Bolen C – Sure A Not

Trump failing to grasp China’s long-game trade war tactics – Asia Times

On: May 8, 2025

In: Asia

As US and Chinese staff prepare to meet in Switzerland in an effort to alleviate their escalating trade conflict, a possible sign of Beijing’s view has emerged in an opinion piece published in the state-owned book Beijing Daily.

Articles in the publication are often seen as a reflection of Beijing’s official stance. The latest piece – Today, it is necessary to revisit” On Protracted War”– argues that the trade war is an American attempt to strangle China’s economic growth and that it is necessary to perceive the current trade tensions as a long-term development.

What’s particularly important here is that the title refers to former Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s 1938 essay” On Protracted War“, a piece of writing that set out Mao’s approach to combating the invading Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945.

This strategy was also key to the subsequent establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, after the communist victory in the long-running Chinese civil war. Mao became the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from 1943 until his death in 1976 and created a set of political theories referred to as Maoism. He wrote extensively on political strategy.

Chinese policymakers and media figures often invoke the nation’s history to justify domestic and foreign policy. And the decision to reference Mao’s text reflects not only China’s strategy in the current trade war but also the lasting influence of his ideas.

Mao’s 1938 essay described a struggle that might seem, at first glance, a world away from the current China/US tariff conflict. His key thesis was that guerrilla warfare was a long-term affair with little chance for a quick victory.

Mao’s argument was that a war of attrition would end with a Chinese victory as it would slowly bleed the conventionally stronger Japanese forces of resources.

Such an approach has been a key feature of insurgencies throughout the modern world, with movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan using the long war of attrition against larger or more technologically advanced foes.

By invoking On Protracted War, it would appear that Beijing perceives its economic struggles with the US as a conflict without a swift resolution, something that may come as a shock to Donald Trump, who is clearly signaling that he now wants a deal.

This long-view approach has also been reflected in how Beijing has been preparing for a second Trump trade war ever since its experiences in the first Trump presidency.

In contrast to China, the US administration appears to have banked on the trade war being a comparatively brief affair that should be ended by a quick and decisive knock-out blow against Beijing. And a public relations coup for Trump.

This explains the showmanship behind the” Liberation Day” announcements and the speed at which Washington deployed its key moves.

But by preparing its citizens for a protracted trade war, it would appear that China’s strategy, similarly to Mao’s, is to slow down the process and grind out the best deal it can over time.

Beijing believes that Chinese consumers are more capable of “eating bitterness” ( coping with hardship ) than Americans. So, US diplomats would be well advised to dip into” On Protracted War” to understand more of China’s President Xi’s intentions.

Mao’s long shadow

However, this is not the only way in which Mao’s strategies are relevant to global politics right now.

Another of Mao’s political ideas was what he termed the “people’s war”. This envisioned a slow movement where one group creates” shadow institutions” that gradually displace established ones in order to build support from the local population.

This echoes part of China’s approach to&nbsp, globalization, where China has supported or created alternatives to US-led institutions.

Many of Beijing’s international institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Belt and Road Initiative, are created to be alternatives to more established international bodies, such as the IMF and the World Bank. These Beijing felt were too dominated by the US.

While China has worked on this policy for decades, it seems to chime with Trump’s lack of commitment to US involvement in international institutions, such as the IMF and NATO. In this aspect of international politics, Xi and Trump seem to have somewhat similar goals, and could open up more space for Chinese leadership of these institutions.

It’s becoming clear that the Trump administration has severely miscalculated by assuming that Beijing would quickly capitulate, showing a lack of understanding of Chinese culture and political history. The expected instant deal has failed to materialize, and US stores are now warning that shelves may soon be empty of many goods.

The trade war has become a war of attrition, and whatever moves Xi makes now are likely to be only his first in what he sees as a very long game, in the great Maoist tradition.

Tom Harper is lecturer in international relations, University of East London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Prabowo’s US-China balancing act of ‘1,000 friends, zero enemies’ – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 8, 2025

In: Asia

A staff of diplomats from Indonesia has been in Washington for much of April and into May to examine trading relations with the world’s largest economy, which is expected to be in the Top 5 in a generation.

The Southeast Asian nation was one of the hardest hit by President Donald Trump’s proposed 32 % charge on its exports to the US, which included the broad-based taxes that were announced on April 2, 2025. Trump then reversed, allowing any additional taxes to go beyond the new 10 % required for a 90-day wait.

Indonesia, whose second-largest export industry is the United States, has so far indicated that it will negotiate with the United States more than retaliate with sanctions like some other nations that Trump has targeted, such as China and Canada.

Indonesia might actually make concessions by relaxing protectionist measures intended to boost domestic companies. People who have known me for a while may say I’m the most patriotic, but we must be realistic, said President Prabowo Subianto.

Trump’s tax plan is a significant first test for Subianto, a right-wing political whose view was shaped by years of military service. He views Indonesia and its place in the world as a whole through the lens of skeptic power politics, aiming to ensure that Indonesia has the necessary hard military might and strong financial standing.

Subianto hopes that by pushing both, Indonesia is not simply swayed by international control and can prevent local unrest as a result of any economic malaise.

His decision to rule the country of 280 million people is motivated by his desire to maintain friendly relations with both China and the United States by working closely with them for both economic and protection.

