A coming age of changing borders – Asia Times

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The US senator has been putting pressure on NATO allies for weeks as he continues to deliberate Donald Trump’s programs for trying to resolve problems in Ukraine and Israel.

After his 2024 election win, Trump repeatedly raised the possibility of annexing the Danish province of Greenland, having initially done so in 2019. His new attack on a vital ally shocked Europe and the world community, which he had previously dismissed as absurd.

Trump has reiterated his position and also reiterated his intention to create the state’s 51st express in November 2024. Up until the middle of the 20th century, there was violent conflict between the two countries, but violent annexation is now unthinkable due to operational difficulties, close ties, and pleasant relations between the US and Canada.

Trump has since doubled down, adding that his comments about capturing the Panama Canal and Gaza have heightened fears that the world’s most powerful nation is genuinely interested in expanding its territory.

Trump’s motivations—whether a business strategy against Canada, securing greater military right in Greenland, or another reasons—remain vague. However, Washington’s interventionist policy tilt coincides with fast-moving negotiations with Russia to try to end the war in Ukraine, good by ceding area to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Israel is considering its unique border combination, including probably permanent pogroms of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and formalizing its invasion of Syria’s Golan Heights.

Trump’s actions, which were once seen as social theater, now appear to be a part of wider efforts to alter the debate on borders, which could lead to an unpredictably new era of regional conflicts.

Following World War II, the global community generally resisted border modifications, even in the context of independence, in dread of spreading instability, independence, and conquest. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, in change, cemented Europe’s postwar borders, discouraging harsh shifts while allowing for peaceful and mutually agreed changes.

After the Cold War, aspiring innovators hoped this design would continue. Germany’s unification in 1990 was followed by Czechoslovakia’s affectionate cut in 1992, and European regional issues had by then been reduced to legal fights, as part of a international, administrative approach to conflict resolution that was expected to spread into Eastern Europe and beyond.

Territories erupted in the newly independent states emerging from former communist Europe, despite having no clear ways of resolving them. In the former Soviet Union, Russian-backed separatists in Moldova and Georgia kept conflicts unresolved.

Uneasy peace was brought on by US and NATO involvement in former Yugoslavia until Western support for Kosovo’s 2008 independence sprang up tensions and divided allies.

Similarly, Western-supported independence efforts in Eritrea ( 1993 ) and South Sudan ( 2011 ) led to prolonged violence, while other secessionist and annexation movements continued to test the West’s commitment to managing territorial integrity globally.

Despite these difficulties, the US-led efforts to uphold the status quo largely lasted until 2022, when Russia launched the largest territorial expansion campaign in Europe since World War II.

Russia’s incursion as it unfolded on NATO’s doorstep was unavoidable despite the fact that Western powers have provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine and prevented Russia from acquiring Kyiv. Since then, confidence in the permanence of established borders has been shattered by the exposed limits of Western deterrence.

Trump appears eager to normalize it and designate the US as its primary beneficiary if a new era of territorial changes has begun. While negotiating border changes elsewhere, the US asserts dominance in a changing world order and even assumes more de facto control over Greenland or the strategically important Panama Canal.

In his first term, Trump hinted at recognizing Crimea, seized from Ukraine by Russia in 2014, and appears to accept that Ukraine will not return to its pre-2022 or even pre-2014 borders. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio convened in Saudi Arabia on February 18, 2025, to discuss Ukraine peace talks.

What does Trump want, though, given that Trump’s intentions regarding Ukraine remain vague, leaves room for improvement? Cutting costs, positioning the US as a peacemaker, calming international markets and potentially securing access to Ukrainian resources are among the possibilities.

However, crafting a deal that looks like a win for US foreign policy will be difficult, making the perception of Washington’s own territorial expansion key.

While increasing control over Canada seems unlikely, Moscow is” closely watching” Trump’s remarks about Greenland. Trump’s open proposal has some weight, following a covert attempt by the US to buy Greenland in 1946.

Russia’s officials and media have suggested that Greenland should be divided equally, but they take it more seriously because they think Washington is pressuring Denmark for more military access.

Given their growing Arctic military presence, proposals for agreements like a Compact of Free Association with Greenland after its potential independence from Denmark would likely sputter heavily on Russia and China. Moscow’s resistance may be softened by concessions in Ukraine, though this remains uncertain.

Washington’s openness to bilateral territorial adjustments, bypassing multilateral arbitration, will still require Ukraine’s consent and consideration of Greenlanders ‘ ( or any other territory’s ) wishes.

Any US-Russian territorial agreement could have an impact on Israel’s territorial ambitions in Gaza and Syria following Bashar al-Assad’s government’s demise in December 2024.

In 2019, Trump recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategically important Syrian region under Israeli control since the 1967 Six-Day War.

His decision, which the Biden administration later upheld, established a precedent for the US acknowledging Israeli territorial claims. Israeli forces quickly retreated to the UN-designated buffer zone to take control of the country after Assad’s government fell, and the Israeli government announced plans to expand its population there.

The Golan Heights provides Israel with a strategic, elevated military position, critical freshwater reserves, and other natural resources. Israel faces little resistance to reinforcing its hold and potentially expulsion the UN in the process, with Syria’s government collapse and Damascus no longer a significant threat.

Strengthening its influence may also allow Israel to portray its most recent military operations as victories, as well as the deterioration of” Iran’s proxy network.”

Russia wants to keep a military presence in Syria despite the fall of Assad, which could stifle other countries from blocking Israeli incursions into the Golan Heights while using its influence over Hamas in Gaza to control tensions.

By deepening cooperation with Israel—closely tied to Trump—Moscow may hope to secure concessions in Ukraine. On February 24, 2025, Israel was one of 18 countries, including the US, to vote against a UN resolution condemning Russia as an aggressor for its actions in Ukraine.

Trump’s unwavering support for Israel strengthens its position and compels other regional nations to do the same. Jordan, which relies on water from the Golan Heights, will likely be compelled to accept Israeli actions, a dynamic that also extends to Gaza.

After Trump had suggested their relocation, King Abdullah II of Jordan met with Trump on February 11, 2025, to discuss the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza. The King, wary of Jordan’s past instability with Palestinian refugees, firmly rejected Trump’s proposal for large-scale Palestinian resettlement.

However, his offer to immediately take in 2, 000 injured children was a tacit acknowledgment of the feasibility of limited relocation, inadvertently lending a degree of credibility to Trump’s larger proposal.

Although the timing of these agreements is still uncertain, agreements with Russia and Israel could reshape international border laws and lead to uncontrollable consequences as the US withdraws from enforcing territorial integrity. Russia and Israel are likely to increase their gains.

Syria is engaged in conflict with Kurdish independence movements and Turkish control in the north. Kurdish independence aspirations extend into Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, directly clashing with those countries, while Turkey‘s ambitions of a “greater Turkey” include expansive control over Cyprus and the Aegean Islands.

Sudan and Ethiopia have territorial disputes in Africa, whereas Ethiopia has longstanding disputes with Eritrea and Somalia. Meanwhile, the country’s growing internal divisions threaten to worsen.

