Musk’s government-by-tech to show the limits of disruption – Asia Times

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Elon Musk, the world’s richest man, will take over the newly created Department of Government Efficiency alongside fellow software billionaire and former national member Vivek Ramaswamy on November 12th, according to president-elect Donald Trump’s announcement on November 12. The new office will be tasked with reining in state government, curbing federal spending, and reducing rules.

Musk has been vocal in his support of Trump’s campaign, which included probably illegal monetary “giveaways” to citizens. Although Musk is relatively new in electoral politics, technology companies and their leaders have made numerous attempts to restructure public policy and governance, ranging from housing and transportation to city planning.

By looking more closely at some of these efforts, we may be able to get a preview of what Musk’s Department of Government Performance may try to do, what government-by-tech may seem like, and what might go wrong.

Replacing public service

In 2013, Musk himself proposed a new form of public transportation called the “hyperloop” to join Los Angeles and San Francisco. And Musk’s SpaceX aims to outsource the rocket-building business to the government.

But another tech firms have had similar interests.

Uber has made a series of attempts to replace people transport. Companies like Sidewalk Labs, a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, have created” intelligent cities” that collect and analyze information about people’s behavior in order to make decisions about providing services, making attempts to replace urban infrastructure.

Perhaps an analyst suggested that public libraries may be replaced by Amazon bookstores. In fields as diverse as cover, personality identification, and education, tech firms have challenged people products.

The boundaries of disturbance

One thing some government-by-tech jobs have in common is a perception that government is inherently inefficient, and that (unregulated ) technology can offer better options.

Silicon Valley software companies have huge espoused “disruption“, the idea of overthrowing a dead standing status with technology. Unlike people agencies, the reasoning goes, companies is “move fast and break things” to discover new and more effective ways to deliver services and price.

Tech firms that adhere to this theory have undoubtedly provided service that many of us use frequently in our day-to-day lives and generated significant profits. But this does n’t mean the Silicon Valley model makes sense for public administration. In reality, the information suggests something more like the same.

A record of disappointment

Tech’s attempts to provide public companies have had mixed results.

Innisfil, Canada, switched to Uber in 2017 to replace all of its public transportation options. The result was a rise in city costs ( in Uber’s fees ), more cars traveling, and more expensive transportation for low-income residents.

After encountering concerns regarding protection and planning, Sidewalk Labs ‘ smart-city trial in Toronto was abandoned in 2021.

The software industry’s disruption has worsened existing issues, with Airbnb and other short-term rental firms playing a role in the housing crisis.

Small solutions for slim problems

Additionally, tech firms typically concentrate on a select few issues. Silicon Valley has helped us to find a car, choose a restaurant for dinner, manage quickly around a town, transfer money to our friends, and search for the best rental for our vacation.

It has provided fewer options for getting low-income cover, providing treatment for the younger, or reducing our power usage. There are significant benefits to this: technology companies want to tap wealthy buyers with disposable income to generate income.

These disparities even reflect Silicon Valley’s lack of diversity, though. Tech remains mostly white, mostly female, generally upper-middle course, typically highly educated. This affects the troubles and answers Silicon Valley finds.

The secret business will suffer from all of this. However, the government’s primary function is to look after all of its citizens, not merely owners or buyers ( or even just those who voted for it ).

The couple get a dozen services.

The issue is that Silicon Valley’s “efficiencies” and solutions may end up delivering the few at the price of the many. Some “inefficiencies” of public service arise from the truth they are designed to get as many people into accounts as possible.

Rules and protections for older people, for those with disability, for those who may not speak English as a second language, for instance, all create the need for more government and more rules.

Musk has compared the public transportation system to a “pain in the pussy” where possible serial killers must be positioned next to one another. Of course, in some places public transportation carries no such discrimination. Additionally, many people who prefer to travel by private jet ( or even Tesla ) may have no other choice but to rely on a public bus for their needs.

One of SpaceX’s aims is to reduce the cost of a trip to Mars to under US$ 1 million. This would be a extraordinary success, but it means that Musk’s imagined Mars settlement may be very wealthy. As a form of public policy, spacecraft and hyperloops are terribly insufficient.

Unromantic needs

The technology sector itself depends on existing facilities and institutions, even though the idea of disruption attempts to minimize its impact.

Uber depends on roads and vehicles, as well as the institutions that maintain them, and Airbnb depends on brick-and-mortar construction, as do Amazon and eBay, which rely on postal service and travel system.

All tech companies rely on solid, enforceable financial, property, and tax laws. These outdated institutions and infrastructures may not be attractive or even effective.

However, these so-called inefficiencies have often evolved in ways aligned with fairness, justice, and inclusivity. Silicon Valley tech companies ‘ past records do not support their positions on these issues.

Hallam Stevens is professor of interdisciplinary studies, James Cook University

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What Ukraine can now do with longer-range US missiles – Asia Times

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According to reports citing White House officials, the incoming Biden administration has given Ukraine the authority to launch a longer-range missile strike into Belarusian territory using materials from the US.

The West is concerned that Moscow, with the aid of the flow of hundreds of North Korean combatants, may be putting together a significant battle to regain control of the Kursk region of Russia.

But how large a package is the Biden choice? And had it alter Eastern Europe’s conflict’s course? For clarifications, The Conversation US contacted Benjamin Jensen, a teacher at American University and the School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University.

What types of weapons did the US permit Ukraine to apply?

The Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, are short-range nuclear missiles that can go a lot farther than the arms earlier at Kyiv’s waste.

We are n’t talking about new technology. Since the late 1970s and 1980s, ATACMS have been around since 1986, when it first started to be produced. By the mid-1990s they were in company, being first deployed by the US in 1991 as part of Operation Desert Storm.

ATACMS have a range of about 190 miles. That distance is longer than British-supplied Storm Shadow and French-supplied Scalp cruise missiles, which have a range of 155 miles ( 249 kilometers ).

Not only do ATACMS get a bit further, they likewise travel very fast – at Mach 3, or three days the speed of sound, making them harder to catch. ATACMS may be challenging for sensor systems to detect depending on where they are fired from.

The other advantage, in this regard, is that ATACMS are no dependant on GPS setting. Different arms that depend on GPS have been successful in preventing clogging and reducing their effectiveness. But ATACMS you move to an gravity guidance system, based on gyroscopes, to avert GPS blocking tactics.

Additionally, the newly authorized missiles can have a significant cargo, which can cause a massive crater when struck.

The current issue may have a significant impact on its range, end velocity, and warhead size. This would give Ukraine the ability to launch extensive attacks on Russian soil.

In contrast, US approval of their use by Ukraine in Russia had, in theory, even make it easier for various allies to transport ATACMS to Kyiv. Nearby Poland and Romania have them, since do South Korea and Australia. The Biden administration’s approval of those institutions ‘ plans to provide the weapons to Ukraine as well.

Why was this longer-range weapons approved then?

The decision by Washington comes as North Korean fighters are increasing their troop numbers in Russia; the 10,000 North Koreans apparently in Russia are just the second wave.

This coincides with the deployment of 50 000 Russian forces near Kursk, which was crucial Belarusian territory that Ukraine seized earlier this year. In order to prepare for what might be a many bigger assault to recover the country, there have been what I would visit “probing problems” by Russia in the area over the past few weeks.

North Korean and Russian forces will need to unite before moving to the front, and they will do so in council regions further away from Russia.

The defense thinking is, if you can strike troops in those strong areas, you can really disrupt Moscow’s functional reach. And because of their size, speed, and selection, ATACMS are ideal for attacks on military assembly areas.

I would be using ATACMS to attack both assembly lines, ammunition depots, and airfields if I were to advise the Russian government.

What appears to be the wondering in Washington?

If I had to wager, I would suggest that there are still growing concerns about an increase but that the fight is transitioning.

Donald Trump, the president-elect, has indicated that he wants to negotiate the close of Ukraine’s conflict. I believe that the Biden administration’s approval of ATACMS suggests that these agreements are about trying to help Ukraine.

Alternately, the latest White House might have considered how to handle the growing pro-Moscow help of North Korea and come to the conclusion that allowing Ukraine to attack North Korean forces before sending them to the front would be a better solution. More artillery casings have been sent to Russia by Pyongyang than Ukraine, aside from forces.