Two men in suits walk towards the camera. — On April 16, 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono meet at the State Department in Washington, DC. Jim Watson / AFP via Getty Images/ The Talk

Great neighbors, multilateral development

Indonesia’s foreign policy has been tied to the” Bebas dan Aktif,” or” Free and Active,” doctrine since it formally gained its independence from the Netherlands almost 80 years ago.

The policy was developed by the nation’s first president, Sukarno, at the start of the Cold War to keep the nation formally nonaligned from any significant power union. While Jakarta continued to be an established independent in international policy while getting much closer to the West and the US during the later long-term authoritarian president of Suharto.

Subianto served in the military under the leadership of Suharto, who at one place was even his father-in-law. Subianto has pledged to implement a “zero foes, one thousand friends” as Indonesia’s head. That strategy comes from two fundamental points.

Second, he tries to secure financial contracts that will help him deliver on his promise of 8 % economic development. Next, he wants to improve security cooperation and defense procurement to develop Indonesia’s military position.

Toward globalism

Subianto has attempted to reframe some of the ideas that have long governed Jakarta’s foreign policy plan as a part of his eyesight.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, has been Indonesia’s collective security buffer for decades, acting as a crucial component of its” Mandala” or” concentric circles” approach to foreign policy.

But, Indonesia’s absence from the ASEAN casual interviews on Myanmar in December 2024 shows that the current leadership has so far shown an unwillingness to use the local system as a tool for projecting strength.

That is just one of several signs that Subianto is trying to change Indonesia’s function from a local actor to a prominent global player.

With the country joining the BRICS group of nations in January 2025, the first time a Southeast Asian nation has been admitted, a critical step in that more confrontational approach was made.

Indonesia has begun discussions with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as additional steps toward multilateral cooperation.

Subianto’s view, which states,” If you’re not at the desk, you’re likely to end up on the menu,” is at the heart of much of this impulse toward international wedding.

critical relationships

However, the crucial connections are still held by the US and China despite Subianto’s wider international ambitions.

Subianto made his first international diplomatic trip to China during the first few days of his administration. As a result, there were contracts between China and Indonesia value up to US$ 10 billion, with a focus on clean technology and technology.

The visit can be seen as part of a broader shift toward Beijing, which was particularly notable given that Jakarta appeared to move closer to China’s position on conflicting geographical says in the South China Sea.

In Beijing, China, Xi Jinping meets Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. Photo: Florence Lo / Getty Images via The Talk

Presently a profitable export market for Indonesian goods is China’s large population. China has outperformed the US and Japan as Indonesia’s main trade market since 2016 and is now its biggest exporter.

In light of Trump’s taxes, that trend is likely to increase as Jakarta works to reduce the cost of American business. Even though Jakarta has indicated independence regarding the wider US-Chinese conflict, Jakarta and Beijing came to an agreement in mid-April to improve bilateral security participation in the South China Sea.

The US also occupies a significant area in Subianto’s head. Subianto, a young man, received training in cybersecurity and special forces at US military installations.

He was afterwards ordered to leave the US for travel from 2000 to 2020 because of the numerous human rights violations he had committed while working for Indonesia’s special forces device, Kopassus, which resulted in his being forcefully expelled from the Indonesian army in 1998.

Subianto was appointed as Indonesia’s security minister by then-President Joko Widodo, but the ban was voided after that administration’s first Trump administration. He was then invited to Washington in 2020.

In November of this year, Subianto’s next official presidential residence was in Washington. Subianto and President Joe Biden spoke about diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the US, regional security issues, and various global issues while on the road. Additionally, Subianto contacted President-elect Trump for a simple phone call to congratulate him on winning the election.

Given the stakes of the joint trading relationship, it is likely that Trump will have a significant relationship right now.

After China, the US is Indonesia’s second-largest buying partner. In 2024, Indonesia exported$ 28.3 billion to the US while importing$ 20.2 billion. This amount of trade was estimated to be worth about$ 38.3 billion.

An Indonesian trade delegation has been negotiating with Trump administration officials in an effort to avoid tariffs of 32 %, indicating its desire to purchase more American products, negotiate trade agreements, and even lower native content demands for Indonesian-made products to allow for more American-made parts.

promoting expediency

Of course, Indonesia and the US continue to differ, not just in terms of their current deal dispute but also in other areas, including the Israel-Hamas conflict. The largest Muslim-majority nation in the world has long supported Israeli rights and had a strong grip on Israeli plan.

Subianto also appears to be open to rationality, with reviews that the Indonesian government is reportedly promoting normalization of ties with Israel in an effort to alleviate adherence to the OECD.

In a similar vein, one can anticipate that Subianto will prioritize Indonesia’s security and defense participation with Trump while avoiding any potential conflicts that may arise.

Indonesia is pursuing a international policy under Subianto that emphasizes the value of maintaining strong and active diplomatic ties with the US. It is also strengthening its partnership with China at the same time. And aside from both, it is asserting its individual independence by strengthening its standing in numerous multilateral organizations.

How Subianto handles all of these relationships is likely to determine the course of his administration.

Gilang Kembara is a research fellow at Nanyang Technological University.

The Conversation has republished this post under a Creative Commons license. Learn the article’s introduction.

Europe repositioning between US and China in new global order – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 8, 2025

In: Asia, World

The term that perhaps best describes the international impact of the first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second term is “disruption.”