Additionally, the decades-long conflict between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Western Sahara reignited in 2020. In exchange for Morocco’s recognition of Israel in December 2020, the US became the first nation to do so during Trump’s final weeks of office.

Yet here, Trump appears to have paved the way for a new direction, with Israel recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2023 and France following in 2024. Numerous other nations have since increased their support for Morocco’s position, but they have abstained completely.

Unabhängig of whether the US was simply ahead of the curve in Morocco, a risky escalation is looming elsewhere. China, observing Russia’s potential acquisitions in Ukraine, has numerous territorial disputes it could escalate, a traditional part of its geopolitical strategy.

Tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea, in particular, could lead to clashes with the US and its allies. China and India continue to fight over their Himalayan border despite recent de-escalation, while India and Pakistan continue to be locked in a conflict over Kashmir, with the threat of nuclear war raising the stakes even more.

Closer to home, tensions along the Belize-Guatemala border also carry the risk of escalation. And, since 2023, Venezuela’s growing claims to Guyana’s Essequibo region, 70 % of Guyana’s territory, have marked a significant shift in the Americas.

An increase in violence on the US southern border could worsen the migrant crisis, putting the question on American borders whether they are strong enough to handle additional pressures.

Despite efforts to defend border integrity, colonial-era boundaries, long-established grievances, and sudden state collapses after the end of the Cold War have challenged territorial stability, with the West largely attempting to maintain order.

His administration instead concentrates on strengthening borders at home while utilizing vulnerabilities abroad, which suggests that global territorial management is not worthwhile.

Changes in Ukraine and Israel may not occur overnight, but years of groundwork, coupled with ongoing deliberations, could accelerate the process and potentially include US territorial expansion.

It’s uncertain whether other nations or upcoming administrations will accept these decisions. However, if Washington sets a new standard, it will prompt other nations to pursue territorial changes more openly, inviting ethnic cleansing and even genocides.

Washington’s ability to control this dynamic is unproven, as is its response to emerging foreign disputes and potential internal secession attempts. What will come after agreements with Russia and Israel over territory allow the White House political breathing room, it’s not clear what will happen.

John P Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book,” Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas”, was published in December 2022.

The Independent Media Institute’s Economy for All project produced this article. It is republished with permission.

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The wise way to ‘un-unite’ Russia and China – Asia Times

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In October 2024, then-presidential member Donald Trump remarked,” The one thing you never want to happen is you never want Russia and China uniting… I’m going to have to un-unite them, and I think I can do that, too. I have to un-unite them”.

The recent flurry of political contacts by President Trump to Russia and the open split between Washington and Kyiv may represent the first steps in a US efforts to distance Moscow from Beijing. &nbsp,

Despite its flaws, the idea of bringing Russia to China is carefully good. It may help Washington concentrate its resources and efforts on its conflict with China while halting what some people refer to as a “quasi-alliance” between Beijing and Moscow.

Henry Kissinger’s contribution to the Cold War, when he helped reach agreement with Beijing in the first 1970s to remove Moscow, would be in opposition. &nbsp, Existing conditions, however, make the likelihood of properly driving a wedge between China and Russia reduced and the expenses of trying higher. &nbsp,

A different strategy, one with a story and putting increasing pressure on both Moscow and Beijing, may increase the chances of victory and lower the costs involved. &nbsp,

Despite allergens in the marriage, Russia does not easily walk away from the advantages China provides. Beijing also has the ability to lead the country’s defense and trade partners, as well as helping it de-dollarize foreign deals without being tied to sanctions, shares surveillance and censorship knowledge, and secures a “rear” along their discussed land border.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, also, like an exceptionally strong personal connection. And while the fight in Ukraine has significantly increased Russia’s reliance on China, the two have been boosting relations since the mid-1980s and were near companions properly before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea.

Washington does, however, have a lot to give Moscow at the table in terms of sanctions relief and a ceasefire. It can also impose sanctions on Russia for imposing sanctions on Ukraine.

Russia’s position on the front lines largely guarantees that it will retain the Russian place it occupies and that Kyiv will be unable to meet NATO without a resurgent American military aid to Ukraine. &nbsp,

Additionally, it’s unlikely that Moscow will refinance its connection with Beijing in exchange for restrictions pleasure. Should Russia be willing to break away from China, it would possibly necessitate intolerably expensive concessions, like redesigning Europe’s security structure in a way that eternally harms NATO. &nbsp,

Some people believe that trying to entice China and Russia is a failure and should not even be attempted. Counterintuitively, however, a more aggressive approach may much status Washington to range Moscow from Beijing over the longer phrase and at a lower cost. &nbsp,

Before Kissinger exploited their split, it was National pieces, no veggies, that contributed to the escalation of tensions between China and Russia during the Cold War. The Frank Eisenhower leadership adopted a policy of strength toward China while facing down the Soviets in Europe and the Middle East.

It vowed to defend Taiwan, continued to impose a deal ban on Beijing, and urged the Nationalists to launch attacks against Taiwan’s mainland. China’s growing needs for the Soviets were made increasingly explicit by US military and economic force, which led to growing hatred in Moscow.

Eisenhower’s pressure policy also contributed to exposing and aggravated different Chinese and Russian interests in Taiwan. Chinese President Mao Zedong reacted to Taiwan’s conflict in 1958 in piece out of anger over its lack of protection support.

Beijing’s activities, which provoked horizontal American atomic threats against China, irritated and worried Moscow. Over Taiwan, which was of no significance to Moscow, the Soviet Union feared being ensnared in a radioactive conflict with Washington.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was forced to reevaluate both Russia’s connection with China and, crucially, the knowledge of providing Beijing military assistance as a result of the crisis.

As the issue unfolded, Moscow began to lag transferring nuclear systems to Beijing, and the next year, it reneged wholly on providing a nuclear weapon design. By 1960, all of the Soviet Union’s authorities had left China, and the Sino-Soviet conflict was already in full swing. &nbsp,

Pressure from the US on both countries today would only serve to worsen their previously different goals in Ukraine.

This may include a reconciliation with Kyiv, double the amount of military aid it provides, and threatening increased economic sanctions against Beijing for selling human goods that have reduced Russia’s war’s burden on society. &nbsp,

Trump might yet impose tariffs on Chinese imports based on how much Russia’s exports are drastically slashed. Doing so would make China more unwilling to provide material support while increasing Russia’s need for it.

While Putin has a major attention in the Ukraine conflict, China finds it to be uninteresting in much the same way. Beijing is interested in preventing Russia from losing, but it is reluctant to bear the high costs on Moscow’s representative. &nbsp,

This is why China has largely avoided providing destructive support, banned sanctioned Russian power ships from its huge ports, and found novel ways to evade US sanctions, particularly against its economic institutions.

Growing tension between China and Russia may lead to tension that could be exploited at the negotiation stand in the future. A Russia that is confronted by a richly armed and unrestrained Russian military and growing extremely angry with China for withholding crucial aid would still need concessions to emancipate it from Beijing.

But the compromises required may be fewer, less important and more reasonable. &nbsp, And they could produce the kind of enormous strategic dividends in Washington’s opposition with Beijing that Kissinger’s rapprochement did in previous century’s rivalry with the Soviets.