These rationales are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, it appears that the Biden administration values the imperatives more than any perceived danger of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s escalating answer or the U.S. being further into the conflict.

What does this indicate about the current status of the conflict?

My checking of the conflict – and you are getting a sense of this through recent&nbsp, comments from Ukrainian President&nbsp, Volodymyr Zelensky – is that Ukraine may only have until the close of the next promotion time, that is, spring to summer 2025, to maintain its position.

This is because battle is still costing Ukraine money. Kyiv is having trouble mobilizing enough forces because Ukraine had tried to avoid using recruitment more frequently.

Not to say that Ukraine has lost all heat. But it will struggle to take more Russian-controlled province. Capturing place in Kursk was a big success, but it was a one-off, high-risk bargain. And fighting in pieces of Ukraine’s eastern occupied by Russia is proving tricky.

Is the goal here to aid Ukraine in retaining Kursk’s holdover?

According to reports about Biden’s approval of ATACMS, Washington has been telling Ukraine that Kursk is the only place the weapons can be launched.

If Trump does have the ability to push people to talk, as he says he does, that will not stop the fighting. Fighting may continue until a cease-fire is reached between the parties, and it could continue even then.

For these reasons, I think you will see Russia put whatever at Kursk, physically. In the event that Kursk becomes its biggest bargaining chip, Ukraine will do everything in its power to maintain its territorial dominance that.

Did Trump’s defeat play a role in Biden’s considering?

I really believe that the decision to grant ATACMS was more about Ukrainian real than American politics. That said, the president-elect’s reported push for conversations as a way to live the Ukraine-Russia turmoil may well have escalated the decision.

Benjamin Jensen is doctor of corporate research at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, Scholar-in-Residence, American University School of International Service

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Note to Trump: Targeted tariffs can work, broad ones never do – Asia Times

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Taxes are back on the agenda because Trump is about to reoccupy the White House. Basically, they never left — Biden&nbsp, slapped large tariffs&nbsp, on a variety of Taiwanese products, including electric cars, cards, and other things.

But Trump is contemplating tariffs that are &nbsp, far broader in scope&nbsp, — a 60 % tariff on all Chinese-made products, and a 20 % tariff on all imports from anywhere.

There are important differences between cover levies like Trump’s and targeted tariffs like Biden’s. I’m not certain whether Trump’s business individuals, including&nbsp, Robert Lighthizer, are informed this distinction or never, but it’s important. Like the fact that&nbsp, imports do n’t subtract from GDP, it’s something that people who debate trade policy often seem not to understand.

What is the goal of levies?

First, let’s discuss about two different things you might want tariffs to perform.

One purpose of taxes is to&nbsp, lower US dependence on China&nbsp, — or on the outside world in general —&nbsp, in a particular set of essential business. For instance, if China makes all the chargers, they may just decide to cut you off whenever they want to — as&nbsp, China just did to America’s top aircraft manufacturer, Skydio.

Uavs are a key tool of modern war — perhaps&nbsp, the&nbsp, vital tool. And some robots are battery-powered. So if the US goods all its capacitors from China, it kind of puts the US at China’s kindness. Thus, we might want to use tariffs to make sure that China does n’t make all our batteries.

A second purpose of taxes is to&nbsp, lower business imbalances. The US runs a very big deal deficit, and China runs a very large trade deficit. In fact, trade is currently essentially balanced across all of the world’s nations, with the exception of the US and China. China’s trade deficit accounts for&nbsp, the vast majority of all international trade deficits, and America’s trade gap accounts for&nbsp, the vast majority of international trade imbalances:

Origin: &nbsp, Brad Setser

Many nations ‘ trade deficits with China and their trade surpluses with America result in healthy business. That does n’t mean they’re buying stuff from China, slapping a new label on it, and selling it on to America. However, what it does mean is that China is the nation’s key” country that sells more than it buys,” while America is the world’s key” state that buys more than it sells.”

Many people want to reduce those imbalances. Some people ( probably correctly ) think that because of these significant trade deficits, American manufacturers lose important markets overseas.

Others believe that global trade imbalances lead to various other economic problems — for example, Michael Pettis, who believes&nbsp, imbalances drive inequality. Still others simply view trade deficits as a “loss” and trade surpluses as a “win” .1&nbsp, Reducing America’s trade deficit was one of&nbsp, the major goals of Trump’s first term in office.

In fact, trade deficits are severely affected by both broad and targeted tariffs. But targeted tariffs&nbsp, are &nbsp, capable of reducing US dependencies in specific areas like batteries — in fact, they’re better than broad tariffs for this purpose. Let me explain.

Broad tariffs struggle to reduce trade deficits

There are actually two reasons that broad tariffs, like the ones Trump is proposing, have difficulty reducing trade deficits. The first reason is&nbsp, exchange rate adjustment.

When you trade stuff internationally, you have to&nbsp, swap currencies. As anyone who has traveled overseas knows, to buy Chinese goods, you need <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan. 2&nbsp, So if you’re an American, you need to swap your dollars for <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan in order to buy stuff from China. The exchange rate refers to the price at which dollars and <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2024/11/trump-tariffs-threaten-to-torpedo-the-yuan/”>yuan exchange each other are exchanged.

China’s demand for Chinese goods is slowed when the US imposes tariffs on it. And that reduces US demand for Chinese&nbsp, yuan, because when Americans do n’t need to buy as much Chinese stuff, they do n’t need as much yuan.

And when demand for yuan goes down, the price of yuan, in terms of dollars, goes down. This is just basic Econ 101, supply-and-demand stuff. The dollar&nbsp, appreciates&nbsp, in value and the yuan&nbsp, depreciates&nbsp, in value. This is called “exchange rate adjustment”.

The impact of the tariffs is partially offset by the exchange rate adjustment. When tariffs make the yuan get cheaper for Americans, that makes&nbsp, Chinese goods cheaper for American customers. And when tariffs make the dollar get more expensive for Chinese people, that makes&nbsp, American goods get more expensive for Chinese customers.

This does n’t completely cancel out the effect of tariffs, but it&nbsp, partially&nbsp, cancels it out. Similar to how pizza restaurants would reduce their prices in response to the government’s taxation of pizza in order to reduce the number of people who no longer eat it.

Of course in the real world, there are more than just two currencies, and more than just two countries trading with each other. However, if you examine the data, it is obvious how much Trump’s tariffs affected China during his first term.

The price of the yuan is represented by the red line in this Jeanne and Son’s ( 2023 ) chart, which shows the dollar’s value.

Source: &nbsp, Jeanne and Son ( 2023 )

You can see that when Trump put tariffs on many Chinese goods, the dollar got stronger ( in fact, it got stronger a little&nbsp, before&nbsp, the tariffs officially went into effect, because people knew the tariffs were about to go into effect ), and the yuan got weaker.

China’s tariffs were less impactful, partly because China buys relatively little from the US in the first place. According to Jeanne and Son,” the US’s tariffs implemented by the US account for about 22 % of the dollar’s appreciation and 65 % of the renminbi depreciation observed in 2018-19.”

How much of the tariffs ‘ effect is canceled out by this exchange rate movement? &nbsp, In theory, it’s possible&nbsp, for it to cancel out 100 %! Everyone who is involved in the exchange rate exchange can say” OK, tariffs made Chinese goods more expensive in America, so we’ll just say that the actual price of Chinese goods is the same, so everyone in America can just keep buying exactly the same amount as before. Good job everyone, glad we got that sorted out”.

Remember that this is not a free market; instead, the Chinese government likely intentionally devalues the yuan to prevent losing market share in export markets.

In reality, exchange rates only cancel out&nbsp, part&nbsp, of the effect of tariffs. A number of factors prevent exchange rates from fully adapting to the new tax, including the fact that most trade imbalances would be eliminated if one billion percent tariffs were applied to everything. So it’s really anempirical&nbsp, question as to how much exchange rates cancel out tariffs.