His tariff policy, his abolition of USAID, his questioning of the transatlantic alliance, and his attempted rapprochement with Russia have neither destroyed the liberal international order nor established anything new in its place.

But the prospects of liberal internationalism under Trump are vanishingly small. And Trumpism, in the guise of an “America First” foreign policy, is likely to outlast Trump’s second term.

That the US is no longer the standard bearer of the liberal international order has been clear for some time. Trump and his Russian and Chinese counterparts, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, appear to see themselves as dominant players in a new multipolar world order. But it is not clear that a grand bargain between them is possible – or that it would endure.

Europe is particularly vulnerable to these changes in the international order. Having been able to rely for the past eight decades on an iron-clad American security guarantee, European countries have chronically underinvested in their defense capabilities, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Defense spending as a proportion of GDP may have increased over the past decade, but remains lackluster. And investment in an independent European defense industrial base faces many hurdles.

These deficiencies predated Trump’s return to the White House. Addressing them will only be possible in a time frame beyond his second term. With no dependable partners left among the world’s great powers, Europe’s predicament – unenviable as it may be for the moment – nonetheless offers an opportunity for the continent to begin to stand on its own feet.

Early signs of a more independent Europe are promising. In March, the European Commission released a white paper on defense which anticipates defense investment of €800 billion ($903.5 billion) over the next four years.

The bulk of this will rely on the activation of the so-called “national escape clause”. This allows EU member states to escape penalties if they exceed the normal deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP.

Once activated for the purpose of defense spending, they can now take on additional debt of up to 1.5% of their GDP. By the end of April, 12 EU member states had already requested that the national escape clause be activated, with several more expected to follow.

Defense is clearly the most urgent problem for Europe. But it isn’t the only aspect to consider when it comes to achieving greater strategic autonomy, something that the European Union has grappled with for more than a decade. In other areas, such as trade and energy, the starting point is a very different one.

Regarding energy independence, the EU has achieved a remarkable and quick pivot away from Russia. It has just released a final plan to stop all remaining gas imports from Russia by the end of 2027.

On trade, Trump’s America First tariff policy has done significant damage to the global system. This has, in turn, created opportunities for the EU, as one of the world’s largest trading blocs, including greater cooperation with China, already one of its largest trading partners.

Complex relationships

China and the EU clearly share an interest in preserving a global trade regime from which both have benefited. But their economic interests cannot be separated easily from their geopolitical interests. So far, China has sent very mixed signals to Europe.

Beijing has, for example, proposed to lift sanctions against some members of the European Parliament who have been critical of China in a show of goodwill. But China’s support for Russia continues as well, most recently with Xi’s commitment to visit Moscow for the Victory Day parade on May 9.

Standing with Moscow may benefit Beijing in its rivalry with the US by solidifying the “no-limits partnership” that Xi and Putin announced on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. But it does little to win the EU over as a partner in defense of the open international order that Trump is trying his best to shutter.

On the contrary, in reaffirming China’s commitment to its partnership with Russia, Xi may well have lost whatever chances there were for a European realignment with China.

The complexities of the EU-China and EU-US relationships – a curious mix of rapidly shifting interests – reflect the EU’s position as the natural center of gravity of what is left of the West.

This is evident in the rapid evolution of the “coalition of the willing” in support of Ukraine, which brings together 30 countries from across the EU and NATO under French and British leadership.

Beyond Europe, Trump’s tariff policy has given plans for a strategic partnership between the EU and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) a new lease of life.

The CPTPP is a group of 11 Indo-Pacific countries and the UK, which joined last December. It is one of the world’s largest free trade areas, accounting for approximately 15% of global GDP.

Even without US and Chinese membership, a partnership between the EU and the CPTPP would wield significant power in the global economic system and could play a future role in shielding its members from an intensifying US-China trade war.

Limited alternatives

None of the steps taken by the EU and its partners on the continent and elsewhere require the breakdown in the transatlantic relationship that the Trump administration appears keen to engineer. But speeches by both US Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were clear that America’s relationship with Europe is changing.

Washington, under its current leadership, increasingly leans towards the political forces in Europe that are opposed to the values on which the continent has been oriented since 1945. This leaves Europe few options but to seek more independence from the US.

A more independent Europe is unlikely to become a global superpower on par with the US or China. But it will be better able to hold its own in a geopolitical environment that is less based on rules and more on power.

The EU currently enjoys historically high approval ratings among its citizens – who also support more unity and a more active role for the EU in protecting them from global security risks.

It’s increasingly clear that EU leaders and their partners have a unique opportunity – and an obligation – to carve out a more secure and independent space in a hostile global environment.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The most dangerous man in America isn’t Trump—it’s Alex Karp – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 8, 2025

In: Asia

Alex Karp doesn’t appear to be a warmonger. The Palantir CEO frequently appears in bizarre outfits and crazy hair, quoting Nietzsche or St. Augustine as though he were giving a TED Talk on techno-humanism.

But a plain truth is hidden behind the literary sarcasm and philosophical posturing: Karp is creating the operating system for a permanent war. And he is succeeding.

Karp was treated in Silicon Valley for years as a enthusiasm because he was too strange, harsh, and connected to the military-industrial complex. He again said,” We were the monster show,” and he was half-proud, half-wounded.