Andrew Taffer works for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University as a research fellow with the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. This essay represents his personal views and not those of the US National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

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Philippines hopeful but openly hedging on Trump – Asia Times

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Following a number of contentious remarks made by senior US officials during the most recent Munich Security Conference and this week’s decision to support Russia over Ukraine at the UN, the Trump administration has purposefully put the future of America’s relationship with Europe in fear.

However, the following Trump president’s signals toward transatlantic allies have been more soothing, hinting at a harder US plan line to appear on China. The presence of both the prime ministers of Japan and India at the White House in recent weeks highlights the generally good speed under Trump with like-minded Indo-Pacific power.

As for infantry friends such as the Philippines, it has been constantly reassured by high-level activities with Trump’s top defense and foreign policy leaders. Among the first contacts that US Secretary Marco Rubio made in his first time in business was Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Eduardo Manalo, who was also notable and notable.

On the occasion of the Munich Security Conference, the two top diplomats met in person to reiterate their shared commitment to upholding a “rules-based” attempt in Asia and working together to stop China’s assertive behaviour in neighboring lakes, including the South China Sea.

In addition, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro was one of the first international best officials to join US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who has broadly agreed with Rubio’s assessment of China as the greatest threat to America’s international management.

However, frontline Pacific supporters are quietly preparing for” the evening after”, especially when Trump’s America becomes a more isolated and possibly crazed power.

Trump’s unwaveringly transactional approach to foreign policy and his apprehension of autocrats in Beijing and Moscow have given Asian allies fresh motivation to develop their own skills and develop relationships with one another under a so-called “multi-alignment” hedging plan. &nbsp,

Major Spanish officers and leading specialists are usually cautiously optimistic about the prospects for continued strong diplomatic relations under Trump. The current freeze of USAID and the wider upending of the US federal bureaucracy are expected to cause US defense aid to the Philippines to be unperturbed.

A multi-billion defense aid package earmarked for the Philippines over the next five years is still a strong bipartisan vote in Congress for military support for important Asian allies. &nbsp,

During the US-Philippines special meeting in Munich, the US diplomatic chief &nbsp, “reaffirmed US commitment to the United States-Philippines alliance]and ] noted his enthusiasm for building an even more invested and enduring relationship”.

The two sides also discussed&nbsp, ways to enhance “ongoing bilateral coordination on addressing China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, and increasing economic cooperation on infrastructure, critical minerals, information technology, and energy, including through civil nuclear cooperation”.

Additionally, the Philippines is in a good position to restart long-stalled bilateral trade negotiations due to its relatively low exports to and trade surplus with America.

Although the Trump administration’s protectionist agenda has largely opposed traditional free trade agreements, it is reportedly looking into sectoral trade agreements with an emphasis on geopolitically sensitive industries like semiconductors, precious minerals, and even digital trade with trusted allies.

As neighboring Taiwan faces the real possibility of conflict with China and Japan ramps up its own semiconductor industry, the Philippines has actively promoted itself as a” China-free” supplier of critical minerals and as an alternative site for semiconductor production.

Manila’s security partnership and economic ties to the US will continue to be the foundation of its international strategy in the long run. For almost a century, Manila’s elite have effectively outsourced their external security needs to Washington.

However, with rising speculation of a US-China grand bargain, what some are already referring to as a” Mar-a-Lago Accord”, the Philippines is also hedging its bets by actively pursuing minilateral cooperation with other like-minded middle powers.

The rivalry, which serves as a middle power, in some ways gives rise to efforts to reach out to nations in similar circumstances and work with them, which is what we’ve been doing, according to Philippine diplomatic chief Manalo.

In April, Manila will be hosting as many as 14 similarly-minded middle powers as it rapidly strengthens defense ties with Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, South Korea and India.

General Nakatani, the Philippine defense chief, and his Japanese counterpart discussed strengthening defense ties and discussed concerns over China. &nbsp,

Nakatani told his Filipino counterpart Teodoro,” The security environment surrounding us is getting worse and that it is necessary for the two countries as strategic partners to further improve defense cooperation and collaboration to maintain peace and stability in]the ] Indo-Pacific.”

The Philippines and Japan’s recently ratified Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA ) has prompted Manila to pursue similar agreements with other similar-minded nations like Canada, France, and New Zealand.

A historic joint drill between Philippine and French naval forces took place last week in the South China Sea. Shortly after, the French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, docked in Subic Bay, the former site of America’s largest overseas naval facility, in a sign of rapidly growing bilateral defense ties with Manila.

The French ambassador to the Philippines, Marie Fontanel, declared on the carrier’s flight deck,” We want to strengthen our cooperation with regional partners with whom we share common values, such as upholding international law and ensuring freedom of navigation in shared maritime spaces.”

By openly discussing its own potential grand strategic bargain with the Asian superpower, the Philippines is also signaling its strategic autonomy and reopening communication channels with Beijing in a deeper hedge.

In exchange for easing tensions and China’s eventual withdrawal from the Southeast Asian nation’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, Philippine President Marcos Jr. made the offer to withdraw the American mid-range Typhon missile system from the northern Philippines last month.

China has voiced serious concerns about the US missile system’s positioning on Philippine soil, which makes Manila able to strike the country’s mainland, and raises concerns that Beijing sees it as a threat in light of a potential US-to-US conflict over Taiwan.

” Let’s make a deal with China —stop claiming our territory, stop harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our boats, stop water-cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and stop your aggressive and coercive behavior, and I’ll return the Typhon missiles”, Marcos said.

” Stop all their aggressive acts and I’ll return everything”, he added, underscoring Manila’s own autonomous decision to leverage its alliance with Washington to deter foreign aggression.

Ultimately, however, the Philippines is investing in its own capabilities, allocating close to$ 1 billion for acquisitions of modern weapons systems this year, with a focus on modern missile defense systems, drones and fighter jets.

Manila is growing more confident that it can and should pursue a more “multi-aligned” foreign policy that lessens its historical reliance on the US against external threats, a trend that will likely increase in the Trump 2.0 era.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Rich Heydarian

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Trump wants Ukraine minerals because China put its own off limits – Asia Times

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Donald Trump is requesting compensation from Ukraine for the help the US provided to Kyiv during the Russian invasion. Trump has demanded Ukraine mark a US$ 500 billion package that would offer the US exposure to, and profit from, Ukraine’s rare and essential minerals, an important tool in the 21st-century economy.

Trump has stated that this will be a part of the US’s settlement of Ukraine aid. Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, has so far refused to sign such an arrangement – stating that the help, as agreed by Trump’s father Joe Biden and the Republican-controlled Congress, was a give and certainly a product.

The US rely on unique minerals like chromium, which is essential for advanced security technologies but is not readily obtainable internally, is a key reason behind Trump’s push for this mineral deal.

China, a major distributor of chromium, has used its dominance of the tool to defy the US. In response to rising US taxes on Chinese goods, it has imposed a moratorium on rare materials being exported to the US.

For military technologies, including electric vehicles, electronics, and missile systems, other materials are important. In Ukraine, there are payments for 22 of the 34 materials identified by the European Union as important.

