed the need for nations to chart out their development plans.

China’s expanding monetary potential has a lot of benefits for the global south. China has a great need for resources and products from developing nations because it has the largest financial and luxury market in the world since 2020.

By engaging more closely with China’s supply chains, developing nations can gain significant new markets for their products, including for meals, fresh materials, and manufactured products. Also, China’s industrial overcapacity offers opportunities for relocating its” twilight business” and low-technology-based manufacturing industry to the Global South, fostering native modernization and job creation.

China’s critics often warn of the dangers of resource exploitation and “debt trap diplomacy”. However, many people in the Global South believe that China’s approach is a viable replacement for Western aid, which has always prioritized the needs of its recipients over those of their donors.

Where there was no alternative in the Global South ten years ago, China offers a frequently welcome alternative to Western aid. ( Though Japan has long provided foreign aid without the constraints put on by Western donors ) )

These countries can lay the foundation for self-reliance, economic sovereignty and sustainable development by embracing China’s positive-sum game model over the West’s often zero-sum approach.

To be sure, the debate over development models and foreign aid is not entirely settled. However, as the Global South grapples with the legacy of Western aid and explores new partnerships, it must prioritize its economic sovereignty, national interests and independence.

The Global South may break the cycle of dependency and lead a more just and prosperous future by utilizing regional collaboration, asserting control over natural resources, and engaging with alternative partners like China.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel

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Trump’s vision of a new US-China-Russia world order – Asia Times

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There has been a lot of discussion about the ramifications of a potential agreement between US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and the increasingly damaging effects it will have on Ukraine and Europe.

There is much more at play than just the potential borders of Ukraine and US relations if Trump and Putin reach a deal.

As we are nearing the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war, Ukraine’s prospect is more in question than it has ever been since February 2022. For once, comparisons to Munich in 1938 are unfortunately correct.

This is not due to a false idea that Putin may be appeased, but rather because wonderful powers once more decide the fate of weaker states without their presence.

Ukraine is now under stress from Russia on the ground and the US, both socially and economically, in the same way that Czechoslovakia was subjected to in 1938 by Germany and its alleged allies France and Britain.

Trump and his team are working fervently to get Ukraine to concede geographical rights to Russia and declare that about 20 % of the Ukrainian territories that Russia has occupied are lost. Trump also demands that Ukraine give back half of its metal and rare earth resources in exchange for its previous military support.

If allied NATO forces were deployed to Ukraine as part of a peace or peace agreement, the United States ‘ refusal to deliver substantial security guarantees sounds like the Munich comparison. No only did France and Britain at the time pressure Czechoslovakia to renounce Sudetenland, which had an ethnic German majority, to Nazi Germany.

When Poland and Hungary seized large portions of the nation, they likewise did nothing. And they failed to act when Hitler, just six months after the Munich deal, created a Czech marionette state and occupied the last of the Czech Republic.

Every evidence suggests that Putin is doubtful to step down from his position in or toward Ukraine. And it is important to keep in mind that the second world war began 11 months after Neville Chamberlain believed he had secured “peace in our day.”

The Munich comparison does not carry that much, however. Trump isn’t trying to appease Putin because he believes he has weaker tickets than Putin, as Chamberlain and Daladier did in 1938.

A more simplistic view of the world, where tremendous power carved out spheres of influence without interfering, seems to drive Trump.

ISW map showing the state of the conflict in Ukraine, February 20 2025.
The state of the fight in Ukraine, February 20, 2025. Institute for Research on War

The issue with Ukraine and Europe in a world order is that no one in Trump’s team views Ukraine as a member of an American impact area, and that Europe is at best a foreground.

Trump-eye glass on the planet

Trump’s concern isn’t really about Ukraine or Europe, but rather about re-ordering the global program in a way that fits his 19th-century perspective of the world in which the US life in splendid isolation and is almost unquestioned in the Northern hemisphere.

In this view, Ukraine is the image of what was wrong with the ancient purchase. Trump believes that the US has engaged itself in too many different international activities where none of its essential interests were at play, echoing Henry Cabot’s protectionism.

Echoing Putin’s talking items, the war against Ukraine little more is an unfair anger but was, as Trump has then declared, Kyiv’s problem. The most important test the democratic global order has to move has been Ukraine.

The conflict with Ukraine is undoubtedly a sign of the decline of the progressive global order, but it is hardly its single cause. It has become the tool that Trump and Putin use to offer it a devastating blast. But while the US and Russia, in their present political combinations, may have found it easy to destroy the existing order, they may find it substantially harder to create a new one.