He isn’t just inside the tent immediately, though. He’s creating the framework for a novel form of techno-authoritarianism in which AI becomes the field rather than just observes the field.

AIP, Palantir’s main solution, is now used in US military operations. On a scale that would make the National Security Agency ( NSA ) blush, it assists with target acquisition, battlefield logistics, drone coordination, predictive policing, and data fusion.

Karp boasts that it unfairly disadvantages the “honorable soldiers of the West” in a bp. When the romantic rhetoric is removed, what he’s giving is computational supremacy: a war waged by a machine, guided by code, and marketed patriotically.

And it’s business America that is purchasing. BP, AIG, Hertz, Citi, and yet BP now use Palantir’s product. The distinction between a military application and a human app is vanishing.

Surveillance technology was originally developed for use in battle, and it is now monitoring both people and customers. Karp doesn’t just want to be in charge of the Pentagon. He desires Palantir in institutions like schools, institutions, judges, and institutions.

His technological prowess are what make him so risky, as is his belief structure. Like Moses on a mountain top, Karp speaks about” transforming techniques” and “rebuilding institutions.”

However, a more chilling message is hidden beneath the biblical tone: the conviction that democratic drag—messy deliberation, open resistance, and moral caution—cannot be avoided. He’s selling necessity, no tools.

Karp keeps his elections a secret. He is pro-military, anti-transparency, and blatantly disapproving of Silicon Valley’s prudery. Karp says the quiet part of the equation: Palantir is here to wage war against incompetence, government, and local enemies, while other Directors flirt with ethics sheets and empty letters.

He lambastes the notion that liberal hand-wringing or social reticence should be used to restrain technology. The spiritual map is no longer relevant to Karp. Effectiveness is what is important: disruption, dominance, and implementation. He speaks with a desire to improve, destroy, and implement power rather than just to assist it.

This isn’t a CEO trying to find harmony; rather, it’s a man creating the application part of the security status and calling it independence. The application decides which issues are for solving rather than just solving them.

According to Karp, Palantir’s fall is a “massive social shift.” He’s correct. America is more and more into rate, simulated command, and security. His methods provide all three.

And unlike Mark Zuckerberg from Meta or Elon Musk from SpaceX, who still believe to sell cultural goods, Karp makes no apologies. He’s delighted that his software supports predicting dragnet surveillance, ICE assaults, and missile strikes. He refers to it as development.

And it is successful. Palantir is now one of the most expensive security companies in US story, trading at 200x projected income. Washington and Wall Street both love him more.

He has now delivered TITAN cars to the US Army and spearheaded the AI-enabled Maven programme, which converts satellite data into instant reach knowledge. Imperial logistics refers to imperial logistics, not only facilities.

The rest of us may be alarmed, despite the philosopher-warrior regular impressing investors and hawks of national security. Karp is promoting a future in which wars don’t require people aid, but rather a backend.

He’s advocating for a conscience that is coded out of every human interaction to get processed, scored, and used.

If Orwell had given us more information about Big Brother, Karp is silently establishing his rule structure. Instead of propaganda or fuss, use purchasing contracts and Program boards. Not in secret with shady spymasters, but in entire view with press releases and Q1 income calls.

Karp sells architecture—digital, full, and lasting, unlike individuals, who sell websites. His greatest risk lies in the way he appears to be. He wears Patagonia, quotes gospel, and appears to be a great professor.

A man is tasked with setting the stage for a future where ambiguity, dissent, and humanity are just another inefficiency to become engineered up.

His vision is absolutely terrifying in many ways, including total awareness, preventive decision-making, and seamless militarization of every institution. Keep an eye on Alex Karp while the multimedia ponders over Trump’s drama.

The most hazardous American male rules instead of yelling.

Bad Vatican deal with China may sink a papal conclave favorite – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

This week, global media covering of the selection of a Roman Catholic Church leader to replace Pope Francis, who died April 21, mostly has focused on the contest between candidates who favor Francis’s relatively liberal outreach on social issues and those preferring the sterner outlooks of his two predecessors, John Paul II and Benedict XVI.

This week, on the eve of the conclave in which 133 Cardinals gather in Vatican City to select a new Pontiff, headlines turned to one of the front-runners, Cardinal Pietro Parolin – and not in a way that might favor his election.

Though debates over hot-button issues like abortion, women’s place in Church governance and sexual identity stoke controversies, Parolin’s candidacy attracted attention over a distant issue: The Catholic Church’s rocky relations with China.

Pope Francis is welcomed by Vatican State Secretary Cardinal Parolin before boarding a plane at Fiumicino airport in Rome — Pope Francis is welcomed by Vatican State Secretary Cardinal Pietro Parolin (L) before boarding a plane at Fiumicino airport in Rome May 24, 2014. Phoyo: Asia Times files /Tony Gentile / Reuters

Parolin was Francis’s Secretary of State, a job usually reserved for the Pope’s closest advisor. It also put Parolin in charge of foreign relations. In that role, Parolin negotiated a 2018 agreement with the People’s Republic on collaboration in the selection of bishops in China.

The results have received negative reviews. China ignored the accord and went ahead to appoint bishops without consulting, or even informing, Francis.

One question that gained traction this week is whether the apparent failure will sink Parolin’s chances to succeed to the Throne of Peter.

