North Korea coup speculation is back – Asia Times

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When you’re sending 12,000 troops to battle under the command of a side not exactly known for its kind treatment of conscripts, you’ve got to be thinking twice about the the soldiers you’re threatening to send and the soldiers coming back. If those troops end up as cannon fodder as a result of Kim Jong Un’s policy choice, the coup d’etat speculation is back on!

There’s a history. In 1996, the Korean People’s Army Sixth Corps, headquartered in Chongjin, planned a coup d’etat. With the failure of state services and the continuing restrictions on trading, North Hamkyung Province was hungry and dissatisfied – including the leadership and officers in each link of the self-monitoring triumvirate of political committees, military command and National Security Agency. We know the coup attempt failed, but we also know it was a very real threat.

Jacket image: Harvard University Press

Edward N. Luttwak’s Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook is the best known book on how to undertake a coup. Luttwak’s book explores the mechanics of seizing state power through small, organized efforts, bypassing mass uprisings or large-scale warfare. It details how modern states’ bureaucratic and military structures can be exploited for swift takeovers.

His work has influenced both coup plotters and governments worldwide, prompting them to refine strategies for seizing power or preventing it, respectively. The book’s impact spans decades, providing insight into real-world coups and shaping political-security frameworks to counteract internal threats to regimes.

The nature of the North Korean state presents unique challenges, requiring a strategy that considers both internal vulnerabilities and external pressures. Drawing on the insights from Luttwak’s text, to destabilize and ultimately collapse the North Korean regime, plotters would need to check several boxes.

  • A vulnerable centralized state apparatus ☑

Luttwak emphasizes that a coup or regime change becomes feasible in a highly centralized system where power is concentrated in a few hands. North Korea’s tightly controlled bureaucracy and military chain of command make it vulnerable to disruptions at key nodes. However, these same characteristics act as both strengths and weaknesses. While the leadership relies heavily on elite military units and inner-circle loyalty, these structures also create isolated factions that can be exploited.

Targeting North Korea’s leadership requires infiltrating the command structure or amplifying internal distrust among elite factions. This could involve intelligence operations designed to increase paranoia within the ruling elite, planting the seeds for a self-fulfilling cycle of purges and defections.

  • Economic deprivation ☑

Luttwak argues that regimes become especially vulnerable during economic crises, which fuel public discontent and elite dissatisfaction. North Korea already suffers from chronic economic deprivation, but the regime’s ability to suppress mass uprisings has limited the destabilizing effects of poverty.

Sanctions, already heavily employed, should be refined to better target the regime’s elite class rather than the broader population. Simultaneously, humanitarian aid directed at border regions and marginalized communities could increase resentment among those outside the elite circles, undermining the regime’s narrative of strength.

  • Exploitable communication and information gaps ☑

According to Luttwak, coups succeed when they disrupt the flow of information within a regime, creating confusion and limiting the leadership’s ability to coordinate a response. In North Korea, the state’s rigid control over communications isolates it from both domestic and international information networks.

Operations should focus on introducing alternative sources of information into North Korea. For example, the distribution of propaganda via radio waves, smuggled devices, or leaflets can erode the regime’s monopoly on truth. This disruption would weaken the state’s ideological control and embolden potential dissidents.

  • Elite discontent and defections to leverage ☑

Luttwak highlights how military factions and dissatisfied elites often play a pivotal role in coups. While North Korea has implemented strict control mechanisms, recent high-profile defections indicate cracks within the elite class.

Incentivizing high-ranking officials to defect or cooperate covertly can further destabilize the regime. International guarantees for defectors, along with financial incentives, could increase the likelihood of defections from within the military or political elite. Encouraging these individuals to disseminate counter-narratives within the regime could accelerate the erosion of loyalty.

  • Perceived or actual external threats ☑

Luttwak emphasizes that external military threats or diplomatic crises often lead to internal disarray, particularly in regimes where survival is tied to militaristic policies. In North Korea’s case, the regime relies heavily on the narrative of an external threat to justify its existence and maintain internal unity.

Strategic displays of military strength, combined with diplomatic isolation, could force the regime into overreactions that expose internal weaknesses. Simultaneously, diplomatic outreach to China and Russia – North Korea’s traditional allies – can erode the regime’s geopolitical support, isolating it further.

  • Psychological operations and disruption campaigns ☐

Luttwak’s analysis suggests that successful coups rely on psychological operations to undermine public trust in the regime and create confusion within the leadership. In North Korea, the state ideology is central to regime stability, making it a prime target for psychological disruption.

Targeted messaging campaigns should aim to discredit the Kim dynasty’s legitimacy, highlighting corruption, contradictions and failures. The spread of dissident voices and testimonies from defectors can further destabilize the regime’s narrative. These operations should be coordinated to coincide with economic or diplomatic pressures, maximizing their psychological impact.

While there have been continuous attempts to undermine public trust in the North Korean regime and create confusion within its leadership, the intensity has been tempered by recognition of South Korea’s concern that collapse threatened economic well-being, and US concern that collapse threatened regional security.

  • Localized resistance movements ☐

While Luttwak warns against large-scale revolutions, he acknowledges that localized resistance movements serve as catalysts for regime change. In North Korea, the heavy surveillance and repression make organizing such movements difficult, but small-scale resistance is still possible.

Empowering underground networks and opposition groups within North Korea, particularly along the Chinese border, could create pockets of resistance. Providing logistical and financial support through covert channels would allow these groups to sustain operations and challenge the regime’s control over remote areas. However, financial support must be coupled with a deeper level of inspiration. Whether this comes from ethnic nationalism, evangelical Christianity, or any other anti-regime belief, there needs to be some form of inspiration that pushes individuals and groups to rise up.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in any attempt to undermine the North Korean regime is the absence of a recognized local resistance movement and the impossibility of supporting them through covert channels. Without an opening of the North Korean regime, this is unlikely to change.

Collapsing the North Korean regime requires a nuanced strategy that integrates internal subversion, economic pressure and external isolation. Drawing on the principles outlined by Luttwak, this strategy emphasizes exploiting vulnerabilities within the leadership structure, promoting defections and disrupting communication channels.

While a direct coup may be challenging, the cumulative impact of these efforts can destabilize the regime and pave the way for meaningful change – and then another problem appears: What comes next?

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. This article was originally published on his Substack, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. Read more here.

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Afghanistan’s climate chaos – Asia Times

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A recent Taliban decree bans women from praying aloud in the presence of one another, prohibiting them from hearing each other’s voices. Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban have implemented numerous such decrees, raising serious concerns about the basic rights of the Afghan population. Unfortunately, international organizations and countries have largely failed to take meaningful action to support those living under Taliban rule.

But at least much of the rest of the world is aware of those human rights issues. That is not the case with the climate crisis facing Afghanistan. There has been little foreign media coverage of the fact that, despite contributing only 0.3% of global greenhouse gas emissions, this landlocked country of around 42 million people faces increasing environmental disasters that make it one of the world’s lands that are most vulnerable to climate change.

Erratic rainfall, prolonged droughts, unseasonal frosts and flash floods are now common. At present, Afghanistan is ranked sixth in global climate vulnerability and fourth in disaster risk, with the International Rescue Committee identifying it as the third most affected country by climate change in 2023.

