Trump pushing India into high-stakes, high-risk China clash – Asia Times

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No president has felt the sting of US President Donald Trump’s tax war as strongly as India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite the fact that no other leader has. Caught in a high-stakes political connect, India is grappling with an philosophical problem: balancing its crucial economic ties with China against the beauty of the American business.

The Trump administration imposed a 26 % “reciprocal” tax on American goods on April 2, 2025, putting New Delhi in tense negotiations to gain access to the country’s largest export location, the US.

India’s response has betrayed a shocking respect, as evidenced by the rapid and significant trade work cuts on Harley-Davidson scooters and American-made whiskey liquor amid a large pledge&nbsp to lift down trade barriers. New Delhi has furthermore announced plans to buy more US strength and protection products in a bid to appease Trump.

The Trump administration has used a 90-day relief on the tariffs to pressure India into a more comprehensive National strategy to isolate China financially and carefully. US Vice President JD Vance made a notable four-day visit to Delhi on April 22 as part of this political unpleasant.

Ostensibly a family affair—Vance, with his Indian-origin wife and children, framed the trip as a nod to his Sasural ( “in-laws” ) and his kids ‘” Nana-Nani” ( maternal grandparents ) —the visit’s true purpose is to tighten the screws on India and secure its alignment against Beijing.

Trump uses the rod of tariffs to fudge Modi’s wishes in his second term, replacing the vegetable of American investment moving from China to India in his first.

Ajay Seth, the secretary of economic affairs, claimed this week that the” first order” hit from 26 % tariffs on India could reduce GDP by between 0.2 % and 0.5 %, which he said was” not a significant impact.” However, underscoring the urgency of the situation, New Delhi planned to transport both its chief trade communicator and finance secretary to Washington this week before the terrible Kashmir problems.

India’s plight is rooted in its divided financial fact. To produce ultimate products for trade, especially to the US, its business center, which is frequently just an “assembly line,” relies heavily on Chinese transitional goods, raw materials, funds equipment, technology, and investment.

In 2024-25, China accounted for over 14 % of India’s full international trade, while India’s goods contributed a simple 1.9 % to China’s international trade, highlighting a striking imbalance. India can import Chinese components, arrange them, and trade finished goods to the US now because a 35 % value addition there qualifies as enough for a “rules of origin” certificate.

Nevertheless, this type makes India susceptible to a proportion readjustment. Tilting toward the US challenges Chinese retribution that could drown its production ranges, leaning toward China threatens to renounce US market access.

India’s fundamental problem is this. Beijing may impose a bombardment of punitive measures, both explicit and implicit, that would deteriorate India’s economic trajectory, erode its security, and weaken its regional influence, much like it did in 2020 in a punitive response to the tensions in the Himalayas.

China’s most immediate tool would be business adjustment, exploiting India’s$ 100 billion deal gap in 2024-25. India’s exposure to Chinese and allied markets may be restricted by Beijing’s imposing steep tariffs or non-tariff obstacles, such as stringent quality checks, on American exports like agro products, textiles, and leather goods.

China might restrict exports of important inputs, including smartphone components, pharmaceutical precursors ( 70 % of India’s supply ), and industrial machinery, even more severely. In 2020, when India tightened attention on Chinese opportunities, Beijing retaliated by blocking engineers ‘ and technicians ‘ visits and technology shipments, a methodology it may rise to even more damaging effect immediately.

Such restrictions would stifle India’s tightly bound smartphone, pharmaceutical, and solar energy sectors, which are all closely linked to Chinese supply chains. China could further skew the trade balance, shrinking India’s export revenues, by selectively lowering imports of Indian goods.

With China constituting over a third of India’s foreign trade, these measures could precipitate a severe economic contraction, hobbling India’s industrial ambitions and global market competitiveness.

China has another means of squeezing India with financial leverage. Beijing could stifle trade financing for Indian businesses by tightening payment terms, putting off processing, or restricting credit flow through Chinese banks with$ 3.24 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and significant influence in global finance. After India’s 2020 ban on Chinese apps, Chinese investors curtailed funding to Indian startups, a precedent that could expand to broader sectors.

China might halt investments in recently approved joint ventures like Vivo, Suzhou Inovance, and ZNShine if India’s US alignment is further strained, undermining India’s plans for manufacturing growth and technology transfer.

By putting Indian projects prioritizing them, China may have a more subtle impact on India’s access to multilateral financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the New Development Bank. These financial chokeholds could starve India’s industrial and infrastructure initiatives, limiting its ability to scale up domestic production or diversify away from Chinese inputs.

China might target India’s nascent digital and defense sectors in the technological sphere. Chinese tech companies like Huawei and ZTE have a share of the power behind India’s 5G networks and smart city projects. Beijing could derail India’s digital infrastructure by restricting access or withholding technical support.

In a report from the Harvard Belfer Center for 2021, China’s dominance in semiconductors, 5G, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence was highlighted. India’s newly established semiconductor industry and defense manufacturing, which depend on Chinese inputs for advanced electronics, could be hampered by an embargo on semiconductors or high-tech components.

China could also complicate operations for its tech firms in India, halting solar panels or telecom equipment supplies. Such alterations would halt India’s advancement in technology and weaken its strategic abilities, particularly in defense systems that are crucial for battling regional threats.

An even greater existential risk is posed by China’s stranglehold on critical raw minerals ( CRMs) and rare earth elements ( REEs ). In 2023, India identified 30 critical minerals vital for electric vehicles ( EVs ), semiconductors, defense equipment, and renewable energy, including lithium, cobalt, gallium, titanium, graphite, silicon, bismuth, tellurium, and REEs like neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.

India is the fifth-largest store in the world with 6.9 million metric tons of REE reserves, but its processing and refining capacity is inestimable. It imports 60 % of its REE imports from China, and over 40 % of its six CRMs, including graphite ( 42.4 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), silicon ( 76 % ), titanium ( 50 % ), and lithium ( 85.6 % ), lithium ( 82 % ), and titanium ( 50.6 % ) ) and lithium ( 42.4 % ) of those products. Beijing controls 87 % of global REE processing, 58 % of lithium refining and 68 % of silicon refining.

India’s plans for 30 % EV penetration by 2030, its semiconductor manufacturing plans, and its defense production, which rely on REEs for missiles, radar, and guidance systems, could be devastated by a Chinese export ban. India’s smartphone sector, which relies heavily on Chinese components, and its pharmaceutical sector, which relies on China for 70 % of its precursors, would experience severe shortages.

While India seeks alternatives through the Mineral Security Partnership and Australian partnerships, decoupling from China’s dominance could take decades. Thus, India’s industrial and strategic goals would suffer a terrible blow if an embargo were to be implemented.

China might use its diplomatic position to isolate India from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and BRICS by portraying its US support as a betrayal of collective interests. In 2024, China’s foreign ministry condemned such alliances, and Beijing could rally SCO members like Pakistan and Russia to obstruct India’s initiatives.