Parolin negotiated and signed onto the 2018 agreement. The Pope declared it a breakthrough and Parolin told reporters that he was still in charge. “There is a dialogue on potential candidates, but Rome nominates, the Pope nominates, that’s clear,” he said.

Well, not so clear. China’s leader-for-life Xi Jinping viewed it more of a suggestion than a concession. China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs issued regulations that ignored the accord. Only the state and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which it runs as a subordinate agency, are involved in selecting bishops. Beijing did not hesitate to appoint them, not even informing the Vatican.

In 2023, China announced the appointment of Shen Bin to head the Church in Shanghai, the country’s largest diocese. The Vatican only learned about the “installation” of Bishop Shen from media reports, after the fact. When asked to comment on the event, the Church Press Office spokesperson responded, “For the moment, I have nothing to say about the Holy See’s assessment of the matter.”

The Pope later authorized the appointment ex post facto.

Cardinal Pietro Parolin, left, poses for a photo with Bishop Joseph Shen Bin of Shanghai at a conference at the Pontifical Urban University in Rome on May 21, 2024. Photo: Elise Ann Allen /Crux

Parolin took center stage in defending the Pope’s acquiescence despite the breach. Francis “decided nevertheless to rectify the canonical irregularity,” he said in a statement. Parolin argued that it was necessary to maintain “open dialogue” and a “respectful encounter with the Chinese side.”

He nonetheless insisted that under the 2018 agreement, it is “indispensable that all episcopal appointments in China … be made by consensus, as agreed, and to keep alive the spirit of dialogue between the parties.”

“Together we must prevent disharmonious situations that create disagreements and misunderstandings,” he said.

Beijing ignored the combined rebuke and appeal. Last year, it doubled down on unilateral appointments. It appointed Ji Weizhou as a bishop in Lyuliang, a town in Shanxi Province, according to a Chinese government statement. Moreover, the Lyuliang diocese was created the same moment the appointment was made.

Francis nonetheless recognized the legitimacy of the new diocese and its bishop on January 20 this year. The official Vatican statement said Francis had simply “remedied” the situation.

If that was not enough to show Beijing’s intentions, China appointed two new bishops, one (an auxilliary bishop) for Shanghai and another for Henan province, in late April – after Francis had died. Under Vatican rules, such episcopal appointments cannot be made between the time of a Pope’s death and the election of a successor.

With the conclave underway, no one is in a position to comment on the report – certainly not Parolin, who is sequestered with the other Cardinals as they decide who will succeed Francis.

“Beijing is reiterating the autonomy of the Church in China, to test Francis’s successor over the [2018] Agreement,” surmised AsiaNews, a Catholic journal.

Despite the apparent snafus, supporters of Francis’s policiy counsel patience. “The past 10 years were not the ideal international context to approach and discuss with China,” says Michel Chambon, a researcher at the National University of Shanghai. “The Vatican does need working relationships with the most powerful world powers. You cannot not have a working relationship with China.”

The conflicts over appointments of bishops ran parallel with the persecution of Catholic worshipers who don’t accept the government intrusion into Church affairs as well as followers of other Christian sects that are not authorized to preach in the country.

A 2024 report published by ChinaAid, a US-based Christian human rights organization, said at least fifty Protestant Christian pastors had been detained or sentenced in 2023, with fifteen receiving prison terms of at least five years. Supporters of clandestine “house churches,” where the faithful worship in secret, are being charged with operating “illegal businesses.” Punishments include fines, freezing of bank accounts and bans on children taking part in in religious activities.

A report by the Hudson Institute, a US-based think tank, said that ten Catholic bishops and laymen preaching outside government-authorized churches have been jailed over the past decade, some sentenced for several years. In a few cases, they have been imprisoned simply for refusing to join the officially sanctioned Patriotic Church.

In 2024, Human Rights Watch, the New York-based rights watchdog, advised the Pope to exit the 2018 accord, which was up for renewal that year. “Even when the agreement was first signed, it was clear that China under President Xi Jinping was highly repressive, including toward religious freedom,” HRW said.

Francis extended the accord for another four years.

Besides Parolin, other papal hopefuls have been caught up in the Vatican-China maelstrom. On a visit to Shanghai last year for a conference, Cardinal Luis Antonio Tagle, a Filipino bishop of Chinese descent, acknowledged “problems, misunderstandings and incidents,” in relations between the Catholic Church and China. Nonetheless, he played down the controversies. There was “never any lukewarm-ness or indifference towards the path of the Catholic Church in China,” he said.

Cardinal Matteo Zuppi, an Italian also considered a “papabile,” or a possible choice, also visited China in 2013, but was quick to emphasize he was trying find a way to end the Ukraine war, not fix relations with the Forbidden City. “The visit forms as another step of the mission desired by the Pope to sustain humanitarian initiatives and to seek paths that may lead to a just peace,” read a Vatican Press Office statement about Zuppi’s visit.

Is Parolin’s starring role in the China story a poison chalice for his candidacy? His closeness to Francis made him a favorite. Monday’s first day of the conclave ended without someone being named Pope, and it’s a secret whether Parolin’s status as favorite is alive or not.

Huge changes in South Korean political system afoot as vote looms – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

As South Korea approaches what may become the most consequential presidential election in its modern democratic history, two principal democratic institutions – the judiciary and the legislature – are accelerating toward a critical inflection point.