Since 1950, temperatures in Afghanistan have increased by 1.8°C, more than twice the global average, which has led to changes in average rainfall patterns and an increase in floods, landslides, and fluctuating groundwater levels. The lack of infrastructure to manage annual floods is estimated to result in economic losses of around $400 million, impacting approximately 335,000 people.

Simultaneously, Afghanistan is grappling with frequent droughts; as of August 2023, 25 out of 34 provinces were experiencing severe or catastrophic drought conditions, affecting over 50% of the country’s population.

The situation is undoubtedly worrisome. Data from 2023 show that approximately 79% of the country’s population does not have adequate access to water, and 67% of households are affected by drought-related hardships while floods impact an additional 16% of the population.

To address climate change concerns, the UNDP and other UN agencies are creating a comprehensive framework comprising four key pillars: climate and disaster risk management; resilient agriculture, livelihoods, and MSMEs; energy and climate-resilient infrastructure to support communities; and water resources and ecosystem management.

At the same time, the Taliban have sought to build infrastructure to use water more productively and effectively.  To deal with the severity of the water crisis, the Taliban regime has been engaged in building around 300 projects aimed at water management in different provinces. Yet some of these hydro-engineering projects have created political issues with the neighboring countries, embroiling Afghanistan and its water-sharing neighbors in disputes.

For instance, the ambitious Qosh Tepa Canal in Afghanistan is expected to significantly impact the water flow of the Amu Darya River, potentially escalating tensions between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

This canal, which is 285 kilometres long, 100 meters wide, and eight meters deep, will have a capacity of approximately 650 cubic meters per second, supplying water to the Balkh, Jawzan, and Faryab provinces. It aims to extract 10 billion cubic meters of water from the Amu Darya River and transform around 550,000 hectares of desert land into farmland, which could affect agricultural production and related economic activities in the region, leading to increased disputes over shared water resources.

In May 2023, heightened tensions over water rights from the transboundary Helmand River led to a violent clash between Iranian border guards and Taliban fighters near the border, resulting in the deaths of two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter. This incident underscores the growing tensions over shared water resources between Iran and Afghanistan.

The limited measures currently in place are insufficient to address Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis linked to climate change. The country urgently requires international assistance to confront imminent climate disasters,

However, Afghanistan is excluded from climate policy negotiations because the Taliban is not recognized as an official government. In light of this, ahead of the 29th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 29) in Baku, Azerbaijan, Roza Otunbayeva, the UN Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, has called for Afghanistan’s inclusion in the conference.

Yet it is unlikely that the Taliban will be invited to COP29. This year, as in 2023, Abdulhadi Ackakzai, an Afghan climate change activist, has been permitted by UN officials to attend COP29 as an observer. In 2023, non-invitation to attend COP28 held in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates was protested by the country’s National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA).  At the time, the head of the climate change department of NEPA, Rohullah Amin, stated that the issue of climate change should not be politicised. 

With a large portion of the Afghan population suffering under Taliban rule, it is crucial to find a solution before it becomes too late. Both inhuman decrees from the Taliban and the accelerating climate change are stifling the Afghan population.

Dr Amit Ranjan’s research interests include water disputes, South Asian politics (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), India’s regional policy and India’s internal security. His papers, review essays and book reviews have been widely published in journals, including Asian Affairs, India Quarterly, South Asia Research, and Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. He has also contributed commentaries, opinion editorials and reviews in newspapers and websites.

Genevieve Donnellon-May is a Researcher at Oxford Global Society and a fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center. She sits on the advisory board member of Modern Diplomacy and is a 2023 CSIS Pacific Forum Young Leader.

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China’s Skydio curbs sound the alarm for US battery supply chain  – Asia Times

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Skydio, the largest drone manufacturer In the United States, has failed to obtain the batteries made by Japanese TDK’s unit in mainland China after it was sanctioned by the Chinese government three weeks ago. 

The California-based company last week sought help from the Biden administration as its Chief Executive Adam Bry met with US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and senior officials at the White House, the Financial Times reported.

The Chinese government last month announced its sanctions against Skydio, Huntington Ingalls Industries and Edge Autonomy Operations LLC, as well as 10 senior executives of American defense contractors, and accused them of providing substantial military assistance to Taiwan. Observers couldn’t help noticing that the date of the announcement, October 10, marked the 113th anniversary of the Republic of China.

After the announcement, Chinese officials visited Skydio’s suppliers, including Dongguan Poweramp, a subsidiary of Japan’s TDK, and ordered them to cut ties with the American drone maker, a person familiar with the situation told the Financial Times on Thursday. 

“This is a clarifying moment for the drone industry,” Bry told Skydio’s customers in a note obtained by the Financial Times. “If there was ever any doubt, this action makes clear that the Chinese government will use supply chains as a weapon to advance their interests over ours.”

He said Beijing wants to eliminate the leading American drone company and deepen the world’s dependence on Chinese drone suppliers.

Bry told US media that Skydio has a substantial stock of batteries on hand but it does not expect new sources of battery supply until next spring, He said the company has invested in domestic production and sourcing outside of China but batteries are one of the few components it has not yet moved out of China. 

Skydio, which has sent more than 1,000 drones to Ukraine for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance purposes, is seeking alternative suppliers in Asia. It has been in touch with Taiwan’s Vice President Hsiao Bi-him about the issue. 

China’s moves to curb Skydio’s battery supply coincided with North Korea’s plan to deploy troops to support the Russian army in Ukraine. US State Secretary Antony Blinken said Thursday that about 8,000 North Korean soldiers are stationed on the Russian border and are preparing to join combat in Ukraine “in the coming days.” 

Chinese pundits’ reaction

Although Beijing’s curbs have not yet been able to disrupt Skydio’s drone production, many Chinese commentators are now celebrating.

“China’s sanctions against certain US companies and individuals have initially shown their effects,” A Henan-based columnist using the pseudonym “Spirit No.1” says in an article published on Friday. “The curbs are having a real impact on American firms, as Skydio now has a limited battery supply and needs to seek alternative suppliers.”

The commentator adds, “It is difficult for the US government to help companies overcome the challenge in the short term given the complexity and time required to reconstruct the supply chain.” 

He says, with its complete supply chain in the drone sector, China is able to limit the production and supply of the US military drone makers that rely on the Chinese manufacturing sector. 

He says that the incident is only reflecting the intensifying technology war between China and the US. He says the US should think twice whether it wants any escalations as it will hurt itself one day.

According to an article by a Hainan-based writer using the pseudonym “No.14 Observation Room,” “China has previously launched several rounds of countermeasures against US firms but people do not know whether these measures really work. Now people are satisfied after seeing Skydio’s failure in getting Poweramp’s batteries.”

He adds that “the US has made up excuses when sanctioning Chinese firms and individuals, and it thinks China can’t do anything to its arms sales to Taiwan. Now China’s counterattack is completely beyond the United States’ expectation. Skydio does not have an alternative supplier.”

That writer says the current Chinese sanctions, which target US defense contractors and drone makers, have displayed only a small part of Beijing’s retaliation capabilities. He says the US defense contractors’ suppliers in China can be targeted.

John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the US and Chinese Communist Party, said the administration and Congress need to work together with industry to set guardrails that protect US companies from CCP economic coercion. 

He said China’s control of supply chains for drones, pharmaceuticals and other sectors was a “loaded gun” aimed at the US economy. He said Beijing is weaponizing these supply chain dependencies against US people. 

