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After a year of brutal armed conflict, the insurgent Arakan Army ( AA ) appears to have almost complete control of the region from the border with Bangladesh to the Irrawaddy Delta, prompting a humanitarian catastrophe in the state of Rakhine, which is ravaged by the war-ravaged state.

The anti-military AA is now under siege in the main town of Ann, which is home to the Western Command of the Myanmar military, and is still fighting fiercely in Maungdaw to overrun Border Guard Police Camp 5, the last installation following months of bloody street fights and devastating device warfare.

The fighting has gotten longer as a result of the military junta from the coup-installed State Administration Council ( SAC ) military junta, which has been dropping reinforcements and supplies via helicopter and parachute into both locations.

In a few weeks of terrible battle, the AA seized more than ten settlements. The state funds, Sittwe, is essentially surrounded, forcing hundreds of citizens to flee north to Yangon by ship.

The port and airports are still functioning, but property routes are officially closed. In order to prevent an AA abuse from coming, SAC safety troops are fortifying the city. A long-standing online blackout exacerbates the situation inside the city, as new photos from Sittwe reveal deserted streets.

This may be an extraordinary victory for insurgents in Myanmar’s history of armed conflict, but it has been done so at a bad price, with the consequences already being felt for years.

The year-long offensive has increased the number of internally displaced persons ( IDPs ) to over half a million, including ethnic Rakhine, Rohingya Muslims and smaller groups such as the Mro, Daignet and Hindus, which are often ignored but are suffering just as profoundly.

The global humanitarian aid operation is failing to meet the immediate need for food, shelter, and medicine because of the extreme restrictions in the environment.

The conflict-induced movement comes after the disaster of Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, which pummeled system and housing, especially in Sittwe, and destroyed 85 % of existing IDP tents.

The limitations of the support efforts over the past year are revealed by a late-October United Nations evaluation. In Sittwe, just 10, 634 of 76, 090 Citizens received some help, or were “reached”, as the support business language goes.

Angry fighting and large fire during the war for Buthidaung from April to May left 85, 223 individuals displaced, with just 27, 839 reached, according to the UN analysis. An estimated 150, 000 residents displaced in Rathedaung, Ponnagyun and Pauktaw have received no aid.

In the north of Rakhine State, districts like Ann, Taungup, Thandwe and Gwa have not been usually defined conflict zones and, consequently, have had little access to emergency help.

Since the AA has seized control of almost all of these locations, the SAC has increased its use of marine airstrikes, artillery bombardment, and other airstrikes against human settlements, causing displacement and halting financial activity.

Rakhine state is in danger of widespread famine, according to the UN Development Program ( UNDP ), where two million people could be forced to eat. According to a recent report, only 20 % of domestic food generation needs will be met by March 2025.

” Internal rice production is plummeting due to a lack of seeds, fertilizers, severe weather conditions, a steep rise in the number of internally displaced people ( IDPs ) who can no longer engage in cultivation, and escalating conflict”, the UNDP report says.

A siege of the majority of the country’s roads and coastal routes has made this remarkable food security worse, with merely shipping to Sittwe, the state capital, and Kyaukphyu’s port. Myanmar state is losing control, and the SAC has been strangulating it.

The AA, its political wing, the United League of Arakan ( ULA ), and its public administration in particular have been burdened with more protection and aid as a result of the conflict.

The large efforts being made by Rakhine professor Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, including the Rohingya, to “establish legitimacy among various areas in Rakhine condition, including the Rohingya,” have just been highlighted.

The AA now has to “govern” while also fighting a state-control battle after steadily expanding its public service as it expanded its place and” control” over a larger proportion of the population.

The Center for Arakan Studies ( CAS ) has analyzed the AA’s burgeoning judicial system, which clearly illustrates the armed groups” seeing like a state” approach.

The incomprehensible agreement between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army ( ARS A ) armed groups to cooperate with the Myanmar military and jointly wage war against the AA has made the conflict in Rakhine even worse.

It was ARSA’s strikes against Myanmar safety power troops in 2016 and 2017 that sparked the government’s large ethnic cleansing battle that forced some 700, 000 Rohingya across the frontier into Bangladesh.