A theoretical model that Jeanne and Son use to arrive at a number range of 30 to 35 % is used. That’s a substantial decrease already, and I actually think the true number is likely to be higher, especially where China is concerned3. If all of the yuan’s movement against the dollar during this time were due to Trump’s tariffs, it would mean that&nbsp, exchange rate adjustment canceled out around 75 % &nbsp, of the tariffs ‘ effect!

And this is n’t the only factor in broad tariffs ‘ efforts to lessen trade imbalances! There’s at least one more. Broad tariffs also&nbsp, raise costs for American manufacturers, without increasing costs for Chinese manufacturers.

Take the automobile market for instance. Automobile manufacturers make a lot of steel and aluminum. Costs for American car manufacturers increase as steel and aluminum cost more. That makes them less competitive, both in the domestic market and abroad.

Steel and aluminum will be among the products that the US will impose broad tariffs on. Due to the tariffs, GM, Ford, and Tesla will have to raise the prices of their cars in order to avoid having to pay higher steel and aluminum prices.

But BYD and other Chinese car companies&nbsp, wo n’t &nbsp, have higher costs, because the tariff only applies in America. Thus, Chinese automakers will have a clear advantage over American automakers. That will lower the cost of Chinese car imports and increase the cost of American car exports.

In fact, we have good evidence that this happens. &nbsp, Lake and Liu ( 2022 ) &nbsp, study the effects of Bush-era tariffs on steel and aluminum, and found that they hurt steel-consuming industries like the auto industry:

In response to the local labor market’s dependence on steel both as an input and as a component of local production, President Bush imposed safeguard tariffs on steel in early 2002. [ W]e analyze the local labor market’s employment effects of these tariffs.

After Bush removed the tariffs, local steel employment did not significantly decline after the tariffs were removed, but local employment in the steel-consuming industries did for years. The tariffs also caused steel-intensive manufacturing facilities to leave the workforce, which suggests that plant-level fixed entry costs play a role in converting temporary shock into long-lasting outcomes.

The same effect will apply to trade balances as Lake and Liu are examining employment outcomes. Across-the-board tariffs make US-made cars and semiconductors and washing machines and refrigerators and farm equipment and robots more expensive, because they raise the cost of imported inputs like steel, aluminum, photoresist, batteries, and so on. But foreign-made products can still get cheap inputs, because they are n’t paying tariffs.

It will obviously reduce some of the impact of tariffs on trade balances by making American manufacturers pay more in price than their foreign competitors.

So between these two effects, we can expect Trump’s big “tariffs on everything” to have a disappointingly small effect on the US trade deficit — not&nbsp, zero&nbsp, effect, but less than Trump would like.

This is what happened in Trump’s first term, when the US trade deficit did n’t shrink at all4&nbsp, despite his tariffs:

Now, Trump’s tariffs did have &nbsp, some&nbsp, effect in shifting US deficits away from China, as I’ll discuss in the next section. They were a total bust, however, in terms of reducing the US’ total trade deficit with the rest of the world. It’s not difficult to understand why that was the case when we consider intermediate goods and exchange rate appreciation.

Targeted tariffs can effectively lower particular US dependencies.

Far from it, I do n’t want to suggest that tariffs are ineffective. Effectively, limiting tariffs on particular imported goods can divert the demand away from those imports.

Suppose we put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese-made computers. In 2022, the US&nbsp, bought$ 51 billion worth of computers from China&nbsp, — about 9.4 % of our total imports from China.

Imagine that we inflated the cost of Chinese computers by ten times using tariffs. Americans would no longer purchase computers from China, choosing to purchase ones made in America, Mexico, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

In fact, Mexico, Taiwan, and Vietnam are currently our biggest foreign sources of computers besides China, and along with local American factories, they’re probably perfectly capable of ramping up production to meet our needs:

Source: &nbsp, OEC. Note:” Chinese Taipei” is a fake name for Taiwan, which the OEC uses in order to avoid offending the government of China.

Now, at this point, you may say,” Well, but the Mexican-made computers and the Vietnamese-made computers will have a bunch of Chinese chips and screens in them, so we’ll still be importing stuff from China”.

And you’re absolutely right! There is no reliable way for America to determine how many Chinese components are present in the finished goods we import. Similarly, if we taxed imports of Chinese batteries, we would n’t currently be able to apply those tariffs to Chinese-made batteries contained in Mexican-made cars or Vietnamese-made phones.

But suppose we&nbsp, improved our data&nbsp, so that we&nbsp, did&nbsp, know which parts came from where. Then, using tariffs, we could completely eliminate Chinese manufacturers from our supply chains for chips, batteries, or anything else.

And broad tariffs significantly outperform targeted tariffs in terms of achieving the objective of securing particular supply chains. One reason is that targeted tariffs&nbsp, do n’t have nearly as big an effect on exchange rates&nbsp, as broad tariffs.

If you put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese computers, that only affects 9.4 % of the US demand for Chinese goods. That wo n’t significantly affect exchange rates. US demand for Chinese goods overall wo n’t fall much, but it will shift to other stuff — plastic, clothes, broadcasting equipment, machinery, or whatever.

The exchange rate will change significantly more, which will largely offset any significant impact on any particular imported good, while applying a tariff on all Chinese goods, including the plastics, clothing, broadcasting equipment, machinery, and everything else.

Additionally, targeted tariffs address the intermediate-goods issue that I previously covered. Yes, if you put a 1000 % tariff on Chinese batteries, that will hurt American EV manufacturers. However, this might be okay if you believe the battery supply chain is more strategic than the EV supply chain, perhaps because batteries also enter drones.

Targeted tariffs work like a scalpel, allowing you to cut out exactly the import types you do n’t want while keeping the less crucial items untouched. Targeted tariffs are very effective if your goal is to secure specific strategic supply chains, even though they wo n’t reduce trade deficits. Fortunately, Robert Lighthizer is probably thinking about this, as evidenced by this passage from his book, &nbsp,” No Trade is Free“:

But this means that Trump’s 20 % tariff on all imports from all countries would actually&nbsp, weaken&nbsp, the effect of his 60 % tariffs on China! If we only tax Chinese imports, we can shift demand away from China to other countries. But if we tax imports from everywhere, the dollar will appreciate, which will cancel out some of the impact of the China tariffs.

Therefore, tariffs should n’t be applied to imports from other nations if what the US wants to achieve is to reduce its bilateral trade deficit with China. Trump’s 20 % across-the-board tariff idea would n’t reduce our trade deficit meaningfully, but it would make it harder to shift our supply chain out of China.

So how&nbsp, do &nbsp, you reduce global trade imbalances?

Anyway, that’s all well and good. But suppose we really&nbsp, do &nbsp, want to reduce the US trade deficit. How do we do that? And how do we do it without kneecapping our own manufacturers?

I’ll write a lot more about this, but the short answer is to reduce trade deficits, &nbsp, you need to depreciate the US dollar. Remember that Americans are encouraged to purchase more foreign-made goods while the price of a higher dollar forces them to compete for US exports? Well, if you’re going to reduce the trade deficit, you need to counteract that somehow.

Stephen Miran of Hudson Bay Capital has &nbsp, a good post&nbsp, explaining that the real problem here is the US dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. Here, from X, is the upshot:

The truth is that the” strong dollar” is probably the root cause of America’s chronic, persistent trade deficits. A strong dollar or a strong manufacturing and export sector are the choices for US leaders. So far, we’ve always chosen the former. If Trump really wants to get rid of the US trade deficit, he’s going to have to dump this long-standing policy. But that’s a topic for another day.

Notes:

1 This attitude often goes by the name of “mercantilism”, though it’s a bit different from the original&nbsp, early modern European version.

2 Yuan is actually a nickname for China’s currency, the renminbi or RMB.

3 Personally, I think Jeanne and Son’s approach to China is incorrect because it assumes that Chinese government policies share the same goals as American government policies.

In reality, Xi Jinping cares a LOT about establishing China’s position in global manufacturing markets, so he’ll likely devalue the Chinese currency in response to US tariffs. China has the power to manage its capital account if it so desires and frequently does.