China Plus One strategy 

While Skydio is working on sourcing batteries elsewhere, TDK is also implementing its China Plus One strategy by adding new production facilities in India.

TDK Chief Executive Noboru Saito told Nikkei in 2022 that it is diversifying its manufacturing network by expanding in countries such as India. He said at that time that TDK no longer saw China as the world’s manufacturing hub although it would continue to treat the country as its main battery production base. 

TDK and a long-term partner, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co Ltd (CATL), in 2021 set up two joint ventures in Xiamen, Fujian province, for the making of electric vehicle batteries. 

Saito said in a speech on Investor Day on May 22 this year that TDK has started production of back-end processes for battery packs in India in 2017 to implement its China Plus One strategy. He said the company also started cell production in India in 2022 and will commence production in a new factory in Sohna of the same country in 2025.

“We will continue to expand gradually in line with growth in local demand,” he said. “In our materials procurement efforts, we will maximize business value by strengthening our value chain, including pursuing strategic initiatives such as investing in material suppliers.”

Meanwhile, several US academics co-write in an article published by The Conversation on Friday that, among the 23 battery plant projects announced or expanded since the Inflation Reduction Act became law in the US, construction for 72% of expected production is on track. 

They say these 23 companies’ new US factories are expected to create about 30,000 new jobs, with projects mostly in the US Southeast, Midwest and Southwest. 

Read: Latest Taiwan drills show off PLA deterrence

Follow Jeff Pao on X: @jeffpao3

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Capital equipment not enough to revive US chip-making – Asia Times

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After decades of decline, a new boost in US manufacturing is garnering considerable media attention. In particular, the semiconductor industry has been prioritized for US government support through the CHIPS Act initiative with some US$50 billion worth of state funding.

But what will be needed to increase and sustain US high-technology manufacturing? A  serious resurgence of advanced manufacturing (chips being the most demanding) will require much more than investing in more sophisticated equipment in new plants.

It will require training a new generation of highly skilled personnel to operate such plants successfully. While increasingly sophisticated technology is key to much of competitive manufacturing, it is productive only with staff with very specialized training to operate in complex plant environments. Badly managed mechanization will hinder rather than promote value creation.

I learned from experience in semiconductor manufacturing. Early in my career at RCA,  I was tasked with designing and operating one of the first silicon transistor factories to manufacture the 2N2102, a transistor I had developed for use in building computer and other electronic systems.  

I outfitted the factory with equipment scaled from my laboratory. At the time, no commercial production equipment existed. For example, the optical lithographic equipment was built by the local photography shop in Somerville, New Jersey, for a few hundred dollars.

When production volume needed to increase, new equipment was required and we purchased new, more automated commercial production  equipment then coming to market. I had hoped that such equipment would increase production volume and yields.

However, volume increased but product yields declined. The cause, we discovered, was inadequate process definition for the automated equipment.

We found that with the original manual processes, the production technicians introduced changes as they deemed necessary to maintain quality and production rates in the face of small changes, for example, in the temperature of chemical solutions.

The new machines were designed to operate under fixed pre-set conditions and changes were not automatically adjustable. To make the factory operate, we had to invest time and effort in defining all of the production elements and avoid human intervention randomly introduced to correct anomalies.

The machines had to be programmed with great precision for desired results. This required much process research to understand variables.

Here, I learned a valuable lesson in production management—the importance of very precise process definition and control. As new, more automated equipment was introduced, product yields frequently declined initially.

They did not improve until the production process was refined to new levels because new automated equipment required new levels of process knowledge and control.

To enable successful production required a close working relationship between production process  engineers and equipment operators. These engineers had to be trained to fully understand the technology. This was a new engineering discipline.

This necessitated change in production methodology was costly and hard to accept by production managers trained in the old days of low levels of automation. But change they did as a new generation of production managers entered chip manufacturing.

However, I found that, given the same equipment, plant performance was a strong function of local management quality and staff  training. The variables to be controlled and adjusted with automation were practically endless and the plants had to develop their own process engineering skills to perform economically.

In effect, starting with devices designed in the laboratory, moving them into production was a whole new endeavor requiring talent as valuable as that of the original design team.

It is evident that as chips increased in complexity, production became extraordinarily demanding in capital and human resources. For my original  transistor, the device dimensions were in fractions of a centimeter and a photoshop could make the equipment to form the dimensions.  

Today, integrated circuit chips have billions of transistors interconnected with dimensions approaching atomic ones. Whatever challenges I faced, today’s plants have them in far greater complexity and cost.

Fast-forward to 2024, and my simple homemade lithographic tool has evolved for the most sophisticated chip production to a huge piece of ultraviolet laser-powered equipment produced by ASML (the sole producer globally), which sells for about $300 million and requires specially trained staff to operate.  

Faced with such costs and management challenges, it is easy to understand why the leaders of so many chip companies decided that manufacturing was too challenging and outsourced production to Taiwan’s TSMC, which is exclusively committed to chip manufacturing.  

TSMC’s success is not based on the invention of unique equipment. Rather, it is rooted in outstanding management of human and capital resources. The company trains its staff to a high level of performance and operates its plants to get the best possible performance from its costly equipment.

 A new fully equipped plant costs $20 billion but it is the highly trained management and staff that make it work. At this time, TSMC produces over 90% of the highest-performance chips in the world. Anyone looking to compete has to invest in the human resources needed, not just the equipment.

Henry Kressel is a technologist, inventor, author and industry executive. He is a long-term private equity investor in technology businesses. Incidentally, the original 2N2102 product is still commercially available.

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Trump 2.0 would be no easy ride for Vladimir Putin – Asia Times

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MOSCOW—Many American elites, their media allies and card-carrying Democrats are convinced that a second Trump presidency would present Vladimir Putin with only opportunities. The reality is that a Trump 2.0 administration would likely bring more problems than the Russian leader has at present.

This soft-on-Putin narrative stems from the “Russiagate” conspiracy theory alleging that Trump was either a full-blown Russian agent or easily manipulated by Putin during his first term. Check the record, though, and it’s clear that Trump imposed more sanctions on Russia than any US president before him until Joe Biden.

Trump failed to implement campaign pledges to improve ties with Russia due to the pressure applied on him by the Russiagate accusation and the way in which some permanent members of the US military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies, spelled “deep state”, subverted his policy vision.

Trump also bombed Syria early in his presidency in response to what Russia considered to be a false flag chemical weapons provocation, which Barack Obama balked at doing in 2013 and thus called Russia’s bluff from back then.  

Another irritant in bilateral ties was the sanctions that Trump imposed on the Nord Stream II pipeline, motivated by his bid to poach the European energy market from Russia for American producers.

Russia was also displeased that Trump did nothing to encourage France, Germany and Ukraine to implement their obligations under the Minsk agreements to resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine.

These and other issues caused Russia to regard Trump’s first presidency as a lost opportunity to enter into a meaningful rapprochement and to be bitter about it in hindsight.

Biden’s term was much worse for bilateral relations, but it didn’t start that way. Biden and Putin met in Geneva in June 2021, shortly after the US leader waived Trump’s sanctions on Nord Stream II, following which Putin publicly defended his American counterpart’s cognitive state in response to a question about them.

