DeepSeek’s revelation was only a matter of time – Asia Times

Foreign start-up DeepSeek’s amazing AI software outcomes have shaken public areas, driving down the stocks of leading US tech companies, including Nvidia.

Some then wonder how a smaller team in China had, in such a short time, challenge the cutting-edge Artificial products of American companies with large resources, exceptional talent and organized market positions.

Little executive team that aren’t as well-known have made notable advancements in the past. Such activities are unstable, but we should not be surprised when they occur, as I noted in a new post. &nbsp,

This has been accurate in many areas. One excellent example of Alan Turing’s pioneer work in computer technology innovation in Britain in the 1940s is. So, China’s DeepSeek has become a prestigious and rare group of small, pioneering teams.

Because high-power processing power is widely available for commercial use and well-trained engineers are then employed worldwide, computer science is perfect for these advancements. Universities all over the world now offer top-notch architectural education. Nevertheless, open-source software has enabled broad access to complex programming.

Leading tech companies from the US, including business leaders like Google, are now able to use well-trained local engineers to create significant portions of their application in locations all over the world.

This results in private talent pools where innovative new businesses can emerge to compete globally. New technology companies are likely to be established when highly skilled engineers are available, sponsored by governments and private money.

Innovations may therefore come from unanticipated locations, because excellent people, with the right resources, can accomplish extraordinary things. And there are now numerous places in the world where advanced software development is possible.

The long-term impact of DeepSeek on the market for AI is also up for debate. However, it is safe to assume that as options become more affordable, the cost of education helpful AI systems will increase.

This has historically shaped commercial technology, resulting in the same winners and losers as usual. However, DeepSeek’s victory serves as a powerful endorsement of government policy regarding regulating technology transfer.

Government efforts to regulate AI markets will be impacted by the widespread growth of computer research skills, which will limit the types of goods available. There will be endless methods of avoiding restrictions as companies around the world become successful competitors as a result of innovative international competition. &nbsp,

No trustworthy barriers can long-term protect products in the field of computer science. Nvidia and Intel have demonstrated with oppose business value that the equipment and technical expertise know no long-term restrictions.

When it was a difficult decision, Nvidia took the initiative to insert the emerging Artificial market. Intel did no. Nvidia is a home business in the US, as it may be. Over time, fresh companies will come from different geographies. For success, incumbent must be more agile.

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Japan should start giving security aid to Pakistan – Asia Times

The Philippines will once again get Japan’s Official Security Assistance, marking the fourth consecutive year of for help. Under the government-to-government initiative, Tokyo pledged speedboats to Indonesia and southern radar systems to the Philippines in 2024. &nbsp,

But as Tokyo’s Indo-Pacific ambitions grow, a vital question emerges: You Control grow beyond Southeast Asia’s maritime states without getting caught too seriously in the crossfire of US-China rivalry?

Pakistan, a Taiwanese ally, is arguably the best place for China to rename OSA as a rational local security initiative, not as a tool to encircle Beijing.

Introduced in then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s National Security Strategy 2022, OSA marks Japan’s change from post-war peace to forging proper safety alliances.

In contrast to its official development assistance ( ODA ), which is focused on socioeconomic development, OSA provides assistance to armed forces and related “like-minded” states to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.

With a modest estimated budget of 8 billion renminbi &nbsp, ( US$ 55 million ) in 2025, OSA cannot significantly issue or counter China’s military may but does improve Japan’s strategic relationships. Instead, it encourages Tokyo to increase its security support without provoking Beijing, establishes apparent military intentions, and lay the foundation for upcoming defense sales.

Divided response to Japan’s OSA in ASEAN reveals its boundaries. While some countries—such as the Philippines, then hotly engaged in maritime issues with Beijing—have hailed OSA as a deterrent, people, like Vietnam, remain meticulous, opting to wall rather than hazard antagonizing China.

Beijing has seized on this break, framing Japan’s OSA as a US-aligned” containment” system. According to Chinese experts, Japan uses South Asian proxies with implicit US support to consciously spark conflict.

For Japan, this description is untenable. If its OSA is seen only as a team for America’s allies, it runs the risk of alienating the nations Japan aims to cultivate, those who are afraid to be drawn into the US and China tremendous power rivalry.

Given these difficulties in Southeast Asia, Japan might want to diversify its alliances. At first glance, India appears to be a natural place to grow into the Indian Ocean and beyond.

But India’s Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, participation and Tibetan boundary disputes with China make it a bad fit. Granting OSA to India would authenticate Beijing’s “anti-China empire” tale and potentially hinder fence-sitters from accepting its OSA. Pakistan, by comparison, offers tactical price without political baggage.

Officially, Japan has already extended OSA beyond Southeast Asia. Mongolia, a coastal state, has received Japan’s air-defense simulations to minimize reliance on Russia and China.

Djibouti, house to Japan’s hapless international maritime base, has received anti-piracy equipment to protect Gulf of Aden shipping. Bangladesh, a Bay of Bengal statement, secured southern radars to track Chinese ships.

However, these grants are probably just examples of exceptions rather than proof of a wider strategy. Mongolia’s OSA is metaphorical, Djibouti’s protects Chinese goods, Bangladesh’s cameras South Asian support. No one changes OSA’s meaning or broadens its scope.

Pakistan, nevertheless, offers a strategic option to bridge areas and adjust perceptions. By turning the support from a quad-adjacent device into a neutral system for local security, OSA to Islamabad could possibly dampen China’s adversarial rhetoric.

Despite its “ironclad” relations with Beijing, Islamabad seeks corporate expansion amid intensifying US-China conflict. By engaging Pakistan in non-lethal OSA projects, Japan could job OSA as a local security initiative rather than an explicit adversary of Beijing. Beijing’s ability to present OSA as a primary concern becomes less clear when a significant Chinese partner discovers value in it.

Japan intends to increase the resources for the OSA program gradually and include “new companions, and eventually work with eight or nine countries next governmental time.” Pakistan is the ideal partner for addressing pressing security and humanitarian needs because it perfectly aligns with OSA’s three main pillars.

First, Pakistan qualifies for OSA assistance in securing the Arabian Sea and other crucial maritime routes in terms of security under the rule of law.

Second, it is well suited for humanitarian assistance due to its vulnerability to natural disasters, including for areas where Japan has historically provided aid, including for disaster response and medical care.

Third, Pakistan’s extensive participation in UN peacekeeping missions aligns with OSA’s international peace cooperation pillar, offering opportunities for capacity-building in peacekeeping and related logistics.

Japan’s OSA outreach to Mongolia—likely aimed at reducing Ulaanbaatar’s reliance on Russia and China —set a precedent. Like Mongolia, Pakistan is strategically overdependent: 82 % of its arms imports between 2019 and 2023 came from China.

Yet Japan already has a foothold, with Pakistan benefiting from its Official Development Assistance ( ODA ) totaling 364 billion yen ($ 2.4 billion ) up to 2021. In keeping with Japan’s desire to boost its defense exports, dual-use OSA projects could build on this foundation without alarming Beijing, which is a promising prospect.