China might strengthen ties with Brazil, South Africa, and other newly incorporated nations in BRICS , which would marginalize New Delhi. Regionally, Beijing could intensify Belt and Road Initiative projects in India’s neighbors—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh—eroding India’s” Neighbourhood First” policy.

Chinese ambassador Chen Song emphasized BRI’s role in South Asia in 2023, signaling Beijing’s desire to encircle India. Such maneuvers would undermine India’s regional influence, isolate it diplomatically, and alienate it from its allies in the Global South, and make it appear as a Western proxy.

If India persists in antagonizing China, Beijing could escalate to hard measures. As seen in the 2020 Galwan clash, border tensions may rekindle with incursions in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh. China deployed 100 advanced rocket launchers along the Line of Actual Control in 2021, indicating its readiness to escalate.

Naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, leveraging ports like Gwadar, Hambantota and Chattogram, could challenge India’s maritime dominance. India’s telecom, energy, and banking sectors could be targeted by cyberattacks, such as the 2020 Mumbai power outage brought on by Chinese state-sponsored organizations, potentially suffocating its economy.

Proxy threats made by Pakistan or Myanmar, which are potentially armed by China, could put strain on India’s security apparatus on multiple fronts.

Soft power offers China a subtler tool to destabilize Modi’s domestic standing. A goodwill gesture was made in 2024 to allow Indian pilgrimages to begin at Tibet’s Kailash Mansarovar, a sacred site for Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists. These communities may react negatively to a new ban, putting strain on Modi’s political standing.

In Washington, India’s trade talks with the US this week will test Modi’s ability to navigate this minefield. Beijing clearly has the upper hand with its outsized role in India’s supply chains and minimal reliance on Indian trade.

Modi might have to balance the risks of defiance against the risks of dependence as a result of a mistake that could plunge India into economic turmoil, compromise its security, and weaken its reputation globally.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at&nbsp, @BhimBhurtel

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IMF: Economic uncertainty is now higher than it was during Covid – Asia Times

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Even among some of the world’s leading economic thinkers, confident predictions are currently hard to come by, according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF)’s ( IMF) just released its World Economic Outlook.

A fortnight of seminars, presentations, and press events focusing on the worldwide economy, foreign growth, and world financial markets are held each flower in Washington, DC. The IMF releases its global economic growth prediction at both the flower discussions and the annual meetings, which are held each fall.

The IMF has released a foundation estimates and an clause analyzing the tax events that occurred between April 9 and April 14 for its spring meeting in 2025. According to the fund’s report, world GDP will grow by 2.8 % in 2025 and 3.0 % in 2026. For the euro area, growth will be 0.8 % and 1.2 % for 2025 and 2026 respectively.

These projections are significantly revised from IMF data that was released just three months ago. Growth in the euro area is down 0.2 % compared to the fund’s January update, and growth globally is down by 0.5 %.

We live in a much more ambiguous world than we did three months ago, so understanding the most recent IMF document and its negative estimates is essential.

Trump, taxes, and doubt

The term “unpredictable” may be sufficient if one had to total up the new US tax scheme in one word. The largest price increase in modern history occurred on April 2, 2025, referred to as” Liberation Day.”

The US leader next made two more presentations only one year later. Second, a 90-day ban on tax increases, which he allegedly did in search of bilateral treaties with the nations to which he had applied levies above 10 %. Next, that China would not be subject to this restriction, with the price increases on its goods increasing to 145 %.

This freeze means that until July, EU products that are sold to the US will be subject to a 10 % tariff rather than the 20 % that was announced on April 2. The new US administration’s 10 % application is still significantly higher than the standard tariff of 1.34 % that was in effect before April 5th, though.

But what will the price get after these 90 time? What will happen in December? What will happen in two centuries? What products will not be subject to the exemption? How far will China’s trade war with the US come? Nobody knows the answer to all of these issues. The IMF’s flower forecast for this uncertainty is clear.

Confusion is unstoppable.

The world industry doubt index from the IMF is now seven times higher than it was in October 2024, which is significantly higher than the pandemic.

This uncertainty affects the economy more severely than a large but clear tariff. Companies can at least restructure their manufacturing processes with a price, and customers can look for alternative goods. There is a charge, but at least businesses and consumers can make plans.

No one can determine these expenses now, though, because no one is aware of the impact of tariff changes. A US company might choose to purchase a particular product from the EU immediately assuming the price will be 10 %, but it turns out that the price has increased to 100 % once the product has arrived in the US because a political advisor predicted raising tariffs on that product would benefit the US economy.

Although it may seem incredible, the levies are being decided and put into effect in reality. According to one theory, Peter Navarro, the government’s financial advisor and tax idealist, was in another room at the time, so they were only able to persuade Trump to stop new tax increases.

Silence is ultimately the best course of action for both consumers and businesses because of this volatility.

Anxiety and turbulence

It should come as no surprise that financial markets are so unstable because of these regular plan changes. Financial areas are now experiencing levels of uncertainty and anxiety comparable to those seen during Covid-19, despite Trump’s proudly humblingly praising rising share prices soon after the price freeze was announced.

Five years ago, uncertainty was linked to a rise in the demand for US government bonds as a result of the “flight to health” effect, which forces investors to sell higher-risk investments and purchase safer assets like gold and government bonds in times of doubt.

We are now seeing the exact same. Since” Liberation Day,” the price of US bonds has decreased, which indicates that investors are selling them. In other words, the US government’s bill is no longer viewed as a protected asset. This paradigm shift may lead to even more financial volatility in the future given the impact of the money and US bill on global industry.

Supply stores are suddenly bridging.

One thing shares the recent situation with Covid-19, the next big global economic crisis, with the upheaval of global supply chains. Production was compelled to cease during the pandemic due to confinement. It is the imposition of tariffs as of right now.

There is, nevertheless, a second significant change. People were aware that there would only be so long before vaccines would be accessible and normal would return during Covid. Today, President Trump’s own advisors sell him all kinds of plans to protect US economical interests, hardly any disease, but rather instability in financial markets.

At the Universitat de Barcelona, Sergi Basco is the head of economics.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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​​Zelensky rejects Trump peace proposal over Crimea handover – Asia Times

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The Trump administration’s efforts to start peace deals between Ukraine and Russia have been hampered by Volodymyr Zelensky. Only after Vladimir Putin announced he was willing to talk to Zelensky in a significant change from Russian plan, Zelensky himself rejected the offer that US diplomats had made.

When Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top representative for international affairs and security policy, declared that the EU did not understand Crimea as Russian, the Trump team acted with some Europeans ‘ cooperation but not the EU.

The policy’s fundamentals have been covered extensively in the planning press, despite the policy’s information remaining confidential. The de jure acknowledgment of Crimea as being Russian and the de facto understanding of Russian territorial claims in the Donbass and abroad are the two major regional characteristics.