But anti-Russian “deep state” hawks ultimately preferred prioritizing Russia’s containment over China’s, sustaining America’s security dilemma in Europe. Putin’s security guarantee requests from December 2021 were rejected, which set into motion the events that would lead to his decision to launch his “special military operation” in Ukraine in February 2022.

It’s beyond the scope of this analysis to rehash the run-up to that fateful decision, but it’s sufficient to say that the events that followed have completely changed the nature of Russia-US relations. If Trump returns to office, he’ll inherit a much more difficult bilateral situation than he did during his first tenure.

The precedent set by his inability to prevent anti-Russian “deep state” hawks from subverting his envisaged rapprochement bodes ill for his possible second term from Moscow’s perspective, considering the much greater power these officials now wield over policymaking on all Russia-related matters.

Russia’s fears that they could stage a major provocation for escalating the Ukraine conflict if Trump wins, whether before or after he’s reinaugurated, explain why Putin endorsed Biden and then Kamala Harris.

Contrary to his image in the Western mind, Putin is a very cautious leader who considers himself the consummate pragmatist. That explains why he only authorized conventional military interventions in Syria and Ukraine at what he thought to be the last possible minute before perceived windows of opportunity closed.

He’s even been constructively criticized by nationalistically minded Russians and their supporters abroad for waiting too long with both military interventions, arguing they might have been more successful had they had been launched earlier.

Putin’s endorsements of Biden and then Harris weren’t part of some “5D chess master plan”, like some have speculated, but rather were sincere reflections of his preference for dealing with the proverbial devils that he already knows than a return to Trump uncertainty.

Not only might Russia fear that the “deep state” could stage major provocations to subvert Trump’s stated plan for ending the Ukraine war within months of taking office, but Trump himself might flirt with “escalating to de-escalate” on his own.

These same “deep state” forces have wisely applied a “boiling the frogs” approach to the latest phase of the already over-decade-long Ukrainian conflict by gradually escalating US involvement and always signaling such in advance so that Russia could prepare and not overreact.

This managed warfare has helped Russia and the US manage their worsening security dilemma caused by American mission creep in the conflict, thus avoiding an apocalyptic World War III scenario sparked by miscalculation – at least up until now.

That could change if Trump is re-elected, at least from Russia’s perspective, since either he or the “deep state” could ignore these prior guardrails by escalating to de-escalate in very dangerous ways. The purpose would be to coerce concessions from Russia ahead of a seemingly inevitable grand peace deal.

Putin has staked his reputation on at least obtaining control over the entirety of the four former Ukrainian regions that Russia now claims so he will be very reluctant to freeze the conflict before that is secure on the battlefield.

Perhaps a series of mutually acceptable compromises between Russia and the US (which could coerce Ukraine into complying with whatever Washington agrees with Moscow) might be reached under Trump. But even if the “deep state” doesn’t subvert such a deal, other problems might quickly arise for Russia.

If the aforementioned compromises aren’t paired with sanctions relief for Russia, then Trump might revert to his preferred use of these means to pressure India, Turkey, the UAE and others into sanctions compliance to Russia’s detriment.

His well-known dislike of Iran could also see him repeat his prior “maximum pressure” policy against Tehran at the expense of Russia’s efforts to develop the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), which runs through Iran and connects Russia with the Gulf States, India and further afield to Africa and Southeast Asia.

In that scenario, Russia would risk becoming even more disproportionately dependent on China than it arguably already is, which it has sought to hedge and avert by using India as a counterweight in various ways.

A Trump 2.0 presidency would only present opportunities for Russia if none of those three scenarios – “escalating to de-escalate”, doubling down on sanctions enforcement, and choking off the NSTC – transpires, a fair compromise ends the Ukraine war and the US “Pivots (back) to Asia” and out of Europe pronto.

Trump’s plan for NATO, as reported by Politico, could enable Russia to more effectively manage their security dilemma in Europe with a view toward negotiating a new security architecture there.

American troops could thus be freed up for redeployment to the Asia-Pacific to contain China, shifting the center of the New Cold War to the other side of Eurasia and relieving some of the pressure applied on Russia over the past two and a half years.

Moreover, encouraging the Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security could lead to a thaw of sorts in their ties with Russia, as would the lifting of some sanctions.

US prioritization of China’s (and to a lesser extent Iran’s) containment over Russia’s in a second Trump presidency would relieve pressure on Russia in Europe, though at the cost of creating new problems that might threaten its interests further afield.

The heightened risk that a hot war could break out by miscalculation between the China and the US, or at least between China and some of the US’ top regional partners like Japan, the Philippines, and/or Taiwan, would destabilize the world much more than the Ukrainian conflict has over the past two and a half years.

That’s because the Asia-Pacific is the center of global economic growth, and a major conflict there would likely disrupt key supply chains. This is especially so for the tech sector, specifically with regard to the high-end chips that power the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as well as state-of-the-art military equipment, thus limiting Russia’s supply even more than currently due to US-led sanctions and raise the risk it falls further behind peers and rivals.

Even if a hot Asia war is avoided and supply chains remain intact, Trump would be expected to apply tremendous pressure on Russia to distance itself from China, perhaps through a carrots-and-sticks approach of the sort that he implied during his live interview with Tucker Carlson on Thursday night during a fundraiser in Arizona.

At the event, Trump claimed that Biden “allowed them (China and Russia) to get together. It’s such a dangerous thing. The stupidity of what they have done… I’m going to have to un-unite them, I could do that too.”

Considering the trade war that Trump waged against China during his first term and his explicitly declared goal of ending the Ukraine war “as soon as possible” if he’s re-elected, Trump might try to meld the two initiatives to “un-unite” China and Russia as part of a new divide-and-rule strategy.

This could put Russia in a dilemma of either accepting whatever deal  Trump might propose at the expense of reversing some of the bilateral progress made in with China since 2022, or rejecting it at the cost of Trump dangerously escalating to de-escalate in Ukraine with the potential for a hot war with the US and associated miscalculation risks.

Cautious and pragmatic Putin might thus prefer to retain the presently more predictable trajectory of US-Russian ties in the New Cold War under Harris than risk a new era of global uncertainty under Trump.

Andrew Korybko is a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity. He holds a PhD in political science from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.” Follow him on X at @AKorybko

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Now is the moment for a Middle East ceasefire – Asia Times

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The recent escalation in hostilities between Israel and Iran has brought the Middle East dangerously close to a full-scale regional war, one that could swiftly draw in neighboring countries as well as the United States and its allies.

With Iran contemplating retaliation after Israel’s missile attack on October 26, the urgency for diplomatic intervention is increasingly critical.

A swift and decisive diplomatic initiative is needed not only for Iran and Israel but is also essential to prevent further regional destabilization, which if allowed to spiral, would have grave implications for global security and stability.

Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Iran retains its inherent right to self-defense in response to Israel’s actions. Iran’s leadership is aware that accepting attacks on Tehran could set a dangerous precedent, suggesting a weakening of its stance.

Israel’s strikes represent the first attacks on Iranian soil since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. A failure to respond could undermine Iran’s image among regional allies and its domestic population.

There is concern that normalizing such incursions might erase critical “red lines,” potentially encouraging Israel to strike Tehran with the same frequency it applies to Damascus and Beirut.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned that Israel’s recent aggression should not be downplayed, stressing that the regime’s miscalculations about Iran’s resilience and strength will not go unchallenged.