While OSA’s limited scale precludes transformative strategic gains, its institutional benefits – enhanced technical cooperation, trust-building with Japan and diversification of strategic partnerships – offer a pragmatic, counterbalancing opportunity for Pakistan. &nbsp,

It could also potentially offset India’s edge from Japan’s Quad cooperation. After the US pulled out of Afghanistan in 2021, military cooperation with an Asian power known for its soft power might also help restore Pakistan’s strategic significance.

China’s sensitivity to such an arrangement is inevitable but arguably manageable. Pakistan can mitigate risks to its China relations by framing OSA as a supplementary, transparency-driven initiative focused on technical and humanitarian areas such as disaster relief, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy capacity building.

Prioritizing projects funded by Japan that have a dual civilian-military use would allow for incremental gains while balancing Beijing-related relations. Pakistan has a low-cost option to deepen trust with Tokyo and demonstrate its role as a stabilizing actor in the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture as a result of Japan’s larger military budget growth, which indicates a continued commitment to OSA.

For Japan, Pakistan is more than just a potential security partner—it’s a litmus test. By succeeding in this case, OSA would demonstrate that it can transcend great-power rivalry and provide developing nations with a third option for satisfying security needs without taking sides. &nbsp,

For Islamabad, it’s a chance to redefine its role in Asia’s emerging order: not as a theater for US-China competition but rather as a sovereign actor bridging divides. In an era of increasingly polarized alliances, that’s a vision worth investing in.

Najam Ul Hassan Naqvi is a researcher at the Consortium for Asia-Pacific Studies.
National Defense University, Islamabad.

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Musk’s hostile takeover about efficiency or empire? – Asia Times

Elon Musk’s position as the head of the Department of Government Performance, also known as DOGE, appears to be a significant step in an effort to reduce the bureaucracy’s errors. However, a disturbing situation permeates the language of cost-cutting and governmental streamlining.

The White House office, which was formerly known as the US Digital Service and later renamed the US DOGE Service on the first day of President Donald Trump’s subsequent expression, has been given the name” unique government individual.” The Musk team claims to improve efficiency and reduce reliability, but their ultimate objectives are both.

That may sound like a striking proceed toward Silicon Valley-style development in leadership. Nevertheless, the deeper desires driving Musk’s engagement are unlikely to be strictly moral.

Musk has an enormous business empire, passions in artificial intelligence, need for financial strength and a long-standing hatred for state oversight.

His access to sensitive state systems and the thick decision-making that has guided Expand to day have enabled Musk to obtain extraordinary economic and strategic advantages for both himself and his businesses, which include Tesla, the leader of space transportation, and SpaceX.

One specific historic parallel is intriguing. The British East India Company, a shopkeeper shipping firm, established itself as a trading body in the Indian Ocean in 1600 with exclusive rights to do business in the region before gradually gaining quasi-governmental authority and establishing its rule with an iron fist over American territories in Asia, including the majority of what is now India. The business was granted the right to issue money on behalf of the British queen in 1677.

In my forthcoming guide,” Who Elected Big Tech” I‘ll explain how. Similar instances of private companies retaking over state functions are occurring in the US.

However, what took ages during the colonial period is now unfolding at a lightening speed in just a few days thanks to digital means. Real trading posts and personal armies have been replaced by digital financial systems and data access in the twenty-first century. Communications are the key to energy then, rather than brute power.

A man in a uniform and a badge holds out his arms, palms outstretched.
A security official prevents U. S. Sen. Ed Markey, straight, from entering the US Environmental Protection Agency office on February 6, 2025, in an effort to join with DOGE team. Image: Al Drago / Getty Images via The Talk

The information network

When examining his business empire, it becomes clearer to see Musk’s actions as a strength get. He is in charge of several businesses that are subject to government regulations and have national deals.

In industries where government oversight may make or break wealth, SpaceX and Tesla, as well as The Boring Company, The Boring Company, Neuralink, and the artificial intelligence business xAI, all operate in industries.

Musk is direct and possibly demolish the government organizations that have typically hampered his organizations in his new position. Tesla’s Autopilot program has been subject to numerous investigations by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Musk has received punishment from the Securities and Exchange Commission for his market-moving tweets, and SpaceX has been hampered by environmental laws.

All of these monitoring mechanisms could be weakened or eliminated through DOGE, disguised as effectiveness, or both.

But Musk’s unparalleled access to government statistics makes up the most disastrous aspect of his position as CEO of DOGE. Expand employees reportedly have electronic authorization to view data in the US government’s transaction system, which includes bank account information, Social Security numbers and income tax documents. Apparently, they have even seized the ability to change the system’s application, data, transactions and records.

Many media reports suggest that Musk’s staff has already changed the rules governing the processing of payments for Social Security recipients and government contractors to make it simpler to halt payments and keep records of payments that have been blocked, made, or altered.

However, Expand people merely require the ability to create copies of the country’s most sensitive personal information.

A federal prosecutor has forewarned that from happening, at least for the time being. Even so, by transferring the data to Grok, Musk’s xAI-created artificial intelligence program, which is already connected to the Musk-owned X, previously known as Twitter, it would have an unmatched ability to predict economic changes, identify state vulnerabilities, and model vote behavior.

That’s a lot of information and strength for one person, which is disturbing.

A man in a business suit stands at a lectern and gestures.
Donald Trump addresses a significant crypto market conference in July 2024. Photo: AP / Mark Humphrey

Cryptocurrency revolution?

Like Trump himself and many of his closest experts, Musk is likewise deeply involved in bitcoin.

The horizontal development of Trump’s personal crypto and DOGE’s visible alignment with the bitcoin known as Dogecoin suggests more than just coincidence. I think it demonstrates a concerted plan to control American money and economic policy, essentially putting the country in entirely private hands.

The genius – and danger – of this technique lies in the fact that each action might seem justified in isolation: modernizing authorities systems, improving effectiveness, updating payment infrastructure. However, they also act as the framework for the transfer of even more financial power to the already rich.

How he might possess his new powers are reflected in Musk’s autocratic tendencies, which are visible in his violent management of X and his claim that it was against the law to publish the names of those who work for him.

Companies that favor Musk may face unanticipated audits, and governmental bodies that are looking into his businesses may find their budgets cut, and allies may have privileged access to government contracts.

This isn’t debate – it’s the natural expansion of DOGE’s expert combined with Musk’s demonstrated behavior.

Critics describe Musk’s activities at DOGE as a large commercial coup. People just refer to it as a revolution. The opposition movement is gaining momentum in Washington, DC, and around the state, but it’s unlikely that street protests only can prevent what Musk is doing.

Who can successfully look into a team that attempts to eliminate monitoring itself? Prior to the Musk operation’s start, the administration’s improper fire of at least ten inspector general hints at a deliberate attempt to obstruct accountability in the government.

The Republican-led Congress, strongly aligned with Trump, may not want to move in, but even if it did, Musk is moving much faster than Congress actually does.

Destroy the state, create a business nation?

Together, Musk and Trump’s actions form what cryptocurrency investor and entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan refers to as” the network state.”

A digital country does emerge online before establishing any physical appearance. Instead of declaring democracy and fighting for it, the channel state builds community and electronic systems like a technology startup company with its own bitcoin.

Alternatives would be impossible to come by by the time a Musk-aligned cryptocurrency became standard because of the main structure and relationships currently exist.