The US’s issue is that China now accounts for a large portion of some crucial metal imports.

Trump therefore views a solution to the Ukraine war as an opportunity to safe other sources of essential vitamins, lessening US dependence on China, and allowing him to get a more intense stance on it. He might not have anticipated that China would retaliate against US tariffs by imposing limits on these crucial commodities so fast.

The reliability and durability of chromium are what the defence industry values. In particular, the ingredient is seen as a vital tool enhancing sensor, satellite communication methods, and electronic warfare techniques. It is also used in multi-chip components used by tracking and air traffic control methods.

In addition to chromium, Ukraine has vast sources of carbon, an aspect that is used in the development of electric vehicles and nuclear reactors, and a third of Europe’s source of potassium, which is used in batteries.

Trump’s interest in Greenland, which has significant reserves of critical minerals, could be an alternative to Chinese-controlled resources because of its emphasis on critical minerals.

Why is China so important?

Trump’s concern for China is also a major force in his negotiations with Russia. One of Trump’s core concerns is China’s partnership with Russia. China is undoubtedly the mainstay of the Sino-Russian alliance right now.

Given the increasing cooperation between the two nations in military, economic, and technological areas, Trump believes that China’s influence in global affairs needs to be countered aggressively. The Trump administration has attempted to undermine the alliance by softening its relationship with Russia, a move that has shocked European leaders.

Given that China is America’s biggest economic rival and a significant obstacle to making the nation “great again,” Trump has long viewed it as the major threat to the US.

His economic policies have focused on geopolitical maneuvers, supply chain dependencies, and Chinese trade practices. One of his principal trade advisors claimed that American businesses are at a disadvantage due to China’s state-controlled economy, intellectual property theft, and trade imbalance.

The US recently imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese imports in an effort to boost US products ‘ competitiveness by causing more Chinese imports to cost more, thereby entice businesses and consumers to instead purchase domestic goods.

Trump also attempted to slam China’s export economy by making it harder for Chinese companies to sell goods in the US. His tariff policies extended to countries other than China, with other measures being considered for Europe.

Trump aimed to shift global supply chains and solidify the US as a manufacturing powerhouse by targeting multiple regions. Trump thinks that by halting the conflict in Ukraine, the US can use US funds and resources to redirect investments and resources used in Europe to combat China’s growing influence.

Trump has attempted to refute Trump’s claim that Chinese manufacturers are to blame for the massive fentanyl production, which is then routed into the US via various channels. Trump has suggested more stringent regulations, including tariffs and sanctions against Chinese companies allegedly engaged in its production, to halt the flow of fentanyl.

Following China’s retaliation, Trump needs peace in Ukraine and the consequential mineral agreement with Kyiv before China’s ban on exports to the US affects critical US manufacturing. With less repercussions, such a deal would then enable him to adopt an even more aggressive posture toward China.

However, Zelensky recently claimed that Russia has taken control of 20 % of Ukraine’s minerals since the invasion. Because there hasn’t been much investment in Ukraine’s minerals sector for almost a decade, it’s possible it won’t be years before any American investors will receive any returns.

Trump will have to wait a while before the minerals from Ukraine will be able to meet all of the US’s needs, even if he does get the deal he wants.

At the University of Portsmouth, Dafydd Townley teaches abroad.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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If Trump attempts World Bank retreat, China-led AIIB could step in – Asia Times

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Donald Trump is well known for his hostility toward internationalism and international businesses. The US senator made the announcement to leave the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the World Health Organization shortly after taking office on January 20, 2025.

Was the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund follow? Surely, supporters of the twin organizations – that have formed the backbone of world economic order for 80 years – are concerned. A Trump-ordered evaluation of Washington’s support for all international organizations has sparked fears that the US will endow more money or withdraw it immediately.

But any receding of U. S. authority in international financial institutions may, I believe, run counter to the president’s apparent political goals, creating a suction for China to move into and get on a bigger international role.

In particular, weakening the World Bank and any other multilateral development banks, or MDB, that has a large US presence may present an opportunity for a little-known, fairly new Chinese-led global business: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank– which, since its inception, has supported the pretty diplomacy the U. S. is attacking.

AIIB’s contradictory function

Nine years ago, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB ) as a means of investing in infrastructure and other related sectors in Asia while promoting “regional cooperation and partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.”

Since then, it has provided an example of an international organization that is willing to cooperate closely with other significant international organizations and adhere to global growth banking standards and standards.

This may conflict with the portrayal of Beijing’s global efforts that are frequently portrayed by China eagles, of whom there are many in the Trump presidency, who frequently envision a China that is determined to undermine the progressive, Western-led world order.

However, as some researchers and other Chinese experts have suggested, Beijing’s policies in international monetary management are frequently nuanced, with actions that both support and denigrate the liberal world order.

As I explain in my new guide, it is apparent that the AIIB is a paradox today: an institution created by an authoritarian government but connected to the rules and standards of the progressive global order.

A group of men and women sits during a forum.
Foreign Finance Minister Lou Jiwei addresses the audience at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank signing ceremony on October 24, 2014, in Beijing. Photo: Takaki Yajima / POOL

The AIIB has a strong connection to the rules-based system, as demonstrated by its numerous joint relationships with other significant multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank under the leadership of Japan.

In this context, the AIIB might offer a Taiwanese opposition in a country where US leadership is waning.

The AIIB’s collaborative pattern

Multilateral development banks have been providing the crucial role of lending billions of dollars annually to promote economic and social development for years.

They can be important sources of funding for poverty reduction, inclusive economic growth and lasting development, with a newer focus on climate change. These global lenders have also been remarkably resilient in the current climate of discord and crisis, with member countries earnestly looking into ways to improve their standing.

At the same time, MDBs frequently receive criticism from civil society organizations because they point out areas of poor performance and are concerned about potential negative effects of the main MDBs ‘ greater focus on working more closely with the private market. Big” MDBs were built around a set of geopolitical and economic strength relationships that are disintegrating before our eyes,” according to MDB professional Chris Humphrey.

There was a lot of concern among key countries about China’s motives when Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed in 2013 the establishment of the AIIB to aid in the development of infrastructure in Asia.

The Obama administration responded by urging different nations to abstain from joining. Its priority was that China may use lending to expand its influence in the area without upholding strict environmental and social standards.

However, all the other main nonborrowing countries, with the exception of Japan, joined the new lender. Now, the AIIB is the second-largest international development banks in terms of member states, behind simply the World Bank. It now has 110 member governments, which translates to over 80 % of the world population. With US$ 100 billion in cash, it is one of the medium-sized international loans.

From the get-go, the AIIB was designed to be collaborative. Jin Liqun, the first president of the bank, has a long history of multilateralism, having spent many years working for the Chinese banking department, the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility, and vice president of the Asian Development Bank.

Previous executive managers and staff from the IMF and other development bankers were among the international group of experts who assisted in the creation of the AIIB, as well as two American with much careers at the World Bank who played key roles in the creation of the company’s articles of agreement and its environmental and social model.