Following his statements, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi emphasized the need for a proportionate response, affirming Iran’s unwillingness to leave this attack unanswered.

As it did following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil, Tehran has expressed a reluctance to escalate into full-scale war with Israel, acknowledging that a well-timed ceasefire could influence its response, potentially moderating or even preventing military action.

This window for negotiation offers the United States and its Western allies a critical opportunity to support a diplomatic solution and press for a ceasefire.

For Israel, a ceasefire could represent a practical exit from the costly and complex situation. Its recent campaign has inflicted substantial losses on Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon but at the cost of innocent lives and significant military resources.

Israel has assassinated high-profile leaders, such as Yahya Sinwar of Hamas and Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah, but both groups’ forces have proven resilient and exacted notable losses on the Israeli military, which drains both resources and morale.

For example, the recent attacks on the Israeli Golani Brigade headquarters and the deaths of Colonel Ehsan Daqsa show that these groups remain formidable. Over the past month, the Israeli army has reported 90 soldiers killed and 750 wounded in Lebanon alone, along with significant losses of equipment, including Merkava tanks, military bulldozers, and advanced drones.

From October 7 to October 25, Israel’s Ministry of Defense reported the deaths of 890 soldiers and officers across its military and security services, with nearly 5,000 more wounded.

These staggering figures have led Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to warn Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of a costly war lacking both “a compass” and “a clear goal that risks entangling both nations in a war of attrition.

The prolonged conflict has also fuelled frustration among Israeli citizens, especially the families of hostages and fallen soldiers, who have publicly voiced dissatisfaction with the government’s approach.

At a recent memorial ceremony for the October 7 attack, Israel’s prime minister faced outcries from grieving families. Some relatives shouted, “Shame on you!” while one repeatedly cried out, “My father was killed.”

Such sentiments reveal a deeper issue: the longer this conflict continues, the greater Israel’s risk of becoming entrenched in an unsustainable, open-ended war. A ceasefire offers a realistic way to break this costly cycle and avoid further casualties.

Israel’s strategy must also contend with lessons from recent history. Some hawkish advocates of a military-first approach to reshaping the Middle East like the former Mossad chief should remember the 2003 Iraq War. At that time, a swift military campaign was anticipated to establish stability, turn Iran’s influence around, and transform Iraq into an ally.

Instead, Iranian influence grew, diverting US resources with limited long-term success. Today, Hezbollah and Hamas have become similarly entrenched within their communities, not just as military powers but as essential service providers. Efforts to reduce their influence must account for this social integration, as tactical victories alone are unlikely to dismantle their regional standing.

Moreover, while some in Israel might assume that a future US administration under Donald Trump would endorse a full-scale conflict with Iran, this overlooks critical variables.

During his first term, Trump favored sanctions and rhetoric over direct military involvement. He notably refrained from a military response in several moments of high tension.

In fact, the Republican nominee has told Prime Minister Netanyahu that he wants Israel to wrap up the war in Gaza by the time he returns to office if he wins the election, as reported by the Times of Israel.

Moreover, domestic support in the US for another Middle Eastern conflict is low following the costly Iraq and Afghanistan wars, meaning that even a supportive administration might push for diplomatic solutions over direct involvement. The United States may be more inclined to back peace efforts that support its own strategic objectives rather than commit to further regional entanglement.

The US government is fully aware of the risks associated with being drawn into this conflict. Already providing significant military aid to Israel, with Brown University estimating nearly $22.76 billion allocated this past year, the US would face an immense financial burden if hostilities were to expand. Such a strain would divert resources from urgent domestic and global priorities, reinforcing the argument for a diplomatic approach.

Beyond economics, a wider Middle Eastern conflict would detract from the US’s strategic focus on containing Chinese and Russian influence in regions like the South China Sea and Eastern Europe. A prolonged Middle Eastern war could allow these powers to consolidate their interests unchallenged, underscoring the viability of a ceasefire for the US.

The escalating tensions between Israel and Iran present a pivotal moment for international diplomacy. Each involved nation faces profound and potentially irreversible consequences should this conflict continue unchecked.

For Iran, retaliation is a matter of both regional standing and self-defense, while Israel faces an unsustainable burden as it risks entanglement in an endless cycle of violence. The United States, aware of its own fiscal and strategic constraints, has a critical role to play in advocating for a ceasefire.

A timely diplomatic intervention could pave the way for de-escalation, sparing the region from further devastation and allowing for a shift toward a more stable, sustainable peace. This opportunity for resolution underscores the collective interest of diplomacy over warfare, positioning all parties for a path out of an otherwise costly and prolonged conflict.

Hossein Zeinali is an international reporter at Farhikhtegan Daily and Sadegh Emami is a member of the publication’s editorial board.

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Tariff time: Free trade skepticism deeply rooted in US history – Asia Times

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One of the more surprising developments in recent American politics has been the backlash against free trade.

As recently as a decade ago, Democrats and Republicans alike generally favored free trade. But with the 2024 presidential election just days away, both Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris are leaning hard on protectionism.

The Trump campaign in particular is promoting tariffs that would be difficult to imagine coming from a Republican presidential candidate just a decade ago.

This new post-neoliberal moment might seem confounding. But it hearkens back to economic policies – and political parties – from around the time of the nation’s founding, and it offers clues to our divided present.

Back in the late 18th century, the Founding Father Alexander Hamilton helped put in place a set of policies designed to encourage US industry and to promote economic development and innovation.

That arrangement, which laid the groundwork for what became known as the “American System,” emerged in part as a counterbalance to British conceptions of free trade. And the American System quickly grew as accepted economic policy as a young America developed its industrial strength.

Hamilton’s economic nationalism

In the early years of the republic, the US didn’t have much of a trade policy at all.

When the US officially achieved independence in 1783 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Articles of Confederation – the nation’s first constitution – greatly limited the federal government’s powers, including its ability to regulate foreign trade.

These restrictions reflected the reality of 13 very different states that had been more united against the British – and their trade controls – than in support of a common vision of economic development.

The economic conditions within this loosely connected nation quickly worsened. A deepening economic crisis, rising debt, inflation, cheap British manufactured goods and rising bankruptcy soon emerged. Such changing conditions gave rise to calls for a new national economic policy.

This economic strain was an important factor leading to the drafting of the US Constitution, ratified in 1789. The Constitution gave the federal government the capacity to regulate trade with foreign countries and, for the first time, to collect taxes. Both were privileges once held exclusively by sovereign American states.

The ‘second American revolution’

A strengthened American Congress made passing a national Tariff Act one of its first tasks. When it was ratified in 1789, a national import tax replaced customs previously enacted by the states.

Perhaps indicating the magnitude of this change, supporters called it “the Second American Revolution,” passed as it was on July 4, 1789. In effect, it helped create a new conception of the American political and economic system, with a much stronger role for the state in economic matters.

Duties were levied on 30 commodities, including hemp and textiles. Perhaps foreshadowing trade policy of a future era, the Tariff Act also placed duties of 12.5% on goods imported from China and India.

The main architect of this new industrial policy was Hamilton, who released his seminal work on economic policy, Report on Manufactures, in 1791. Hamilton’s ideas were based on transforming a predominantly agricultural nation into one defined, at least in part, by growing and diversified industry.

Though often overlooked, Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures also contained a grander vision – it sought to encourage the development of American invention and ingenuity as a form of economic policy and argued for unlocking “the genius of the people” so that “the wealth of a nation may be promoted.”