Converting more of the nation’s economic system to privately held cryptocurrencies do remove federal governments from their own citizens. Musk has now begun this endeavor, making use of his wealth and social media reach to run for office in Germany, as well as several other European nations.

A country that is run by those who could afford to purchase the electronic currency do no longer be run by the people who live in its place. In this situation, I’m concerned that Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, or Palantir, the AI-surveillance conglomerate, will make Congress’s control of government spending and actions useless. Along the way, it may end up removing the ability to keep presidents responsible from the judiciary, Congress, and citizens.

All of this certainly presents a slew of conflict-of-interest issues that are completely unheard of in terms of range and scope.

The question facing Americans, thus, isn’t whether federal needs development – it’s whether they’re willing to sacrifice politics in pursuit of Musk’s edition of effectiveness.

We’re necessarily altering the partnership between personal power and public governance when we give tech leaders immediate control over government functions. I believe we’re undermining American national security, as well as the strength of We, the Citizens.

The most hazardous inadequacy of all may be the Americans ‘ inaction in handling this crisis.

Allison Stanger is Middlebury’s Distinguished Endowed Professor.

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Read the original post.

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Google quietly drops promise not to use AI for weapons – Asia Times

Last week, Google quietly abandoned a long-standing commitment to not use artificial intelligence ( AI ) technology in weapons or surveillance. The software giant removed claims that promised not to do in an upgrade to its AI concepts, which were first published in 2018.

  • systems that damage the general public or are likely to cause harm to them.
  • arms or other solutions whose primary function or application is to directly or indirectly inflict harm on people
  • systems that gather or use details for monitoring are in violation of international standards.
  • solutions that conflict with internationally recognized human rights and international law principles.

The release came after former US President Joe Biden’s executive order was removed to promote the safe, secure, and reliable advancement and use of AI.

The decision by Google is in line with a new trend of big tech entering the regional security space and accommodating more AI-based government programs. Why is this occurring then, then? And what will the impact of increased AI use in the army be?

Militarized AI

In September, older representatives from the Trump government met with leaders of leading AI businesses, such as OpenAI, to examine AI development. The authorities finally established a task force to organize data center development while considering environmental, economic, and security objectives.

The Trump government released a note the following fortnight that, in part, addressed “harnessing AI to fulfill national safety objectives.”

Big tech companies heard the message right away.

Tech giant Meta made the announcement in November 2024 that it would offer government organizations and private organizations involved in security and national security access to its” Llama” AI models.

This was despite Meta’s own policy which prohibits the use of Llama for” ]m ] ilitary, warfare, nuclear industries or applications”.

Anthropic, an AI firm, also announced at the same time that it would collaborate with Palantir, a data analytics firm, and Amazon Web Services to give US knowledge and protection agencies access to its AI models.

The US Department of Defense received a statement from OpenAI the following month that it had partnered with security startup Anduril Industries to create AI.

The firms claim they will blend OpenAI’s GPT-4o and o1 designs with Anduril’s systems and technology to enhance the US government’s defenses against helicopter attacks.

Defending countrywide surveillance

The three businesses argued that the adjustments to their plans were necessary because of US national security concerns.

Get Google. The business cited world Artificial competition, complex political landscapes, and national security interests as factors in a blog post that was published earlier this month as justifications for changing its AI concepts.

China’s access to particular types of high-end system cards used for AI research was restricted by the US’s trade controls in October 2022. In response, China issued their own trade control measures on high-tech aluminum, which are essential for the AI device market.

Due to the recent release of very effective AI versions by Chinese tech corporation DeepSeek, the tensions from this business war grew. Prior to the US’s export controls, DeepSeek reportedly used 10, 000 Nvidia A100 chips to create their AI designs.

How the military of corporate AI would advance US national interests has not been made clear. However, there are abundant signs that tensions with China, the US’s biggest political rival, are influencing the decisions being made.

It is already well known that animal life has been impacted by AI’s use in military settings.

For instance, in the battle in Gaza, the Israeli government has been relying heavily on advanced AI resources. These devices call for a lot of information and more storage and processing companies, which are being provided by Microsoft and Google. These AI instruments are frequently false when identifying possible targets.

Officials in Gaza claim that these errors have increased the death toll in the conflict, which is now more than 61 000, as a result of Jewish military ‘ claims.

Google’s elimination of the “harm” provision in their AI guidelines is in violation of international human rights legislation. This identifies” surveillance of people” as a crucial measure.

Why would a business software company need to outlaw a provision relating to injury is concerning.

Facebook right challenges

Google does state that its products may also adhere to “widely accepted principles of international law and human rights” in its updated rules.

Human Rights Watch has objected to the inclusion of more explicit information about arms growth in the original principles despite this.

Additionally, the group points out that Google hasn’t fully explained how its products ‘ animal rights may be met.

Joe Biden’s revoked professional attempt on AI even addressed this issue.

Biden’s program wasn’t ideal, but it was a move towards establishing guardrails for accountable development and use of AI systems.

As big technology becomes more and more entangled with military organizations, and the risk that comes with AI-enabled war and the violation of human rights rises, like scaffolding are now more important than ever.

Zena Assaad is older teacher, School of Engineering, Australian National University

This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.

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Leftists’ excesses are turning more South Koreans conservative – Asia Times

South Korea is mired in political unrest as US President Donald Trump continues to implement his” America First” plan. The senate of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is causing perilous social unrest and stifling the regional balance of power.

This issue resembles the shocking impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2016 in an alarming way. In both instances, the ruling, traditionalist People’s Party acted unfairly toward its own leader, which led to the passage of the senate resolution in the National Assembly.

Legacy internet fabricated and manipulated news to deceive the public, which had a significant impact on shaping public view. The Constitutional Court, which has been widely criticized as a “kangaroo jury,” violated due process by holding two trial sessions per week for President Yoon and four per week for President Park.

Also, doubts have arisen that Foreign citizens, disguised as Koreans, participated in pro-impeachment gatherings. These worries were made even more acute when the Chinese consulate officially forbade its citizens from participating in Korean political demonstrations.

A change in social interactions

Despite connections, important variations exist between the 2016 and current anti-impeachment activities. In 2016, the anti-impeachment demonstrations were disorganized and fundamental. Activists, mostly in their 50s and 60s, wore hiking equipment and waved Korean and US flags to communicate their pro-democracy position.

At the time, pro-impeachment liberals, mostly in their 30s and 40s, ridiculed them as obsolete and capable of good judgment. At the age of 45, Rhyu Si-min, a dramatic communist and former minister of health and happiness, reportedly observed that Koreans ‘ mental powers begin to decline after 60.

Today, however, the political environment has shifted. A considerable majority of Koreans aged 18–30 and 60–70 muscular traditional, leaving liberals in their 40s and 50s extremely isolated. Unfortunately, past Minister Rhyu, then 65, just contradicted his earlier claim by dismissing young liberal men in their 20s and 30s as “garbage”.

Asian girls, usually left-leaning, have furthermore gravitated toward conservative. The traditional parents ‘ online group” Right Terrace” has grown to 8, 500 people. The organization has since expanded its efforts to support different liberal causes, starting with providing heated trucks for march participants during wintertime protests.

