US-India ties dangle darkly on Sikh separatist kill plot

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The United States government recently stated it had thwarted a plot to assassinate a Sikh separatist leader in the US and issued a warning to the Indian government.

According to media reports, US authorities say they successfully stopped a plot to assassinate Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun on American soil. Pannun is a US-Canadian citizen and a prominent figure in the pro-Khalistan movement, which calls for establishing an independent Sikh state in northern India.

White House National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson indicated that the administration is treating this issue with the utmost seriousness and noted it has been raised with India “at the senior-most levels.”

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said he hoped India “will take these real concerns seriously.” This recent revelation comes two months after Trudeau said his government had “credible evidence” of an Indian link to the killing of a pro-Khalistan leader in Canada. In June 2023, Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated outside a Sikh temple in Surrey, British Columbia.

The alleged killing in Canada and foiled plot in the US give rise to concerns regarding India’s reliability as a trusted strategic partner for Western governments.

The mounting authoritarianism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government and its belligerent foreign policy raises questions about India’s future trajectory which potentially conflicts with the interests of the US and its allies.

The US reportedly issued a diplomatic protest to India following Modi’s visit to Washington in June. Furthermore, US federal prosecutors have filed a sealed indictment against one suspect in court.

The debate now centers around whether to unseal and make this indictment public immediately, or await the completion of Canadian investigations before its disclosure.

Pannun has been organizing a symbolic referendum on an independent Khalistan in San Francisco. India perceives the activities of pro-Khalistan leaders as a threat to its sovereignty.

People line up outside for the Khalistan referendum vote at the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia, on October 29, 2023. India views the activities of pro-Khalistan activists as a threat to its sovereignty. Photo: The Canadian Press via The Conversation / Ethan Cairns

India’s differing responses

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has not commented on the White House statement. Nevertheless, the White House statement conveyed that their Indian counterparts “expressed surprise and concern” upon the issue being raised with them. Indian officials reiterated that extrajudicial killing is not reflective of Indian government policy.

The contrast in the Indian government’s response to the Canadian and US announcements is intriguing. India vehemently denied Canada’s allegations and dismissed the claims as “absurd.”

Furthermore, New Delhi heightened diplomatic tensions by issuing a travel warning to its citizens in Canada, halting visa services and threatening to revoke the immunity of Canadian diplomats in India.

From the perspective of the Indian government, relations with Canada are not deemed strategically crucial. Consequently, India appears willing to weather a temporary strain in relations and can afford to allow them to be derailed for a few years.

However, India’s relations with the US hold immense strategic significance. Given the ongoing border disputes with China and Beijing’s escalating assertiveness, there exists a tangible threat to India’s territorial sovereignty.

Recognizing the power asymmetry with China, India finds it imperative to cultivate a closer strategic partnership with the US. Conversely, the US sees India as pivotal to its Indo-Pacific strategy, which is aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing influence.

The US has actively supported India’s economic and military growth to foster a power balance in the Asian region.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused India of being behind the assassination of a Sikh separatist in June 2023. Photo: AP via The Candadian Press / Sean Kilpatrick / The Conversation

The great power rivalry between the US and China aligns with India’s national interests. However, India seeks a stable rivalry, cautious of overly hostile relations that could potentially entangle it in the US-China conflict. Simultaneously, if relations were to improve between the US and China, India could risk losing its current strategic significance.

The Indian government has consistently asserted that extrajudicial killing is not part of its foreign policy. However, its alleged involvement in Nijjar’s assassination in June, the killing of another Sikh leader in Pakistan in May, and this thwarted plot in the US indicate a concerning pattern of behavior.

The authoritarian tendencies of the Modi government and its seeming willingness to target people on foreign soil could strain India’s relationship with its allies and partners.

The India-US relationship has been billed as grounded in shared democratic values. This alliance has also been held up as a model contrasting with the authoritarian regime in China. The recent events, however, cast a shadow on this narrative and could prompt the US to reevaluate the partnership.

Under the authoritarian trajectory of the Modi government, US-India relations appear to be shifting towards an alignment with mutual interests rather than shared values.

Saira Bano is Assistant Professor in Political Science, Thompson Rivers University

Disclosure: Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Navigating Commonwealth’s pandemic-induced challenges

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The economic repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic pose a substantial threat to the progress made in eradicating poverty, outlined by the Sustainable Development Goal 1 (SDG 1) in least developed countries (LDCs) through various action programs.

Current estimates indicate that an additional 35 million people in LDCs are now living in severe poverty, surviving on less than US$1.90 per day as a direct result of the pandemic and efforts to “contain” it. The rising poverty lines in LDCs are exacerbated by heightened food-security threats stemming from the Covid-19 disruptions, especially in the poorer sections of the Commonwealth countries.

The pandemic disproportionately impacted Commonwealth nations, mainly due to factors such as economic vulnerability, heavy reliance on sectors like tourism that were significantly disrupted, agricultural activities being curtailed, and the global recession triggered by the pandemic in addition to the volatile food and energy markets due to ongoing geopolitical conflicts. 

Covid-19 and the SDGs. Source: UNDESA

Many Commonwealth countries, especially the LDCs in the island states and territories, faced severe economic consequences as their economies depended heavily on sectors that suffered during the pandemic.

Additionally, the crisis underscored existing weaknesses and territorial disparities, revealing a need for regional resilience in Commonwealth nations. These factors collectively hampered sustainable development objectives for the Commonwealth, emphasizing the need for strategic interventions to address these vulnerabilities.

The pandemic further disrupted agricultural activities, causing disruptions in food supply networks and increasing prices for staple items such as wheat, poultry and vegetables. This had regressive implications for the sustainable development goal of Zero Hunger (SDG 2).

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNICEF, World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) report that moderate to severe food insecurity is prevalent in countries with low and middle incomes, with a slightly higher prevalence rate among women than men across every continent.

The severe economic impacts of Covid-19 resulted in increased unemployment across virtually all Commonwealth LDCs. Women, constituting a significant portion of the workforce in service industries such as retail and tourism, were disproportionately affected by the restrictions imposed to combat Covid-19.

In the 54 Commonwealth countries, Covid-related lockdowns disproportionately affected informal-sector employees, many of whom lack adequate financial reserves, access to modern technology, and the ability to engage in remote work and are often subject to discrimination. These challenges undermined the progress in achieving Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8) and significantly impact SDG 10, which aims to reduce socio-economic inequalities.