To promote this spirit of national enterprise, Hamilton encouraged promoting technological progress, subsidizing research, attracting migrants, supporting a new financial system and implementing a patent system to promote invention. Such policies were in many ways an extension of previous policy enshrined in Section 8 of the Constitution.

Tariffs and their discontents

As the use of tariffs continued in the decades following Hamilton’s plan, policymakers turned increasingly protective in an attempt to more directly promote American industry. They enacted tariffs to insulate growing American industries from foreign competition, primarily from the UK.

By the early 19th century, this growing protectionist movement coalesced around the powerful Kentucky legislator Henry Clay and his Whig Party. Clay, who first referred to the American System by name, and his allies were instrumental in raising average national tariff rates to 20% in 1816.

When crisis appeared during the Panic of 1819, a collapse in cotton prices, a tightening of credit, widespread foreclosures and rising unemployment followed. In response, Clay and his allies raised tariff rates again, to 50% in 1828.

The increasing use of tariffs provoked a fierce response from some in the nation’s agricultural and slave-owning class, who objected to perceived Northern dominance and a strong federal government. One prominent Southern critic at the time referred to the 1828 tariff as the “tariff of abominations.”

Indeed, opposition to elements of the American System was one of the chief policy goals of early Democratic politicians such as Andrew Jackson, and fights over the system presaged later sectional fights leading up to the Civil War.

As an industrial revolution took root in American society in the decades that followed, tariffs remained a cornerstone of US economic policy. By the late 1850s, tariffs had become integrated into the policy of the newly formed Republican Party and an important plank of Abraham Lincoln’s economic platform.

Toward the end of the 19th century, a changing Democratic Party, supported increasingly by a strong agricultural populist movement, continued to largely oppose the tariff system, arguing it benefited powerful industrialists at the expense of the working class while offering little to counter economic crisis.

The breakup of the American System − and why it matters today

Between 1861 and 1933, tariffs were a standard tool of US economic policy. During this period, tariffs on dutiable goods often averaged 40% to 50%, especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. US policymakers didn’t seriously question tariffs as a form of industrial policy until the deepening of the Great Depression in the 1930s.

Following World War II, the US decisively shifted away from tariffs. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was widely blamed for deepening the Great Depression and contributing to the international conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s, effectively ending the protectionist era of U.S. industrial history.

The establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913 provided policymakers with a novel tool – monetary policy – to deal with economic downturns. The Keynesian revolution provided still another policy response for governments to consider during periods of economic crisis: spending as fiscal stimulus to create jobs and income.

Finally, as postwar American policy embraced open global trade, American economic policy pursued more direct mechanisms to foster national innovation and entrepreneurship – effectively breaking up policy once dependent on activist trade intervention. With the elimination of tariffs, one of the great periods of American economic growth and innovation followed.

In 2024, the Republican platform has, in many ways, returned to its origins by offering tariffs as a key economic strategy. Likewise, the Democratic platform, with its skepticism of concentrated corporate power, coupled with a renewed focus on financial support for small businesses and entrepreneurship, echoes its own earlier generation.

As Americans head to the polls, it’s worth asking how current economic proposals with deep roots in the American System of old might help shape economic policy in the future.

Erik Guzik is assistant clinical professor of management, University of Montana

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Airbus, Toshiba building the hydrogen planes of the future – Asia Times

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Airbus and Toshiba will cooperate to develop superconducting technologies for future hydrogen-powered aircraft, a potential revolutionary collaboration to curb carbon emissions and improve efficiency while switching to a sustainable long-term fuel source.

Airbus UpNext, a wholly-owned subsidiary of France’s Airbus, and Japan’s Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation, a division of the electronics conglomerate, will carry out the work as per a newly signed agreement.

Airbus UpNext’s says its mission is to identify, evaluate and develop potentially disruptive aerospace trends and concepts that could yield radical technological breakthroughs such as flying “at speeds well beyond what seems feasible today” or, in this case, a new and better approach to aerial propulsion.

Airbus UpNext says it aims “to further accelerate traditional research cycles, developing proof of concepts and completing both ground and flight testing with scale and speed.” Practically speaking, this likely means within two or three years.

Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation is one of Japan’s leading suppliers of power generation and transmission equipment, and energy management technology.

Director Tsutomu Takeuchi says the company brings “expertise in superconducting technology for high current flow, motor drive technology for precise current control, and advanced rotating machinery technology for stable, high-speed operation” to the partnership.

The two sides signed the agreement last month at the Japan International Aerospace Exhibition 2024, which hosted more than 660 companies and other organizations at the Tokyo Big Sight exhibition center from October 16-19.

Airbus senior vice president Grzegorz Ombach, who heads the aerospace giant’s “Disruptive R&T” (Research and Technology) division, said, “Partnering with Toshiba presents a unique opportunity to push beyond the limitations of today’s partial superconducting and conventional electrical motors.”

Ombach and Takeuchi were joined by Kensuke Suzuki, executive in charge of new technology in the power systems division of Toshiba Energy Systems & Solutions Corporation, and Ludovic Ybanez, head of the Airbus Cryoprop demonstrator project.

Cryoprop was launched last May to accelerate the development of a two-megawatt superconducting electric propulsion system cooled by liquid hydrogen. The project seeks to confirm the potential of superconducting technologies for future aircraft applications in manufacturing, maintenance, operations and safety.

Any breakthrough would give Airbus the opportunity to accelerate the introduction of new products such as superconducting cables, motors, cryogenic power electronics and cryogenic cooling systems.

Toshiba, which has been conducting R&D on superconducting technology for nearly 50 years, announced a prototype two-megawatt superconductivity motor in June 2022. Its and Airbus’ projects have now converged.

The collaboration marks a hopeful start for the new Airbus Tech Hub Japan announced last May, which aims to create partnerships in Japan to promote research and innovation and build a next-generation aviation ecosystem. One of many established by Airbus, it will focus on aviation materials and automation as well as decarbonization.

The Tech Hub concept, supported by the governments of France and Japan, is more forward-looking and more likely to benefit Japan than the ill-fated Mitsubishi regional jet project, which was launched in 2007 and, after numerous delays, finally cancelled in 2023. It also marks another step for Japan away from reliance on America’s Boeing toward increased collaboration with Airbus.

Airbus is already working with Japanese aircraft and aircraft component makers Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and ShinMaywa, carbon fiber producers Toray and Teijin, and dozens of other Japanese companies.

On October 18, Airbus and Kawasaki Heavy Industries signed an MOU to study the feasibility of building hydrogen infrastructure at Kansai International Airport, Osaka International Airport and Kobe Airport.  

A new addition to the Airbus Hydrogen Hub at Airports program, it is part of a roll-out of hydrogen infrastructure at airports in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and North America.

The Airbus hydrogen network already includes some 215 airports and associated energy suppliers, ground service companies and airlines – including All Nippon Airways (ANA). It is beginning to develop the scale that would make hydrogen-powered flight economical.

Airbus wants to introduce the world’s first hydrogen-powered commercial aircraft by 2035 and has developed four design concepts to that end. Three of them—turbofan, turboprop and blended wing-body turbofan—use hydrogen combustion gas turbines and modified fuel injectors similar to the technology currently in use. The fourth uses hydrogen fuel cells to power electric motors.