At the heart of this confrontation lies Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung, whose ongoing legal entanglements have triggered an institutional contest between the imperatives of the rule of law and the legitimacy of an electoral mandate.

What began as a legal proceeding involving alleged violations of the Public Official Election Act has rapidly evolved into a broader institutional contest with long-term implications for South Korean democracy. With just weeks remaining before the June 3 national election, both the judiciary and the legislature appear determined to assert their respective domains and competing visions of democratic authority.

The result is an escalating struggle that may redefine the nation’s democratic foundations for decades to come.

Accelerated judicial process

The judiciary, notably the Supreme Court and Seoul High Court, has pursued Lee’s case with exceptional urgency. At issue are statements he made during a prior election campaign. Prosecutors charged him with violating the Public Official Election Act by knowingly disseminating false information – an offense that carries criminal liability under South Korean law.

After years of conflicting rulings in lower courts, the legal process took a dramatic turn in April 2025 when the Supreme Court overturned an appellate court’s acquittal. The case was remanded to the Seoul High Court with instructions to re-examine it under a presumption of guilt. Within hours of receiving the file, the High Court assigned the case to a criminal division, scheduled the first hearing for May 15, and issued a personal summons to Lee – an unusually expedited move aimed at accelerating proceedings.

Even the Supreme Court’s own timeline was extraordinary. The verdict was issued just 34 days after the appeal was accepted and only nine days after it was referred to the Grand Bench – a procedural velocity virtually unprecedented in the South Korean legal system.

Legal analysts view this swift action as judicial activism intended to ensure that voters are fully informed about the case ahead of the election, reinforcing institutional accountability amid political turbulence.

Legislative response

In parallel, the Democratic Party-led National Assembly has launched a series of legislative initiatives that, if enacted, would dramatically reshape the balance of power among South Korea’s democratic institutions.

On the same day the High Court announced Lee’s retrial, the Democratic Party introduced a bill to amend the Criminal Procedure Act. This amendment would suspend criminal proceedings against any presidential candidate once elected – effectively granting temporary immunity while in office.

At the same time, the party has proposed changes to the Court Organization Act to increase the number of Supreme Court justices from 14 to 30. While publicly framed as a response to case backlogs and judicial inefficiency, critics argue it is a transparent attempt at court-packing – a way to shift the ideological balance of the judiciary in favor of the ruling bloc.

Most controversially, an amendment to the Constitutional Court Act has been proposed that would permit constitutional petitions against final court rulings. Currently, such decisions are immune from constitutional review – a safeguard meant to preserve judicial independence and finality.

Critics warn that if enacted, the amendment would open the door to retroactive legal challenges initiated for political reasons, eroding judicial impartiality. Legal observers are increasingly concerned about the lasting damage this could inflict on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.

Taken together, these reforms would represent a sweeping redefinition of institutional power. Supporters argue they reflect necessary modernization of outdated systems. Detractors, however, warn they pose an existential threat to South Korea’s constitutional equilibrium.

Far from being reactive measures, these reforms appear to be part of a broader legislative effort to recalibrate the country’s governance architecture in anticipation of a political transition.

Geopolitical undercurrents and the strategic stakes

This constitutional face-off is playing out amid significant geopolitical flux in East Asia. Under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, South Korea has aligned closely with the US and Japan, deepening trilateral defense ties and embracing the broader US Indo-Pacific strategy.

Yoon’s foreign policy has emphasized deterrence against North Korea and strategic decoupling from China.

Lee Jae-myung, by contrast, is widely viewed as favoring a pragmatic foreign policy reset. He has advocated diplomatic engagement with North Korea, greater economic cooperation with China and Russia, and a more balanced posture between Washington and Beijing.

Should he win the presidency, South Korea’s foreign policy could pivot toward a multipolar alignment – reshaping its Indo-Pacific positioning and accelerating its outreach toward Eurasia.

This potential reorientation is of keen interest to Korean strategists and global observers alike, as it could redefine Korea’s international standing amid rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region.

In that light, the judiciary’s urgency and the legislature’s reformist drive are no longer seen as mere procedural moves, but as expressions of deeper ideological alignments. The judiciary, rooted in legal conservatism, seeks to preserve continuity and institutional stability. The legislature, led by progressive forces, is pushing for structural transformation in response to shifting geopolitical and domestic realities.

Democratic divergence: rule of law vs. rule by mandate

The unprecedented speed of institutional activity underscores a profound philosophical divergence over how democracy should function. The judiciary champions procedural legality and institutional restraint, rooted in constitutionalism and separation of powers. The legislature, in contrast, argues that true democratic legitimacy arises from the electoral mandate – and that lawmakers have a moral duty to reshape institutions in accordance with the will of the people.

Lee Jae-myung’s candidacy embodies this divide. He presents himself as an agent of change – socially progressive, economically redistributive and diplomatically balanced. His critics describe him as a populist cloaked in technocratic reform, warning that his proposed structural changes could concentrate power and destabilize institutional checks and balances. In this view, the judiciary’s rapid intervention is seen as a safeguard against democratic erosion.

Meanwhile, South Korean voters are caught in the middle of this institutional contest. One segment of the electorate embraces systemic reform in response to growing inequality and elite inertia. Another warns that rushing changes under the banner of progress may weaken the very institutions that protect democracy. The increasingly polarized discourse is not just about Lee’s case – it is about the future of governance itself.