Even though Ukraine and other important Western nations may appear trivial at this point, the EU and NATO have robust institutional foundations and deep pockets even without the US.

Despite the justified criticism of Europe’s largely ambitious responses thus far, the continent is built on much stronger politically and economically than Russia, and the vast majority of its citizens have no desire to live in the conditions that Putin’s want-to-be empire has.

Without China, neither Trump nor Putin will be able to rule the world. Trump does use a package to scuttle a wedge between them and drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but this is unlikely to work given China’s growing ties to China and Russia’s growing conflict with the US.

All Trump would accomplish is a more US-to-West continent resurgence if he reached a deal with Xi as well, for instance regarding Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, allow alone over Taiwan. This may leave Putin and Xi to do their own, existing package of a no-limits relationship unimpeded by an American-led counterpoint.

From the standpoint of what remains of the progressive global order and its adherents, a Putin-Xi deal, also, has an strange parallel in past – the short-lived Hitler-Stalin alliance of 1939. Only this time, there is little to recommend that the Putin-Xi ally will break down as quickly.

Stefan Wolff is professor of global surveillance, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Alibaba making China tech investible again – Asia Times

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Alibaba Group’s headline-grabbing protest tops off what’s been an extraordinary month for Chinese tech companies.

In late January, the sudden appearance of made-in-China synthetic knowledge game DeepSeek pulled the rug out from under Wall Street’s” Trump business” group. Bettors predicted that US stocks would explode as a result of the US President Donald Trump’s plans.

Trump’s eagerness for AI, which he and his patron Elon Musk, contributed to the excitement. Trump punctuated the place on January 21, when he stood shoulder-to-shoulder with OpenAI’s Sam&nbsp, Altman, Oracle’s Larry Ellison and SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son at the White House to light a&nbsp, US$ 500 billion &nbsp, Al network project.

Weeks later, it seemed like old hat as DeepSeek’s claim caught world markets off guard. Its cost-effective AI model using less advanced chips precipitated a nearly$ 600 billion selloff in&nbsp, Nvidia’s shares&nbsp, alone — history’s biggest corporate loss in market capitalization.

Then Alibaba is again on the international scene with an passion that’s even caught global investors off-guard. It includes a large force into Al, in which Alibaba is investing confidently.

The business Jack Ma co-founded claims to have invested more than$ 53 billion in data centers and other AI system projects. Apple, nevertheless, is incorporating Alibaba’s Artificial services in handsets sold in China.

But Alibaba’s march might have arms for an even bigger purpose: Xi Jinping’s selection to, in the words of scholar Stephen Jen, “make Chinese equities investible again”, starting with software platforms.

Jen, CEO of Eurizon SLJ Asset Management, says that “in some ways, this is a call for a extended bounce-back in a long-depressed and unhappy business. However, there are now many more reasons to get good than bad about Chinese stocks and China in general.

After Trump called for greater scrutiny of international companies listed in the US, Alibaba’s wave hit a speedbump on Tuesday, along with Taiwanese technology companies in general.

But from Jen’s perspective, Chinese stocks will remain on roll for reasons including: regulation easing, signs the property sector is ultimately bottoming to support better consumer sentiment, the resilience of Chinese bonds and the yuan, a serious misjudging of China’s manufacturing and industrial prowess, low valuations, and signs the world remains thin Chinese assets.

Xi’s meeting with Ma and other mainland tech founders last week helped, too. Following Xi’s crackdowns, which started with Ma’s fintech tycoon Ant Group, China’s tech scene has been in a state of corporate limbo since late 2020.

Ostensibly, Ant’s planned$ 37 billion listing was scrapped after Ma criticized Beijing, suggesting policymakers don’t understand technology. Ma alleged that regulators were stifling innovation and that banks were having a “pawnshop mentality” in a speech delivered in Shanghai.

First, Ant’s initial public offering was pulled. At the time, it would’ve been history’s biggest. Next, Xi’s financial regulator put under a microscope a who ‘s-who of tech giants: search engine Baidu, &nbsp, ride-hailing giant&nbsp, Didi Global, e-commerce platform JD.com, &nbsp, food-delivery Meituan and gaming colossus Tencent, among others.

Ma effectively entered a political exile. Last week, when Xi invited Ma and other tech billionaires to a gathering that would put Chinese technology back in the ascendancy, that appeared to change. Ma sitting in the front row and Xi shaking his hand caused investors to sift into mainland shares with an unprecedented enthusiasm.