The AA has repeatedly fought with Rohingya extremists and raided their alleged military installations in northeastern Maungdaw. In Maungdaw and Buthidaung, the teeming Rohingya migrant camps in Cox’s Bazar and among the native populations are recruiting soldiers from some militants.

The Myanmar government has even forced, or accepted freely, thousands of Rohingya men to take up hands. The AA is also accused of abusing the Rohingya through forced labour and other methods.

In Rakhine state, fight dynamics have changed significantly in the past year, which could lead to a multifaceted issue. This makes the Rohingya’s return to Bangladesh’s Myanmar position even more risky than it was a year ago, and it’s good impossible in the near future.

Unheeded calls for a charitable corridor between Bangladesh and AA and government areas. Bangladeshi security forces have restricted supplies from entering Rakhine state and blocked Rohingya immigrants from entering, a significantly different view from the new Muslim Yunus administration’s commitment to aid the Rohingya.

After ferocious fighting broke out in Maungdaw in the middle of 2024, this disengage was particularly obvious. There is also popular rumors that Bangladesh’s government is providing training and arms to the RSO.

However, items from India are even restricted. In January, the AA suddenly took control of a number of nearby Chin state’s Paletwa, capturing one of the area’s numerous Myanmar Army firebases.

This, which is effectively significant for the AA, opened up the possibility of increasing food and fuel supplies from India, along the Kaladan River, and by path.

But, barricades are being imposed according to inter-ethnic animosity. Food and fuel supplies from India’s Central Young Lai Association, an ethnic Chin business with a base in Mizoram, have been stopped from India’s Paletwa and finally Rakhine State.

The Young Lai Association has been preventing supply routes for many months and is angry about the AA’s annexation of Chin place.

The new trend of “anticipatory actions,” which looks at present dynamics to forecast for unforeseen catastrophe or emergencies, is a big hit with the charitable aid sector. By then, planning to stop the state of Rakhine express from famine must be more important. But among Myanmar’s estimated 18 million individuals who need humanitarian aid, most are not being reached.

The international community’s responses to this humanitarian emergency call for a reversal of their foreign policies toward racial Rakhine communities, who have long been subject to persecution. To bridge gaps between Rakhine areas, it also requires a basic rethink of the” interpersonal unity” programming favored by Western support and development sponsors.

Since 2012, Western donor financing has been wasted on a tens of millions of dollars with much evidence of the expenditure. It is obvious that international organizations must develop new strategies that transcend the traditional and unsuccessful intervention efforts.

It is obvious that the UN Country Team in Yangon is unable to increase humanitarian aid or foster harmony.

A secret meeting with SAC leaders was made by Julie Bishop, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, and former Australian foreign secretary. It was evident that there was no miracle in aid distribution.

In her first speech at the UN in late October, Bishop bemoaned the “zero-sum” mentality of all sides in the conflict. Many in Myanmar were enraged by this because the SAC is the primary perpetrator of using aid as a means of conflict.

The current international mediation methods will likely only add to tensions and continue to fail. Engaging with the AA leadership and the organization’s humanitarian administration is the key to resolving the crisis.

To facilitate aid directly through the Arakan Authority, Bangladesh and India must engage in more proactive international advocacy. All communities in Rakhine state will be destroyed if the humanitarian catastrophe is not addressed. There will be no end to the state’s reputation.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues on Myanmar.

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To quote the Roman intellectual Antonio Gramsci, a great range of “morbid signs” appear in times of crises. The deterioration of global rules, in particular, is accelerating.

Over the last years, the use of power in Iraq, therefore in Ukraine, and now in Gaza and Lebanon, not to mention some other less-publicized conflicts, has strained the position of traditional rules.

The idea of the law of nations as a system of governance in foreign relations is still being debated in the United States and other nations.

Generally, the disconnect between regulation and energy has not always been so clear. Scholars were not the only ones who were privy to legitimate concerns for a long time. The prevailing theory was organic law, that is, morality.

It primarily included philosophical reflections on what was really, fair, and right. According to the laws in place between sovereign states, international legal issues are now rephrased to describe what constitutes law.