A country being recognized as de law means it is recognized as a legitimate right. De facto does not imply any rights, but it is just stated proviso and could be altered.

On January 11, 2024, Volodymyr Zelensky, the chairman of Ukraine, met with Kaja Kallas, the prime minister of Estonia, at Stenbock House in Tallinn. Raul Mee in pictures.

The Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts have been annexed by Russia. An operational department or region’s borders were originally established under Russian control. Russia currently controls 70 % of the annexations it has annexed.

It’s unclear whether Russia may consent to a de facto arrangement of the four oblasts, which leaves some of them under Russian control. No way is it certain whether a de facto agreement would avoid the war from rekindling in the future.

The Trump administration’s plan has no known features. The issues include how to secure a temporary or permanent settlement of the conflict, the role of outside parties ( such as the Ukrainian military and the power of European countries on Ukrainian soil ), the disposition of significant assets ( minerals and power plants ), and of course keeping Ukraine out of NATO.

Ending sanctions ( which most likely includes returning seized Russian assets ), is one of the veggies the US is waving in front of Russia. Because of the sanctions ‘ impact on the international banking system, the supply of energy to Russia’s previous clients, and how business will become regulated on the Black Sea, the US cannot formally do this.

If Zelensky didn’t engage, which is currently the case, nothing of this might be significant. Zelensky is attempting to sink any deal with the United States, but is he trying to get more concessions from them? This is the backdrop issue. He most likely intends to do both.

Zelensky’s unwillingness to cooperate with Crimea has caused a stir in the US administration and among the Europeans who were hoping for a partnership. That was the justification for holding a high level meeting of international officials in London.

The meeting has now been significantly downgraded, and it will likely turn out to be a contentious and pointless training. The US is sending Public Keith Kellogg, who is arriving without any particular authority, instead of Secretary of State Rubio or even Steve Witkoff. In addition, Witcoff will become visiting Moscow after this week to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin for a second time.

The Witkoff and Putin’s goals are unknown, especially in light of Zelensky’s scuttling behavior. The Trump administration may want to avoid Russian military action in Ukraine by buying period, according to sensible speculation. President Trump repeatedly makes that point to both parties and to others because he is particularly vulnerable about the individual prices of the battle.

Making purchases may include information about easing some restrictions or completing some business deals to appease the Russians. Such arrangements do likewise alert Zelensky to the US’s intentions to pursue further cooperation with Russia.

Greater participation in space, particularly between SpaceX and Roscosmos, is a good indicator of what kind of agreements might be made. A Belarusian state company is in charge of aircraft research, cosmonautics plans, and space flights.

Angara rocket launches at Vostochny Cosmodrome ( Photo Roscosmos )

Elon Musk’s accomplishments with SpaceX have been praised by the Russian press, and Starlink-related technology cooperation is definitely on the cards. Starlink, which is deployed in Ukraine and provides the Ukrainians with excellent conversation communication in the midst of the conflict, has been a concern for Russia. Putin may enjoy a significant victory if Putin cooperated on Starlink. It’s unfamiliar whether Trump or Witkoff will become willing to take that path.

Some experts believe that Russia’s goal is to take Odesa, particularly former NATO chief General Wesley K. Clark. This would indicate Russia’s victory in the Ukraine conflict, Clark claims. One would assume that the Trump presidency would like to stop this if necessary.

Senior correspondent for Asia Times Stephen Bryen previously held positions as assistant undersecretaries of defense for policy and staff director of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This article was initially published on his  Weapons and Strategy  Substack, and it is republished with authority.

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Forced to choose in a new technopolar order – Asia Times

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Great power competition has spread beyond the realm of microchips, artificial intelligence ( AI), and quantum computing. It is no longer only conducted on battlefields.

The US and China are engaged in a fierce conflict to determine the structural framework of the 21st century in this emerging “technopolar” order, where command over advanced systems may determine the trajectory of global power.

The rules of the upcoming world order will be dictated by those who control the data, computing power, and associated supply stores. And in this rapidly changing new world order, smaller countries will increasingly be subject to pressure to choose their technological stances. &nbsp,

AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing are not just resources for financial advancement; instead, they are power bonuses that are shaping everything from global governance frameworks to military supremacy.

One of the most important areas in which international techno-politics is being played out is AI. There are American, Chinese, British, and European models, each with their own unique interpretations of the strategic principles surrounding AI.

Crucially, a country with AI supremacy will outshine rivals in intelligent defense systems, security, and decision-making.

The modern electronic economy’s essence is also made up of electronics. It would be inappropriate to refer to it as the “new crude” of the world economy, where cards are used to power everything from smartphones to fighter jet.

The major inquiry is: If the world is in the process of a new techno-global order, where industrial “haves” and “have-nots” may be categorized according to which bloc a state is aligned, where does this leave developing states that lack the home business base and know-how to protect against modern dependencies?

The US-China tech war is more than just a fight for economic dominance; it is also history’s most defining moment. The winner of this contest will influence the international system’s ideological trajectory, the structure of global security, and the rules of the digital era.

This is no longer a time when relying solely on market forces is sufficient. Due to concern about China’s rapidly developing and leapfrogging industries, technology alliances are already being discussed in Western capitals.

Today’s semiconductor supply chains are highly fragmented across multiple countries, in contrast to the Cold War, where US technological dominance was clear and largely self-sufficient.

The main suppliers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, for instance, are Japan and the Netherlands. Advanced chip production is dominated by Taiwan and South Korea ( TSMC). India is emerging as a major player in the manufacturing of crucial technologies and AI development.

Washington is attempting to forge a web of strategic partnerships, creating a new tech alliance to stop Beijing’s rise, for its strategic imperatives.

This “alliance” is characterized by, but not limited to, the Dutch-Japanese agreement to halt exports of high-end semiconductor equipment to China, the Quad’s focus on cutting-edge and emerging technologies, and US-Taiwan and US-South Korea agreements to protect semiconductor supply chains.

However, it’s not that simple to contain China. The US attempted the same with Japan in the 1990s, but there are still differences today. Through trade diplomacy, market competition, and selective interventions, the US managed to halt Japan‘s technological development.

China does not adhere to the same rules as Japan, and it does not. China’s industrial policy is profoundly intertwined with the state-security apparatus, in contrast to Japan’s operation within the framework of the global Bretton Woods system.

In this way, China actively stocks AI hardware and semiconductor tools, strengthening its self-sufficiency strategy. Tech companies like SMIC and Huawei can compete for global markets and create cutting-edge technologies thanks to China’s state-driven business model, which has fueled rapid industrial growth.

China has a dominant position in key industries like solar energy and lithium-ion batteries because the US and its allies have failed to coordinate industrial policies. China is also well on its way to rule the world’s EV markets.