The enlightenment of South Korea’s liberal movement

What has changed? Meetings with conservatives disclose a number of important reasons why they engage in engagement:

  1. Media disdain – They were aware of the biases that the legacy media had when they were impeached in 2016 but not imagined they would actually create the news.
  2. New advertising platforms – In 2016, YouTube was never a major media source, and the majority of people relied on traditional advertising. Today, other media play a crucial role.
  3. Financial decline under Moon Jae-in – The prior administration’s policies greatly impacted the economy, leading some to reevaluate their social stance.
  4. A reluctance to change – They refuse to been deceived once after one prosecution based on false information. Some believe that if this prosecution succeeds, South Korea’s politics will be at risk.

In this way, South Koreans are taking real rights of their politics. South Korea has a liberal democracy-style exterior composition but lacks its heart since its independence in 1948.

Then, the people are actively shaping their country in line with their personal background, traditions, and values. They are battling for their liberty, which is a necessary battle because it cannot be just granted or required. South Koreans are living examples of how a thriving politics may be owned by its citizens.

International consequences

On the global front, today’s problems varies from that of 2016. The US also believed that China could be incorporated into the current world order for peaceful coexistence at the time. Yet, the US has since abandoned its proposal plan, then viewing China as a strong competitor.

What are the worldwide consequences? It was destroy the area and cause a “doomsday effect” if isolationism is practiced by America Firsters today in the same manner as their post-World War I predecessors.

The US created the Washington Treaty System in 1921 to halt Chinese development and stop China from entangling. The US omitted it, though, in 1931 when Japan seizes Manchuria because it feared intervening was against its wishes. Essentially, this passive attitude gave Japan free grip in Asia.

Currently, as the US prioritizes its own passions, China has rapidly expanded its control over South Korea – slowly, quietly and secretly.

Two significant occurrences best illustrate this pattern:

  1. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences ‘ ( 2002-2007 ) project aimed to rewrite history by claiming that the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryeo was a part of China.
  2. The establishment of Confucius Institutes ( 2004–present ) – South Korea was the first country to host a Confucius Institute, a Chinese government-backed institution used to exert soft power and ideological influence.

With US assistance, South Korea has become a regional superpower. However, it remains resilient. If the US fails to stand solidly behind South Korea’s politics, China will eventually fill the vacuum.

Given China’s regional proximity, financial power and military fall and the growing Chinese people in South Korea, the danger is evident and immediate.

The struggle for politics in East Asia

In 1950, the US formulated National Security Council Document 68 ( NSC-68 ), marking a radical shift in policy. It stated that the global conflict was “momentous, involving the realization or loss of both this Republic and of civilization itself” and established a goal of” to fight local Soviet moves with local actions.”

Now, South Korea stands as the front defence against tyranny.

In a 2017 post for Asia Times, I claimed that the highest rates of crime were a result of a larger subterfuge plot by authoritarian forces.

The current issue suggests that story may become repeating itself, but South Koreans are more knowledgeable, more engaged, and more determined to stand up for what is happening. The battle for the future of democracy in East Asia may be recognized by the global community as a whole.

The risk of allowing authoritarian pushes to advance more is that the free world’s actions could threaten the stability of the entire region. The time has come to show a strong commitment to the politics of South Korea.

Hanjin Lew&nbsp is a former South Korean liberal party foreign official and a social commentator with an emphasis on East Asian matters.

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The rocky road to a Ukraine deal – Asia Times

The Trump administration will likely have to come up with an original plan to put an end to the battle, and it is unlikely to be able to reach a complete agreement with Ukraine right away. There are some challenges to overcome, in part because the Russians have zero faith in anything coming from the West, in part because the Ukrainians are unreliable partners, and in part because Europe wants to keep the combat going.

In an interview with the New York Post, President Trump acknowledges having at least one phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and doesn’t act out having more. The Kremlin has not independently confirmed or refuted reports that names have occurred, but Russia officially claims that it has not received any ideas from the US area.

However, the US is sending Vice President J. D. Vance and retired Public Keith Kellogg to the Munich Security Conference. Zelensky will even attend the meeting, Kellogg says that he is preparing “options” for President Trump but didn’t disclose them at the Munich event.

What can be accomplished in Munich is unclear. In reality, US high level participation at the Munich event was really stifle any agreement with Russia because America’s Western colleagues are urging more war, no less. ( Of course, the Europeans expect America to keep footing the bill for the conflict. )

Russia sees Zelensky and the Europeans as having little or no reason to deal. Putin, however, plainly favors negotiating with the United States. Obviously, if a deal can be found, Putin believes that the only feasible agreement will be between Russia and the US.

The Russians have thrown in more resources to fight in Kursk, but as it appears right now, after some initial increases, the Russian insulting is being rolled up. In other areas, Ukraine is attempting to use more troops to occupy positions in Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk, two important cities. It is too soon to know if the Russian progress, slower and plodding as it is, may be halted. However, Ukraine is working hard to recover from its numerous field loses and is now using its F-16s for the first time to help front-line activities.

The acting chancellor of the Kursk area, Alexei Smirnov, posted a picture of the city of Sudzha in an image on his Telegram network.

All in all, Ukraine is trying to buy time and stop a significant Russian advance that may cause a complete collapse in Ukraine’s threats. Zelensky’s issue is threefold:

  • He is losing men at a higher level, including supposedly thousands of traitors.
  • He can no longer depend on US-wide weapons deliveries, whose have will unavoidably more deteriorate Ukraine’s ability to fight.

I don’t believe the Trump presidency will deliver any great things to Zelensky. In fact, there are more than stories that the management wants to replace Zelensky with a more flexible management, possibly by the fall. Obviously, Zelensky does not consent and says that elections&nbsp, would wreck the military.

While General Kellogg will consider options for President Trump’s consideration, many of the potential elements of a deal with Russia are already known ( and numerous press leaks tend to confirm what the administration is thinking ).

One option may be taken off the table immediately, unless it is apparently modified. That is the concept behind a ceasefire to end the battle. A peace would allow Ukraine to resurrect its defense and build up a new, bigger arsenal of weapons, according to the Russians. A ceasefire in area is similar in concept to what was agreed double ( 2014 and 2015 ) in the Minsk partnerships.

Normandy format talks in Minsk ( February 2015 ): Alexander Lukashenko, Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, and Petro Poroshenko take part in the talks on a settlement to the situation in Ukraine.

The level of confidence is so low now that it’s difficult to believe that the Russians will back any claims, such as stopping any additional arms sales to Ukraine.

Although it’s unclear whether acknowledging Russia’s wars in Ukraine means de facto understanding of the status quo or, rather, de law popularity that the captured lands are a legal part of Russia, the alleged US plan also includes a acknowledgement of the conquests by Russia in Ukraine.

Under the now defunct Minsk agreements, Donetsk and Luhansk would have remained part of Ukraine and subject to ( some ) Ukrainian laws and administration, but would in some unspecified manner be autonomous with protections for the Russian-speaking population of these territories. It is obvious that concept has been superseded by Russia’s settlements of these lands, which also include Zaphorize, Kherson and Crimea.

Without a long-term agreement between the external and internal events, the Ukraine war never come to an end.