In 2021, the United Nations General Assembly commemorated the 50th anniversary of establishing the LDC category. This milestone followed the conclusion of the Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA) for LDCs, spanning from 2011 to 2020.

It also marked the beginning of a new action plan covering 2022 to 2031, aligning closely with the concluding decade of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The long-term developmental consequences of the pandemic in LDCs, particularly in terms of education, may not be felt for years. Many learners, especially females, in LDCs have experienced delays in their education due to school closures and declining household finances. Limited access to technology for remote education during pandemic-induced lockdowns further exacerbated the impact on students in LDCs.

The impact of Covid-19 on teaching and learning had a class dimension, particularly in LDCs and developing members of the Commonwealth. The success of interventions to “save the school year” depended on parents’ ability to teach their children at home or engage in remote teaching, which, in the absence of necessary digital skills or low literacy and education levels, hindered some parents’ participation.

The varying levels of teachers’ digital skills also negatively affected children’s well-being, hindering progress toward achieving quality education (SDG 4).

Concerning gender equality (SDG 5), the Covid-19 outbreak unfolded in a manner that suggested women were experiencing the pandemic differently from men, despite a lower fatality rate. Overall, vulnerabilities resulting from women’s gender roles and uneven social positions are heightened.

Differing demands emerged within and outside countries, contributing to financial setbacks and profoundly impacting post-pandemic socio-economic equity. This led to significant sociological and psychological challenges, exacerbating existing issues in critical sectors like health, education, gender equality, and poverty.

The challenges underdeveloped countries face, particularly those within the Commonwealth, are significant and require urgent attention. Addressing these challenges necessitates equitable vaccine distribution, strengthened health-care systems, economic recovery measures prioritizing job creation and supporting vulnerable sectors, access to quality education, and gender-responsive policies.

By focusing on these areas, the international community can work toward building a more equitable and resilient post-pandemic world, placing socio-economic stability at the forefront of development efforts.

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China’s Fujian carrier flexes next-gen launch tech

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China’s Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier has commenced testing its state-of-the-art electromagnetic catapults for launching jet fighters, marking a new era in Chinese naval power.

The Chinese carrier displaces over 80,000 tons, measures approximately 316 meters in length and can carry 70 aircraft including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.

This month, Naval News reported that China’s Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier has started testing its electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), a significant upgrade from traditional steam catapults which use steam piped from the ship’s turbines to launch aircraft.

Electromagnetic catapults can launch heavier aircraft, meaning more types can be launched from a carrier while each fighter aircraft can carry more fuel and weapons. It is also said to be gentler on the jet airframes, reducing maintenance downtime.

Naval News shows footage from social media with the carrier conducting dead load launch tests, a standard procedure for carriers equipped with catapults. The source mentions this testing phase involves launching test vehicles from the carrier’s catapults to validate their functionality.

It notes that the Fujian was observed moving away from its berth, sparking speculation about an imminent sea trial linked to the catapult testing. However, Naval News says the timeframe for further testing remains uncertain but a sea trial may happen shortly.

The Naval News report notes that the Fujian represents a significant advancement for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) as the first Chinese carrier equipped with EMALS and featuring several technological firsts.

It says the Fujian’s development, construction and testing phases are being closely monitored with frequent updates shared through overflight and satellite imagery on social media.

Naval News compares the Fujian with the US Navy’s USS Gerald R Ford (CVN-78), which is also equipped with EMALS. Despite the similarities, however, the Chinese system differs technically from the American EMALS.

The report says that the USS Gerald R Ford’s testing timelines and challenges might only provide a broad reference for Fujian’s progress as the Chinese carrier faces unique challenges.

The US Navy’s USS Gerald R Ford, supercarrier plies the Atlantic. Photo: US Navy.

The USS Gerald R Ford experienced multiple delays before entering service linked to constant redesigns and rebuilds from incorporating multiple advanced technologies on a carrier for the first time, such as the EMALS, Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapon Elevator (AWE).

The Fujian, the first PLA-N carrier of its size and capabilities, began construction some time before 2018 and was launched in June 2022. It is expected to undergo extensive trials and testing, potentially leading to commissioning in 2025.

China’s carrier fleet is set for rapid expansion. In a June 2023 article for Aviation Week Network, Bradley Perrett notes that the Fujian’s successful sea trials would pave the way for a fourth Chinese nuclear-powered carrier and up to six carriers by 2040. Perrett also predicts that China’s shipborne fighter numbers will quadruple over the coming decade.

Perrett says Fujian took around six years to construct while the Shandong was completed in just 4.5 years, although it was not put into operation until 1.6 years later.

He mentions China could have five carriers by 2030 if it starts building fourth and fifth ships soon, possibly by next year. Perrett notes that one of the upcoming carriers could be made by Dalian Shipbuilding, the shipyard in northeast China that constructed the Liaoning and Shandong. He suggests Shanghai Jiangnan, Fujian’s builder, could build the other simultaneously.

Perrett estimates that China’s shipborne fighter force for future aircraft carriers should increase to 317 aircraft by 2033. He says the aircraft will likely be divided equally between the J-15 and J-35, although the former will no longer be in production by then.

He says that 26 fixed-wing KJ-600s and around 100 helicopters will be needed for the carriers. He also notes that transport planes based on the KJ-600 design may soon be introduced and that by 2033 Chinese carrier air wings and supporting land-based training squadrons should have more than 440 aircraft.

The Pentagon’s 2023 China Military Power Report notes that China’s growing carrier force extends air defense coverage of deployed task groups beyond the range of land-based defenses, enabling operations farther from China’s shores.

It also notes that the Fujian, the first of China’s next-generation carriers, has greater endurance and that its EMALS system will allow it to launch more types of aircraft, such as airborne early warning (AEW) and electronic warfare (EW) types, increasing the strike power of China’s carrier battlegroups when deployed to areas outside China’s immediate periphery.

The Fujian’s launch ceremony. Image: Twitter Screengrab

For instance, Reuters reported on October 2023 that China’s Shandong carrier battlegroup passed south of Taiwan through the Bashi Strait and into the Western Pacific. That could have been a flanking move against the self-governing island in conjunction with a similar maneuver with another Chinese carrier battlegroup traversing the Miyako Strait.