The scene suggested that “one of the world’s greatest living entrepreneurs” is “back into the good&nbsp, graces”, says analyst Bill&nbsp, Bishop, who writes the Sinocism newsletter. Bottom line, he says, “it’s an encouraging signal for private businesses”.

Daiwa analyst Patrick Pan notes that “from a long-term perspective, we turn more positive on the outlook for the China stock market”. China’s recent tech breakthroughs and pro-business pivot, he says, are “game changers for China stock prices”.

In March 2023, Alibaba unveiled the&nbsp, biggest restructuring &nbsp, in its 26-year history, splitting into six units and exploring fundraising or listings for most of them. At the time, Alibaba said the strategy is “designed to unlock shareholder value and foster market competitiveness”.

The six units included: domestic e-tailing, international e-commerce, cloud computing, local services, logistics and media and entertainment.

The market is the best litmus test, according to former Alabaster CEO Daniel Zhang, who remarked two years ago, and each business group and company can launch independent fundraising and IPOs when they are ready.

The enterprise was bigger than Alibaba, though. It served as a case study of sorts for China Inc. as Xi’s regulators attempted to mitigate risks and halt monopolistic tendencies among tech giants.

Given that Xi and Premier Li Qiang both claim that they want private companies to create more jobs and boost a troubled economy, the situation is quite a balance.

Ma’s Alibaba was an obvious place to start. It has long been a global representation of China’s tech goals and a symptom of Beijing’s tolerance for tech billionaires spreading their wings.

Now, after years of uncertainty, says Daniel Ives, analyst at Wedbush Securities, Alibaba just “delivered an inflection point quarter”, led by a stronger-than-expected cloud business and an expanding AI push that could represent the “next gear of growth”.

AI is” the kind of opportunity for industry transformation that only comes around only once every few decades,” as current Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu put it last week.

Wu added that” when it comes to Alibaba’s AI strategy, we aim to continue developing models that extend the boundaries of intelligence” and that AI may eventually “have a significant influence on or even replace 50 % of global GDP”

When it comes to cheap Chinese valuations, Alibaba could be Exhibit A. While some profit-taking might happen, the company is still trading between 35 % to 40 % below past highs.

However, Alibaba is under increasing pressure to act in order to validate investors ‘ bullishness.

According to HSBC Holdings analyst Charlene Liu, “fundamentals will have to be back in focus” in order to increase stock prices. Alibaba shows” a clear strategy to monetize AI and accelerate cloud revenue growth and margin improvement,” as evidenced by increasing its e-commerce market share.

The real onus, though, is on Team Xi to convince global investors broadly that China’s “uninvestable” days are over for good. &nbsp,

Over the last dozen years of Xi’s leadership, Beijing has too often slow-walked moves to strengthen capital markets, reduce opacity, scale back the role of state-owned enterprises, build a globally trusted credit rating system and increase regulatory certainty.

Clearly, the return of Hangzhou-based Alibaba to favor in Communist Party circles may be its own inflection point.

Recently,” Hangzhou’s innovation model has been lauded for fostering numerous superstar technology startups, dubbed the’ Six Little Dragons’ in markets”, says Carlos Casanova, economist at Union Bancaire Privée.

This, Casanova says,” suggests China may be preparing to adopt a Hangzhou-style model that promotes both hard technology and high value-added software and services in its upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan, expected to be unveiled this October. Although we won’t know for certain until the draft is made public, it appears that China is gearing up for a strategic turn in 2026.

However, it will be simpler to persuade global funds that the multi-year tech inquisition is over. Although handshakes and rhetoric are acceptable, it is more crucial to end the regulatory chaos that has persisted recently.

According to Jeremy Mark, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council,” this will take much more than optimistic pronouncements to restore confidence after months of undelivered promises.” Beijing has long sought out foreign institutional investors, but this uncertainty is unsettling.

The volatility of recent months, though”, has given Chinese officialdom greater incentive to pursue a tightly regulated, less volatile stock market — one in which the likes of insurance companies, pension funds, and other government-run behemoths hold sway over individual investors,” Mark says.

The order of the day, Mark adds”, will be to encourage long-term investments in large companies by offering bigger dividends, share buybacks, and — ideally—steady profit growth. ” &nbsp,

Of course, some people believe that concerns about market structure are overshadowed by the attractiveness of mainland valuations. &nbsp,

” Since January, the rally in the Chinese tech sector has been stunning, though the overall A-Shares market has not risen much,” says Jen of Eurizon SLJ.