How the AIIB influenced people to learn from them

In a variety of ways, the bank fits into the international development environment. The Asian Development Bank’s mandate, which promotes “regional cooperation and collaboration in addressing growth challenges,” is directly related to the Asian Development Bank’s base.

The AIIB has environmental and social norms in line with other important multilateral development banks, as well as its conventions and policies.

The AIIB collaborates closely with its classmates, besides stealing fundamental ideas. The World Bank originally ran the AIIB’s government functions. In its early years, the AIIB co-financed a significant portion of its assignments with other bilateral development institutions.

In a recent sign of cooperation, in 2023, a deal between the AIIB and World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD ) saw the AIIB issue up to$ 1 billion in guarantees against IBRD sovereign-backed loans. This increased the IBRD’s capacity to provide more money, while diversifying the AIIB’s payment collection.

As of February 6, 2025, the AIIB had 306 approved initiatives totaling$ 59 billion. Its two biggest lending sources are transport and power. Recent projects that have received approval include funding for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s wind power plants and an Indian solar power plant. India, which has a slippery partnership with China, is one of the company’s largest consumers, together with Turkey and Indonesia.

collaborating and competing with China

From its conception until recently, the bilateral AIIB has frequently distinguished itself from China’s diplomatic efforts. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a framework for network borrowing by Chinese corporations that has been criticized for lacking transparency and accountability, is one of them.

However, some Belt and Road-linked initiatives have faced problems about problem, costs and the transparency of the loan contracts.

The AIIB has made more mention of the benefits of working with Belt and Road lenders in recent years, and the lender now houses the Secretariat of a service called the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance, which provides grants and assistance to developing nations seeking to finance equipment in nations where Belt and Road lending takes place. This may blur the distinction between loaning under Belt and Road and AIIB, but it doesn’t appear to lower the company’s standards.

No fresh concerns about the impact of the Chinese government at the AIIB. In June 2023, Canada froze its ties to the bank in a pending investigation into a French employee’s dramatic resignation after claiming that the bank was ruled by Communist Party users.

No additional member countries expressed their concern, and Canada has not yet released a report on the situation. An internal review by an AIIB executive director contained no findings to support the claims.

It would be wise for the new US administration to consider the variations in China’s strategies in global economic leadership as its formulation of its policies toward China may require more complex responses. Recognition of areas of assistance, competition, and conflict calls for more complex responses. The US will cooperate with China in many areas while competing with China.

Interestingly, any actions by the Trump administration to reshape multilateral organizations could put the AIIB in a better position to collaborate than the world’s leading multilateral development banks and the US, regardless of whether or not it is an anomaly. role.

At American University, Tamar Gutner is an associate professor.

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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US foreign policy overlooks human rights as national security – Asia Times

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Through taxes, financial sanctions, and military partnerships, the US is making more and more of its military and economic countermeasures against North Korea and China. However, one essential strategy remains ignored – individual rights. Not just a moral imperative, it is also necessary to address human rights violations as risks to national security. It is a proper necessity that enhances alliances, destabilizes authoritarian regimes, and promotes global stability.

According to former US Vice President Mike Pence,” a nation that oppresses its own citizens seldom stops there.” Oftentimes, human rights violations fall under the umbrella of philanthropic and intellectual issues rather than pressing issues of national security. In truth, they are interrelated.

The US has long acknowledged that systems that violate human rights frequently repress their anger abroad. This tenet served as the foundation for the United States ‘ desire for Japan’s unconditional surrender during World War II, enabling a rebuilding of the country’s political system to stop future physical brutality.

How human rights violations become threats to safety

When the right of an entity or a small party are violated, it is a human rights violation. When a whole country’s rights are violated, it becomes a threat to national security. The crucial difference is the size of the infraction.

Human rights abuses usually start on a smaller scale but, when organized, escalate into federal security threats. A state that defies the rights of its own citizens is unlikely to honor those of other countries. Treating human rights as a secondary problem ignores how they directly affect international stability and security.

Totalitarian governments ‘ weaknesses

Totalitarian systems, or “fear cultures”, maintain authority by instilling anxiety and isolating their people. However, history demonstrates that when people realize they have worldwide support and a place to hide, their power weakens.

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, which tied US trade ties with the Soviet Union to immigration right, was one of the most successful tactics against authoritarian regimes. This strategy weakened Russian power and led to the USSR’s eventual demise.

In Korea, contemporary cases are also present. South Korean President Park Geun-hye made a direct appeal to North Koreans in 2016 asking them to” travel to the breast of freedom in South Korea.” A number of North Koreans eluded North Korea and sought independence in South Korea as a result. Yoon Suk Yeol, the president of South Korea, publicly pledged in 2024 to never send dissenters back to North Korea, strengthening the notion that South Korea is a haven for those who are fleeing oppression.

Retaliation against individual rights campaigning

North Korea retaliated by ordering its supporters in South Korea to reduce Park’s and Yoon’s governments after acknowledging the existential threat posed by people right campaigning.

Communist politicians with a majority in the National Assembly attempted to sue Yoon for election fraud, punish Chinese spies under the Espionage Act, and obstruct him in his efforts to strengthen relationships with the US and Japan.

They slashed state expenses and impeached 29 important officials. Yoon’s management was left with a non-functioning state. Given these difficulties, President Yoon was left with the option to impose martial law as a last resort.

Strategic advantages of individual rights advocacy

Addressing human rights issues provides important benefits.

Second, it offers general validity. Making animal rights advocacy a rare bipartisan issue, yet leftists struggle to defend it.

Next, it strengthens US-Japan-ROK assistance through common earth. While South Korea’s devotion to the US-ROK empire is strong, its connection with Japan remains unstable. Socialists in South Korea often make use of past conflicts to thwart participation.

However, placing North Korea’s human rights violations as a shared problem offers an opportunity to improve relationships without giving adversaries a pretext to stoke section.

Human rights politics in motion

Between 2017 and 2021, I attended Chinese government-hosted events advocating for the release of Chinese captives held by North Korea. Although these occasions were planned by Japan, Otto Warmbier‘s home was generally present, demonstrating cooperation between the US and Japan while putting pressure on North Korea.

The North Korean Ministry of Unification has also been addressing the violence of both South Korean and Japanese people by North Korea. The ministry’s complete section addresses Chinese citizens who have been abducted by North Korea, which demonstrates its handle to address this issue.

Both Korean and Japanese nationals who have been abducted by North Korea are addressed by the UN Human Rights Office in Seoul ( in English ). Multilateral efforts may be significantly strengthened by a coordinated strategy between the US, Japan, and South Korea.

expanding multilateral cooperation between China and North Korea

The next step should be to address human rights abuses in China now that US-Japan-South Korea have successfully collaborated to address human rights violations committed by North Korea. While strong apologies and escape routes are effective for North Korea, China’s methods for China must concentrate on strengthening civil world efforts, political force, and economic measures.

Human rights campaigning is not just a social responsibility, it is a proper imperative. We may:: acquiesce to human rights violations as threats to national security by:

  1. Strengthen partnerships with authoritarian regimes
  2. Improve the diplomatic presence in Northeast Asia
  3. undermine the legitimacy of China and North Korea

Animal rights may no longer be viewed as a secondary issue in international relations. Instead, they should be key to global surveillance method. Addressing human rights abuses is not just about morality—it is about ensuring long-term political security.