A nation at the crossroads

South Korea is now undergoing a historic test of democratic resilience. The judiciary’s attempt to ensure legal clarity before the vote and the legislature’s drive to assert electoral legitimacy are not simply procedural decisions – they represent opposing visions of democracy. Both institutions are acting in defense of democratic principles, but through fundamentally divergent frameworks.

The consequences of this institutional divergence will echo long after June 3. What is at stake is not just a presidential election but the integrity of South Korea’s legal framework, its strategic orientation and its standing in the world.

Whether the country emerges stronger or more divided will depend not only on who wins the presidency but on how well its institutions endure and adapt under pressure.

As the world watches, South Korea’s election has become more than a democratic milestone. It is a referendum on the meaning of power, legitimacy and the future direction of a nation navigating a rapidly shifting global order.

Ukraine’s war lessons for India – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

India, the world’s largest democracy, has stayed on the sidelines while Ukraine fights on the front lines to defend democratic values and the international order against an imperialist Russia. Moscow seeks to subjugate and colonize Ukraine, as it has done for centuries, but Ukraine has resisted fiercely and is now bringing the fight to Russia. Despite this, India has remained cautious and continues to maintain close ties with Moscow.

Both Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh have canceled their trips to Moscow for Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade. Instead, India will send a lower-ranking official, with reports suggesting the decision is partly linked to ongoing tensions with Pakistan. India also launched fresh strikes against Pakistan, sparking worries about a larger conflict brewing between the nuclear states.

For other leaders who plan on attempting the parade in Moscow, there are real concerns that Ukraine could threaten the parade. As a result, Putin is desperate for a three-day ceasefire to help protect his parade.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico condemned Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for warning foreign delegations not to attend Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade, calling Zelensky’s comments disrespectful.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of keeping “nothing sacred” after he rejected Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a temporary ceasefire during Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, claiming Zelenskyy had “hit rock bottom” by warning of possible threats to veterans attending the May 9 events.

“They are responsible for your safety. We will not provide any guarantees, because we do not know what Russia might do on those dates,” Zelensky said. Meanwhile, for the third year in a row, occupied Sevastopol was forced to cancel its Victory Day military parade, citing safety concerns amid ongoing Ukrainian strikes on Russian military targets across Russia. Ukrainian drones over the last few days have continued targeting Moscow.

Ukraine has come a long way. In February 2022, many Western governments expected it to collapse within days. Now, Ukraine has developed a domestic arsenal of long-range drones and missiles and is striking targets deep inside Russia. Putin may hope that parading alongside Chinese leader Xi Jinping will project strength, but the reality is that he is facing a symbolic defeat. The Kremlin is now reduced to quietly pleading with Ukraine not to strike Moscow. Ukrainian drones have continued to target Moscow in the days before the parade.

Yet while Ukraine demonstrates military ingenuity and defiance, India continues to walk a careful line of neutrality. To understand why, it’s helpful to examine the deeper strategic logic behind India’s positioning.

“I don’t think India is going to commit to either side,” said Branislav Slantchev, a political science professor at UC San Diego. “They have never done this and they are in a complicated neighborhood.”

Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, explained that India’s position on the war in Ukraine stems more from tradition than indifference. “India’s stance isn’t about a lack of democratic solidarity,” he said, “it’s about strategic tradition.”

Wheat pointed out that “since the Cold War, India has maintained a posture of non-alignment, preferring to avoid choosing sides in conflicts between major powers.” That legacy, he noted, continues even as India increasingly asserts itself on the global stage.

“Its relatively cautious response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects both historical ties with Moscow and a deep-rooted preference for strategic autonomy,” Wheat added. “India sees itself as a regional and eventually global power, but one that moves at its own pace, balancing relationships across geopolitical divides.”

“Supporting Ukraine more forcefully,” he concluded, “would require redefining that balancing act, something New Delhi has not yet shown it’s ready to do.”

Wheat added, “India isn’t looking to replace its relationship with Russia, and aligning too strongly with Ukraine could undermine its defense ties with Moscow. India is still a major purchaser of Russian military hardware, and it prefers not to alienate a long-standing supplier while it’s still building its own defense manufacturing base.”

But over the long term, Wheat argued,“India could benefit significantly from a deeper partnership with Ukraine, particularly in defense innovation. Ukraine’s experience with adaptive warfare, battlefield innovation, and drone production could offer insights that align well with Modi’s ‘Make in India’ vision for the defense sector. The question isn’t whether Ukraine offers value; it’s whether India is ready to shift its geopolitical calculus to embrace that value.”

“Ukraine has effectively turned into a real-time laboratory for modern asymmetric warfare, particularly in the use of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare, and rapid battlefield adaptation,” said Wheat. “These are exactly the kinds of capabilities India would need in a high-intensity conflict with China along the Line of Actual Control or in the maritime domain.”

Wheat argued that India stands to gain more than just tactical insights. “More importantly, Ukraine has demonstrated how to mobilize civil society, private sector innovation, and field-level experimentation to solve tactical problems quickly. India could learn not just about the hardware, but about the organizational mindset required to wage modern war.”