Airbus also has R&D teams working on cryogenic fuel systems and hydrogen fuel tanks. Hydrogen has an energy per unit mass three times greater than that of the jet fuel currently in use, but a lower energy density by volume. That means hydrogen fuel tanks will be bulkier than existing jet fuel tanks, and thus, future hydrogen-powered aircraft will look quite different from today’s airplanes.

US aerospace rival Boeing is skeptical of the hydrogen push. Speaking at the Farnborough International Airshow in July, Boeing chief technology officer Todd Citron said that hydrogen’s low energy density by volume and high flammability present a design problem and a serious safety risk. “Is it safe and certifiable?” he asked, adding, “That’s a really big question.”

His critical comment came after the April announcement of a Boeing R&T Center in Nagoya to focus on digital model-based engineering and manufacturing, composite materials, sustainable aviation fuel and the use of hydrogen fuel cells to power aircraft.

Like Airbus, Boeing has been working on hydrogen-powered flight for several years. However, faced with a net US$6.2 billion loss last quarter, a strike that has shut down most of its production and a discounted stock issue to save its bleeding balance sheet, management’s focus is now more on restructuring and survival than innovation.

Indeed, keeping pace with Airbus on hydrogen-powered aircraft does not appear to be a Boeing priority. With its Hydrogen Hub at Airports implementation program, Airbus is getting so far ahead in the field that Boeing may never catch up. For its part, Toshiba has seemingly chosen the right partner to commercialize its superconducting motor technology in aviation markets.

Follow this writer on X: @ScottFo83517667

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Cutting-edge US counter to China’s ‘Guam killer’ missiles – Asia Times

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The US has installed a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) in Guam, signaling heightened readiness against potential threats from China as the US integrates cutting-edge missile interceptors to fortify its Pacific stronghold.

Last month, The War Zone reported that the US Navy had installed a Mk 41 VLS for Guam’s Aegis Ashore air defense system, marking a significant upgrade to the island’s defenses. The War Zone report mentions the installation is part of broader efforts to enhance Guam’s airspace security against mainly Chinese threats.

The report notes that the Aegis Ashore system, which includes the Aegis Combat System and AN/SPY-1 radar, is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their midcourse flight using SM-3 interceptors.

It says the modular Mk 41 launcher can accommodate other interceptors like the SM-6 and the forthcoming Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), enhancing its capability to counter hypersonic threats.

However, The War Zone suggests that the installation faces challenges due to Guam’s limited open space and mountainous terrain. The Mk 41 launcher is a crucial component of the planned Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system, which aims to provide a comprehensive 360-degree defense of the island against a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

Asia Times reported in April 2024 that the US is set to enhance Guam’s missile defenses by deploying Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) following a successful test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

The IBCS, which integrates disparate sensors and weapons systems into a cohesive network, will bolster Guam’s defenses against ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and drone threats.

The upgrade is part of a broader strategy to address vulnerabilities in the US air and missile defense kill chains, particularly against Chinese and North Korean threats.

The EIAMD missile defense system, featuring Aegis Ashore, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Typhon and Patriot systems, will form the future core of Guam’s defense.

However, in May 2023, Asia Times mentioned that integrating multiple systems may present challenges, as unlinked systems and fixed sensor-to-shooter combinations could fail against advanced missile attacks.

China and North Korea’s “Guam killer” missiles, such as the former’s DF-26 and the latter’s Hwasong 14 and 15, pose significant next-generation threats, with China potentially deploying hypersonic weapons from its naval and air forces.

Alongside kinetic missile attacks, Asia Times mentioned in October 2024 that China could potentially take advantage of vulnerabilities in the US kill chains by launching coordinated attacks from various domains, including space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, to overcome US missile defenses.

Asia Times reported in June 2022 that the US has initiated significant construction on Tinian, a strategic island in the Western Pacific, to serve as a backup facility for its naval and air operations on Guam.

This effort, part of a broader US$20 billion initiative to enhance the US military presence in the Pacific, includes the Tinian Divert Airfield project, which features a new aircraft taxiway and parking apron and is set to be completed in October 2025.

The project aims to provide strategic, operational and exercise capabilities for US forces to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Tinian’s infrastructure will accommodate 12 tanker aircraft and support personnel, with regular military exercises planned.

Aside from Tinian, Asia Times reported in May 2021 that Palau has invited the US to build strategic ports, bases and airfields on its Pacific islands in response to China’s perceived economic bullying.

Palau’s President Surangel Whipps has recently accused China of destabilizing Palau’s economy by “weaponizing” lucrative Chinese tourism after Palau refused to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

This geopolitical tension has led Palau to seek closer military ties with the US, highlighting the high-stakes rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the Pacific.

Palau, with a population of 18,000, is strategically located in the “Second Island Chain,” which is crucial for US military interests in the region. The US has a historical defense agreement with Palau, and recent military activities have included training exercises and visits by high-ranking US defense officials.

These developments underscore the islands’ historical and ongoing strategic importance dating back to World War II. The US military strategy in the Pacific, which relies heavily on Guam, faces challenges due to the far-flung region’s limited, isolated facilities that are increasingly within the range of Chinese and North Korean missiles.

They also align with the US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which aims to enhance survivability and operational flexibility in increasingly contested environments.

ACE seeks to counter adversary threats to traditional airbases by increasing resilience and generating combat power from dispersed, flexible locations, complicating enemy targeting efforts.

The air strategy promotes a shift from large, centralized airbases to smaller, dispersed locations, enabling rapid movement and maneuvering of forces.

ACE leverages decentralized execution, tailored force packages, pre-positioned equipment, scalable logistics and robust communication networks for joint all-domain operations and partner-nation cooperation.

The focus is on expeditionary skills, infrastructure innovations and agile logistics to maintain combat operations. These elements ensure the US Air Force can generate airpower from multiple, unpredictable locations, complicating adversary planning and reducing vulnerability to attack.

However, James Leftwich and other writers mention in a May 2023 RAND report that the US military’s focus on efficiency has led to a highly centralized supply chain, which could make it vulnerable during high-end conflicts.

Leftwich and others emphasize that centralized decision-making outside warfighting commands leads to delays in resource allocation. They highlight the risk this poses to combat support operations, as the logistics network may struggle to quickly adapt to rapidly changing demands during a contested fight, which in turn could threaten overall mission effectiveness.

In an April 2021 Air & Space Operations Review article, Zachary Moer and other writers note that many US dispersed bases under the ACE concept lack the essential infrastructure of traditional airbases. Moer and others say this includes hardened shelters, advanced air defense systems and sophisticated maintenance facilities.

They point out that scattered military bases are susceptible to attacks without adequate protection, particularly from opponents such as China, who could exploit diplomatic, economic or physical tactics to target them. They note this could potentially undermine air operations due to a lack of proper defenses and logistical support.

In addition, Matthew Donovan mentions in a January 2022 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that US adversaries have studied its force deployment and invested heavily in pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and all-domain long-range offensive capabilities that put its global footprint at risk.

While dispersal complicates targeting, Donovan argues that adversaries could still leverage pervasive surveillance technologies to detect and strike these smaller, less-fortified locations.

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Ukraine’s decentralized warfare: the battle of the common person – Asia Times

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers an unprecedented case study on the democratization of warfare, particularly in three critical domains: drones, cyberattacks and influence operations.