But&nbsp, regulations are often difficult to interpret, especially in the framework of lingering conflicts involving many position and non-state actors. &nbsp, &nbsp,

No wonder did the law seem to fluctuate so dramatically in accordance with the circumstances and conditions in the past. Law, in their eyes, could only be played a very minimal role in foreign affairs, one that was often and often circumscribed by energy realities.

It would be cruel, yet, to judge worldwide legislation only by its shortcomings or failures. Truthfully, we occasionally anticipate too much from international law and just remember it when it is necessary.

Maybe understanding how laws adapts to the changing world is a more positive way to view points. And, more frequently, what is in the cards for the international legal attempt in an age of corporate competition?

The “liberal West” and “illiberal sleep” will have a different energy balance depending on the shifting power balance between the “liberal West” and the “illiberal sleep,” according to Greek philosopher Heraclitus ‘ equivalent valley, in which” no gentleman ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same valley and he’s not the same man.”

It assumes that Western preferences are primarily the result of contemporary international law. As much as this construct looks appealing, some granularity is required. It is true that non-Western and non-aligned developing nations ‘ most pressing requests for reforms are primarily based on Western norms. &nbsp,

However, non-Western states have not always been without influence. The United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, Bandung 1955 and the human rights revolution of the 1970s and 1980s are all the result of concessions, interactions and political battles across cultural and regional divides.

No nation is actually advocating for the complete demise of the rules-based order at a time when the majority of the world is welcoming back multipolarity thanks to the emergence of more balanced power.

A much denser network of principles and procedures has been created in international law, replacing a contractual system of rules. The international judicial system is a significant player in the creation of a global system of governance, as exemplified by this transition.

The wheels of the international system are still turning even when the Security Council is unable to take action. In Ukraine, the International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Council, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights are all present.

Additionally, a record number of states played a significant role in bringing that situation before the International Criminal Court. Gaza is an obvious example of how internationalization is increasingly used in many conflicts, with the latter being a clear example of how to internationalize a conflict as a legal issue rather than just a political one.

The World Court has already been asked to indicate interim measures four times in 2024, in the case of South Africa ( and others ) v. Israel on behalf of the Gaza Strip’s application of the Genocide Convention.

This authority, which is only exercised when there is a need, has evolved into a legal tactic to advance case arguments on the merits. International courts and tribunals are unquestionably capable of changing the world. However, a word of caution is in order.

Judic institutions ‘ primary function has always been to resolve disputes between states without resorting to international politics ‘ greatest problems or even bringing justice to them.

Not all violations of international law should be addressed by courts with limited authority and enforceability. It would be both unrealistic and misplaced.

Given that there are so many unsolvable conflicts and so many international crimes, how should we respond to the growing need for justice and accountability?

Institutionalization, and not courts alone, could be one practical answer to such challenges. The UN Security Council has the authority to hold accountable when serious violations of international law occur through inventive procedural and substantive measures.

One proposal could be that the UN Security Council pass a resolution obliging the secretary-general to establish a general, centralized, fact-finding Unit on Serious Violations of International Law ( USVIL ).

When there is conclusive evidence that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide have been committed, the unit could make factual determinations and recommend further legal action.

There would be a number of benefits to creating a USVIL as a standing body. First, it would continue to support the Security Council’s primary function and refuse to request a change to the UN Charter.

Second, it would n’t have to depend on individual states’ moral standing or intentions, who can sometimes be more concerned with a situation’s outcome than its outcome.

Finally, it would avoid turning systematically to the World Court, which, as the main judicial organ of the United Nations, is not equipped to handle the world’s largest crises and an increasing number of disputes.

States at war that breach international law share the same responsibility. This wrongdoing consensus should not be discarded. Institutionalization is the best way to reassert some degree of political control and judgment because politics alone cannot guarantee peace and justice.

Eric&nbsp, Alter, a former UN civil servant, is dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and professor of international law and diplomacy.

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InsideOver&nbsp, is a popular European online media network. Roberto Vivaldelli, a journalist, posed some questions to me about US legislation and Ukraine on November 14. Users may find the original content in Italian&nbsp, around. With Stephen Bryen’s agreement, this English-language version has been republished.