Companies outside the tech industries are trying to do the same, just as Chinese tech companies are actively looking for ways to harness the power of rapidly advancing AI. Chinese companies are generally very eager to adopt the best technologies, especially if they are cheap.”

When the” Magic Seven” is so expensive, Jen adds,” Chinese equities ought to be in good standing if the collective’I Q’ of Chinese manufacturing can keep up with the best in the world.” ” The seven companies mentioned here are Apple, Microsoft, Google parent Alphabet, Amazon.com, Nvidia, Meta Platforms and Tesla.

The argument isn’t always clear-cut. As mainland stocks surged last week, so did Nvidia’s.

By the start of this week, the California-based company had recovered roughly 90 % of its market valuation losses. It’s a reminder that the AI boom is no particular nation’s to lose. And that Beijing’s desire to keep control might conflict with the success of disruptors like DeepSeek.

According to Bank of America analyst Vivek Arya,” The stock may be volatile following results, but we anticipate positive momentum to resume as investors look forward to Nvidia’s leading new product pipeline and total addressable market expansion into robotics and quantum technologies at the upcoming]Nvidia ] conference.”

The macroeconomic backdrop matters, of course. The upcoming Trump trade war and the high chances that they will cause inflation are still a source of uncertainty for the world.

” The upbeat mood seen among US businesses at the start of the year has evaporated, replaced with a darkening picture of heightened uncertainty, stalling business activity and rising prices,” says Chris Williamson, chief economist at S&amp, P Global Market Intelligence.

Companies, Williamson says”, report widespread concerns about the impact of federal government policies, ranging from spending cuts to tariffs and geopolitical developments. He states that the outlook for the rest of 2025 has shifted to “one of the gloomiest outlooks since the pandemic.”

Despite this, there is growing hope that Team Xi’s efforts to batten down the hatches and its exportation to global South nations will lessen its vulnerability to Trump’s bullying than many people had predicted.

China Inc. is also demonstrating that it has some serious game on playing fields Trump World takes for granted, and not just AI. Chinese biotech companies are exhibiting signs of developing drugs more quickly and affordably than their American competitors.

At the same time as Trump is empowering Tesla billionaire Musk to launch a disaster against America’s scientific research institutions, this includes cancer drugs.

In the case of Alibaba, though, investors are hoping Beijing’s multi-year battle with Chinese tech is officially over. To validate this optimism, Team Xi will need to make sure changes are being made so that the big meeting internet platform from last week is more than just a photo op.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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Philippines: EDSA, Marcos Jr and the risk of forgetting – Asia Times

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Every February 25, the Philippines commemorates the EDSA People Power Revolution—an function that toppled a dictator, restored politics and became a worldwide mark of quiet weight.

In 1986, thousands of Filipinos from all walks of life took to the streets, driven by a shared desire for shift. They came armed not with arms but with confidence, prayer and perseverance.

Clad in golden bows and carrying necklaces, they faced down tank and troops, their chants echoing through the money. The action was a testament to the resolve of regular people to free their country from autocratic rule.

This trend did more than just reduce a tyrant; it also established democratic institutions, reinstated free votes, and promised a government that was accountable to the people.

Beyond the Philippines, it sent a strong message that could help other countries fight tyranny. The uprising’s violent character established its place in history, demonstrating that a change may be achieved without using force.

However, as the centuries passed, the strong energy that again filled EDSA has waned. The roads that were once crowded with activists have become less noisy. The annual ceremonies persist, but with a visible reduction in cooperation.

Although the People Power Monument is still in use, its supporters are declining as a result. The recollection continues, but it has lost much of the fervor and intensity that were present in the period immediately following the trend.

The irony of the EDSA memorial has since become unfathomable: the state that recognizes it is now led by the deceased family.

President Ferdinand” Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the son of the late tyrant Ferdinand Marcos Sr., is in charge of a country that previously rejected his father’s rule in an unprecedented show of social power.

Since Marcos Jr. became president in 2022, his administration has veered cautiously to the EDSA memorial. The current government has chosen to follow a more subdued strategy than previous administrations, which included holding huge events, making strong statements, and yet holding wreath-laying rites at the People Power Monument.

Official claims acknowledge the time, but they lean on topics of “unity” and “moving ahead”, avoiding direct references to the republic’s value.

In fact, Marcos Jr. actually removed February 25 from the roster of national holidays in 2023.

Proclamation No. Conspicuously omitting EDSA People Power as a unique non-working trip, 368, which downgraded its significance in the regional calendar.