Alternatively, a Chinese carrier battlegroup crossing the Bashi Strait could be redirected to the Philippine Sea to cut off US resupply and reinforcements from Guam heading to either the Philippines or Taiwan.

However, the Fujian and other Chinese carriers would be as just as vulnerable to existing weapons as America’s carriers. In a June 22 article for Task & Purpose, Jeff Schogol mentions that unless the Fujian and other Chinese carriers have a revolutionary ship defense technology, they are vulnerable to US weapons.

Schogol says that aircraft carriers, regardless of age or type, can be targeted by aircraft with anti-ship missiles or submarines. He notes that cruise missiles can inflict a mission kill on an aircraft carrier by destroying aircraft on its flight deck and that submarines using torpedoes or mines can sink carriers outright.

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Zhongzhi collapse could be bigger than Evergrande’s

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Top executives of a major Chinese wealth management firm are being probed after the company reported a net liability of up to 260 billion yuan (US$36.5 billion) last week.

Beijing police said over the weekend that they have launched a criminal probe into the wealth management unit of Zhongzhi Enterprise Group, which reportedly manages about 3.72 trillion yuan worth of assets and is regarded as one of China’s largest “shadow banks.” 

A person surnamed Jie, who is believed to be a nephew of the firm’s late founder Jie Zhikun, is among those who have been arrested, Chinese media reported on Monday. Jie Zhikun died in December 2021 due to heart disease.

The arrested were accused of being involved in illegal fundraising activities and other suspected crimes. 

The police operation was launched a few days after Zhongzhi reported on November 22 total assets of 200 billion yuan and total liabilities of between 420-460 billion yuan, meaning the firm’s net liabilities were somewhere between 220-260 billion yuan.

On Monday, Chinese commentators published a series of articles and videos criticizing Zhongzhi for partnering with some state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and using its reputation to sell wealth products. 

They also slammed Jie’s family members and senior executives for cashing in on their wealth product investments before Zhongzhi’s financial problems were reported by the media this summer. 

“With a net liability of 220 billion to 260 billion yuan, Zhongzhi is severely insolvent and is having a huge operational risk,” a financial anchor said in her vlog posted on social media on Monday.

“The company said it’s not easy to liquidate its assets, most of which are bonds and equities that are now undervalued. It seems to be telling the public that its net liability may actually be more than 260 billion yuan.”

She says Zhongzhi’s founder and executives built a financial empire by forming partnerships between the firm and SOEs while using the latter’s reputation to raise funds over the past two decades. She says Jie’s family had accumulated as much as 25 billion yuan of wealth during the peak period.  

Zhongzhi Enterprise Group’s founder Jie Zhikun died in December 2021. Photo: Baidu

“Zhongzhi said it has lost its direction after the death of Jie in 2021. How could the company blame a dead person after a huge amount of its assets disappeared?” she asked?

“The fall of Zhongzhi may be one of the largest defaults since the establishment of the New China in 1949,” a financial columnist wrote in an article. “The negative impact of Zhongzhi’s collapse may be even bigger than that of Evergrande as Zhongzhi has huge assets under management.”

“Many senior executives in Zhongzhi have made their fortune and left the company while the company’s wealth management product clients lost their money,” he says. “Who is going to take the responsibility?”

An apology

In June, some clients complained that they could not get their money back when the wealth management products they bought from Zhongzhi and its subsidiaries such as Zhongrong International Trust matured. 

On August 11, an unnamed former employee of Zhongrong was quoted by Cailian Press, a financial website, as saying on August 11 that at least 350 billion yuan of Zhongrong’s wealth products that were sold through Zhongzhi’s sales channels had stopped payouts. 

He said the figure did not include the products directly sold by Zhongrong.

The National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA), China’s financial regulator, has set up a task force to examine Zhongzhi, Bloomberg reported. 

After a three-month auditing, Zhongzhi told its clients in a letter on November 22 that it wanted to apologize for its ineffective internal operation after Jie’s death. It said its management had tried to restructure the business and turn around the unfavorable situation but the moves did not achieve the expected results. 

“After the issuance of this letter of apology, Zhongzhi’s clients’ last hope that the company would survive has vanished,” a financial writer using the pen name Mi Mei says in an article. 

Over the past two decades Zhongzhi had invested in different companies and financial assets but all these investments, controlled by Jie, had seen falling returns in recent years, Mi Mei wrote. 

Zhongzhi’s liabilities are way bigger than its assets. Image: Twitter

According to a Beijing Police announcement, a person surnamed Jie was arrested for Zhongzhi’s illegal fundraising activities.

Chinese media said after Jie died, his nephew Liu Yang was appointed by the board to lead the company. At the same time, Jie’s other nephew, Jie Zizheng, a 34-year-old executive director at the firm, had the power to decide which projects to invest in.

Jie’s other successor options were his daughter Jie Huiyu, as well as his second wife, Mao Amin, a famous Chinese singer, and her two children.

Read: Chinese wealth management firm stiffs big investors

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

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China’s aircraft carriers racing to catch the US

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China is devoting a great effort to building aircraft carriers. It has already deployed two conventionally powered carriers, the Liaoning Type 001 (60,000 tons) and the Shandong Type 002 (65,000 tons). 

China also is building a much larger aircraft carrier, the Fujian Type 003 weighing 80,000 tons. It was so important that Xi Jinping, the president of China, initially wanted it named after himself.   

The Fujian project is significant not only because of its military value but principally because it is a high-prestige project, making China “equal” to the United States.

Both the Liaoning, an updated Russian aircraft carrier hull based on Russia’s Kuznetsov aircraft carrier which the Russians call a cruiser, and the Shandong, an improved copy of the Liaoning, have a ski-jump style carrier deck for launching aircraft. The only fighter aircraft that China has capable of operating on these carriers is the J-15 Flying Shark. 

The Liaoning aircraft carrier.

The J-15 is a knock-off of a Ukrainian copy of the Russian Su-33, itself a strengthened and heavier version of the Su-27. The J-15 cannot carry a full load of weapons or filled fuel tanks when operating from these carriers because the aircraft would be too heavy for launch from the carrier deck. 

The Russians have already lost at least two Su-33s from the Kuznetsov, one while operating off the coast of Syria.