Without tech blocs, it’s simply impossible to vitiate China’s advancing technology. There will soon be the conundrum of a binary choice for small nations like Pakistan. Technology will no longer be the “global common” it was after the globalization boom in the 1990s.

Countries will increasingly be forced to align themselves with a particular technological order as a result of the intersection of technology and global politics. For this, they will have to put their own technology behind it in their respective economies and societies.

Many countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, which are all treading a tightrope between the US and China, are already in a Catch-22 situation due to a zero-sum approach.

Other players, like the EU, France, and Britain, are present, but it’s likely that they will follow the US-led tech order rather than the Chinese one.

Pakistan’s technological outlook includes everything from defense equipment, space satellites, EVs, 4G and 5G networks, to daily-use electronics, which is increasingly reliant on advanced Chinese technology.

However, too firmly rooted in the Chinese tech camp could stifle or restrict access to new, emerging Western technology. Pakistan will need to contribute in terms of manpower, knowledge-innovation, or open markets, even if it chooses a side. &nbsp,

One thing is done to balance security ties between powerful countries, but another is done to balance technological reliance. It’s a brand-new geopolitical reality that will make fateful geopolitical decisions for Pakistan and others like it.

The Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad employs research associate Hammad Waleed. He received a distinguished degree from Islamabad’s National Defense University, and he writes about international relations, conflict, emerging technologies, and public policy. He can be reached at [email protected].

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Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw putting the heat on India – Asia Times

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Virtually redrawn, South Asia’s digital geopolitical map is basically being redrawn, not with bold declarations, but with deliberate, quiet strokes.

The coexisting background and hard-won emancipation have been a testament to the centuries-old friendship between India and Bangladesh. But that unshakeable cooperation is starting to wane as a result.

Nobel prize Muhammad Yunus, who is currently in charge of Bangladesh’s interim government, is at the center of this change. Dhaka is looking past the common accept of New Delhi under his watch and waving a careful hand toward Islamabad, an implausible partner.

This is not just a political gesture, though. It was the first public melt in a long-frozen marriage when Yunus met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif last year on the fringes of the D-8 Summit in Egypt.

Since that moment, which was rarely visible outside the press rooms for the foreign ministry, has gained momentum. The subsequent outreach to Beijing, which was highlighted by Yunus’s well-known visit and rumors that China’s infrastructure is extremely southeastern of India, has only heightened New Delhi’s unease.

The picture of a national head shaking hands with a Muslim rival is jarring for many Bangladeshis who grew up in the darkness of 1971. The Liberation War, which was the result of murder and trauma, is more than just a historical incident; it is also a deeply embedded national storage.

Releasing with Pakistan was a dark line under the previous Bangladeshi president, Sheikh Hasina.

Bangladesh, nevertheless, is indicating that it no longer views its international coverage from a single perspective. Dhaka is playing a more unexpected game in a place where relationships are shifting and power is at stake.

The message is clear for India, who has grown accustomed to treating its neighbor as a political frequent: nothing in South Asia can be changed, not even the past.

people summits, explicit exchanges, and summits

Certainly their material, but rather their showmanship, is what has been most revealing about the recent burst of Bangladesh-Pakistan political and cleverness exchanges.

These are not hidden from view or quiet summits like backchannel efforts. They’re calculated people displays that combine photo ops with press releases and talk levels.

This is a lifeline for Islamabad, which has long been marginalized in South Asian politics. It offers a chance to reshape a location where it has gradually lost influence and a new partner in Dhaka.

Financial incentives, assistance in defense, and even shared interests in international forums are all currently on the table. Additionally, Pakistan is not wasted time.

But, Bangladesh’s justification is more about widening the playing area than it is about rekindling old relations. Dhaka is hedging as India’s local dominance is being progressively seen through the lens of disparity and aggressiveness.

Detached from political dynasties ‘ personal weight, the time government is adopting a more transactional, cold diplomacy.

However, this new rationality comes with dangers. The national brain still carries a lot of the trauma of 1971, including the murder, the mass displacement, and the war crimes. Healing is both a matter of policy and principle for the thousands of Bangladeshis.

Any action that yet suggests absolution or amnesia is susceptible to stoke public outcry, especially among a younger generation who is both politically engaged and previously aware.

It’s unknown whether this diplomatic thaw will produce anything sustained or simply fizzles as a result of the pain experienced in the past. However, one thing is certain: the geographical balance is changing.

Bangladesh is no longer content to play the improbable darkness of India’s future. The nation is pushing the boundaries of its independence in this emerging post-Hasina surroundings, carved out space for its own-defined alliances.

Remembrance and unification

The latest foreign secretary-level discussions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, the first in more than 15 years, brought the past to life.

The consultations, which were held in Dhaka, were nothing short of habit. UNpaid war dues and hurricane relief, US$ 4.52 billion in reparations, and an unwavering, unequivocal explanation for the holocaust of 1971 were proudly direct.

One of the most persistent injuries in South Asian politics is that Islamabad has consistently dodged responsibility by offering only warm emotions of “regret” while dodging accountability.

And while the time management may look more eager to veer off, these demands are consistent with those made by every previous Awami League-led authorities. The message is clear: remembering is not the only thing that can be improved.

Dhaka is diversifying its security and geopolitics, despite the fact that traditional wounds are still untreated. Bangladesh’s involvement in Pakistan’s AMAN-25 naval exercises and its alleged involvement in Pakistan’s JF-17 warrior jets represent a subtle but significant change from its traditional martial sources.

The calculus is unmistakable for some hawks of foreign policy: While China may continue to be the dominant supplier, strategic diversification is then a top priority in Dhaka.

This rebalancing even extends beyond the China-Pakistan shaft. The introduction of Russian ships in Chittagong along with the recent visit of Bangladeshi Army chief common Waker-Uz-Zaman to Moscow underscores Bangladesh’s desire to strengthen its security alliances.

And Khalilur Rahman’s appointment as national security adviser, who was the administration’s minister for the Rohingya crisis, demonstrates a more forceful, regionally focused strategic outlook.

The pressure from the United States has only increased the bets. Washington’s demands for more coherence with Myanmar coverage add another layer of complexity to Dhaka’s now delicate balancing act.

Fundamental principles

The difficulty lies in managing expectations while maintaining autonomy while no simply choosing allies. However, it would be mistaken to associate Bangladesh’s altering unusual plan with its abandonment of its founding principles.

The refusal of the Awami League’s authoritarian ideology does not mean that the principles established in 1971—freedom, justice, and sovereignty—were not respected. These are the aspirations of a new era demanding respect at home and trustworthiness worldwide, not just slogans for the record books.

New Delhi ought to notice. A social change in Dhaka does not automatically mean respect. If India doesn’t expect to be loyal without getting involved, it is misinterpreting the situation.