It appears that the Trump administration is not opposed to reversing any upcoming Ukrainian participation in NATO. &nbsp, Keeping NATO out of Ukraine is a vital requirement made by the Russians. There is a concern, yet.

If Ukraine is to join NATO, Zelensky has argued that he will need protection offers from the US and NATO troops to protect Ukraine. One can ask, what is the difference in practice if there are NATO troops in Ukraine ( perhaps officially as peacekeepers ) and security guarantees?

In fact, this is exchanging one difficulty, NATO membership, for another, NATO military and security offers.

A cushion zone, which is still undefined, is one way out of this conundrum. The alleged peacekeeping force may either work in the buffer area or remain outside of it. Who would be in charge of creating a cushion area, and how could it be managed?

In the Minsk agreements, the&nbsp, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe&nbsp, ( OSCE ) was supposed to help keep the peace and prevent violations of the deal. It was a loss, and the OSCE is unlikely to do so once more. Today there are not many other applicants. The UN had serve some sort of monitoring function, similar to the OSCE, but the UN’s performance abroad has been far from stellar.

The Ukraine kerfuffle has many other problems, too. Russia does want its cash reserves in European and American businesses &nbsp, returned, apparently with interest. Whatever it may be fair, the arrest of Russian funds is likely to violate international law. Those assets are &nbsp, valued at around$ 300 billion, perhaps more. Ukraine has received the information gained from the seized Russian resources.

Another problem of some result is the gas and oil pipelines. Nordstream, for instance, was largely destroyed by “unknown” events. You Russia, one of the owners in Nordstream, &nbsp, require compensation?

In addition, there is the broader spectrum of sanctions, including the bank and SWIFT system, blocking transport and sales of products and other limitations that affect Russia. You Trump offer the Russians restrictions comfort, and can he get Europe to collaborate? Get note that General Kellogg is suggesting&nbsp, greatly increasing the sanctions&nbsp, then as a way to force Russia into a package.

Internally, there is a problem with Russian speakers being protected in Ukrainian cities and towns that are under Ukraine’s command. Infringes on Western political and human rights standards by enacting cultural and religious laws in Ukraine. Did a resolution to peace require that Ukraine reform them?

Given the breadth of the issues and Trump’s unwillingness to support any agreement that rewards the Russians, the EU and its main supporters ( Germany and France ), are, it is unlikely that Trump will be able to secure a comprehensive agreement.

This suggests that the Trump administration may possibly attempt to “move the knife” on a package by creating potential future alternative mechanisms in trade for ending the fighting, with the remaining issues left for future discussions.

Even though doing this requires a difficult path, the Russians will want very strong and binding assurances regarding Ukrainian weapons, particularly long-range weapons like the USHIMARS and ATACMS and the British-French Stormshadow/SCALP EG.

Other than being subjected to pressure to keep the war in Ukraine going, it is unclear what Vance and Kellogg will bring home from Munich. Trump will have to work with the Russians to see if there is a way forward while Trump will have to rely on his NATO partners to watch him closely.

Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and a special correspondent for Asia Times. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

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There’s method behind Trump madness but he’s set up China for wins – Asia Times

It has been three weeks since Donald Trump was inaugurated as America’s 47th president, but it feels like three years.

Tariffs imposed, tariffs suspended; a Gaza ceasefire negotiated and then put in danger; Greenland, Panama and Gaza all desired as potential new US territory; America’s $40 billion overseas aid budget destroyed; American withdrawal from the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organisation, and sanctions on the International Criminal Court.

It has been dizzying and disturbing in equal measure.

During Trump’s first term in the White House it was common to describe his administration as chaotic and unpredictable. We have learned that being unpredictable is a deliberate technique to put opponents off balance. The blizzard of actions and announcements is another deliberate technique, to make it hard for critics to focus on what really matters.

Yet so far it is unclear whether chaotic is going to remain the right word to describe the Trump effect. Wild, it certainly is. But what is happening so far looks like a combination of two much more coherent efforts than before.

One is the attempted destruction of many traditional elements of the federal government and of American commitments abroad; the other is the seizure of power to the presidency from Congress and other parts of the American constitutional system.

These two coherent efforts depend partly on Trump’s own instincts but substantially on the ideology of those around him, including Elon Musk as well as many other zealots who have spent the Biden years planning for this moment. It will remain wild for some time, but several patterns are emerging.

For the outside world, the clear pattern of the Trump administration is that “America First,” his campaign slogan, is going to be insufficient to describe the change under way: “America Alone” seems more appropriate.

Collaboration in forums and institutions is being dumped, unceremoniously: Although the Paris accord and World Health Organization were predictable victims, the replacement of collaboration by imperialism was not.

So far, it is an imperialism of words, though the sudden swing of policy this week on Gaza comes close to action.

The world has been left speculating whether President Trump can really be serious when he says he wants Gaza to become US territory, given his previous resistance to spending American money or risking American lives on conflicts overseas. Yet the real implication is something more immediate: Almost certainly, this wild move will act as a cover for Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu to break the ceasefire and resume his war against Hamas.

That may have been Trump’s intention, or it may just be a consequence.

Regardless of the explanation, he has thrown aside any idea of a collaborative effort with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to rebuild and govern Gaza, for those states all demand negotiations for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state to go alongside the ceasefire and reconstruction.

The fact that he has countered that demand with his own demand that the 2.1 million Palestinians who were living in Gaza be taken in by Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states means that he has no interest in serious negotiations. Soon, citing evidence that Hamas militias have moved back into Gaza, the Israeli forces are likely to invade again.

A second pattern that emerges from Gaza but also from his threats of import tariffs on Canada and Mexico is that it is wrong to call Trump a “negotiator,” as Giorgia Meloni has done. If he were a negotiator, he would genuinely want to make deals with other countries, just as he did during his first term when his administration made a new trade arrangement with America’s two giant neighbours.

Instead, what we have seen is a man who wants “wins,” not deals, and uses his threats not to achieve a sustainable outcome but rather to emphasize and display his own power.

That is why he has followed his pressure for a Gaza ceasefire so swiftly with his destabilizing claim to Gaza as potential US territory. And it is why he was willing to suspend his tariff threats against Canada and Mexico as soon as both governments offered concessions, even though the concessions they offered were trivial.

To Trump, if it can be made to look like a win, it is a win regardless of the truth.

The third pattern is related to this desire to display power. Trump and the zealots around him know that he is currently at the peak of his political power, having won November’s election and having turned the Republican Party in Congress into a largely supine group.

Soon, some things are bound to go wrong, reducing his popularity and, crucially, giving Republicans a motive to diverge from him to save their seats in the mid-term congressional elections due in November 2026.

He and the zealots in his team know they must move fast if they want to achieve anything. More crucially, they are also trying to exploit his current political power to increase the practical power of the presidency, to guard against the revival of congressional opposition.

Musk’s destruction of US AID, the development aid agency, is part of this effort: It is a small and weak target, as it mainly employs people overseas. But is a symbolic one – as, by succeeding in destroying it, he has shown that the US Constitution, under which Congress is supposed to have the final say over such agencies, can be ignored.