Shenyang J-15s

Russia also has a second aircraft it can use on its carriers, the MIG-29KR. One of these also went to the sea in the Syrian operation.

India operates two aircraft carriers, the INS Vikrant and the INS Vikramaditya. The Vikramaditya uses the Russian MIG-29K and is based on the old Russian Kiev-class design.  The Vikrant is planned to use the Rafale M aircraft, although it might also end up with the MIG-29K.

China does not have the MIG-29K. The J-15 Tiger Shark, although it has been improved, renders both the operational Chinese carriers limited in capability and value.

The US Marines for their amphibious assault ships like the USS Wasp (LHD-1) and the British for their new aircraft carriers the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales use the Lockheed F-35B STOVL short take-off, vertical landing stealth fighter jet. These ships do not have launch systems or arresting wires for landing.

Like the US Marines, Japan operates two Izumo-class aircraft carriers, the JS Kaga and the JS Izumo. These are being upgraded to support the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. The Kaga requires extensive modifications, so it will be some time before either of these ships can operate with the F-35B.

For the Fujian, China is betting it can come up with a truly flexible carrier that can launch modern fighter jets such as China’s FC-31 stealth fighter. But China also has taken a significant risk in going for an EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) launcher.

China has high hopes for the FC-31.

The USS Ford faced a number of problems getting its EMALS to work reliably and recent reports say it still is encountering difficulty.

EMALS offers the advantage of being able to cycle more quickly than a steam catapult, and to take up less space internally since the steam pipes and special boilers for it are not needed for EMALS.

China may be having similar problems. The initial EMALS for the Fujian was based on alternating current and high voltage (most likely copying the US Ford design). Apparently, it did not work and has been replaced with a home-designed medium voltage direct current system. 

The USS Ford’s EMALS uses a linear induction motor and alternating current. The EMALS’s 300-foot (91-meter) LIM can accelerate a 100,000-pound (45,000 kg) aircraft to 130 knots (240 kilometers per hour; 150 miles per hour).

The Fujian Type 003 (CNS-18).

Photos of the Fujian show the deck covered with three structures to hide the work on EMALS. The latest reports from social media, based on photos taken from commercial aircraft taking off from Pudong Shanghai airport and overflying Changxing island where the Fujian is located at the Jiangnan shipyard, show that testing of EMALS has begun. 

Should China be successful with EMALS, it will be moving forward to reaching its goal.  Nonetheless, some estimate that the Fujian could be four years away from being operationally ready.

Evaluation

China also has plans for a fourth carrier that will be nuclear. That is some years away because China has yet to design a nuclear reactor big enough for a large carrier. 

For example, the USS Ford uses two A1B nuclear reactors designed and manufactured by Bechtel. China uses small nuclear power plants for its submarines, but it does not have large enough reactors for a carrier.

The real question for all modern aircraft carriers is survivability.  Right now, both operational Chinese aircraft carriers carry only a small number of aircraft that cannot fly long distances or carry heavy weapons loads. 

Those aircraft are vulnerable to modern air defense systems, such as AEGIS on US destroyers and cruisers or land-based air defenses. Both carriers are limited in range and can’t operate very far from home and are easy targets for modern cruise missiles and torpedoes.

A Standard MS-3 missile is launched from the guided-missile destroyer USS John Finn, Nov. 16, 2020, in the Pacific Ocean as part of Flight Test Aegis Weapons System-44. Photo: US Navy

The Fujian promises to be a far more capable platform and will have installed offensive systems, even reportedly a rail gun. It will initially operate with the J-15B, an upgraded version of the J-15 with modern avionics, a stealth paint job, and other improvements. 

The Fujian could carry as many as 40 fighter aircraft along with an AWACS aircraft. Later it will get fighter jets like the FC-31.

The main limitation on Fujian is its power plant, limiting its range and staying power at sea. Like the other Chinese carriers, it will be vulnerable to anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles and torpedoes.

A question that applies just as much to the Ford as to the Fujian is just how much of an electromagnetic signature is generated by EMALS. It could make this class of carriers vulnerable to anti-radiation weapons, even smart glide bombs. 

Once Fujian goes to sea it will be a key addition to the growing Chinese naval fleet. How China will deploy it in operation and what its main security tasks are, remain to be determined.

Stephen Bryen, who served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a deputy undersecretary of defense
for policy, currently is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.

This article was originally published on his Weapons and Security Substack. It is republished with kind permission.

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Chinese media in Australia: clickbait or security threat?

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Recent narratives surrounding People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence have framed Australia’s Chinese-language media as problematic. Central is anxiety about the Chinese government’s possible use of diasporic Chinese communities and its media to push its influence.

Some claim Chinese-language media outlets in Australia are primarily instruments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). WeChat, owned by China’s Tencent, is often blamed for disseminating propaganda to Chinese diasporic communities.

Anxiety about China is neither new nor unique. But little has been done to understand Chinese-language media in Australia. Considering this, a five-year study was undertaken.

This five-year study shows that the Chinese social media platform WeChat — and its Chinese version Weixin — is one of the main news channels used by Chinese Australians. This is highlighted by data from two surveys conducted on Chinese Australians in 2018–19. 

Over 60% of respondents reported they “always” used Chinese social media to access news. WeChat was the most used social media platform, with 92% accessing it hourly or several times daily. A 2021 survey confirms this trend remains largely unchanged.

Among Chinese-language news media outlets in Australia, the most notable are the WeChat Subscription Accounts (WSAs), which are run by Chinese migrant content entrepreneurs to target Chinese migrants living in Australia. WSAs nestle in the Weixin ecosystem (thus subject to rules governing PRC users) and are popular among middle-aged and older users. 

They use revenue-generating mechanisms to maximize clicks and therefore income from advertising. The user-friendly nature of WeChat and the capacity for infinite reproduction of content ensures online outlets can maximize their reach, profit and impact.

WeChat is underscrunity in Australia. Photo: Handout

This produces a paradoxical situation. These media outlets are Australian content providers that serve local markets but are subject to Chinese platform and content regulations as China-registered accounts. It is important to question to what extent this sector is an instrument of Chinese government influence.

This research reveals a more complex picture, which calls into question some statements made about the Chinese-language media’s foreign influence.

While some WeChat accounts promote Chinese government interests, Chinese-language social media platforms are business operations and not funded by any government. Some have tried to produce independent content, but this aspiration is mostly overshadowed by the need to produce clickbait headlines.