4 This is true as a percent of GDP, as shown in the chart. In dollar terms, the trade deficit&nbsp, actually got worse under Trump. In fact, these trade deficit numbers have some big problems — they do n’t measure&nbsp, value-added trade, and some of the trade they do measure is basically&nbsp, faked for tax avoidance purposes. No matter what method we use, the US trade deficit is still unaffected by Trump’s tariffs.

This&nbsp, article&nbsp, was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion&nbsp, Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion&nbsp, subscriber&nbsp, here.

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Path to peace in Ukraine likely to run through India – Asia Times

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Vladimir Putin’s meetings will take place in India when it leaves for the end of this year or the beginning of the time, keeping in mind New Delhi’s policy of principled independence toward the conflict in and around Ukraine.

India has always rejected the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia and has always abstained from anti-Russian commitments presented at international forums like the UN. India has called for global laws to be respected and the Ukraine war to end as soon as possible at the same time.

India has acted as a launch mechanism for American pressure on Russia, giving Moscow a great power alternative to growing overly reliant on China.

Due to the fact that India is now the second-largest consumer of subsidized Russian crude after China, bilateral trade increased to US$ 65 billion last month from$ 12 billion in 2021.

Cheaper oil has fueled India’s robust economic growth, which averaged 8.2 % last year and is on track to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027, according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF).

Some of India’s private financial institutions also comply with Western sanctions, which has made it challenging to transfer some of these resources, despite the Indian government’s refusal to do so. Russia has so agreed to&nbsp, invest some of&nbsp, its dollar stockpile in India, which has helped to expand and balance the two sides ‘ business.

India and Russia have also given three shipping corridor growth projects priority, none of which have reached their full potential. These include:

  • the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ) through Iran with branches across Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia,
  • the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor between those places, which is also known as the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and
  • the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic.

According to rumors that returning US President Donald Trump plans to resume his “maximum force” campaign against Iran, the INSTC is the most appealing but also the most susceptible of the three.

India has previously obtained a waiver from the US for dealing with Afghanistan at Iran’s Chabahar Port. Trump might impose more stringent sanctions on Iran, making it impossible for it to compel India to stop selling American goods, including pharmaceuticals, on Russian shelves, thereby lowering Russia’s now sizable dependence on China and raising its already high level of dependence on China.

If India’s alleged subtle technology channel is targeted, the same could happen. Given the number of China hawks in his case, that would seem to conflict with the incoming Trump administration’s great strategic goals.

Trump stated just before the election that he wanted to “un-unite” Russia and China, but he would just unintentionally do so if he places new restrictions on Russian-Indian industry to condemn Iran.

Trump added that he will give Ukraine’s battle a chance. Some observers anticipate that he will allow Russia to achieve its full range of territorial and other objectives in a ceasefire agreement, despite the uncertainty of how precisely. A suggested compromise’s words are still undetermined.

Under the American Logan Act, which criminalizes the negotiation of a dispute between the US and a foreign state by an undocumented American citizen, Trump and Russia are not permitted to communicate on a package. On January 20, agreements will start to discuss Trump’s election.

That could help India, which has close ties to Russia and the US, get started on discussions. Putin and Narendra Modi, the country’s prime minister, was talk about the possible military and economic ramifications of a bargain, including a possible Iran-Indian trade ban and/or a gradual lifting of sanctions against Russia.

India was then privately communicate these Soviet dealing points to the Trump administration, which if the president-elect’s initial term is any indication, may be specially friendly towards Modi’s government.

Dmitry Peskov, a spokeswoman for the Kremlin, confirmed on Tuesday that Putin’s trip to India will soon be announced. It may adopt Modi’s second visit to Russia in June, when he was Putin’s guest of honor at the time and had his first official meeting there in September. The officials signed nine partnerships and released a thorough joint statement at their most recent meeting over the summer.

Trump is also near to Modi, while is his nomination for director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard. Trump’s national security advisor get, Mike Waltz, is co-chair of the India conference and his nomination for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, introduced the US-India Defense Cooperation Act in July.

If those figures and planets are paired up, India might be the key to bringing Ukraine to peace rather than past mediator Turkey or young ally China. Putin and Modi will likely talk about a deal with Ukraine during his upcoming trip, but details wo n’t likely be made publicly.

Putin is undoubtedly aware of Trump’s desire to “pivot” up to Asia, which necessitates a fast resolution of the Ukraine war. Putin is even aware of the crucial part India plays in controlling the European balance of power with China. &nbsp,

So, Modi is well-placed to evade US punishment for its business with Russia through Iran, which, if imposed, may lead to more Chinese influence in and over Russia. Modi may even offer pragmatical recommendations on how to reach a settlement in Ukraine that would be appropriate to Russia based on his near ties to Putin since 2014.

Putin had undoubtedly no support or encourage Trump to travel back to Asia to encircle China in a more powerful way. Instead, Putin understands Trump’s great strategic interests and may get to leverage them to Russia’s benefit.

Modi might explain to Trump how this would improve his aims in relation to China in order to achieve a compromise on Ukraine that is most likely to be appropriate to Russia.

Modi may even try to persuade Trump that an unfavorable outcome could be an escalated conflict in Ukraine ( even if it is done so so that it will then de-escalate to better terms for the US).

Russia may continue to be pushed closer to China as its growing junior partner, which was stifle the European balance of power in way that hurt US and Indian objectives.

Beyond sporadic hints at Ukraine, none of this is good to be included in the future Putin-Modi meeting or phone call, either later this year or first future. However, it’s important to appreciate the role that India plays in US and Russian great strategies, in the European balance of power and so, correctly, also in the Ukraine war.

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Europe must flex muscle in a Trump-led Ukraine peace deal – Asia Times

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Since Donald Trump won the election on November 5, there has become irrational about what his term as president will think for the Ukrainian conflict, which is now in its 1000th time.

Trump’s campaign’s claim that he would end the war in 24 hours, perhaps before taking office in January 2025, is simple to refute. However, it is obvious that Trump will use all available indicators to pressure Moscow and Kyiv into agreeing to a ceasefire and maybe a wider resolution.

Whatever happens with Trump’s dealmaking may have effects that need to be considered and prepared. From a Russian view, the implication is that the country may lose its already Russian-occupied lands, at least for the time being, and would have to give up on its ambition for NATO account. This is very distasteful for Ukraine.

Kyiv ca n’t afford a continuation of the conflict because of recent Russian advances on the front lines in both eastern Ukraine and the Kursk region in Russia, which are both held by the Ukrainians. If Trump actually implements his risk to end all martial support for Ukraine, this is especially important.

Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, made the statement on November 16 that Kyiv “must do everything to ensure that this war ends following year… through political means.”

This was primarily a smile in Trump’s way, indicating Ukraine’s willingness to engage in conceivable US-brokered counseling work. It also served as an acknowledgment that Ukraine’s long-term hopes have been dark for some time.

A map showing Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.
Over the past several months, the Russian army has been capturing territory more rapidly than ever since the invasion’s beginnings. Institute for Research on War

In light of Moscow’s continuing defense speed, there is some fear that the Soviet leader, Vladimir Putin, is eager to reach a settlement immediately. He has indicated that conversations are open, but Russia is known for holding off on talks, imposing more requirements, and simply signing agreements once it has obtained the most agreements.

Even then, significant application on the ground is almost a given, and re-escalation is good – as the Minsk Accords on Ukraine of September 2014 and February 2015&nbsp, illustrate&nbsp, only very vividly.

Third caveat: While Trump will likely be fully committed to making a deal at first, he may decide to withdraw if his and Putin’s timelines do n’t work out. This is what happened when Trump’s short-lived passion for an agreement with North Korea’s Kim Yong Un during his first word evaporated, and he simply walked away empty-handed.

However, even in this situation, some conversations broke out, most vitally without significant concern for US allies like South Korea and Japan. In the end, Trump and Kim’s disagreement turned out to be one of the catalysts for additional advancements in North Korea’s nuclear programme and closer ties with Moscow.

Western allies of Ukraine and the US had make plans for the day following Trump’s opening, regardless of whether Trump presses Ukraine into a bad deal, whether Russia withdraws from a after Trump-brokered settlement, or whether Trump abandons his efforts to end the conflict.