This is a genuine constitutional crisis, yet for the time being is one in which the part of the constitution whose powers are being violated, Congress, is doing nothing about it. That will now be tested further, as Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, a new body that has no constitutional status, will seek to impose further spending cuts and even to abolish whole federal government departments. Only private lawsuits and the courts are currently standing in their way.

This brings in the final pattern that is emerging. The Trump teams’ mission to establish “America Alone,” to impose trade tariffs on allies to achieve “wins” and to withdraw from international collaboration is creating an open goal for China.

If Beijing wants to strengthen its friendships with the Global South or even with long-time American allies, it now has a huge chance to score.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute.

First published on his Substack newsletter Bill Emmott’s Global View, this English original of an article in Italian in La Stampa is republished with permission.

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Japan’s hypersonic arsenal getting up to speed – Asia Times

In response to growing threats from China and North Korea, Japan is expanding its fast weapons arsenal, but modern gaps and reliance on the US defense sector could stymie progress.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense ( MOD ) announced this month that it had successfully conducted flight tests for its island defense hypersonic glide vehicle ( HGV ). Four check launches were conducted at a page in California, with one start in August 2024, two in November 2024 and one in January 2025.

The stand-off missiles, designed to neutralize threats first and at long range, effectively demonstrated their expected aircraft performance, according to the Japanese dialect news. Japan’s HGV study will be finished by 2025, while mass production has been afoot since 2023.

Previously, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology &amp, Logistics Agency ( ATLA ) released footage of a successful test launch of the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile ( HVGP ) in July 2024, signaling apparent significant hypersonic weaponry progress.

The” Early Deployment Version ( Block 1 )” test featured extended-range variants planned for 2030.

The 900-kilometer-range HVGP will enter the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces ( JGSDF) service in 2026, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is reportedly speeding up the weapon’s production.

In March 2020, Japan unveiled two hypersonic weapon concepts: the Hypersonic Cruise Missile ( HCM) and the HVGP. The HCM, which is powered by a scramjet website, resembles regular cruise missiles but has longer ranges and faster speeds. A solid-fuel jet motor propels the HVGP’s bomb while maintaining high velocity as it glides toward its target.

At the military level, fast weapons are necessary to Japan’s emerging counterstrike features, although using them poses professional challenges.

HGVs and HCMs demonstrate advanced missile systems. Launched from nuclear missiles, HGVs may strike speeds of up to Mach 20 and glide suddenly to escape interception. If the power permits, they may evade during the final step.

Likewise, HCMs use ramjets or scramjets for sustained speeds over Mach 6 and a boost for motion, enabling detailed strikes in rough, strong dives.

Satoru Mori and Shinichi Kitaoaka explain the military justification for Japan’s purchase of hypersonic arms in a February 2021 RAND statement. They claim that they can attack weapon defenses, attack critical infrastructure, including air and naval bases, logistics centers, and control centers.

But, Masashi Murano points out in a March 2024 content for the Hudson Institute that Japan lacks sufficient flying ships and escort jammers for serious hit functions.

Murano notes that Japan has substantial gaps in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting ( ISR-T) capabilities for hitting mobile, time-sensitive targets and still struggles to build warheads for hardened targets.

Japan needs to address its significant dependence on the US and the security industry constraints, even though it is speeding up its fast weapons system to protect against a possible conflict in its disputed islands with China and Russia and to hinder local missile threats.

In a possible conquest of its distant islands, especially in the Senkaku Islands contested with China, Japan may use fast weapons to breach opponent defenses, according to Katsuhisa Furukawa’s report for Open Nuclear Network in April 2021.

Furukawa advises using multiple platforms and trajectories to launch them at various speeds to maximize the advantages of hypersonic weapons. He claims that maneuvering could narrow those weapons ‘ ranges, necessitating air-launch platforms like the F-35, even though they could theoretically strike missile storage and launch facilities in China and North Korea.

Furthermore, The Mainichi reported in December 2024 that Japan would earmark US$ 1.57 billion to speed up hypersonic weapons development.

That figure is in addition to the$ 130 million that will be used to mass-produce long-range missiles starting in FY 2025, which will cost$ 130 million. Japan will allocate$ 110 million to mass-produce an improved version of its Type 12 extended-range shore-based anti-ship missile and$ 19.75 million for a submarine-launched version.

However, Japan’s defense industry faces significant challenges in achieving these goals. In an article for Asia Military Review this month, Gordon Arthur mentions that Japan is still dependent on imported US weapons and that its defense sector is uncompetitive due to the JSDF’s small order sizes and self-imposed export restrictions.

He mentions Japan’s efforts to address these shortcomings by providing direct financial support to its defense manufacturers.

However, Grant Newsham says Japan’s long-term overreliance on the US has hobbled its ability to defend itself. He concludes that there is no substitute for the US defense” services” in Asia and that Japan cannot defend itself against China alone, let alone adding in North Korea and Russia.

As for the strategic impact of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, Fabian Hoffman mentions in a May 2024 article for the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that long-range conventional strike ( LRS ) weapons, such as cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, have four primary strategic functions: counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership and counterforce.

He mentions that LRS weapons can weaken an adversary’s will or capacity to resist by targeting enemy populations, critical infrastructure, leadership and military assets.

In a complex security environment, Japan’s National Security Strategy 2022 and National Defense Strategy 2022 provide the country’s justification for acquiring conventional counterstrike capabilities.

In response to rising missile threats and geopolitical conflict, the National Security Strategy emphasizes the need for proactive measures to safeguard Japan’s sovereignty and regional stability.

In the meantime, the National Defense Strategy emphasizes counterstrike capabilities as crucial for preventing and halting missile attacks. In order to bolster deterrence while upholding Japan’s defense-oriented policy, it emphasizes that these capabilities will be used as a last resort under constitutional and self-defense principles.

Japan’s efforts to develop counterstrike capabilities may also contribute to a regional arms race.

In a November 2023 article in the peer-reviewed Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Michiru Nishida mentions that China has expressed serious concerns about Japan’s development of intermediate-range missiles, particularly in light of their dual-use nature, which could allow them to carry conventional or nuclear warheads, with some voices advocating for Japan to obtain the latter. &nbsp,

From the perspective of China, Nishida believes it is crucial to prevent a regional arms race and lower the chance of miscalculation by making sure these missiles are not equipped with nuclear warheads. However, he says China remains skeptical of Japan’s military intentions, perceiving these missile developments as a potential threat to its security and regional influence.

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Why Trump and Ishiba aren’t ‘bromance’ material – Asia Times

TOKYO — Call it the financial bigotry of low objectives.

The first meeting between Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Donald Trump on Friday ( February 7 ) is a smashing success, according to Japanese and international media outlets.

Given how few, if any, objectives did Ishiba return to Tokyo with, or any indications that some might be forthcoming, it makes for unusual headlines. Of course, in the madly turbulent Trump 2.0 era, Trump’s decision to not attack a world leader on social advertising is its own little success.

However, the US president reminded Tokyo’s social elite that Japan’s business is in Trump’s path two weeks after Ishiba visited the Oval Office.

Trump’s statement that 25 % taxes are on the way for all steel and aluminum imports&nbsp, served up sounds of Japan’s knowledge during Trump 1.0 from 2017 to 2021. That was when Shinzo Abe, the then-Prime Minister, allegedly developed a strong friendship with the infamously contextual Trump.