Bangladesh’s position with its foreign policy is no longer a foregone conclusion. And the path ahead calls for more than just passing press releases or sporadic delegations: it calls for fair examination of history, of each other, and of the local realities of a fast-changing world order.

Abu Jakir is a columnist based in Dhaka.

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Mar-a-Lago Accord would end the dollar’s – and America’s – reign – Asia Times

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The US Treasury market has a sell-off as a result of President Donald Trump’s numerous tax presentations, not the least of which was his decision to impose” Liberation Day” mutual tariffs on April 2.

The sell-off, which started on April 5, was largely caused by concerns about tariff-related prices and overly leveraged hedge funds facing percentage names. But most importantly, it demonstrated a rapid market acceptance that Trump is serious about implementing profoundly problematic economic laws.

Investors today think that anything is achievable under Trump, following the courage of the Liberation Day tariffs. The proposed” Mar-a-Lago Accord,” suggested by Stephen Miran, who is currently the head of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, stands out as probably the most destructive statement, even though it is currently unlikely to get implemented.

The valuation of the US dollar, which Miran believes is the biggest issue facing the country’s economy, may lead to an effort to address a Mar-a-Lago Accord, which had aim to increase the US trade deficit and increase production.

His approach would be to convert short-term US Treasuries held by foreign investors to long-term, non-tradable zero-coupon obligations at much lower inherent offer, which would be the equivalent of restructuring US sovereign debt. The outcome would be to lower the cost of funding for the US government as well as to decrease the money.

The proposal’s apparent simplicity contrasts with its possible disastrous effects, which would be a specialized default on US Treasury bonds. Bonds are currently regarded as the country’s safe asset and are currently denominated in the dollar, the reserve currency of the world.

The disruption a move like this could cause would be so wonderful that Miran’s plan has frequently been derided or dismissed, but Trump’s outrageously high mutual taxes, which are officially suspended for 90 time except for China, were not expected sometimes.

So, some buyers are concerned about a potential US king debt restructuring. In a possible Mar-a-Lago Accord model, it should be noted that US Treasury transfers are not the only way to weaken the dollar while lowering the US Treasury’s financing costs.

Miran even suggested that in collaboration with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve may help to lower the cost of loan servicing. Although story provides some examples, Iran did not fully understand how such coordination may lead to lower US Treasury yields.

In order to support US war efforts, the Federal Reserve specifically implemented obvious offer controls in 1942 and 1951. However, the global financial system of the day resembled nothing less than it does today, not just because of its interdependence, where foreign investors own close to 30 % of US royal debts, but also because there were therefore foreign exchange controls and funds account restrictions.

The senator and his economic team should have received a distinct wake-up call from the severity of the Liberation Day sell-off and Trump’s timely decision to halt most of the mutual tariffs to prevent the US economy’s collapse, including the abandoning of US Treasuries.

In theory, this should make Miran’s anticipated Mar-a-Lago Accord even less likely to ever become a reality. No one can deny Trump’s unpredictability, which makes him unaffordable.

Due to the exorbitant privilege of the US as the issuer of the world’s reserve currency, US Treasuries can no longer be regarded as the safest assets in the world. The US’s virtuous circle, which it uses foreign capital to finance its bloated fiscal deficit and trade imbalance, is now in danger. The dollar’s future as the world’s all-powerful reserve currency is also uncertain. &nbsp,

As the Treasuries sell-off demonstrated, firting with the dollar’s reserve currency role is even more dangerous than imposing sky-high tariffs on trading partners. In fact, assuming that market forces will still be allowed to operate freely in the future, market forces appear to be the best defense the US economy has against poorly thought-out and bad policies.

Bruegel’s senior research fellow, Alicia Garcia Herrero, is the country’s chief economist for Asia-Pacific, and a professor in the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology’s adjunct program.

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Choosing the next Pope Francis – Asia Times

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He was a tower, a pillar, and a beacon for the typical people, the underprivileged, the have-nots, and those who faced discrimination in any way who wanted to live in harmony, love, and unity with other people and the natural world. Regardless of their faith, Francisco ( Jorge Bergoglio ) was not just the head of the Catholic Church. He was also a voice for the eight billion people who lived on Earth.

Every bishop has attempted to live up to this part, but probably never has a pope put so much effort into it and succeeded in it since early Christianity. So, the first question for his successor is clear: May he chose to change his course or continue on this path? Many in the Church thing, arguing that too much effort to engage non-Christians affects the Church’s integrity.

Francis’s mentoring to Muslims, Hindus, and agnostics did not increase the number of people attending Mass. Temples remained empty, especially in the traditional Catholic regions of Latin America and Europe. His opponents contend that attracting people outside the Church will be futile if they don’t care for the people who currently exist, leaving the organization as a barrel.

The second pope may try to strike a balance between these two trends, but it’s not clear how that will be achieved. The task facing the future pope could be enormous because of such an overall and enormous reach to every person on the planet. The difficulties are possibly more sobering than previously.

Conservatives and Disciples are expanding their influence wherever Catholics again had hold in history, not just in Latin America but also in developing nations like Africa, India, and China. For example, there may be ten million Christians in China, but there could be hundreds of millions of pseudo-Christians or self-proclaimed Christians.

The Church hasn’t been unified on how to process this phenomenon so much. Some claim that it presents a problem and that the faithful may be resurrected with the true faith. Some claim that it is useless; instead, people are more in tune with pastors and communities who have much needs. As more people convert to Christianity and distance themselves from their initial non-Christian beliefs, this conflict grows.

Additionally, there is the complicated problem of mega-states, which hold 40 % of the country’s population, namely, China and India. Francis requested an invitation from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but Francis was not invited, citing concerns raised by the nearby Catholic Church.

In this context, it is obvious that India is more successful in fostering ties with the upcoming bishop. If Modi and the nearby Catholics come to terms, India might be able to ally itself more with the Church, which could have significant political benefits. Modi aims to build a new American identification that is rooted in Hindu nationalism, which frequently contrasts with Christian and Islamic beliefs.

Catholicism has been a part of the subcontinent’s personality since the first century AD, with legends claiming that Jesus traveled to India to study with regional specialists before coming back to Israel at the age of 30.

Christianity is woven into the fabric of American personality, and it might encourage Modi and his friends to accept this reality. India might gain a competitive advantage over China if it practices Catholicism.

Regarding China, the Church might put relations with Beijing on the back burner unless some strong initiatives from China are taken, though such a growth seems implausible. This circumstance may have an effect on China’s standing globally.

As the UN waned and major power engaged in arm-wrestling over several problems, the Church became a centre for speech and covert intervention under Francis. Beijing might find it uncomfortable to be kept out of Vatican conversations.

The cardinal may then choose the next pope to manage these decisions. They are incredibly diverse, with Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia among the more diverse nations there are than previously. Franciss hoped for a more diverse audience worldwide.