Since maximizing traffic, growing followers and securing advertising revenue are paramount, WSAs will provide what their intended users want. The intended users are mostly first-generation Mandarin-speaking migrants more interested in information relevant to their new lives in Australia than news about China. 

Like any international WeChat users, Australian WeChat users often subscribe to multiple WSAs from multiple sources (including those of the PRC official media), or are exposed to such content in their chat groups. They are also exposed to news from Western media outlets via social media platforms beyond WeChat or Xiaohongshu (popular among young people).

Most Australia-focused WSAs refrain from publishing content critical of China not because they hold a strong pro-China stance, but because of their survival imperatives. News editors note they are also wary of publishing politically sensitive issues involving Australia–China relations for fear of being labeled instruments of the CCP.

Producing content attractive to potential readers while ensuring compliance with Tencent’s regulations requires a pragmatic business model. All posts by WSAs are filtered by automated processes — pre-publication algorithmic censorship and post-publication human censorship. 

WSAs are part of a censorship regime that combines high-tech machine-learning technologies with low-tech user reports. Within WeChat, WSAs face the tightest content restrictions because of their easy reach to mass audiences.

All WSAs must comply with Tencent’s service and user agreements, as well as meeting Chinese legal requirements. This includes prohibitions against spreading information that goes against China’s policies on national security, political unity, religion, public assembly or core socialist values.

Another complicating factor is that only media entities with state-authorized news permits in China are allowed to engage in original news reporting. Yet WSAs run by Chinese living overseas and for diasporic markets are subject to a much more flexible regime. They can push original news that focuses on local content and repost original or translated news from mainstream media outlets.

This means WSAs focus mostly on Australia-related news, news about Chinese communities in Australia and lifestyle news. Clickbait titles, sensationalist descriptions and visual appeal all attract more clicks.

The overemphasis on media control overlooks the bigger role WSAs play in the lives of Chinese Australians and undermines the agency of Chinese Australian content entrepreneurs. WSA self-censorship is more a business decision than political coercion. The status of WSAs is confined by a pre-existing technological infrastructure and regulatory framework, not direct intervention by authorities.

The key business strategy has been to publish locally oriented news from multiple outlets, rather than producing original news. In a sample of 87 news posts, 74 were translations of English-language news from Australian media outlets, which were then compiled with reports from other Chinese-language media outlets in Australia.

English-language news is often not just directly translated, but also editorialized. The source texts in English are points of reference to create commentary in Chinese.

Chinese and Australian flags ripple in the wind. Photo: Facebook

For WSA editors, editorialization is not about accuracy – but the cultural relevance of the story they create. There are very few articles directly translated from English. Content is compiled into one article and peppered with commentary from editors.

As anxiety about China grows, so does concern over the content published by Chinese-language media outlets. China’s influence via social media should be addressed with evidence-based research. It is misinformed to interpret an absence of China-critical content as evidence that the Chinese diaspora is acting on behalf of China.

Though many new Chinese migrants are patriotic, the majority of first-generation Chinese Australians are neither active conduits nor passive receivers of propaganda.

First-generation Chinese migrants use a wide range of social media platforms to express an identity of in-betweenness and to cope with the daily challenges of being caught between two increasingly hostile countries.

Wanning Sun is a Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney. She also serves as the Deputy Director of the UTS Australia-China Relations Institute.

Haiqing Yu is Professor and ARC Future Fellow in the School of Media and Communication, College of Design and Social Context, RMIT University.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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US threatening to hollow out Asia’s chips industry

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Even as they share similar concerns about economic security and resilience, the United States’ trading partners in Asia wonder what Washington’s new embrace of industrial policy means for their own development.

With deep government pockets, a large domestic market and potent research and development capabilities, the United States has the economic power to capture a significant share of global investment in targeted industrial sectors. 

The US turn towards protectionism and its desire to shift trade to “like-minded” friends raise fears that the US market will be closed to Asian exports unless US demands for common standards and supply chain configurations are met.

The CHIPS and Science Act, passed by the US Congress in 2022, illustrates Washington’s “reshoring” intentions and their implications for trading partners. The act is designed to “bring back” domestic semiconductor manufacturing that is presently concentrated in Asia by offering a menu of subsidies, tax credits and domestic content rules that promote onshore research, development and manufacturing. 

Bipartisan support for the funding comes from the centrality of semiconductors to civilian and military technology and concerns over the geopolitical vulnerability caused by fabrication that has moved to mainland China and Taiwan.

The CHIPS Act subsidizes onshore investment in semiconductor fabrication, promising US$39 billion of manufacturing incentives on top of 25% investment tax credits. These incentives seem to already be attracting the major semiconductor fabricators and their suppliers to invest in the United States.

According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, from the CHIPS Act’s introduction in 2020 to June 2023, 67 new projects and expansions of existing US facilities were announced in research and development, intellectual property, chip design, semiconductor fabrication and manufacturing equipment, supplies and materials. 

This new activity contrasts with the steady decline in the US share of global semiconductor manufacturing, which fell from 19% in 2000 to only 12% in 2020.

US CHIPS Act is attracting new investment in America’s laggard chips industry. Image: Twitter

Assessing how many of these projects have been attracted to the United States because of CHIPS Act subsidies is difficult. The allocation of these funds has not occurred yet and some of these investments might have been made regardless. 

But US export controls on advanced chips and the equipment and supplies needed to produce them have undoubtedly affected decisions within the industry because they limit the materials that can be sent to China for manufacturing.

The CHIPS Act explicitly pulls investment from global semiconductor companies to the United States, raising fears that US industrial subsidies will hollow out tech industries in other regions. East and Southeast Asia is home to 10 of the 16 semiconductor exporters and the top six suppliers, accounting for 84% of global exports in 2021.

While US subsidies are clearly a response to this regional concentration, expanding production capacity in the United States will affect the markets that these exporters now serve. On the one hand, US chip-related activities may reduce US chip imports from some Asian suppliers. But they may also expand trade in materials, equipment and more labor-intensive activities, such as testing and packaging.

How the industry and the market for Asian semiconductor-related exporters evolve in the future also depends on the actions of other countries. In response to the CHIPS Act, the European Union, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea have initiated or extended subsidy programs of their own.