Even now, the later Abe is frequently remembered as the” Trump whisperer”, the only president of a big politics who seemed able to tame Trump’s worst feelings. Yet this is merely half accurate, at best.

There’s no question Abe understood Trump’s needed for flattery. In November 2016, after Trump 1.0’s election win, Abe was the first earth president to jump to Trump Tower in New York for an audience. Abe also offered his support for the” America First” president in most ebullient words.

” I am convinced Mr Trump is a leader in whom I may have great trust” and” a relationship of trust”, Abe told reporters that morning.

Abe’s intuition didn’t time well. Despite Abe’s pleas, Trump exited the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ), the core of Tokyo’s effort to contain China. Nor did Trump 1.0 give “friend” Abe a cancellation on steel and aluminum fees.

Complicated gifts— including Abe giving Trump a US$ 3, 800 sport team — didn’t do the trick. Nor did Abe voting Trump for a&nbsp, Nobel Peace Prize. Worse, Trump boasted about the election while humiliating Abe in Liberal Democratic Party lines. And the ruling LDP was not all that happy that Kim Jong Un’s bizarre relationship with North Korean dictator Trump came at the expense of Japan’s national protection.

None of this kowtowing bought Japan little, if any, kindness from Trump. In truth, it took Ishiba completely 94 times to get an audience with Trump since November 5 — his opportunity to build an Abe-like “bromance”.

Despite the positive coverage that the Chinese and foreign media have received, Japan finds itself right in the collateral damage area. Sunday’s tax media makes that obvious enough. The fact that Trump 2.0 appears to be acting as though Ishiba’s Japan is more unnecessary than most people would like to say.

Narendra Modi’s attend to Washington this week attracted much more hype than Ishiba’s. Odd, considering Trump 1.0 had no better ally than Tokyo.

Despite its tendencies to criticize China, Trump 2.0 is most likely focused on achieving a significant Group of Two business deal with Xi Jinping, which is a part of the connect. So why is he hesitant to form a strong relationship with Ishiba.

Trump might never care because Joe Biden and Ishiba aren’t nearly as well-liked among citizens. With federal elections slated for July quick approaching, Ishiba‘s chances of keeping his work aren’t wonderful. Team Trump might not see the benefit of investing in a state that is irrational.

Either way, there’s almost no situation where Trump 2.0 goes also for Japan. On top of Trump’s levies on steel and aluminum, Japan is bracing for Trump’s comment to Taiwanese president Xi’s punitive measures following the 10 % tax Washington slapped on Beijing.

Chances are, too, that Trump’s anti-China industry experts are prodding him behind the scenes to reach Xi’s business equally hard.

On Friday, the same day he met Ishiba, Trump&nbsp, declared he would immediately announce a series of mutual taxes on any number of important buying partners. Morgan Stanley economists don’t see Trump halting with only 10 % tariffs on Chinese goods as a result.

They make the argument in a word that” we also anticipate that the US will impose more tariffs on China after this year as part of its larger business goals.” That, they note, may inspire a pattern of tit-for-tat trade restrictions.

According to Oxford Economics analysts, the” trade war is in the early stages, but the likelihood of additional tariffs is high.” In order to reflect this, Oxford Economics is currently adjusting its China development direction for 2025.

That spells major problem for Japan, as Ishiba’s main trading partner faces intensifying challenges. Retail sales are struggling at house despite the Bank of Japan’s commitment to keep up with its payment strengthening.

Since Donald Trump’s return to office, the world macro environment has become more dangerous, according to Masahiko Loo, a strategist at State Street Global Advisors. The possible combination of policies put forth by the new leadership is deemed to gain the US dollar, causing the yen to suffer even more. This makes it possible for the BOJ to consider lowering the plan price difference between the US and the US, thereby reducing the chance of a second rate increase.

The BOJ’s use activity score, adjusted for traveling, fell 0.5 % in December from November. It’s a” unexpectedly poor effect”, Angrick says. Consumption of durable and non-durable goods, meanwhile, dropped&nbsp, 1 % and 0.7 %, respectively. Across 2024, consumption fell 0.7 %.

The BOJ’s state that private consumption is increasing moderately is difficult to reconcile with the unsatisfactory run of data, according to Angrick. Real wages have been declining for nearly three years, straining the budgets of the households and having an impact on use. Consumption will increase with higher wages in 2025, but the treatment may take a while as inflation is still high.

This is even before Trump 2.0 introduces the taxes that major commerce officials like Peter Navarro have long advocated for in Asia. According to economists at UBS, the 60 % tariffs Trump has threatened to impose on Chinese goods had cut China’s around 5 % economic growth rate in half.

Economists advise staying objective about how little Ishiba really accomplished in Washington last week as this threat looms over Asia’s 2025 like a weapon of Damocles. This includes the unsatisfying “deal” he and Trump allegedly struck over US Steel.

Nippon Steel had been trying to acquire US Steel for about$ 14.9 billion. Previous President Biden vetoed the bargain, leaving Team Ishiba hoping Trump, Mr Art of the Deal, might say yes. To no avail. Instead, Trump said Nippon had “invest greatly” in US Steel without being granted a lot interest.

Some are reading it as a win-win for Trump and Ishiba. &nbsp,” Trump’s wonder choice … to support a Nippon Steel funding in US Steel represents a significant win for Ishiba”, says David Boling, analyst at Eurasia Group.

Boling notes that “while the facts remain ambiguous, this statement is a better-than-expected results for Ishiba, and it will likely increase his political sitting at home in the immediate future.”

Trump, Boling adds, had met with US Steel representatives on February 6,” which perhaps paved the way for the new approach. Ishiba has been outspoken in favor of the agreement, even urging Biden to approve it near the end of his presidency, unlike his predecessor Kishida Fumio.

As such, Boling says,” Ishiba will be in a good position to claim credit for smoothing the way for a compromise, which may also help to assuage concerns by the&nbsp, Japanese&nbsp, business community that the US was turning against FDI”.

Others are perplexed. Jeffrey Park, &nbsp, head of alpha strategies&nbsp, at Bitwise Asset Management, speaks for many when he notes:” Nippon Steel tried to buy US Steel last year but now instead found themselves investing billions into the US, which Ishiba actually spinned it as a’ successful’ meeting so then Trump sealed it with his signature kiss of a 25 % tariff”?

Ishiba is beginning a terrible year of trying to win over a US leader who is looking elsewhere. Additionally, Team Ishiba‘s decision to settle for a shadow of the deal Nippon wanted and appear to like it repeatedly causes it to be rolled over by Team Trump.

What happens, for example, when Trump demands Tokyo engage in another bilateral trade deal? Trump must be aware that the initial agreement with Abe was a failure.

The US-Japan trade agreement, which was announced on September 25, 2019, is “honored by President Donald Trump as a major breakthrough,” according to Jeffrey Schott, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who is an expert on the subject. It actually only partially restores the advantages that Trump recklessly discarded when he pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP )

This economic-bigotry-of-low-expectations problem isn’t new for Japan. To this day, many economists argue that Abe’s 2012-2020 premiership, the longest in Japanese history, was a whirlwind of disruptive reforms that ended deflation and set the nation up for a vibrant future. In reality, Japan imports a lot of its inflation because of rising global commodity prices and an undervalued yen.