Hanjin Lew&nbsp is a former foreign spokesman for North Korean traditional parties and a political commentator with an emphasis on East Asian matters.

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Taliban’s ‘gender apartheid’ could be its undoing – Asia Times

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Last week, the Taliban announced it was withdrawing from the International Criminal Court (ICC), rejecting the court’s authority and accusing it of political bias.

In a public statement, the Taliban claimed it had no obligation to the ICC because it was incompatible with the regime’s interpretation of Islam, and that it was being unfairly targeted after the court’s failure to address accusations of war crimes committed by United States-led forces between 2001 and 2021 in Afghanistan.

This comes after ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan applied for arrest warrants in January for Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for crimes against humanity committed against women in Afghanistan.

Khan claimed Taliban leaders were responsible for persecuting Afghan women and girls since the group’s return to power in August 2021. This includes the severe deprivation of physical integrity and autonomy, freedom of movement and expression, education, private and family life and freedom of assembly. 

The Taliban undeniably treats Afghan women and girls abysmally, denying them an education and most jobs. According to the United Nations, 2.5 million school-age girls have been denied their right to education.

Women have even been banned from working with aid organizations, leaving many Afghan women out of work or unable to access lifesaving humanitarian assistance.

The Taliban have also instituted “vice and virtue” laws forbidding women from showing their faces in public, looking at other men or taking transport without a male chaperone.  This comes after the Taliban banned women from using beauty parlours and visiting national parks last year, completely removing women from public spaces.

The situation for women has gotten so bad that the UN declared it the “worst globally” last year, while the UN’s representative in Afghanistan – Richard Bennet – labeled the Taliban’s actions “gender apartheid.”

Khan’s request for warrants is the latest attempt to hold the Taliban accountable for its treatment of women and girls.

In January, the United Kingdom joined several other countries in referring the regime to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging it had violated the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Twenty-four countries have now threatened to refer the Taliban to the courts.

While the regime can and has easily rejected the authority of the world’s courts, it does pose a problem for the Taliban.

The Taliban needs legitimacy to remain in power over the long term and craves recognition that would validate its strict interpretation of Islam. But despite some countries informally recognizing the regime – such as China – the broad consensus has been a refusal to accept the Taliban as the official government until it treats women and girls more humanely.

The Taliban has hoped the world would run out of patience and meekly accept its hardline regime, but United States President Donald Trump’s recent aggressive rhetoric against the Taliban makes this scenario unlikely.

Indeed, if the Taliban wants to take its place in the community of nations, it needs to play by the world’s rules. This includes the ICC, which Afghanistan joined in 2003 under then President Hamid Karzai, giving the court clear jurisdiction over crimes committed in Afghanistan.

But when the Taliban accuses the court of double standards, it has a point. No American politician or soldier has been handed a warrant for war crimes against Afghan civilians. Trump’s recent sanctions against the ICC in response to arrest warrants for Israeli leaders for crimes in Gaza also highlights the unequalness of the international “rules-based order.”

But this does not absolve the regime for how it treats women, and international law is something the Taliban will need to accept if it wants to officially represent Afghanistan at the United Nations.

The warrants have also exacerbated tensions within Taliban ranks. In January, Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Abbas Stanikzai publicly demanded an end to the ban on women’s education, calling it a “personal choice” and rebuking the regime’s claim its position on women was consistent with Sharia law.

The warrants also come at a time when the Taliban is under significant pressure. Islamic State continues to carry out deadly attacks throughout Afghanistan, claiming responsibility for the assassination of Taliban minister and powerbroker Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani in December.

The regime’s relationship with former ally Pakistan is also fraught, leading to border skirmishes and air strikes on Afghan soil that have humiliated the regime. All in all, the Taliban looks weak and arrest warrants for its leaders have only worsened its position at home and abroad.

Stanikzai gets what many Taliban do not: that the world is not just budging on how the regime treats women and girls; rather, it is doubling down on demands for better treatment.

Oppressing 20 million Afghan people is neither sustainable, nor is it consistent with any tenets of Islam. The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls is about power, but that power is now fracturing from within. And disunity is death in Afghan politics.

Make concessions on women and girls and the Taliban will get its coveted seat at the table and the international legitimacy it craves.

This would be a boon for the regime and enable it to work with the international community to solve the myriad of problems Afghanistan faces, particularly on terrorism and the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

The alternative is isolation and a reliance on cruelty, both of which brought on the Taliban’s last downfall in 2001.

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China puts Philippines on hypersonic nuke alert – Asia Times

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Due to rumors that China is developing a new underwater capable of carrying nuclear-tipped hypersonic missiles especially to neutralize the missile threat, China’s conflict with the Philippines appears to have reached a disturbing new phase.

A semi-official military newspaper reported this month that a Chinese invasion submarine that is currently being developed at a factory in Wuhan might be used to strike Philippine medium-range weapon defense systems.

The report indicates that the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has not yet confirmed if the submarine class is under development.

However, SCMP notes that a publication from Naval &amp, Merchant Ships, owned by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation ( CSSC), a PLA Navy ( PLA-N) supplier, mentions details about its design and features, thus validating its existence and reasons for its development.

The release mentions that the US Typhon missiles, which have been stationed in the Philippines since April 2024, may launch missiles from Luzon, a northern Philippine area, into island China.

The PLA can launch attacks from outside enemy lines, according to the report, and it has the option to use nuclear missiles if important. China’s most recent submarine is capable of carrying hypersonic missiles.

The YJ-21, which is used on its Type 093 nuclear attack submarines ( SSN), is likely to be used for the new submarine. The YJ-21 has also been deployed on China’s Model 055 ships, and its estimated collection is 1, 500 to 2, 000 km with an estimated velocity of Mach 10.

The underwater, first spotted in mid-2024, appears to have Vocabulary and an X-shaped tail fin for better athleticism and security, according to SCMP. Additionally, the report mentions that the submarine is anticipated to have AIP (air-independent propulsion ) technology.

Tensions between China and the US Typhon weapon system have gotten worse. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in September 2024 that the Typhon’s implementation “undermines regional peace and stability,” adding that it “is not in the interests of local locations.”

But, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro hit up at the notes, stating that China is using “reverse philosophy” to prevent the Philippines from building its security features.

Teodoro challenged China to “lead by instance”, saying that it should kill its nuclear arsenal, reduce its ballistic missile features, “get out of the West Philippine Sea”, and get out of Mischief Reef, a contested element in the South China Sea.

However, China conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) test since 1980, flying an ICBM from Hainan to French Polynesia, just outside France’s Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ ) around the country, in a thinly veiled signal of displeasure the same month.

Undaunted, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr highlighted in January 2025 that China’s missile systems substantially exceeds the Philippines. In exchange for halting anger in the South China Sea, he suggested removing the US Typhon missile program.

China appears determined to take a radical stance despite the strong words from Spanish leaders. In February 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesperson Guo Jiakun emphasized that the Philippines is “placing its safety in the arms of people” and that China” does not stand idly by when its passions are threatened.