In 2022 the EU launched the European Chips Act to ease government funding rules for semiconductor plants. In August 2023, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced plans to build a $11 billion chip manufacturing plant in Germany, in a deal that reportedly includes up to $5.5 billion in government subsidies. 

The United Kingdom also announced a 20-year strategy for its domestic semiconductor industry, recognizing its inability to compete with massive US and EU subsidies and focusing on areas where it already has competencies.

This high level of intervention in the industry raises the specter of a coming glut of semiconductors and falling world prices, even as the cost of production by new players is expected to exceed those in more established locations. If such a scenario plays out, governments will be tempted to protect subsidized manufacturers behind import tariffs or offer customer subsidies conditioned on domestic content requirements.

The US turn to such restrictions is evident in the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in August 2022, which provides subsidies to purchasers of electric vehicles assembled in the United States. The threat to Asian suppliers is clear if the subsidy race blocks semiconductor export markets and lowers world prices.

Another concern for Asian suppliers may arise from US demands to reduce Chinese involvement in supply chains. To date, Washington has not made such demands directly, but the CHIPS Act’s investment tax credits are contingent on recipients refraining from significant new investments in manufacturing facilities in China. This indicates that the United States intends to reduce links to the Chinese industry.

The implications of such ambitions are unclear. Silicon is produced by a handful of countries, but the largest supplier by far is China. Pressure to find alternative sources will be a problem throughout the industry.

A man walks past a company logo at the headquarters of the world’s largest semiconductor maker TSMC in Hsinchu, Taiwan, on January 29, 2021. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Sam Yeh

Even if the United States completely removes China from the supply chains that serve domestic chip manufacturers, it will still rely on imports of legacy chips from foreign partners.

Through ongoing consultations, facilitated in part by the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework’s new Supply Chain Council, Asian exporters may be able to moderate negative spillovers from the emerging semiconductor subsidy race and open up space for their participation in the expanding US industry. 

The Council, envisioned to meet at least annually, is tasked with exploring options to diversify concentrated supply sources for sectors and goods of shared interest. Member countries could work to avoid duplication, maintain open trade among members and gradually modify critical material sourcing.

Mary E Lovely is the Anthony M Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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China’s new stealth sub built for a Taiwan blockade

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China’s Type 039C Yuan-class submarine appears to mark a new era in underwater stealth technology, posing significant challenges to traditional detection tools as speculation mounts about a possible submarine-led Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Naval News reported that the Type 039C Yuan-class submarine features an angled sail design to reduce its active sonar detectability, making it the world’s first known submarine with the feature.

Naval News reports that China’s mass production capability has made the Yuan-class the most numerous air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarine worldwide.

The use of angled stealth shaping is gaining momentum worldwide, with the upcoming Swedish A-26-class and Germany’s Type-212CD-class incorporating similar features, with the latter even encasing the whole submarine in an angled outer hull.

The trend is being driven largely by the mainstream shift from using passive to active sonar, where passive detection is less effective as submarines are increasingly built to be quieter.

Naval News says that active sonar, which involves emitting a sonar signal and measuring the rebounds, is gaining in use while passive sonar, which listens for sounds emitted by a submarine, is proving less effective.

The report notes that the stealth features on the Type 039C Yuan-class are designed to counter medium frequency sonars and complicate enemy classification of the vessel.

China’s Type 039C appears to represent the latest evolution of its conventional submarine designs and may already have been deployed in military exercises simulating a Taiwan blockade.

China’s conventional submarine program has Taiwan in focus, as an invasion would not require nuclear-powered submarines with unlimited range in the nearby theater.

Asia Times reported in August 2022 that the Type 039C, built in Wuhan and fitted out in Shanghai, marks an evolution in conventional submarine technology using 60% newly researched and improved equipment and featuring significant system reconfiguration.

China aims to upgrade some of its submarines with lithium-ion batteries. Image: Twitter

While the Type 039C features AIP technology, the specific propulsion system is unknown. Some have speculated it may employ lithium batteries, which would make strategic sense considering China manufactures three-quarters of the world’s electric vehicle (EV) batteries.

Submarines can significantly enhance their acceleration for high-speed operations and extend their underwater endurance by over two-fold with lithium-ion batteries.

The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) has been trying to replace traditional lead-acid batteries with lithium-ion ones for over a decade but apparently hesitated due to thermal runaway and fire risks.

However, recent advancements such as using low-cost, readily available iron and phosphate can replace the usual but dangerous nickel and cobalt combination while hard carbon and ceramic coating can improve the safety of battery packaging.

The Type 039C submarine may have similar weaponry to its Yuan-class predecessors, including wire-guided torpedoes, naval mines and anti-ship missiles. It may also be capable of launching land-attack cruise missiles from its torpedo tubes.

China may already have deployed the Type 039C in August 2022 military exercises off Taiwan, simulating a submarine blockade against the self-governing island.

The Type 039C and other submarines would play a vital role in a future blockade of Taiwan, as the island is believed only to have a 146-day oil stockpile and 11-day natural gas supply.

In a Taiwan blockade, conventional submarines may minimize the risk to PLA-N surface ships and aircraft, and target ships going in and out of Taiwan’s ports. A blockade may force Taiwan to capitulate without sending in an amphibious invasion force and make hiding battle losses and mission failures easier, avoiding a possible domestic backlash in China.

The US and its allies may use a convoy system and engage in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations east of Taiwan against a Chinese invasion.

In this scenario, China wins if it sinks enough ships until the US and its allies can no longer guarantee safe access to Taiwan’s ports, and the US and its allies win if they can track down and sink a significant number of China’s submarines.

In a November 2021 article for The Warzone, Kevin Noonan notes that the US Navy may not be prepared to face the threat of China’s high-tech conventional submarines.

Noonan says that since the end of the Cold War, the US Navy has yet to adapt its ASW capabilities for shallow water operations, potentially providing China an advantage in the Taiwan Strait, which is only 60 meters deep on average.

The Type 039C may have already been used in a Chinese simulation of a Taiwan invasion. Image: Facebook

Furthermore, he says that small conventional submarines generate smaller acoustic signals, making them harder to detect, and that Chinese submarines will be essentially operating in their home waters in the Taiwan Strait, giving them a home-field advantage.

He also mentions China’s submariners know how to conceal their submarines in the background noise of civilian commercial shipping, complicating their detection and targeting.