Many of these cardinal have not met and scarcely understand one another, making it challenging to come to a compromise. With 19 chiefs out of 138, with two of them stationed overseas in Jerusalem and Ulaanbaatar, the largest one union is made up of the Italians. They may assist in organizing the conference, but it’s still not clear whether they will fit their preferred prospect in the white robe.

Americans, who have ten chiefs, make up the second-largest party. They were key in choosing Francis, but they are now divided into liberal and conservative parties, making it unclear whether they can exert the same influence.

18 American chiefs are present. The Church’s immediate future is shaped by a number of conversions, pressing issues, and competing political interests between emerging powers like China and historic colonial powers, as well as by migration and other pressing issues.

But, it’s not certain whether a powerful, global-minded number will join this group because the Pope needs to serve as a pastor to the entire world. Secondly, it’s not clear whether the next pope will use traditional criteria when choosing him.

A bishop was traditionally expected to have significant experience in a big Catholic bishop, which would reduce individuals like Cardinal Parolin, the Secretary of State, who has never served as a catholic priest, or Cardinal Bo from Myanmar, whose Christian population is in the minority. Both are viewed as personable and socially knowledgeable, which makes them attractive candidates.

These classic standards may no longer apply because there are more cardinal from nations where Catholics frequently make up small groups and in a world where the majority is in the minority.

Finally, the new pope will have to understand the delicate relationship with the Vatican, which is the world’s greatest superpower, the bulwark of the West, and the one-time biggest donor.

The second bishop must not blindly follow American principles, which may alienate the rest of the world. In contrast, being aggressive might turn off thousands of honest.

The terrible conflict within the American Catholic Church, which traditionalists oppose Francis and liberals back him, all contributes to the state itself, which is racked up by President Donald Trump.

The second bishop may also have to perform a difficult task of bringing America together again.

This content was originally published on Appia Institute, and it has since been republished with authority. Read the original right below.

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Why a US trade deal won’t be enough for India – Asia Times

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The terms of reference for the upcoming free trade agreement negotiations were finalized this month between India and the US. A comprehensive strategy is anticipated to guide the strategy, which will improve industry access, tariff reductions and non-tariff barriers, and establish a strong, integrated supply chain. &nbsp,

Donald Trump’s” Liberation Day” tariffs on April 2 cannot be more confining for most nations, including India. The impact of Trump’s 26 % tax on India will not only negatively impact Indian exports, but it will also cast doubt on its ability to adapt rapidly to the fundamental realignment of global supply chains, which Trump’s punitive tariffs aim to necessarily change. &nbsp,

The volume of taxes and counter-tariffs has been reduced to mere amounts as the situation evolves. Hope for a quick, US-China deal to end business disputes have almost vanished.

The 90-day delay on reciprocal taxes is a break for most countries, except for China, which is subject to a staggering 145 % income. In this ambiguous environment, no government would dare to make long-term plans. International trade is being rewritten in some ways in real-time.

Two recent events have suggested that Trump’s position has slightly cooled. He put a 90-day delay to the higher mutual tariffs on the targeted nations so they could deal with the US on April 11 and then put it on hold until China. He made the announcement on April 13 that tariff deductions for items like phones, computers, and other electronics are available in the US.

Additionally, tariffs on pharmaceuticals are a looming risk, which, if implemented, do have a near-doom effect on India’s economy. According to some estimates, India could be liable to lose about 30 % of its exports to the US alone.

India should not rejoice at the fact that China ( 145 % ), Vietnam ( 46 % ), Thailand ( 36 % ), Cambodia ( 49 % ), Indonesia ( 32 % ) and Bangladesh ( 37 % ) have been hit with higher impositions. However, India has trade opportunities and a lot of market space in the form of semiconductors and machinery, among others.

India should see the new fact being imposed by Trump as both a challenge and an option. In some ways, India is in a similar position to 1991, when the land was practically forced to open up due to diminishing foreign exchange reserves.

The new US tax regime and its battle with China offer an opportunity to reevaluate opportunities, discover weak points, and deal with its monetary policy demons.

Many Indians are unrealistically putting their hopes on a landmark Bilateral Trade Agreement ( BTA ) with the US to rescue this mess. India’s strategy to free trade agreements, while faced with an extremely mercantilist global trading system, will still be supported by its multi-vector international policy and its unwavering support for a multi-polar world.

India may now think betrayed by the US after what transpired following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attend to the US in February of this year, despite the absence of a public demonstration of dissention.

During his check-out,” Mission 500,” which aimed to double bilateral trade to US$ 500 billion by 2030, was discussed and discussed. In that regard, a determination was made to finalize the second stage of a mutually advantageous BTA by the fall of 2025.

Trump officially criticized India for being a “tariff prince” and a “big perpetrator” of trade relations just before announcing the new mutual tax government on April 2. This is in contrast to what he has been saying for a while.

India courted the US in the wake of that visit and the” Liberation Day” price announcement, signaling its commitment to US energy imports and serious defense talks with Washington.

India hastily eliminated the 6 % online advertising income and cut taxes on solar panels, luxury cars, bourbon whiskey, and a few other items in preparation for the BTA. Elon Musk’s Starlink was also suggested by India that it might be approved in India. Despite all those early concessions, India, like most other countries, continued to be subject to the reciprocal and baseline tariffs.

A trade agreement, in Trump’s opinion, is an instrument to improve self-reliance and shift the balance of trade. The US is currently pressuring India to open its politically sensitive agricultural and dairy sectors in trade negotiations.

The US and India also have a number of ticklish issues, including stringent approval standards for genetically modified products, strict licensing, and enforcement of intellectual property rights. &nbsp,

India’s response has been more or less predictable. It will almost certainly not produce dairy and agricultural products, giving itself a bargaining chip for future negotiations. India will likely agree to increase the imports of US-made defense equipment and energy products to combat the negative trade balance.

In industries like pharmaceuticals and autos, where it already enjoys low costs and a strong manufacturing base, it might even consider 0 % tariff. Beyond this, it’s difficult to see India giving in to any more concessions.

However, India might face difficulties from rival nations that are also dealing with higher US tariffs, such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, and others. China has reacted by imposing similarly high counter-tariffs, but Vietnam has reacted by signaling it will drop all tariffs to 0 % in order to reach a trade agreement with the US. &nbsp,

A senior Vietnamese official, who was recently on an official trip to the US, pledged to start negotiations for a free trade agreement and the purchase of US defense supplies. Additionally, he made an announcement about Vietnam’s intention to purchase$ 300 million worth of Boeing aircraft for its VietJet commercial airline. The US tariffs are undoubtedly bargaining chips.

India’s low dependence on exports of goods may seem advantageous in its negotiations with the US, but because of Vietnam’s precedent-setting commitment to 0 % tariffs on all US imports, India should be prepared for US expectations for a similar deal.