If China’s assertion that its new submarine carries hypersonic missiles is confirmed, the Philippines lacks reliable air and missile defense capabilities to counteract such a threat.

As of 2022, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the US arsenal that can intercept hypersonic missiles, and even that capability is described as “nascent”. The US Glide Phase Interceptor ( GPI), designed to destroy hypersonic missiles in their glide phase, is still under development.

Should the Philippines strengthen its extended deterrence strategy with the US and use the Typhon as a foundation, it may purchase military equipment that will support the Typhon missile system in its own backyard.

While the Philippines operates SPYDER surface-to-air missile ( SAM ) batteries, they are not designed to engage hypersonic threats. In addition to SPYDER, the Philippines plans to buy additional short-range SAMs, possibly India’s Akash missile system. But, as with SPYDER, Akash is not designed to engage or neutralize hypersonic threats.

Given the Philippines ‘ capability shortcomings, it may be up to the US to defend its Typhon batteries against China’s hypersonic arsenal. The US deployed Patriot missile launchers to the Philippines in May 2024, with the Patriot successfully intercepting a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile over Kyiv in May 2023.

However, Russia’s propaganda may have overhyped the Kinzhal’s capability, and China, having much more resources than the former, can likely afford more sophisticated hypersonic missiles.

Aside from attempting to intercept China’s hypersonics, US submarines in the South China Sea could try to track and hunt their Chinese hypersonic-armed counterparts.

In the South China Sea in 2023, 11 US SSNs and two nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) were discovered, according to a report from the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI ) in March 2024.

China may launch a nuclear response if it believes its underwater nuclear deterrent is in danger because it may be using the South China Sea as a protected bastion for its SSBNs. The Philippines runs the risk of being caught in a nuclear conflict between the US and China because of nuclear-armed submarines from opposing sides patrolling nearby. &nbsp,

However, in a May 2024 National Bureau of Asian Research ( NBR ) report, Herman Kraft argues that the Philippines does not view China’s nuclear arsenal as a direct threat but rather as a factor in US-China competition. According to Kravit, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has not until recently resulted in the threat of nuclear weapons.

Manila is also developing relations with other countries, including Japan and Australia, while the Philippines acknowledges that the US might use its military installations and forces to target China. He claims that this strategy allows the Philippines to expand its defenses without being involved in US-China nuclear dynamics.

Kraft claims that while the Philippines advocates a normative, diplomatic approach to nuclear weapons, it is constrained by its longstanding dependence on the US.

Although the US Typhon missile system makes the Philippines a potential target for China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, it is improbable whether any president of the Philippines will permit US offensive strikes from its territory, unless the Philippines ‘ main islands are attacked.

If a leader of the Philippines approves such strikes, it runs the risk of making China, which will always be present nearby, a long-standing adversary.

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China’s largesse was always a better deal than USAID’s – Asia Times

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As part of a wider plan spearheaded by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency ( DOGE ), US President Donald Trump has shut down USAID, the country’s top international aid organization.

USAID has been harshly criticized by the Trump administration for perpetuating errors and oddities through its support to developing nations. Musk called USAID” the most crooked establishment” and declared that “it deserves to die”.

While USAID has long claimed to focus on humanitarian aid, health services and growth, Trump has said that it has rather facilitated political interference, problem, opaque governance and unwarranted interference in the inner affairs of recipient countries.

Trump and Musk’s claims would seem to corroborate accusations that recent unrest in Bangladesh and Ukraine’s 2014 “orange revolution” —an event that ultimately led to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022—are evidence of USAID’s role in orchestrating” color revolutions”, a modern form of regime change akin to a military coup around the world.

The US international coverage framework has three columns: security, politics, and growth. By promoting international policy and expanding effect, USAID purports to support the interests of the US, but it doesn’t always address the real needs of the sender nations.

Only a small portion of the allocated budgets are used to reach the intended recipients, as a significant portion of USAID money is absorbed by administrative costs, high wages, obligations for intermediaries, and highly expensive consultants ( many former USAID senior officials ).

Studies reveal that for every 100 US dollars USAID spends, a mere 12.10 money reaches reader places. Additionally, funding from USAID has been accused of undermining local laws and regulations, causing bribery and opaque governance in host nations. Criticisms contend that the company generally benefits the country’s ruling political elite and its US-educated offspring rather than the less fortunate.

Trump’s” America First” coverage, which is apparently trying to stop the theft of US taxpayer funds domestically and internationally, includes the decision to close USAID. The disclosures of Trump-Musk information have also made the Global South countries have to consider the effects of American support and take the necessary steps to increase financial independence, sovereignty, and progress.

American foreign aid acts as a double-edged weapon for several developing countries. While it claims to bring about growth in the terms of the recipients ‘ nations, it entails dominance and undermines their economic sovereignty and independence.

Western donors first disburse sizable grants, but after recipient nations become more dependent on external aid, they switch to smaller grants.

The recipient countries ‘ economic independence is restrained by the severe economic policy conditions of Western loans ( bilateral and multilateral, such as from the World Bank and IMF), which keep them stuck in a never-ending vicious cycle of borrowing to pay off outstanding debt.

It undermines the foundation of people’s employment and sustainable development by using a more limited government budget to pay off debt and suppress home agriculture and young industries.

American support typically has a relationship to the political objectives of the donor countries, making the recipient countries have to connect their guidelines with those of their donors. In consequence, the receiving nations are unable to develop their own economic and trade techniques.

Moreover, according to Musk, American aid has been linked to promoting fraud and errors in recipient nations by shutting down USAID. Some funds are lost there or mismanaged by help administration, failing to achieve their original objectives.

While frequently well-intentioned, including initiatives to distribute gratis food, grains, and other essential services, USAID’s assistance frequently tramples local crops and companies by displacing domestic producers and deteriorating local knowledge and skills.

Instead of fostering long-term financial self-sufficiency, for investment breeds dependence symptoms, making nations centered on outdoor aid. Some academics contend that American aid fosters resentment and hopelessness rather than promoting real growth.

It is now a very good idea for developing countries to move to financial freedom and independence. Trump’s discovery on USAID calling for a conscious effort to build local business, cut down on imports and boost local production.

Investment in training, technology and equipment is crucial to developing the ability to grow effectively. Development-focused countries must collaborate with lenders who offer enhancement funds without having to meet any social or policy requirements in order to accomplish these objectives.

The Global South has a promising future ahead of geographical trade and assistance. The Global South must abandon the notion of getting rich by exporting cheap products to Western markets or relying on foreign support for national development as the US embraces protectionist policies, which are more demanding than even the Smoot-Hawley Tax Act of 1930.

Rather, it should concentrate on fostering local partnerships and business contracts. To protect themselves from raw materials and manpower exploitation, American nations can use pan-African assistance and collective bargaining.

South America may improve frameworks for local partnership, while ASEAN countries should take advantage of the opportunity to build similarly bold local initiatives. The integration of the Asian economies to produce tangible outcomes is essential under the leadership of Russia.