This means, above all, taking more responsibility for their own safety, as the Polish prime secretary, Donald Tusk, put it succinctly before the US elections. Because it is unclear what the future of relations will be between the major players, this is easier said than done. However, there are some obvious rules that can now serve as guidelines for European planning.

What ought to be the strategy of Europe?

Second, the US will no longer provide the bulk of its military aid to Ukraine. In the future, Kyiv’s Western friends will be responsible for the majority of the lifting. This will require providing long-term investment in Europe’s and Ukraine’s defense business base as well as financing the purchase of weapons and ammunition.

Next, it means getting Ukraine what it needs quickly. But, Russian requirements must be based on a credible military strategy rather than a flimsy win plan intended to retake control of all Russian-occupied areas. This became optimistic wondering at the moment Ukraine’s 2023 battle failed.

A workable strategy is required to safeguard Ukraine’s front-line locations, along with Ukrainian aircraft, at the time of a peace. This will increase the likelihood of an agreement being signed by Russia and give the possibility of steadily and effectively rebuilding areas under Kyiv’s control.

Third, any military approach to defend Ukraine will also need to be a foundation of a foreseeable European security order that effectively deters any potential Russian invasion. In upcoming negotiations, Kyiv should n’t be left alone. Ukraine would be the weakest link in negotiations involving Trump, Putin, and Zelensky only, and Western interests would likely be totally ignored.

This is not to say for a profit to the style of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany that oversaw the failed Minsk Accords. Instead, if the notion is that Europe will have to move away and be the main guarantor of Russian independence, Kyiv’s EU and NATO partners need to have some insight in negotiations.

The shock mobile phone Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, shared with Putin on November 14 is an indicator that this has been recognized.

It will be crucial to establish a communication network for Europe to make it obvious that all European lovers have a common understanding of red lines and what they would mean if the Kremlin crossed them, as well as what advantages it would have if it were to respect them.

The northern sanctions regime has a significant impact on both the consequences and the benefits, which was highlighted in a G7 leader’s statement supporting Ukraine on November 16 that reaffirmed the dedication to “imposing significant costs on Russia through sanctions.”

Europe may, therefore, also need to operate with Trump and had communication channels with his presidency. Scholz’s phone contact with Trump on November 10 was reported as a “very detailed and good conversation”, including on Ukraine.

Trump’s strategy of striking a deal with Putin to “un-un-unite” Russia and China is at conflict with German suspicion of Putin as a trustworthy companion. Possible solutions to this issue across the Atlantic can be found, but they must also include a workable and long-term solution to Ukraine.

After the most bloody military conflict on German soil since the Second World War, 1, 000 people have come to terms with the fact that everything about Europe should exist without it.

If Trump and Putin value durability and scorn failure, then the only road to getting this level across in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv is through toned pursuit of German self-interest and self-assertion.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The gray area between Korean diplomacy and espionage – Asia Times

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To your dismay, after studying Asian for centuries at school, you now work in a government department that records agricultural data. A Korean minister requests a meeting the week after you attend a North Korean Embassy function.

She introduces you to a partner, a Mr Kim. Another week after, Mr. Kim requests that you submit a brief essay on the most recent election to aid him in understanding local politics. He is, after all, fresh to the state. It would be a pretty kind favor for you to practice Asian. Although, it’s weird, you think: Mr Kim does n’t read the newspapers?

Therefore, Mr. Kim gives you more cash than the job was worth. This is nice, you think. A few weeks later, you’ve written little papers on regional elections, the school system and the internet – and received good money!

Therefore, Mr. Kim inquires if you’d like to write an essay on agriculture that is more in-depth. He’d spend more money, and it is what you do at job. Maybe you could provide it in Korea, he says. More money and a complimentary trip…

Close friends hacker on each other. &nbsp, It’s a history. Alliances are presented to the public as built on mutual respect and shared targets, but personal nations&nbsp, always&nbsp, emphasize their interests.

This means that in any diplomatic partnership, there rests a degree of uncertainty and hostility. Intelligence procedures are used to influence partners ‘ objectives, abilities, and techniques.

This increases confidence and provides more clarity. It allows companions to protect regional security, maintain proper benefits within the framework of cooperation and, importantly, avoid surprises. Managed maturely, knowledge acts as a type of diplomatic reassurance. This also applies to the South Korea-US marriage.

Despite the commitment to “fight tomorrow” in an “ironclad” empire, South Korea and the US routinely conduct brains operations to reduce&nbsp, rejection anxiety&nbsp, and to safe competitive advantage. Hands power during the Cold War is a good indication.

South Korea and its partners had a significant impact on US ties with international partners when the US conducted operations to check whether it was adhering to arms control agreements, while South Korea also conducted operations to break free of the restrictions it was subject to.

Of course, there are places in which South Korea and the US compete immediately. In all socioeconomic grounds, they are innate rivals. Fighting side-by-side is just as common as having the intelligence and control to out-compete the another.

Exercise frequently begins in a gray area between spy and diplomacy, as is typical in “recruiting friendlies.”

The equivalent duties that diplomats and intelligence officers perform create a gray area between politics and spy. Officials and intelligence officials gather information and try to persuade participants to help the state. For the minister, these are the first two of four large clashing types of tasks – reporting, picture, bargaining, and taking care of nationals in the network state. &nbsp,

Basically speaking, intelligence officials have the same objectives, but with various perspectives. While knowledge pays less interest to international laws and political conventions, diplomacy operates informally.

The ambiguity stems from deeds that, while performing consular duties, may also include deeds that involve intelligence- or intelligence-related actions. The slim line between political process and intelligence is challenged by this overlap. Understanding the hiring process for brokers is the easiest way to tell the difference between the two.

It’s a slim line between politics and knowledge. Image: X Screengrab

The selection procedure

Recruiting brokers is a key component of cleverness. The procedure is complicated when organizations ask people to gather and switch sensitive information.

A thorough understanding of human philosophy, strategic planning, and cautious execution are necessary for success. All states ( and people within states ) have different approaches, with repeat borne of prior effective approaches. Broadly speaking, there are four phases:

    Recognition: &nbsp, The first step in recruitment is identifying individuals who have exposure to useful information or have the power to exert influence. These targets had become government officials, military personnel, business executives or even individuals with exposure to significant networks. Intelligence agencies generally look for people with certain risks. The next step is to figure out whether these individuals have any weaknesses that do make them easier to enlist, such as financial difficulties, intellectual dissatisfaction, or personal grievances.

  1. Marriage building: &nbsp, When a potential attract is identified, the next step is to develop a relationship. It involves gently interacting with targets, finding out about their motivations, and figuring out how to persuade them to cooperate. The consultant may cause as a brother sympathizer, a potential company partner or even just a useful acquaintance. Establishing trust and eventually introducing the concept of partnership are the goals. This is frequently done in a way that is appropriate for the internal page of the target.
  2. Recruitment: &nbsp, When the moment seems right, the manager makes the ball. The process is at its most delicate phase. The method is become direct or indirect, depending on the user’s character and the connection that has been developed. The consultant may sell money, protection, or even just appeals to ego depending on the target. Challenges and extortion may be used in some circumstances, but these methods demand more thought and care.
  3. Management: &nbsp, When recruited, watchful supervision is need to make sure the broker continues providing valuable knowledge. This involves maintaining normal conversation, offering rewards or reassurances, often manipulating emotions to preserve the agent dedicated and also supporting an agent’s move into more valuable positions.

South Korea’s espionage activities demonstrate modes of&nbsp, identification, relationship-building, recruitment and management processes that are similar to those employed across all&nbsp, Five Eyes countries. The majority of cases never become public. &nbsp,

Accusations of espionage by allied states can cause diplomatic angst, cause conflict to break out, and deteriorate the alliance’s reputation. Accordingly, governments prefer to handle such matters discreetly to avoid breakdowns in cooperation, which could weaken their collective security and strategic objectives.

Suppressing reporting on spying among allies helps to&nbsp, maintain stability and trust within their relationships. It prevents unnecessary escalation and allows diplomatic channels to secretly manage issues, frequently resulting in in-the-scenes negotiations or apologies that preserve the broader relationship.