Given those challenges, the Hudson Institute notes in a July 2023 report that the US needs to change its approach to undersea warfare to emphasize uncrewed vessels. That, the report says, would enable the US and allied forces to exploit active sonar and track increasingly stealthy Chinese submarines without risking counter-detection.

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A brighter demographic story for China

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“And so we talked all night about the rest of our lives, where we’re gonna be when we turn 25”

– Vitamin C

Below, we present the two most depressing charts on China. These are the two data series most bandied about by China bears – both long-term and short-term. And ugly they do look.

In the first chart, we see that China’s births have been cut in half since 2016. Though below the replacement rate of 2.1, China’s birth rate had been running at a tolerable 1.6 to 1.8 for decades. We’ll be okay; it’s higher than Japan’s 1.3, Chinese demographers surely told themselves.

Any such confidence should have evaporated in the past five years as the birthrate plummeted to a shockingly low 1.1 (still above South Korea, said some flunky demographer).

In the second chart, China’s youth unemployment, a data series introduced in early 2018, has climbed steadily from the low teens to over 20%. It got so embarrassing that the series was “temporarily” suspended in July because “the economy and society are constantly developing and changing. Statistical work needs continuous improvement.” This proved to be even more embarrassing.

Demographics is destiny and the depressing future laid bare by annual births is surely causing aneurysms in Beijing. And then there’s the pressing emergency. Looks like the slowdown is taking an increasing toll on China’s youth with unemployment hitting 21.3% in June, the last available data point. According to these two charts, China’s future and present are melting down concurrently.

But what if? What if… what if there are different charts. Charts that address both the future and present meltdown in less fraught terms. Charts that are just as revealing but which present a different – yet related – demographic story and, perhaps, an altogether different destiny.   

In tension with a declining birth rate has been China’s rapidly rising college enrollment. At the turn of the century, China produced one million college graduates. This represented 6% of the age cohort which we calculate by dividing graduates by births 24 years prior (the average age at college graduation is 23.7 in China). This has increased dramatically to 11.6 million graduates for the class of 2023, 63% of the age cohort.

Over this time period, college graduates in the workforce increased from low single-digit percentages to 25%. With the working-age population peaking in 2011, upgrading the labor force has become a necessity.

Happily, the investments have been made, and, barring a sudden collapse of the education system, China’s blue-collar workforce will transition to a white-collar one as retiring migrant workers are replaced by their college-educated children. College graduates in China’s workforce should exceed 70% by 2050.

Of note, over 40% of China’s college graduates are STEM majors. This compares to 18% in the US, 35% in Germany, and 26% in the OECD. Given the rapid increase in graduates, these STEM majors have taken China from a standing start to topping science and technology metrics like the Nature Index, the top 1% of cited papers, the top 10% of cited papers and WIPO PCT patents in recent years.

In real-world terms, China’s technically proficient workforce has given it the industrial output of the US and EU combined. Dozens of electric vehicle (EV) companies have emerged from nowhere with product cycles half as long as established car companies.

China has cornered the market on batteries, solar panels and wind turbines. China’s National Space Administration and defense industry have made significant technological leaps with their legions of fresh-faced engineers.

This trend should have another 20 years to run, at which point China’s workforce will have more STEM grads than the rest of the world combined. All of this is more or less written in stone until 2043. The college grads and STEM majors China’s needs by then have already been born.

The problem is what comes after the post-2017 baby bust cohort graduates from college. Without a baby bounce or – horror – continued decline, China’s future starts winding down pretty quickly.

The government has rolled out various policies designed to raise birthrates from reducing academic pressures by eliminating the tutoring industry to reducing home prices by kneecapping property speculation to promoting family time by restricting video games.

More natalist policies are sure to come. We reserve judgment on their effectiveness beyond, “We’ll believe it when we see it.”       

Two anomalies strongly suggest a bounce in birth rates in the coming years. Covid’s effect on births from 2020 to 2023 should be fairly obvious. We expect a spike in births starting in late 2023 from couples who put off conceiving during the Covid crisis.  

Medical staff member put clothes on a newborn at a gynecology and obstetrics isolation ward for expectant mothers infected by the Covid-19 coronavirus in Xiehe hospital in Wuhan in China’s central Hubei province, March 7, 2020. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP

The less obvious factor is the surge in college graduates starting in 2022. This was the result of intensive investment in university expansion in the mid-2010’s. These new university spaces started enrolling students in 2018 taking an additional 1.7 million young people for the class of 2022 and 2.5 million for the class of 2023.

While we await graduation statistics for 2024 and beyond, we believe recent university expansions have enrolled an additional 3 million students per year since 2017, taking them out of both the job and family formation market until graduation. This just so happens to coincide with both the sudden decline in births and the increase in youth unemployment.

We believe family formation for the college-educated is delayed past 23.7 years of age, the average age at graduation. Educated young people often put off having children for graduate school, to establish professional careers, to play the field, to travel, to be young and hip in the city, etc. And some prolong their adolescence for so long that they entirely skip the biological imperative.

What this all boils down to is that part of the collapse in births can be attributed to delayed family formation from increasing university enrollment. While we expect many delayed births to show up in future years, they will likely come gradually with some births forever lost to Peter Pan syndrome, dating apps, gym obsession, boss girl lifestyles, and other civilization-wrecking ills of modernity.

If we had to guess, we would say China’s birthrate should partially recover to around 1.5 in five years. Any further increase will need to come from effective natalist policies which we will leave to fate and the powers that be.   

The recent surge in college enrollment increased graduates from 35% of the 2017 age cohort to 63% in 2023, a 28 percentage point increase. We believe an increase of such magnitude in such a short period of time completely confounds “youth unemployment” data, which only started to be reported in 2018.

We do not know the precise methodology the National Bureau of Statistics used to calculate China’s short-lived youth unemployment, but it has been a wild ride of a continuous upward trend from 10% to over 20%, overlaid with massive seasonal swings and completely at odds with overall unemployment which has rarely stepped outside a narrow band of between 5% and 6% since 2018.   

Like births, we believe youth unemployment has been upended by the surge in college enrollment. Since 2017, we calculate that employable youths (16 to 24-year-olds not in school) have fallen 43% – from 65% of the age cohort to 37% – due to increased college enrollment. We believe a proportion – say 5% – of these young people are neither employable nor educable in their youthful abandon.