To implement its stalled free trade agreement (FTA ), South Asia should revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ). These local efforts can be strengthened by a reinforced BRICS framework, which will encourage greater cooperation among the Global South countries.

More important, these nations need to regain possession of their natural sources. By regaining control over their separation, miners, utilization, and trade, developing nations had put an end to wealthy nations ‘ use of their resources. This will increase the value added from these resources by allowing nations to offer their resources fairly.

Through shared and regional discussions with China, there might be a good chance of achieving this objective. Compared to the zero-sum sport usually promoted by the West, China’s “win-win” trade and development method emphasizes common benefit. Cooperating with China may help China achieve its goals while avoiding the numerous negative effects of American support.

Under the American support model, which is defined by the conditionality of grants and loans, political and economic passions of donor countries are given precedence. American aid often comes with needs for democratization, social reforms, animal rights improvements and stress to meet alliances against rival nations.

It is a type of interference in the domestic affairs of the receiving nations, making them to adhere to American economic, political, and social norms, which are frequently incompatible with their social values and traditions.

China, in comparison, favors trade and investment over social engineering. Through procedures like the Belt and Road Initiative, China invests in large-scale infrastructure projects, including ports, railways and bridges, in recipient places. For numerous emerging countries, these activities are the foundation of long-term monetary expansion.

For example, Chinese investment has accelerated Africa’s clean energy transition and online and transport infrastructure. Interestingly, because China’s design does not impose monetary policy, social systems or cultural requirements, it permits nations to preserve financial policy-making and social autonomy. In this way, it has surpassed the need for nations to chart out their development plans.

China’s expanding monetary potential has a lot of benefits for the global south. China has a great need for resources and products from developing nations because it has the largest financial and luxury market in the world since 2020.

By engaging more closely with China’s supply chains, developing nations can gain significant new markets for their products, including for meals, fresh materials, and manufactured products. Also, China’s industrial overcapacity offers opportunities for relocating its” twilight business” and low-technology-based manufacturing industry to the Global South, fostering native modernization and job creation.

China’s critics often warn of the dangers of resource exploitation and “debt trap diplomacy”. However, many people in the Global South believe that China’s approach is a viable replacement for Western aid, which has always prioritized the needs of its recipients over those of their donors.

Where there was no alternative in the Global South ten years ago, China offers a frequently welcome alternative to Western aid. ( Though Japan has long provided foreign aid without the constraints put on by Western donors ) )

These countries can lay the foundation for self-reliance, economic sovereignty and sustainable development by embracing China’s positive-sum game model over the West’s often zero-sum approach.

To be sure, the debate over development models and foreign aid is not entirely settled. However, as the Global South grapples with the legacy of Western aid and explores new partnerships, it must prioritize its economic sovereignty, national interests and independence.

The Global South may break the cycle of dependency and lead a more just and prosperous future by utilizing regional collaboration, asserting control over natural resources, and engaging with alternative partners like China.

Bhim Bhurtel is on X at @BhimBhurtel

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Trump’s vision of a new US-China-Russia world order – Asia Times

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There has been a lot of discussion about the ramifications of a potential agreement between US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and the increasingly damaging effects it will have on Ukraine and Europe.

There is much more at play than just the potential borders of Ukraine and US relations if Trump and Putin reach a deal.

As we are nearing the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war, Ukraine’s prospect is more in question than it has ever been since February 2022. For once, comparisons to Munich in 1938 are unfortunately correct.

This is not due to a false idea that Putin may be appeased, but rather because wonderful powers once more decide the fate of weaker states without their presence.

Ukraine is now under stress from Russia on the ground and the US, both socially and economically, in the same way that Czechoslovakia was subjected to in 1938 by Germany and its alleged allies France and Britain.

Trump and his team are working fervently to get Ukraine to concede geographical rights to Russia and declare that about 20 % of the Ukrainian territories that Russia has occupied are lost. Trump also demands that Ukraine give back half of its metal and rare earth resources in exchange for its previous military support.

If allied NATO forces were deployed to Ukraine as part of a peace or peace agreement, the United States ‘ refusal to deliver substantial security guarantees sounds like the Munich comparison. No only did France and Britain at the time pressure Czechoslovakia to renounce Sudetenland, which had an ethnic German majority, to Nazi Germany.

When Poland and Hungary seized large portions of the nation, they likewise did nothing. And they failed to act when Hitler, just six months after the Munich deal, created a Czech marionette state and occupied the last of the Czech Republic.

Every evidence suggests that Putin is doubtful to step down from his position in or toward Ukraine. And it is important to keep in mind that the second world war began 11 months after Neville Chamberlain believed he had secured “peace in our day.”

The Munich comparison does not carry that much, however. Trump isn’t trying to appease Putin because he believes he has weaker tickets than Putin, as Chamberlain and Daladier did in 1938.

A more simplistic view of the world, where tremendous power carved out spheres of influence without interfering, seems to drive Trump.

ISW map showing the state of the conflict in Ukraine, February 20 2025.
The state of the fight in Ukraine, February 20, 2025. Institute for Research on War

The issue with Ukraine and Europe in a world order is that no one in Trump’s team views Ukraine as a member of an American impact area, and that Europe is at best a foreground.

Trump-eye glass on the planet

Trump’s concern isn’t really about Ukraine or Europe, but rather about re-ordering the global program in a way that fits his 19th-century perspective of the world in which the US life in splendid isolation and is almost unquestioned in the Northern hemisphere.

In this view, Ukraine is the image of what was wrong with the ancient purchase. Trump believes that the US has engaged itself in too many different international activities where none of its essential interests were at play, echoing Henry Cabot’s protectionism.

Echoing Putin’s talking items, the war against Ukraine little more is an unfair anger but was, as Trump has then declared, Kyiv’s problem. The most important test the democratic global order has to move has been Ukraine.

The conflict with Ukraine is undoubtedly a sign of the decline of the progressive global order, but it is hardly its single cause. It has become the tool that Trump and Putin use to offer it a devastating blast. But while the US and Russia, in their present political combinations, may have found it easy to destroy the existing order, they may find it substantially harder to create a new one.

Even though Ukraine and other important Western nations may appear trivial at this point, the EU and NATO have robust institutional foundations and deep pockets even without the US.

Despite the justified criticism of Europe’s largely ambitious responses thus far, the continent is built on much stronger politically and economically than Russia, and the vast majority of its citizens have no desire to live in the conditions that Putin’s want-to-be empire has.

Without China, neither Trump nor Putin will be able to rule the world. Trump does use a package to scuttle a wedge between them and drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but this is unlikely to work given China’s growing ties to China and Russia’s growing conflict with the US.

All Trump would accomplish is a more US-to-West continent resurgence if he reached a deal with Xi as well, for instance regarding Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, allow alone over Taiwan. This may leave Putin and Xi to do their own, existing package of a no-limits relationship unimpeded by an American-led counterpoint.

From the standpoint of what remains of the progressive global order and its adherents, a Putin-Xi deal, also, has an strange parallel in past – the short-lived Hitler-Stalin alliance of 1939. Only this time, there is little to recommend that the Putin-Xi ally will break down as quickly.

Stefan Wolff is professor of global surveillance, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this essay under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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