Given the length of these negotiations so far with the UK, EU, and US in particular, India should at best be cautiously optimistic about outcomes, especially given that ongoing trade talks with the US did not protect it from Trump’s high reciprocal tariffs.

As a general rule, an emerging market like India shouldn’t be concerned about a respectable trade deficit as long as it benefits from a BTA, boosts its exports, overall trade, and introduces new technologies and investments. However, India needs to be aware that a free trade agreement on its own won’t address India’s structural issues. It is entirely up to India to address them both at once.

Thus, India should take advantage of Trump’s tariff crisis as a unique opportunity to unilaterally lower global tariffs to increase competitiveness. This in turn will encourage the flow of superior foreign technologies, which will improve productivity and quality and boost national exports, especially those from emerging industries. Only then will India be able to take advantage of the opportunities Trump’s global supply chain disruptions offer.

Will India seize the opportunity, is the debatable question? Or will it once more go missing? How successfully India maneuvers the looming, negative effects of Trump’s tariffs depend not only on how quickly it negotiates a bilateral free trade agreement with the US, but also on how other nations bargain with the US over tariffs.

The key to a successful FTA with the US is to conclude, but the bigger question for India is how quickly it can increase its manufacturing capacity, adopt smart technologies, train skilled workers, construct modern logistical infrastructure, and pass progressive regulatory changes that can adapt to newly emerging global value chain alignments.

Only when global supply chains actually feed and integrate into Indian manufacturing can India count on being well-positioned to become a major global manufacturing and export hub in the upcoming years and ultimately a net-net Trump trade war winner.

Raghu Gururaj, an Indian Foreign Service officer, is a retired ambassador. He has his own opinions expressed here.

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Ukraine path to peace narrows as Trump drive wanes – Asia Times

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The chances of serenity for Ukraine remain thin after more than three years of conflict. Given Russia’s refusal to prolong a short, tense truce over Easter, there is no clear, believable path, perhaps to a stalemate. Despite the fact that the US, UK, and Ukraine have all expressed their help for this plan,

A more important issue do still exist even if the significant obstacles to a ceasefire deal may be overcome. No one of the important people in the fight appears to have a strategy for reaching an agreement that Kyiv and Moscow are likely to agree with.

Prior plans, such as a shared plan by China and Brazil in May of last year that was supported by a Chinese-led” Friends of Peace” group, mostly focused on a stalemate as a launching pad for negotiations about an exact peace agreement.

Although the specifics of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine were unspoken, this and other plans were roundly criticized by Ukraine and its eastern allies as favoring Russia. This was not an absurd position because a ceasefire would simply freeze the top lines and have a very good chance of making them lasting with or without a new peace deal.

But, what Ukraine chose to do was hardly more practical and was supported by its western allies, at least philosophically. At the time of the second” Summit on Peace in Ukraine” in Switzerland in June 2024, Volodymyr Zelensky’s proposed peace schedule was already in limbo.

There was no consensus on a follow-up meeting, and only 84 of the 100 representatives at the summit ( out of 160 invited ) supported a more nuanced version of Zelensky’s plan in their final communiqué. The Ukrainian harmony strategy was unmistakably dead in the water.

Therefore, Ukraine suggested an “internal endurance plan.” This is nothing more than a peace plan because it focuses on ensuring the nation you live a protracted attrition war with Russia.

However, it helps Kyiv’s wants to avoid a total retreat to Moscow. The commitment to supporting Kyiv is also great on the agenda for Ukraine’s Western allies, who are also on top of their goals.

It is crucial to keep Ukraine in the fight while assisting the emerging German coalition of the willing in developing its own defenses. They are susceptible to a new global order, which might split the world into US, Russian, and Taiwanese spheres of influence.

Where is the White House located?

For a vehement effort is at the heart of US President Donald Trump’s efforts, which include a deal that would offer the US privileged access to Ukrainian resources as well as a peace between Russia and Ukraine.

This deal appears to be close to being finalized after first unravelling during an incredibly content press conference held at the White House on February 28.

According to a recent suggestion from Trump’s special minister for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, the peace agreement that Trump appears to have in mind may break Ukraine into spheres of influence. Diplomats are still eluded by even a pro-Moscow deal that would grant Putin power of 20 % of Ukraine.

Given Trump’s unwillingness to put any significant pressure on Russia, the Russian president currently has some incentives to accept less than his highest demands and end a war he believes will still be able to get on the battlefield.

At times, it seems more probable that Trump will simply give up trying to put an end to the fighting in Ukraine. This would be desirable from the Soviet point of view over a ceasefire that would stop the turmoil but don’t produce a peace agreement in line with Moscow’s demands.

Even if the US midterm elections in 2026 would likely weaken Trump’s hold on power, the Kremlin’s estimate suggests that two more years will pass before the country can win more Ukrainian territory. Moscow may demand any further conquests as payment for a lawsuit if Washington then presses for a new ceasefire.

Even if Trump decides to stay in the talks right away and even if his exclusive minister Steve Witkoff ends up putting up a package, it will still look more like a stalemate than a peace deal.

Strong gulf between Ukraine and Russia

The basic reason for this is that neither Russia nor Ukraine’s positions on a satisfactory result have changed. Putin continues to support the full conquest of four of Ukraine’s regions as well as the preservation of Crimea. Zellensky has repeatedly ruled out regional concessions, and he enjoys wide support from Ukrainian in this regard.

The West’s perception that a peace deal would be nearly impossible to reach in terms that would satisfy all parties has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. There are only a handful of joint attempts by Ukraine, the US, and the German coalition of the willing, with all of them focused on a functional peace.

On April 17 at a gathering of foreign ministers and senior officials in Paris, the discussion centered on sustaining for a ceasefire. Although the specifics of how this can be achieved are still unsure, the fact that there are now more equitable conversations indicates development, at least in terms of the negotiation approach.

However, their substance and whether Ukraine and Russia may finally agree on terms regarding alienation of forces, monitoring, guarantees, and enforcement mechanisms will determine whether this will actually lead to a breakthrough toward a green ceasefire.

This is already a very high table, and the table for a later peace deal is even higher. A peace is undoubtedly a prerequisite for a peace agreement in the current level of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. However, the one thing that needs to be focused on the first won’t make the former any more probable.

In addition, investing everyone in a ceasefire deal may turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophesy for Ukraine and its followers given Russia’s history of breaking the Minsk stalemate agreements of September 2014 and February 2015.

Tetyana Malyarenko, professor of global surveillance, and Stefan Wolff, professor of global surveillance, are Jean Monnet and professor of Western security, National University Odesa Law Academy.

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Study the article’s introduction.

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Cambodia at heart of Trump’s proxy trade war on China – Asia Times

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After Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Phnom Penh next month, which was disappointing for Washington, it returned the trip by renouncing its importance for international relations.