Robert Vivaldelli: Jake Sullivan just announced that Biden intends to obtain more money for Ukraine from the Congress. What do you think of this decision now?

Stephen Bryen: In the United States we may call Biden’s request for more Ukraine money a” Hail Mary Pass” ( a term used in American sports ). He is requesting that he show his support for Ukraine and to try to persuade the Republicans to help Ukraine in some way in the future. In my opinion, Congress may wait until Trump takes office before implementing the Biden request. Biden does n’t seem to have any faith in the measure. &nbsp,

Conditions have changed since the last, huge optional for Ukraine. Big expenses have never improved Ukraine’s position. In reality, the Russians continue to make substantial gains against Ukraine’s military and proceed to destroy the Russian critical infrastructure, especially the power grid.

If the war continues, Ukraine could become non-recoverable in terms of infrastructure, and the Ukrainians who left the country wo n’t come back to a wasteland.

Vivaldelli: In your watch, what should we expect from a Trump administration concerning Ukraine? Do you believe that a US-Russian speech could put an end to the conflict?

Bryen: A lot depends on the actions of the Soviet leader. I think Trump wants to negotiate with Putin, but Putin, at least so much, wants to win the war in Ukraine, or nearly so, before he engages with Trump. Therefore, it is a kind of Kabuki. &nbsp,

There are far more significant issues than Ukraine, including how to lessen the risk posed by Russia and Europe ( including the United States ). Trump and Putin want to discuss all of these subjects and much more. &nbsp,

Trump will also have to consider the potential impact of a global turmoil and the future of the US. Who makes call first may be decided, we must delay. When his team has been assembled and has thoroughly discussed the proper position, I assume it will be Trump.

Vivaldelli: What does Russia’s requires be in such negotiations?

Bryen: Russia has a long list of what it wants regarding Ukraine. Russia is attempting to establish a pleasant relationship with Ukraine without any involvement with NATO. Some of Trump’s friends, such as the America First Policy Institute, argue for a 20-year wait before Ukraine is join NATO.

This is a non-starter because the Russians want NATO out of Ukraine immediately, now and in prospect. As long as they win the war, I do n’t believe Russia is willing to go any further.

Russia even wants Ukraine to remain demilitarized. Russia appears to want to seize any potential defense conflict in Ukraine, despite the possibility of sacrifice. Russia has previously annexed Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaphorize and Kherson.

It will require that Ukraine fully cede these regions. &nbsp, What remains to be determined are the borders of these regions and the conditions ( people, trade, security ) that will apply to the borders.

Russia wants to end Ukrainian oppression of the Russian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian attempts to eradicate Russian language and culture, and Russian citizens generally treated differently. To do this, Russian laws and regulations must be repealed.

The social climate in Kyiv and the battlefield’s progress determine how much money the Russians can get. The more Russia floats up Ukraine’s troops, the stronger its place in conversations becomes.

In regard to Kyiv and its state, the future is quite questionable. Because it is unlikely that there will be a Zelensky-led government, who the Russian speaker is is is of any significance. The Zelensky federal properly fall due to the current state of affairs on the field, in a few weeks or months. &nbsp,

The US State Department, apparently, is working on a schedule for elections in Ukraine. Since creating a system for elections is a fierce challenge and may take too long to implement, this seems like an unattainable “ask.” &nbsp,

In chaotic conditions, different rivals will try and seize key positions, including the Presidency, or Ukraine could resort to a military leadership, perhaps by bringing General Zaluzhnyi back as some sort of” supreme commander” .&nbsp,

Additionally, the Russians had put their own participant in command, creating a momentary government in exile and finally moving it to Kyiv. All of that is in the future, but the prospect is quickly creeping up in Ukraine.

Vivaldelli: According to the Telegraph, Trump’s peace program may include deploying German soldiers in a buffer area along the existing front lines. What are your emotions on this method?