So far, wage gains aren’t keeping up with inflation. According to economists, this will likely result in higher wage increases this year. In this context, according to Barclays strategist Shinichiro Kadota,” we anticipate that Japan’s annual spring wage negotiations will result in another respectable 5 % increase this year while inflation will remain above the target of 2 %,” according to Barclays.

Also, Abe – and the three prime ministers who followed – made little progress in reducing bureaucracy, internationalizing labor markets, rekindling innovation, increasing productivity or empowering women. The Nikkei 225 Stock Average reached all-time highs in 2014 thanks to the success of efforts to increase shareholder value. However, larger efforts to boost Japanese wages and increase competitivity continue to be underwhelming.

The solution is for Ishiba to resurrect reforms in order to improve Japan’s economic standing. Leaders like Trump only respect strength. Team Ishiba would be wise to develop more domestic economic muscle to restore Japan’s global relevance rather than making any moves to placate Trump or offering trade concessions that will never satisfy him.

Rather than follow the Abe playbook, Ishiba, many observers say, might be better off leaning into the “anti-Abe” persona he had long cultivated. Perhaps a little more of the same enthusiasm as that of Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is in order. Instead of agreeing to Trump’s demands for trade concessions, both leaders are pushing back.

” Ishiba will be walking on thin ice and needs to woo Trump, but he lacks the subservient qualities that served Abe well and Trump smells desperation”, says Jeff&nbsp, Kingston, head of Asian studies at Temple University’s Tokyo campus.

Accepting that Ishiba’s Oval Office visit was nothing more than a positive experience would be the first step in recognizing that Japan needs a new direction in the Trump 2.0 era. Just adds to the possibility that Tokyo will be a good choice for the upcoming trade talks.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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US tried ‘America First’ tariffs in 1930s – guess what happened next? – Asia Times

Donald Trump has hit the 30-day pause button to impose 25 % tariffs on Mexico and Canada, but he is still planning to impose 10 % tariffs on Chinese imports. Tariffs on the EU are also on his agenda.

Trump has declared that “tariff” is” the most beautiful word in the dictionary”. The president might want to get a record book and put out the dictionary as he weighs up the broad repercussions of his tariff fixation.

The US Smoot-Hawley Tax Act, which was passed in 1930, is referenced in terms of their scale and scope.

For instance, Paul Krugman, a Nobel Laureate scholar, stated to Bloomberg that” we’re actually talking about taxes on a level that we’ve never seen,” adding that” we’re talking about a reversal of actually 90 years of US plan.”

The Smoot-Hawley taxes were originally intended to support the greatly obliged US agricultural field at the end of the 1920s and shield them from foreign rivals, which are both well-known themes in the anti-free-trade speech being smuggled out by Trump supporters today.

The introduction of the Great Depression had generated common, albeit not general, demands for security from imports, and Smoot-Hawley increased now considerable tariffs on international goods. Members of Congress were keen to protect their constituents ‘ industries by trading votes in exchange for assistance.

Although, at the time, more than&nbsp, 1, 000 economics implored&nbsp, President Herbert Hoover to reject Smoot-Hawley, the act was signed into law. On 20, 000 or consequently different types of imported goods, income amounted to nearly 40 % as a result of the resulting price action.

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the US’s record of business taxes.

The culmination resulted in a dramatic decrease in US trade with other nations, especially those that retaliated, which is now widely acknowledged to have significantly worsened the Great Depression. According to one estimate, the sum of US imports plummeted by almost half.

What’s more, the consequences were felt worldwide. Around half of the 25 % decline in global business is thought to have been caused by protectionism, which in turn contributed to the development of the economic factors that led to the second world war.

The impact on Capitol Hill was significant, as well: due to the optics of the tax act’s vote-trading, Congress delegated power of business plan to the leader just four years later because the behavior was viewed as being so careless.

All of this was set against the landscape of American political protectionism in the 1930s, which is similar to many of Trump’s present attempts to veer away from or even harm multilateral institutions.

For instance, the US previously joined the United States despite receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 for his contributions to founding the League of Nations, a precursor of the United Nations.

In this time, the phrase” America First” was also frequently used to refer to a target on local legislation and high taxes.

Fast forward to the day.

Trump has stated that his levies will” produce some problems,” but that they are “worth the amount that must be paid.” Trump’s taxes may increase fees for the common US home by more than US$ 1,200 annually, according to new estimates from the non-partisan Peterson Institute for International Economics.

When actual prices start to rise, it’s still up to US voters to decide whether or not they will support Trump.

However, many Republicans on Capitol Hill have rushed to Trump’s defense. New York’s congressional representative Claudia Tenney expressed gratitude to the United States for “projecting strength for once on the world stage.”

Senator Eric Schmitt of Missouri argued that tariffs were” not a surprise,” pointing out that Trump had campaigned tirelessly for “enhancing our standing in the world.”

Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, who described the tariffs as a “bad idea,” was perhaps the Republican’s most severe rebuke.

According to public opinion data, tariffs are fraught with controversy, with partisanship influencing both general opinions of tariffs and those of specific national targets.

According to a January 2025 Harvard CAPS/Harris poll, 52 % of Americans overall approve of placing new tariffs on China, with 74 % of Republicans in favor, but just 34 % of Democrats.

Support is more modest for imposing tariffs on America’s neighbors. Only 40 % of voters think tariffs on Canada and Mexico are a good idea, including 59 % of Republicans and 24 % of Democrats.

Tariffs rank low on a list of national priorities. Only 3 % of Americans believe that Trump should prioritize tariffs on Mexico and Canada, while only 11 % view China as top priority.

a potential for a more extensive trade war

What seems clear is that Trump’s proposed tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China could be just the opening salvos in a broader tit-for-tat that may extend to Europe, and beyond.

The political challenge for Trump is to maintain what is increasingly looking like a fragile coalition at home, balancing the needs of hardline Maga supporters who oppose free trade and tech titans who believe tariffs are stumbling down crucial supply chains, especially in Asia.

After Trump’s election, former adviser and populist nationalist Steve Bannon warned that America would no longer be “abused” by “unbalanced trade deals”. ” Yes, tariffs are coming”, he said. You will have to pay to enter the US market. It is no longer free, the free market is over”.

Meanwhile, Silicon Valley has been mostly silent on the tariffs. Tech moguls have been assured that the tariffs are about leverage and will be eliminated soon enough, despite doubtlessly trying to win their favor for tariff exemptions or total tariff reductions.

Trump is showing that tariffs are a significant component of his” America First” foreign policy, a kind of belligerent unilateralism that treats allies and adversaries alike as pieces that can be moved around a chessboard.

Under Trump, the” art of the deal” means throwing America’s weight around as the world’s economic superpower, and waiting for the leaders of other nations to fold. His resolve may depend on whether American voters will bear the economic costs associated with his plans.

Trump might believe that the word “tariff” is a beautiful one at this time. However, its economic shadow might soon appear gloomy if even a hint of the 1930s is repeated.

Michael Plouffe is a lecturer in international political economy at UCL, and Thomas Gift is associate professor and director of the Center on US Politics.

This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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