Public disclosure of spying can also undermine ongoing intelligence operations by revealing methods, sources, and vulnerabilities that a partner or third party might exploit. Allies can continue to collaborate on common goals without the detriment or repercussions of a public scandal by keeping these incidents out of the public eye.

In essence, suppression is a wise decision to strike a balance between protecting national security interests and maintaining strong, cooperative international relationships.

But we know it does go public. There are several&nbsp, well-known cases&nbsp, of South Korean espionage and a number of&nbsp, less well-known cases&nbsp, where the potential damage outweighed the perceived benefits of media exposure.

So, why does it go public? There are three broad reasons for counterintelligence agencies to make a case public: strategic ( to cover other operations ), operational ( to reduce the effectiveness of the” sending” state organization that has dispatched diplomats or spies ) or political/bureaucratic ( to satisfy broader objectives within the “host” or “receiving” state bureaucracy or political environment ).

Similarly, it is also the case that the sending state will allow an asset or agent to be compromised for broader strategic, operational or bureaucratic/political rationales.

Because of the extremely distinct nature of the individuals themselves, the source of all human intelligence collection, it’s difficult to categorize and generalize intelligence processes, practices, and cases. That raises a question: Why do individuals engage in espionage? ( Read why in the next post. )

The fact is, &nbsp, most do n’t know&nbsp, they’re engaged in espionage until it’s too late. The more effective the hiring process, the less likely it is for the agent to be aware of the hiring process. &nbsp,

A free trip and more money. But then you realize, when Mr Kim tells you he’s willing to pay more and fly you to Korea, that it’s already too late: There’s no free lunch in this world. You’re now an intelligence asset!

Jeffrey Robertson is an academic, consultant and writer focusing on foreign affairs, diplomacy and the Korean Peninsula. &nbsp, This article was originally published on his Substack newsletter, Diplomatic Seoul, and is republished with permission. &nbsp, Read more here.

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Biden got Trump out of a jam – Asia Times

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Donald Trump was put out of a connect by Joe Biden. &nbsp, Trump, in his political campaign, had claimed he was immediately bring an end to the Ukraine war and push a dialogue between Kyiv and Moscow.

Joe Biden’s decision to launch ATACMS missiles on Russia has given the panel the confidence to fulfill that commitment.

The Ukrainians shot five or six ATACMS weapons at the Bryansk region of Russia, which is located about 75 miles north of the Ukrainian border, shortly after the public announcement that strikes would be permitted on November 18.

The Russians say that they destroyed 5 of the six weapons, with one weapon reach but not totally destroyed. &nbsp, That missile, according to the Russians, fell to the ground&nbsp, and exploded, but caused little harm. &nbsp, The Ukrainian say that the missile&nbsp, hit an ammunition depot and blew it up.

The Russians used their weather mechanisms, most importantly the S-400 and Pantsir. &nbsp, The S-400 has much variety, Pantsir was likely used to go after weapons that the S-400 did not catch. &nbsp, &nbsp,

ATACMS is a huge weapon. The US HIMARS launch system you just fire one ATACMS at once, which requires reloading after that. &nbsp, The weapon weighs 3, 690 weight and travels at a rate of around Mach 3 (2, 300 miles ), making it faster than regular flight soldiers. &nbsp, &nbsp,

In 2021 dollars an ATACMS missile costs$ 1.7 million, meaning that a replacement cost would be more than$ 2 million per copy. &nbsp, However, the US plans on replacing ATACMS with the Precision Strike Missile ( PrSM) which will have longer range. &nbsp, ATACMS may attain 190 miles. PrSM can travel 250 miles, which is a small price to pay because a new missile will cost more than$ 3 million per copy. &nbsp, Using AI-supported math ( just kidding ), replacing 6 missiles will cost US taxpayers$ 30 million or more.

The Biden administration uses ATACMS to thwart discussions between Ukraine and Russia, but the use of ATACMS is consciously controversial. &nbsp, Biden’s goal is to prolong the war and to make it difficult, or nearly but, for Trump to make a bargain. &nbsp, &nbsp,

How likely are ATACMS weapons to be in Ukraine? Perhaps not more than a couple of hundred, although there is no proved information.

Straight hand-left side issues are present in the current administration. &nbsp, Some in the leadership, particularly the State Department and elements in the CIA, reportedly want to change Zelensky in Ukraine with a more “democratic” head and began talks with the Russians. The management wants to worsen Trump and prolong the war. That explains the extraordinarily indifferent position taken yesterday regarding ATACMS’s usage against Russia.

However, it is well to keep in mind that the Europeans were briefed in advance about the Biden decision, which is why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who heads a failed state, called Putin and, on the day of the common announcement of ATACMS approval, said Germany &nbsp, would hardly supply Taurus weapons to Ukraine, notwithstanding the US judgement on ATACMS.

The use of ATACMS wo n’t have a significant impact on the war, in terms of combating it. Indeed, the decision to attack targets in the Bryansk region rather than Kursk, where intense fighting is taking place, and where the administration insists North Koreans are fighting alongside Russian forces, highlights the fact that firing ATACMS has not, at least not yet, had anything to do with the conflict. &nbsp, Could the Bryansk attack be a warning to the Russians? &nbsp, Maybe, but wasting$ 30 million on a warning seems nonsensical.

The Russians, of course, have their own long-range missiles. They could be used just as easily as they are being used against targets in Ukraine, and they are. One would assume that Biden is aware of this and that he would anticipate a larger conflict and a subsequent NATO intervention in Ukraine. &nbsp, That is part of the White House calculus.

Russia’s ability to launch retaliation is uncertain at this time. There are plenty of good targets in Ukraine where the Russians could take a defensive line. &nbsp, &nbsp,

Trump’s nominated national security advisor, Mike Waltz, says that the Biden decision will not help Trump end the Ukraine war. &nbsp, Waltz&nbsp, says that he was not briefed&nbsp, by the Biden administration on the ATACMS decision, a breach of the normal protocol in which incoming officials are briefed on national security matters and often asked for their views. &nbsp, Biden and his people did neither, and on purpose.

Trump now has an excuse for allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles and other weapons with the assistance of NATO technicians and intelligence assets.

Although there are still many things that could possibly go wrong after January 20th, including the collapse of the Zelensky government and the defeat of Ukraine, there are still many things that could possibly go wrong.

Without speaking with Trump, it appears as though Biden will continue to pursue his interests.  Biden’s promise of a smooth transition of government turns out to be dishonest and deceptive.

Stephen Bryen served as the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s staff director and its deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. &nbsp, This&nbsp, article was first published on his&nbsp, Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy and is republished with permission.

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The impact of Ukraine firing US missiles into Russia – Asia Times

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Ukraine may be able to repel Russian forces trying to recapture Belarusian territory that Ukraine seized earlier this year by lifting US restrictions on the use of ATACMS nuclear missiles. It could also improve Ukraine’s hands forward of US President-elect Donald Trump’s appearance in the White House in January.

It may, however, be another case of too little, too soon in American support for Ukraine.

The Biden Administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the Armed Tactical Missile Systems ( ATACMS ) missiles this week. ATACMS have a range of around 300 km. Recently, the US has told Ukraine just to use them against Russian troops on Ukrainian place.

Ukraine has been extremely frustrated over this, especially considering that it is unable to use them against Russian foundations that have launched endless missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities. According to the UN, 183 civilians were killed and 903 were hurt in the Russian strikes on Ukraine in October.

Details of the US plan alter have not been made available to the public. According to the New York Times, attacking Russian troops will only be allowed to massachusette in the Kursk area, according to the New York Times.

Graphic: AP via The Talk

More than 500 square meters of country that Ukraine had seized in a strong offensive in August are being reclaimed by Russia. According to American organizations, there are a number of thousand North Vietnamese soldiers en massed on the Russian aspect.

The ATACMS’s restrictions may be the main catalyst for the ATACMS’s suspension due to North Korea’s role. The move perhaps deter North Korea from sending more troops in addition to boosting Ukraine’s ability to maintain its grip inside Russian territory.

Concerns that the US choice may be justified by North Korea’s existence, which also eases concerns that Russia may view it as an escalation.