Bryen: I have seen this thought floated here in the US. On the one hand, it clearly understands that no Trump advisor may permit US troops to be in Ukraine, perhaps as soldiers. Beyond that study, Russia will reject Russia’s suggestion of stationing German troops on Ukrainian soil because it is not fighting to deploy NATO forces in any territory close to its borders or its army. &nbsp,

The reality is that any outside-the-Ukraine peacekeeping force would presume that the conflict would end up being a sort of standoff. That applies likewise to the notion of a “buffer zone”, which I do not see happening.

It could be, but it is rather doubtful, that Ukraine had become partitioned. Although there is a lot of talk about Poland annexing some of the former held American Ukraine, I believe this is just speculation right now.

Why would the Russians consent to reclaiming the majority of Ukraine? To give credit to Poland for acting as NATO’s offer force and providing weapons to Ukraine? &nbsp,

Vivaldelli: On the field, studies indicate that Russia has launched a battle around Kursk, and in the Donbas area, Kyiv appears to be under considerable pressure. Would it be possible to offer your opinion on the current condition?

Bryen: There are reports that Russia has put up a huge “new” power of between 50, 000 to 100, 000 forces. Some claim that they will be stationed in Kursk, while others claim that they will be a part of a fresh unpleasant in the Zaphorize region.

The Ukrainians in Kursk are gradually being pushed back while using some of their best products and best models. I’m not sure what Putin’s desired timeline is for finishing the operations in Kursk, but I’m not sure if he’ll engage in negotiations until the entire Belarusian territory is reclaimed. &nbsp,

Does that imply committing 50 to 100 thousand more army? Sometimes, it cannot be ruled out. &nbsp, Strategically, from what we can see, the Russians are relying heavily on aircraft to kill Ukraine’s resources and materials heading for Kursk and minimizing, to the level feasible, Russian casualties.

Zaphorize is another matter. Zaphorize would be the southern flank of a pincer if the Russians ‘ war goal was to encircle Ukraine’s army ( also known as a cauldron ). Once important towns like Chasiv Yar are taken and the Russian army can establish a northerly flank for the pincer to develop, the more northerly flank will develop. &nbsp,

This would lead to the destruction of Ukraine’s army as a combatant force and a drive toward the Dnieper River. Whether this can happen is anyone’s guess, but Zelensky’s insistence holding onto Kursk as a “bargaining chip” is depriving Ukraine of an adequate force to hold the line in Donetsk, especially southern Donetsk.

Incidentally, the plan for the Kursk operation was cooked up by the British, but it did not contemplate a stalled operation and failure to reach key objectives, particularly the Kursk nuclear power plant. Ukrainian casualties in this operation are now running at over 30, 000 and these are losses, among elite units, Ukraine ca n’t afford.

Vivaldelli: Lastly, if a Trump administration decides to end US funding for Kyiv, what do you think Europe’s options would be? Without US assistance, would Europe be able to bear the military and financial costs alone?

Bryen: If the US stops supporting Ukraine, the war is over. For a variety of reasons, Europe wo n’t be able to replace the US. Firstly, Europe does not have weapons that can replace American supplies. &nbsp,

Secondly, Europe does not have finance other than seized Russian funds. Thirdly, Europe’s politics are changing. The writing on the wall for Europe is the demise of Germany’s government coalition. The British continue to demand more aid for Ukraine, but they also lack both money and an army. &nbsp,

Beyond the obvious arguments above, the Ukraine war would never have taken place if NATO, led by the US, had NATO remained outside of Ukraine. The NATO theory of continued expansion, which covers Russia’s entire former empire and includes much more than Ukraine, underlies this.

NATO will need to revert to being a defensive alliance rather than establish itself as an expansion alliance if NATO is defeated in Ukraine, as seems likely. NATO’s expansion is now based on a military or economic foundation, which presents a risk of a general war that Europe wo n’t be able to survive.

Roberto Vivaldelli ( 1989 ) has been a journalist since 2014 and collaborates with IlGiornale. it, Gli Occhi della Guerra and the daily newspaper L’Adige. His articles have been published on international websites like LobeLog and are translated into various languages.

At Asia Times, Stephen Bryen is the senior correspondent. He also served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp, This article&nbsp, was also published on his&nbsp, Weapons and Strategy&nbsp, Substack, and is republished with permission.

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