Despite the negative people effect, it remains the same this time, as Proclamation No. 727 declares EDSA a unique working vacation. This move farther signaled the president’s silent effort to push EDSA into the history of national consciousness.

This shift in tone is not sudden. It reflects the difficult balance of a Marcos president, which allows acknowledging EDSA without supporting its fundamental message.

After all, to fully accept the significance of EDSA would mean to forgive the Marcos family’s history mistakes, which they have consistently dismissed or blatantly denied.

A government that regards EDSA as a traditional event but does not reconfirm its aspirations is a paradox that defines the current political climate.

But is simple confirmation enough? Or does reducing EDSA to a program, depoliticized event diminish its real meaning?

Eroding EDSA’s tradition

Celebrations are more than just ceremonies, they are functions of social memory. They affirm the principles that a country maintains and serve as reminders of lost fights for its citizens. But over time, the way a nation remembers an event is change—either through continuous indifference or deliberate sophistry.

In the case of EDSA, both causes seem to be at enjoy. On one hand, there is the normal passage of time. The revolution took place roughly four decades ago, and many of those who took part in it have passed away.

For younger generations who did not experience the tyranny, EDSA is not a specific experience but a traditional account, which is extremely up in the modern era.

On the other hand, there is the effective rewriting of history. The Marcos family has spent years attempting to change consumer perception through social media, social effect, and even legal actions.

The dictatorship’s years in power, when widely regarded as a time of persecution and financial mismanagement, are then painted by some as a “golden age”. Traditional facts —such as human rights abuses, fraud, and cronyism—are dismissed as mere social problems.

The deterioration of EDSA’s tradition is most visible in public opinion. A growing number of Filipinos, especially the youth, show frustration with the revolution.

Some see it as a failed claim, pointing to frequent poverty, corruption, and injustice. People believe it was an exaggerated function, exaggerated by its recipients. This despair has made a fertile environment for reactionary narratives to emerge, allowing the Marcos family to regain control through political means.

Does it matter if the social remembrance of EDSA disappears? If Filipinos little longer see it as related, does that reduce its value?

The solution lies in what EDSA absolutely represented. It was never really about toppling a dictator—it was about restoring democratic organizations, ensuring responsibilities, and preventing the transfer of autocratic rule.

To ignore EDSA, or to decrease it to an annual note, is to undermine the pretty safeguards it fought to restore.

Politics is no self-sustaining. It requires attention, active involvement, and a devotion to truth. When background is forgotten or distorted, the same faults become easier to repeat.

Current and upcoming abuses become more simple to defend when history abuses are dismissed as misconceptions. The EDSA’s rules are being broken, but today’s failure to uphold them puts the future in danger.

What EDSA may suggest currently

A Marcos administration that oversees EDSA anniversary celebrations should not just be an unpleasant contradiction; it should also be a time for reflection. If the trend is to be related, it must be understood beyond its metaphor.

EDSA was never a perfect trend. It did never miraculously resolve the most pressing issues in Spanish society, nor did it maintain long-term reform.

However, it demonstrated that social activity has energy. It showed that ordinary individuals, when united, you hold the powerful responsible. That session may be learned over time.

Instead of being seen as a locked chapter in history, EDSA must be seen as an empty struggle. The battle for transparency, good governance and human rights did not end in 1986 —it continues today.

And in a social environment where the majority of the country’s energy is still largely in the hands of the elite, where record is constantly rewritten to fit the ruling course, and where democracy is constantly under scrutiny, EDSA serves as a reminder that the people still have the authority to determine the future of their country.

In a time when people want to ignore EDSA, remembering it is more than just marking a day on the calendar; it is also important to protect the lessons from history from intentional erasure.

The reduction of standard commemorations, the fall of reactionary narratives and the public’s growing separation from EDSA all stage to a dangerous reality: when traditional truths are left undefended, they become pliable to the whims of those in power.

As the storage of EDSA fades in the regional consciousness, we may ask—what happens when a nation chooses to ignore its own revolution? And more importantly, who benefits when we do?

The Marcos administration must do more than just acknowledge EDSA on the calendar if it truly respects it. It must uphold the democratic principles that EDSA stood for: truth, accountability and justice. Anything less would make every February 25 hollow ceremonial, one that honors a cause without actually honoring it.

Chalize Penaflor, 24, is a policy researcher, intersectional feminist and human rights advocate. She received her BA in sociology from the University of the Philippines and concentrates on legislative research, policy analysis, and program evaluation in the public sector.

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