These are the slackers, deadbeats, dropouts, dreamers, gaming addicts, marginally talented musicians, etc. They are not in school and contribute to the unemployment rate with their lackadaisical attitude toward finding and/or maintaining employment.

While this numerator of young slackers may remain largely constant, the denominator of employable youths has been dramatically reduced due to university enrollment of their more conscientious peers, pushing up the youth unemployment rate. We calculate that this could account for 6 percentage points of a roughly 10 percentage point increase in youth unemployment since 2018.

A growing number of Chinese youth would prefer to ‘lie flat’ than work. Image: Twitter

While highly suspicious to some, we do not doubt that “the economy and society are constantly developing and changing” and “statistical work needs continuous improvement” given the surge in college enrollment. Based on our calculations, 60% of the increase in youth unemployment since 2018 is simply a data artifact resulting from this surge.

We wonder whether much of the narrative surrounding youth unemployment is a media concoction based on a data artifact. The media, both domestic and foreign, is filled with stories of college students graduating into a hopeless job market.

While this may be true for some, or even many, it should not be a primary driver of the youth unemployment numbers given the youth cut-off age of 24 is just marginally higher than the average age at graduation of 23.7.

If new graduates are indeed unemployed at very high rates, that should drive the overall unemployment figure more than the youth figure, which does not seem to be the case.   

Similarly, we wonder how much of China’s deteriorating demographic story is actually an artifact of a much more promising demographic story. A better-educated workforce was always the key to offsetting falling birthrates.

However, a sudden increase in college enrollment may have resulted in the temporary statistical illusion of collapsing birthrates.

Han Feizi is a Beijing-based financial industry veteran.

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Achieving climate equity for the Commonwealth

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The Commonwealth of Nations has demonstrated a long-standing dedication to tackling climate change and assisting member countries in mitigating its adverse effects.

The unified political determination to safeguard the planet for succeeding generations has been precise and robust, dating back to the Langkawi Declaration on the Environment in 1989. During this pivotal moment, Commonwealth leaders pledged to take concerted action, both independently and collectively, through a program focused on environmental initiatives and addressing the challenges of climate change. 

Climate action plays a vital role in the resilience and prosperity of small island developing states (SIDS), particularly within the Commonwealth. SIDS, despite their diversity, face significant vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, posing existential threats to their economies and ecosystems.

The Commonwealth actively supports SIDS in advocating for increased climate action, recognizing the unique challenges they confront in the face of climate change. The commitment of the Commonwealth heads of government to various goals, including climate action, underscores the interconnectedness of health, education, gender equality, and climate resilience for SIDS. 

Access to electricity is essential for economic progress and poverty reduction. However, many less developed nations in the Commonwealth face limited power availability, which hampers such social services as health and education. Additionally, it is crucial to decarbonize the energy sector and ensure climate equity to promote sustainable development objectives. 

Energy access disparities are prominent in the Global South, where both power access and the proportion of renewable energy lag behind the global average. African Commonwealth nations, in particular, require significant electricity availability development despite being leading renewable energy producers.

Bridging these disparities is essential to fulfill the objectives of Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7), which aims to achieve universal access to affordable and reliable energy services.

The Commonwealth Sustainable Energy Transition (CSET) Agenda is a collaborative platform for concerted efforts among member countries to expedite the shift toward low-carbon energy systems and attain SDG 7. This initiative is grounded in three fundamental pillars: inclusive transitions, technology and innovation, and enabling frameworks.

It champions actions led by members to accelerate inclusive and equitable energy transitions, ultimately realizing the objectives of SDG 7. The CSET Agenda has introduced three new member-led action groups focusing on energy literacy, geothermal energy, and a crosscutting youth action group. 

Transitioning to a low-carbon economy is vital for achieving decarbonization targets and addressing climate change. However, this transformation poses challenges due to the historical reliance on hydrocarbon energy sources.

Moreover, the shift toward decarbonization may lead to stranded hydrocarbon assets, affecting not only their owners, but suppliers, staff, entire communities and regions. A comprehensive and inclusive policy framework is necessary to guide member nations in aligning their efforts with the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the COP21 Paris Agreement.

While policy frameworks and climate targets are essential, they must be accompanied by binding rules and regulations. Legislation can enforce energy-efficiency standards, promote the adoption of renewable energy, and phase out carbon-intensive practices. As already done in the UK and Canada, prohibiting internal-combustion engines or coal-fired electricity generation can expedite the energy transition and propel positive climate action.

Climate injustice is a significant concern within the Global South, where poorer nations often contribute more to combating climate change than wealthier countries. Evaluating national emissions capabilities and historical emissions reveals stark disparities, emphasising the need for fair burden-sharing.

Wealthier nations have an opportunity to address climate injustice by supporting renewable energy projects in Commonwealth countries, thereby reducing energy poverty.

To this end, the Commonwealth Climate Finance Access Hub (CCFAH) facilitates unlocking climate finance for small and vulnerable member states. This initiative assists countries in bidding for and gaining increased access to climate finance by supporting the development of grant proposals and project pipelines.

The process also involves building human and institutional capacity, providing technical advisory services, and fostering cross-Commonwealth cooperation. Commonwealth national climate finance advisers, deployed and embedded in relevant government ministry departments, play a key role in facilitating sharing of experiences and expertise among member states. 

Africa Caribbean Pacific
Mauritius Antigua & Barbuda Fiji
Eswatini Belize Solomon Islands
Namibia Grenada* Tonga
Seychelles* St Lucia Vanuatu
Zambia Barbados, Jamaica & Guyana*  
Regional Technical Assistance – Commonwealth Regional Climate Finance Adviser, Indo Pacific Incoming – Regional Technical Assistance Regional Technical Assistance – Commonwealth Regional Climate Finance Adviser, Africa
* Countries that have previously been supported by a Commonwealth national climate finance adviser.
CCFAH Beneficiary Countries | Source: The Commonwealth and Climate Change Report

Examining how energy is generated, delivered, and utilized is essential to achieving decarbonization goals and fostering socioeconomic growth. Accelerating the energy transition requires strong political will, technological advancements, and cost reductions. Finally, ensuring inclusive processes during this transition is crucial for achieving sustainable and people-centered social development.

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