Cautious decision-making by the West

The US’s precaution has been primarily due to its recent concerns about increase and the possibility of a strong conflict between Russia and NATO.

This has been fuelled in part by Soviet atomic saber-rattling. Russian President Vladimir Putin upped the ante in September, warning that allowing Western arms to beat Russia may form NATO’s “direct contribution” in the battle.

Russia says, apparently without basis, that such weaponry need American personnel to man them. Russia asserts that precise targeting of the missiles does require European intelligence.

The US news this week has reacted consistently, saying it will “add more fuel to the fire” of the conflict. ATACMS have also been used against Soviet targets inside Ukrainian-owned place, most recently in Crimea, which Moscow had illegally annexed ten years ago.

Some Biden presidency sources have told the media that the country’s reluctance to allow ATACMS to attack Russia has also been influenced by its concern about retribution via damage. In recent years, Russian intelligence services have carried out a significant damage plan in Europe.

Since Russia’s massive conquest of Ukraine in 2022, people have been averse to these risks. European nations have expressed concern at every turn about straddling Putin’s alleged “red ranges.”

They first balked at supplying different types of equipment – be it vehicles, fighter jet, short-range weapons or long-range weapons. Finally, they placed restrictions on how and where to use them.

In Washington in 2023, Joe Biden ( right ) and Volodymyr Zelensky ( right ) greet the president of the United States. &nbsp, Photo: Michael Reynolds / EPA via The Talk

Does it help Ukraine?

Britain and France placed related restrictions on Ukraine’s use of SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, which both have a 250-kilometer range, as a result of US restrictions on using ATACMS. The US decision appears likely to help the UK and France to then relax those restrictions.

Another boost to Ukraine’s army may arrive from Germany, where the Greens, Social Democrats and the criticism Christian Democrats support green-lighting supply of Taurus cruise weapons to Ukraine, which have a range of 500 meters.

Although it has been blocked by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the time, votes are then scheduled for February.

Because Russia has moved a large portion of its key ammunition, especially jet fighters, outside of its purview, Washington authorities have recently claimed that ATACMS will now only be of minimal use.

Nevertheless, some military experts think there are still numerous, possibly hundreds, of priorities within range.

These include prompt and contacts posts, logistics hubs, arms depots, weapon units and aircraft detachments. Russian businesses may find it more difficult to move equipment farther back from the front lines, stretching their supply ranges, and requiring longer wait times for air support.

Russia’s assistance has grown

It’s not all that encouraging to allow a sovereign state that has been improperly invaded to apply arms against military targets inside the aggressor’s nation.

Also, as US-based Russian professor Sergei Radchenko points out, it would be extremely difficult for Russia, which has so terribly underperformed on the field in Ukraine, to strike NATO in reply.

Given the large amount of ammunition and weapons supplied to Russia by its own followers even before North Vietnamese soldiers entered, Russian warnings about increase seem even more absurd.

Russia has received thousands of rounds of ammunition and lots of nuclear missiles from North Korea. Additionally, it is officially providing Russia with multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled howitzers.

Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of Shahed uavs, helicopter production technology, weapons and short-range rockets.

An Egyptian Shahed-129 aircraft is displayed at a rally in Tehran, Iran. &nbsp, Photo: Ebrahim Noroozi / AP via The Talk

And China sells Russia about US$ 300 million each quarter in dual-use equipment needed for weapons manufacturing, from appliance tools to microchips. Russia might even have a shop there for producing military-grade drones.

What was Trump’s appearance mean?

In an effort to give Ukraine as much of a foothold as possible before Trump takes office, the Biden White House does ease restrictions on using ATACMS inside Russia by, for instance, allowing their use outside the Kursk place.

Some Russians worry that Trump’s quick military intervention will hurt Ukraine. However, some believe Trump may be just as good as the Biden administration, given the latter’s prudence and the need for Trump to be seen as a reliable dealmaker, rather than selling Ukraine down the river.

Some in Trump’s new team, notably incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, have spoken, albeit equivocally, of using the prospect of more robust support for Ukraine as leverage in pushing Putin to negotiate.

However, the strong presence of those who have long been vocal critics of aid to Ukraine or even outright apologists for Russia must offset this optimism in his new cabinet and inner circle.

There is also a good chance that the Trump administration will rescind its decision to impose ATACMS use restrictions.

Jon Richardson is visiting fellow, Centre for European Studies, Australian National University

The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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How allied are Iran and Russia really? – Asia Times

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After this month, Iran and Russia are expected to signal a strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, strengthening a relationship that has been in place since the early 2000s but has occasionally been adversaries.

Although the two parties have repeatedly shortened the original arrangement, both have acknowledged the necessity to revise it to better reflect modern-day international realities.

What were now contentious ties between Moscow and Tehran have been impacted by the conflict in Ukraine, the decay of relations between Russia and the global West, and the growing US-China conflicts.

The conflict in Ukraine appears to have altered Russia’s perspective, even if it was previously cautious not to give sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, mainly due to potential negative West-related reactions.

Iran has become a crucial position in its political rebalancing, and Moscow has made an incessant pivot toward Asia. Moscow is exceedingly seeing Iran as a significant partner because it is a heavily sanctioned condition and crucial for Russia’s expansion into the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

The current situation is unlikely to change with Donald Trump’s election. Although it is possible to reach an agreement between Moscow and Washington, the tensions between the two countries are conspicuous nevertheless.

Russia may continue to support its ties to the Islamic Republic. The former, too, is expected to experience greater stress from the Trump presidency, driving it to get greater military and political participation with Moscow.

The potential strategic partnership treaty’s major, important details are not made publicly available. However, an examination of Iranian and Russian government official public statements reveals a number of potential areas for improved diplomatic assistance.

The strategic partnership will unavoidably highlight the opposing positions of the Western-led international order and encourage a more multilateral one. Russia and Iran both support non-Western initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ) and the BRICS.

The development of the International North-South Transport Corridor ( INSTC ), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India, and new payment options for international currency exchange, which are both important since trade between the two nations has recently declined.

Bilateral defense and strategic assistance will be a second, much more important area, as evidenced by Iran’s alleged supply of Russian short-range ballistic missiles and military drones. Later in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that the agreement would involve more defence <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2024/10/31/russia-says-upcoming-treaty-with-iran-includes-closer-defense-cooperation”>cooperation.

Moscow and Tehran have also made an effort to work together to address regional concerns in the South Caucasus, where they border and whose goal is to keep non-regional ( mostly Western ) players at bay.

This thinking is at the root of the 3 3 program, which Tehran and Russia simultaneously support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, notably Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has consistently refused to participate according to Russia’s activity of 20 % of its territory.

The new Russo-Iranian contract, which will undoubtedly grow cooperation, will probably end in vain because of their complex relationship as both companions and rivals in the Middle East. A legally binding alliance with iron-clad commitments to joint protection is neither required nor desired by either side.

Alternatively, both seek expanded assistance that gives enough space for movement. In fact, the two nations ‘ combined size allows them to avoid narrowing down their individual foreign policy objectives. They have so far avoided placing a singular adversary or professional at risk because it would restrict their options for international policy.

Despite the growing defense collaboration, diplomatic conflicts persist. Iran has reported that it is awaiting the distribution of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jet, which may indicate that the country is trying to balance its relations with another Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s impact and activities there.

Another level of tension lies in local infrastructure. The Zangezur hall, a proposed transportation route connecting Armenia and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik state, which edges Iran, has just received Russian support.

Iran opposes this hall, citing both its own local influence and its challenging connection with Armenia.

Most significantly, maybe, Russia is apparently afraid to go along with Iran in its worsening conflict with Israel. Iran is well-known for its close ties to Russia, and Israel has always had a particular connection with Moscow.

In part because of its close ties to the Jewish state, Russia has also been careful about offering military aid to Iran.

The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military activities in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major transitions in Russia’s demeanor toward Israel. Moscow has generally adopted a pro-Palestinian place, and there are more differences.

Russia is also unlikely to support Iran in any possible immediate conflict with Israel, despite this bad backdrop. Even though it is technically feasible that Russia could supply air defense and aerospace to Iran to thwart an invasion, developing experience in using them takes time ( at least three months for the S-400 air defense system ).