The accessibility of technology has empowered ordinary citizens to participate directly in modern warfare, reshaping how wars of the future will be fought.

Ukrainian civilians have demonstrated methods that could be followed by citizens in other countries facing similar threats. Military analysts and scholars must understand these trends to prepare for future conflicts, which are likely to incorporate similar decentralized strategies.

For example, if the United States were to engage in a conflict with China over Taiwan, civilians most likely would play active roles both in defending online and in supporting operations on the physical battlefield.

Cyber warfare: the IT Army’s pioneering role

On June 20, 2024, the IT Army of Ukraine – a decentralized group of volunteer hackers – claimed to have launched against Russia’s banking system a distributed denial-of-service attack that it described as the “largest DDoS in history.”

That attack temporarily crippled several Russian banks, causing significant financial disruptions and showcasing the effectiveness of decentralized cyber tactics.

In a hybrid warfare landscape the IT Army has become a key player, operating across both physical and cyber battlefields and redefining modern warfare.

The IT Army was initially formed in early 2022 following a call to arms by Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, who saw the potential of mobilizing civilian hackers to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.

The IT Army’s primary tactic – DDoS attacks, which flood networks with excessive traffic – is accessible and effective, democratizing cyber warfare by enabling individuals worldwide to participate without extensive technical knowledge.

The impact of the IT Army has drawn attention from Russian officials. In March 2024, Dmitry Gribkov, an aide to the Russian Security Council, warned Western nations that supporting the IT Army was akin to “opening Pandora’s box.”

Gribkov alleged that hacking experts were being trained in Ukraine and the Baltic states for cyber operations targeting Russian infrastructure, reflecting the Kremlin’s growing concerns about Ukraine’s ability to inflict pain on Russia.

The IT Army’s cyber offensive has inflicted significant and lasting damage, with economic losses estimated to exceed $1 billion. In early 2024, DDoS attacks on Russian companies doubled overall compared with the year-earlier figures.

The Russian energy sector in particular suffered a tenfold increase in such attacks, which weakened critical infrastructure supporting Russia’s war effort.

The IT Army has also collaborated with Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) to conduct synchronized DDoS attacks and drone strikes, helping knock out Russian telecom networks and CCTV systems. That reduces the visibility of Ukrainian drone operations and thereby increases their success rate.

Encouraging global participation, the IT Army utilizes social media to share tools, instructions, and targets, allowing ordinary people to contribute to cyberattacks. This open-call structure taps into a global volunteer base, including participants from Europe, the US and other regions.

These actions showcase a new type of warfare, one that merges military and civilian resistance and bridges the gap between traditional soldiers and online combatants.

Countering Russian disinformation: NAFO and civilian influence operations

The Ukrainian defense effort has also been characterized by resilience and adaptability in information warfare. The North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO), formed in response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, has become a formidable force against Russian disinformation.

Using humor and memes to counter propaganda, NAFO – a leaderless, decentralized group – engages online audiences to keep the global spotlight on Ukraine and challenge Russian narratives. The group’s humorous approach, exemplified by Shiba Inu dog avatars, has proven remarkably resilient, making it difficult for Russian trolls to undermine its efforts.

A NAFO dog avatar. Image: Emerging Europe

Supporting Ukraine’s information frontlines, NAFO has been instrumental in fighting Russian trolls and countering disinformation campaigns. NAFO gained popularity by using Shiba Inu memes to mock Russian propaganda, making Russia’s accusations against them seem absurd. One ongoing joke within NAFO is that members are “real Shiba dogs employed by the CIA,” which deflects accusations while adding levity to their messaging.

Early in the invasion, NAFO’s success was clear when it forced Russia’s top diplomat in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, off X (formerly Twitter) following a heated exchange with a cartoon dog. This flexible and decentralized approach has allowed NAFO to respond quickly to changing narratives in the fast-paced realm of information warfare.

The Kremlin’s discomfort with NAFO’s influence is evident, with RT labeling NAFO as a “vast pro-Ukrainian bot army.” Even Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman criticized the group in July 2023. The Economist described NAFO’s approach as “a remarkably successful form of information warfare,” while Jamie Cohen, a media studies professor, characterized NAFO as “an actual tactical event against a nation-state.”

NAFO has further demonstrated its influence by helping suspend the screening of “Russians at War,” a pro-Russian documentary by ex-RT employee Anastasia Trofimova, in Canada. The group’s efforts highlighted the broader dangers of Russian influence operations and underscored NAFO’s capacity to effectively counter these narratives. In the digital age, anyone with an internet connection can join NAFO, making it an accessible and powerful counterbalance to Russian troll farms, which have been influencing global opinion since the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Volunteer-driven military tech supply chains

On the physical battlefield, Ukrainian civilians have also taken on a critical role in providing drones, which are essential to Ukraine’s defense strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Kurylenko emphasized this reliance, stating, “We’re only holding back the Russians with crowdfunded drones.” He noted that FPV (first-person view) drones, many of which are supplied by volunteers, are a crucial element preventing Russian breakthroughs on all fronts.

Demand for drones far exceeds supply, and Ukraine has depended heavily on volunteers to manage drone supply chains since the start of the invasion. Dzyga’s Paw, a fund that has supported over 100 military units, has played a key role in delivering essential tech supplies.

Former tech professionals from the fund have coordinated drone operations for Ukrainian forces, building robust tech supply chains for the military. Volunteers have also devised innovative solutions, such as using Google Meet to livestream drone footage, providing commanders with real-time battlefield intelligence.

Despite the efforts of volunteers, Ukraine still faces challenges due to limited access to Chinese-made drones. Kostyantyn Mynailenko, a commander in the Liut Brigade’s aerial reconnaissance unit, said, “The Russians have many more drones than us. They have a stable supply chain sourced directly from China, whereas we must order our Chinese drones indirectly through Europe.” This procurement gap has made Ukraine heavily reliant on volunteers to source Chinese drones for nearly two years.

The future of decentralized warfare

The Russo-Ukrainian War has vividly demonstrated the power of decentralized, civilian-driven warfare, establishing a model that will likely shape future conflicts. Through the democratization of drones, cyberattacks, and influence operations, Ukraine has mobilized ordinary citizens and volunteers, showing that advanced military capabilities can be built from the grassroots level. With crowdfunded drones, volunteer hackers, and online influence campaigns, Ukraine has effectively empowered civilians to play an active role in defense.

This new approach, blending traditional military tactics with the contributions of individual citizens and decentralized networks, has proven highly resilient and adaptable. As military analysts and strategists examine the implications, it’s clear that the integration of citizen-driven support will become an increasingly crucial component in modern warfare.

Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of “small wars” has evolved – from irregular units gathering intelligence and disrupting enemy operations, to “armed” citizens engaging in digital battles through drones, memes, and cyberattacks.

Ukraine’s experience has provided an invaluable case study for countries worldwide, showing that in a digitized world, anyone with an internet connection can contribute to the national defense. The democratization of warfare is not new, but technology has reshaped and expanded its possibilities, redefining how wars will be fought in the future.

This piece is an excerpt from a report presented by the author at the UK Parliament on October 9, on behalf of the Henry Jackson Society, titled “Military Lessons for NATO from the Russia-Ukraine War: Preparing for the Wars of Tomorrow.” The original report includes extensive footnoting to show the sourcing of facts and quotations.

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