Prime Minister Hun Manet&nbsp stated that” Cambodia’s international scheme is never biased against or detached from any land.” The Royal Government of Cambodia’s official status is that” we maintain good relations with all places based on mutual respect for democracy, independence, and shared interests.” We don’t share any distinct country’s values.

Obviously, the majority of the discussion surrounding Xi’s visit was centered on Trump’s threatened tariffs, which are now halted until July. Sun Chanthol and Cham Nimul, the US Trade Representative’s member, have been holding a video seminar with Jamieson Greer, the US Trade Representative, as of April 16.

The group hasn’t been invited to Washington for more discussions, according to the news. Making matters worse, Beijing’s business ministry announced on April 21 that it” strategically opposes any party to reaching a deal at the price of China’s interests.” Peace won’t be brought about by peace, and settlement won’t be accepted. Importantly, it stated that” China may resolutely taking mutual measures and will never accept it.”

Who knows what the Trump administration will do next in this saga, but I believe we can safely say that the White House’s full tariff strategy has been at best poorly thought out and will continue to be so. One of the few guiding principles he has maintained for years is Trump’s personal peccadillo with trade deficits.

I forgot who made the joke about the “right woke,” but Trump does seem to think of levies as compensation for America’s white working class. Some in his tent appear to be really convinced that tariffs will re-introduce manufacturing to the US in large numbers, as though all socioeconomic background rules can get rewritten by claiming they don’t exist. As likely as Brits creating an empire are, America’s prospects of reindustrialization are.

However, here is a more convincing explanation: the initial Trump administration’s trade war largely consisted of a test run. Place tariffs on China just and watch what happens in a trade war.

China then reversed its trade routes through third countries, including Cambodia, either directly through illegal” shipping,” where Chinese-made products are labeled” Made In Cambodia” and re-exported from Sihanoukville’s port, or by moving production to places like Cambodia.

Trump’s trade war, in the opinion of this writer, has expanded that test by imposing tariffs on nearly every nation in an effort to stop” transshipment” and stop Chinese goods from entering the US market through the proverbial back door. Think of tariffs as third-party restrictions against the Chinese market.

The Trump administration intends to engage in negotiations with more than 70 countries to stop China from moving goods through their borders, stop Chinese companies from locating in their territories, and stop China from importing cheap commercial goods into their economies, according to the Wall Street Journal&nbsp last month.

Take, for example, this week’s announcement that the US Commerce Department will impose taxes as high as 3, 403 % on solar cells and panels imported from Southeast Asia but primarily produced in Chinese-owned factories following a long-running situation that saw Washington establish anti-dumping and countering duties on solar items from four South Asian states next year. Some Chinese firms in Cambodia did charge the highest tariff on renewable imports.

According to Reuters&nbsp, Vietnam’s business department issued a mandate on April 15 to impose a ban on the shipping of items to the US as part of its tariff-avoidance approach, despite it being announced just hours after Trump’s tax announcements on April 2.

Transshipment rates are likely to rise as China dumps more goods into Southeast Asia because America has increased tariffs to as high as 145 % and Beijing has retaliated by imposing duties of 125 % on US goods.

Thus, it appears as though we’re waging a proxy trade war, in which Beijing and Washington might punish other nations for their economic ties to one another. In Southeast Asia, Cambodia is at the center of this conflict, but it has no room to retreat.

Phnom Penh might curtail direct transshipment. As previously mentioned, Vietnam has already indicated that it will strengthen the oversight and inspection of imported goods to determine their origin.

Phnom Penh could also offer a similar commitment, &nbsp, publicly stating that it will, too, increase inspections of goods coming from China. After years of lofty promises that never materialize, whether Washington would trust the government’s promises is another question.

The most troubling aspect of Cambodia’s garment manufacturing supply chain is that it is entirely transshipment-adjacent, which is what makes the country’s economy’s foundation. Essentially, almost all cotton or cloth is imported from China, combined with other products made in Cambodian factories, and then sold to Western ( mostly American ) consumers. Additionally, a sizable portion of garment factories are Chinese-owned.

Of course, this is what many contemporary supply chains look like. However, those who want them to will perceive these things as transshipment. Washington may declare it to be transshipment if it appears to be.

Give Peter Navarro, Trump’s architect of trade wars, ear and ears. Let’s conquer Vietnam. They sell us$ 15 for every$ 1 we sell them when they promise to “we’ll go to zero tariffs,” but that doesn’t mean anything to us because it’s nontariff fraud. He claimed earlier this month that China is transshipping to Vietnam for$ 5 in order to avoid their tariffs. For this, Navarro referred to Vietnam as” a colony of communist China.”

In a conversation with Bloomberg News last week, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent seemed to be addressing Southeast Asia more directly.” On our side, we want to avoid transshipment, which has been a big issue. And then, I believe they want to avoid dumping. Because of where these Chinese goods will go. If their biggest export market is shutting down, I don’t believe it will take much prodding.

The issue with Phnom Penh is that it is unable to do anything about this. It’s impossible to separate ourselves from China. Its entire export sector is built entirely on Chinese imports and investments. If you have nothing to export, why would you want zero tariffs on exports? So, if this is a proxy trade war, what is the answer to the two main antagonists ‘ ability to endure?

Trump’s entire tariff policy, as previously stated, is incredibly flawed: It simply won’t accomplish what he believes it will. Inflation and higher prices for American consumers will be what it will achieve, one of the two issues that gave Trump a close victory in November, the other being immigration.

The White House now perceives itself as being in a chickenfight with Beijing. China’s court is where the ball is. China needs to strike a deal with us. Trump’s press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, said last week,” We don’t need to make a deal with them.” Was it on that occasion that she was wearing a” Made in China” dress?

Washington should take note of the pandemic lessons: The Chinese Communist Party can put its citizens under far more stress and economic hardship than any American president can.

Frankly, Xi isn’t taking a flight to Washington anytime soon. That was evident when he refused to attend Trump’s inauguration. Beijing spent the majority of last year getting ready for this circumstance.

It is accurate to say that Trump is quickly destroying the American Empire ( more on that in a later article ) and that his administration is bringing former US stalwarts closer to Beijing.

Meanwhile, Trump’s approval ratings are already declining. They will drop lower as a result of a recession and rising consumer prices. The Republican Party will be considering a successor and how to return to economic normalcy as the midterm elections in late 2026 come closer to being held.

One can see why, if a nation like Cambodia is currently essentially being told by Washington and Beijing that it will face retaliatory measures if its economic policy swivels “pro-US” to avoid sanctions or “pro-China” as Beijing dumps cheaper goods, it would have a good reason to believe that China has much more staying power to inflict harm.

Xi Jinping will be in office for life, replacing Trump, who could abandon his entire tariff plan in a month.

This article was originally published on David Hutt’s Cambodia Unfiltered Substack, and it is now republished with kind permission. Subscribe to Cambodia Unfiltered right here.

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