The Russo-Iranian partnership, rooted in common resistance to American dominance, is logical but instantly fraught with competition. Russia is skeptical of Iran’s work to expand its international relations, especially if it wants to re-engage with the West.

Also, Iranian officials view Russia’s support as partially greedy, noting Moscow’s shift in attitude regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to force the West amid the Ukraine conflict.

Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new corporate contract, which will allow for both heightened cooperation and mute conflict, despite these difficulties. The relationship may strengthen while preserving each nation’s freedom on a global scale thanks to the agreement.

Emil Avdaliani&nbsp, is a professor of global relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road professor. Following Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani

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Friend or foe? Southeast Asia braces for Trump 2.0 – Asia Times

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BANGKOK – As Southeast Asian nations grapple with US President-elect Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant language and business war threats, the approaching party’s next trip will set the region’s trade-dependent nations on edge and its autocratic regimes at ease.

” In his first term, he]Trump ] did not exhibit interest in the promotion of democracy or human rights”, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, a former Thai foreign minister and trade representative, said in an interview. ” This trend is expected to continue.

” Administrations in Southeast Asia will feel less or no stress on this front,” sage Kantathi predicted.

Those officials, including in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, all seen as leaning toward China, can expect less clash from Washington in responding to their lack of good votes, free speech and other animal rights-related issues, which Democrat administrations like the cheerful Joe Biden state generally emphasize.

Provincial leaders reportedly change their political stances in response to Trump’s unpredictable behavior.

” Under his strongman administration, a personal connection with him has heightened price,” Kantathi said”. The advantage will be those who can accurately compliment Trump. Charm offensive abilities may be made more valuable.

The former leading minister added that “government officials who favor a transactional approach and dedication to work toward a deal harmony with the US will be seen in a good light.”

As businesses seek to relocate their operations from China to Southeast Asia in order to avoid Trump’s tariffs, Trump’s return to power could lead to a US-China trade war, according to analysts.

A first trade war salvo on a few Chinese goods, which Trump had previously won, spooked many businesses and prevented them from entering Southeast Asia and from China to avoid tariffs and quotas on “made-in-China” goods and services. Vietnam was one of the victims of that migration, but others might benefit from a larger exodus in the future.

If US President-elect Donald Trump follows his threat to radically increase tariffs on Chinese goods, Cambodia could be a major winner, according to a recent online article from the Phnom Penh-based Khmer Times. According to the statement,” US companies are already looking for alternative sources of goods to shift their production from China to the kingdom [Cambodia].”

Cambodia Chamber of Commerce vice president Lim Heng told the local publication,” We know all about the]trade ] war threat between China and America. Chinese companies will be more reliant on this threat to invest in Cambodia.

He predicted that” chinese businesses and regional businesses will invest in Cambodia and export to the US, Europe, and other countries.”

Cambodian exports of clothing, electrical goods, raw materials, and travel accessories could benefit from new US tariffs, which Trump has suggested will rise to 60 % for all goods made in China and 20 % elsewhere.

Still, regional countries will rue having to make the push-comes-to-shove choice of backing either the US or China if the world’s two biggest economies wage an all-out trade war.

Some people worry that Trump’s tariffs will put more of China’s excess goods in nearby Southeast Asian markets, putting more low-cost, competitive pressure on local manufacturers and businesses.

A Bangkok Post editorial warned on November 8 that the Thai government should be careful not to be perceived as having an unfavorably close relationship with China or acting as a hub for Chinese investors.

” We want to be loved by China. We want to be loved by America”, said Thailand’s Commerce Minister Pichai Naripthaphan in September before Trump’s election win.

However, some in Asia believe that America, which is battling hostilities and wars across the globe and that needs friends and allies, is becoming increasingly desperate.

According to Wanwichit Boonprong, a lecturer in political science at Bangkok’s Rangsit University,” Southeast Asia now has more bargaining power than before and sees that the United States will re-enter the conflict in the South China Sea.” Therefore, America’s position is not as strong as before.”

Indeed, China appears to be gaining in regional influence.

” He]Trump ] should know that in recent years, Chinese capital has had a huge influence in]Southeast Asian ] countries, both legally and illegally, and many countries are happy to accept it because of their geopolitical location that is very close to China, coupled with the fact that many countries have Chinese descent, and in terms of culture or tradition it is easy to accept being Chinese,” Wanwichit said.

For instance, during the anti-communist purges and extrajudicial killings that targeted ethnic Chinese throughout the archipelagora during the old Cold War, China was Indonesia‘s adversary.

Today, Beijing has built a Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure-building program and has poured billions into the nation’s nickel industry, a key element in the global transition to electric vehicles ( EVs ).

He should be aware that several Asian nations have increasingly sought to maintain balance between China and the US as a result of the rise of China in the [Southeast Asian ] region and what appears to be Washington’s diminished interest there. This includes Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia,” Paul Chambers, a Southeast Asian security affairs specialist at Naresuan University, said in an interview.

Regional nations that believe China exerts excessive pressure on itself for power and influence may concur with Trump’s resumption of the presidency.

” Given Trump’s demonstrated anti-China policy in his first term, his return to office in 2024 points to more economic and security benefits for countries feeling bullied by China in Asia, namely Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Japan, and South Korea,” Chambers said.

” Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia are the frontline states in the eyes of the United States as a result of China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea,” Kasit Piromya, another former Thai foreign minister, said in an interview.

Washington and Bangkok enjoy close diplomatic, economic, and, especially, military relations – all of which are expected to continue under Trump.

” If Trump offers positive inducements to the Thai military, relations will improve,” Chambers, an expert in the Thai military, said.

Thailand, a non-NATO US treaty ally, excels at balancing its relations with China and the US delicately by looking for the advantages that each superpower offers the country.

Trump’s return to the White House coincides with the US Pentagon’s hopes to sell Lockheed Martin’s F-16 warplanes to Thailand against strong competition from Sweden’s Saab-made Gripen E/F fighter aircraft.

Eight AH-6″ Little Bird combat helicopters are currently being built by US defense contractor Boeing for the Royal Thai Army, and Thai pilots will soon be trained at Yuma Proving Ground in Mesa, Arizona.

In July, a couple of Beechcraft/Textron AT-6TH Wolverine light attack aircraft were delivered from its Providence, Rhode Island-based factory to Thailand’s air force.

Possible options include arming the Wolverines with laser-guided bombs, AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and other weapons. A dozen patrol boats were given to the Thai Marine Police by the US a year ago.

In October, US Ambassador to Thailand Chusak Sirinil, a minister, met with the prime minister’s office to discuss how the US is ready to work with Thailand in a number of areas, including modernizing the military, battling drugs, and strengthening economic ties. Chusak said”, Thailand remains a steadfast ally of the United States.”

Countries like Cambodia could face new scrutiny for their close financial ties with Chinese companies that have profited from the nation’s real estate, natural resources, tourism, and other industries if Trump adopts a targeted hard line against Beijing and its regional allies.

US-Cambodia relations are already strained by Washington’s criticism of Phnom Penh’s slide toward authoritarianism and human rights clampdown. Cambodia has accused the US of interfering with its internal affairs and even suggested that the country attempted to start a” color revolution” to overthrow previous Prime Minister Hun Sen’s regime.

Additionally, according to Phnom Penh’s repeated denials, the US believes that Cambodia has entered a secret pact that grants China access to its Ream Naval Base along the Gulf of Thailand.

Senate President Hun Sen, who allegedly hoped to bolster ties with Trump, optimistically posted on his Facebook page:

” Before the election, Donald Trump sent a message to the American people and around the world about loving peace, war-hating, ]and ] so-called pacifism. Trump’s victory demonstrates that Americans prefer peace over a direct conflict with Israel and Ukraine.

Since 1978, Richard Ehrlich has been a foreign correspondent for the American government in Bangkok. Excerpts from his two new nonfiction books”, Rituals. Killers. Wars. &amp, Sex. — Tibet, India, Nepal, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka &amp, New York “and” Apocalyptic Tribes, Smugglers &amp, Freaks “are available <a href="https://asia-correspondent.tumblr.com/”>here.

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