The question, he said, is not about relevance but about receptivity. “The challenge is whether India is politically willing to learn from a country that isn’t part of its usual strategic orbit. If it is, there’s a great deal of value waiting to be absorbed.” Other experts agree that the strategic logic for closer ties with Ukraine is mounting, not just politically, but tactically.

“Russia’s war has exposed both supply-chain fragility and quality issues in Russian kit, accelerating India’s shift away from Moscow as its primary arms source,” said Fedir Martynov, a partner at Trident Forward. “Any extra political or technical backing New Delhi gives Kyiv therefore doubles as leverage on the Kremlin and as insurance against a tighter Moscow-Beijing axis.”

Martynov emphasized the operational edge that Ukraine has built under fire. “Ukraine has built a battlefield drone complex that ranges from $400 FPV kamikazes to multi-domain swarms, powered by a start-up ecosystem and a streamlined acquisitions pipeline that moves ideas from garage to front line in weeks,” he noted.

“Its operators have learned to fight through aggressive GNSS jamming by using visual navigation and decentralized control, skills India will need along a GPS-denied Himalayan frontier.”

That value becomes even clearer when viewed through the lens of Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, something defense experts believe India would do well to study closely.

Bill Cole, founder of the Peace Through Strength Institute, commented on the strategic urgency of India needing to learn from Ukraine’s experience: “India is staring down a PLA that has spent years investing in drone warfare.” The solution, he argues, lies not in theory but in lived experience. “You want to neutralize that? Ukraine is the partner who has already bled for that knowledge.”

“India cannot claim to counterbalance China while indirectly enabling Russia. Sooner or later, that contradiction will collapse,” said Cole.

He pointed to Ukraine’s maritime ingenuity as another lesson in adaptive strategy. “Ukraine didn’t have a navy. So they built one – from garage tech and courage. And they’ve punched a hole in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. That’s the blueprint for asymmetric warfare,” noted Cole. “If India ever faces a maritime threat from China, it’ll need the same mindset. Nimble, fast, precise, and unpredictable. Ukraine is showing the world how to fight smart.”

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @DVKirichenko.

Signs suggest Beijing’s uneasy over growing Pyongyang-Moscow ties – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

Chinese authorities in the northeastern city of Shenyang reportedly arrested a North Korean IT specialist in late April, accusing him of stealing drone technology secrets.

The suspect, apparently linked to North Korea’s main missile development agency, was part of a wider network operating in China, according to the story, first reported by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency. In response, Pyongyang was said to have recalled IT personnel in China.

The story was later circulated by several Chinese online outlets. Given the tight censorship in China, this implies a degree of tacit editorial approval from Beijing – although some sites later deleted the story. In a response to Yonhap over the alleged incident, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that North Korea and China were “friendly neighbors” that maintained “normal” personnel exchanges, without denying the details.

The incident suggests a rare semipublic spat between the two neighboring communist countries, contradicting the image of China and North Korea as “brothers in arms.”

As a scholar of Northeast Asian security, I see the arrest – which has gotten little attention in English-language media – as representative of a wider, more nuanced picture of the two countries’ current relations. There are signs that Beijing is growing frustrated with Pyongyang – not least over North Korea’s increasing closeness with Moscow. Such a development challenges China’s traditional role as North Korea’s primary patron.

In short, the arrest could be a symptom of worsening ties between the two countries.

Beijing’s dilemma over North Korea

North Korea has long been seen by Beijing as both a strategic security buffer and within the natural Chinese sphere of influence.

From China’s perspective, allowing a hostile force to gain control of the peninsula – and especially the north – could open the door to future military threats. This fear partly explained why China intervened during the Korean War of 1950-1953.

Beyond security, North Korea also serves as an ideological ally. Both countries are run by communist parties, although the Chinese Communist Party operates a Leninist party-state system with a partial embrace of market capitalism while the Workers’ Party of Korea runs a rigid socialist state characterized by a strong personality cult.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands during Kim’s visit to China in March 2018. Photo: Xinhua

Even today, Chinese state media continue to highlight the bonds of “comradeship” with Pyongyang.

However, Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions have long troubled Beijing. North Korea has conducted multiple nuclear tests since 2006 and is now believed to possess nuclear weapons capable of targeting South Korea, Japan and US bases in the region.

China supports a denuclearized and stable Korean peninsula – both for regional peace and for economic growth. Like the US, Japan and South Korea, China opposes nuclear proliferation. It fears North Korea’s periodic tests could provoke US military action or trigger an arms race in the region.

Meanwhile, Washington and its allies continue to pressure Beijing to do more to rein in a neighbor often viewed as a vassal state of China.

Given China’s economic ties with the US and with Washington’s East Asian allies – mainly South Korea and Japan – it has every reason to avoid further instability from Pyongyang.

Yet to North Korea’s isolationist rulers, nuclear weapons are vital for the regime’s survival and independence. What’s more, nuclear weapons can also limit Beijing’s influence.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un worries that without nuclear leverage, China could try to interfere in the internal affairs of his country. After the death if Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, in 2011, Beijing was thought to favor Kim Jong Un’s elder half-brother Kim Jong Nam as successor — possibly prompting Kim Jong Un to have him assassinated in 2017.

But despite ongoing tensions over the nuclear issue, China has continued to support the North Korean regime for strategic reasons.

For decades, China has been Pyongyang’s top trading partner, providing crucial economic aid. In 2023, China accounted for about 98% of North Korea’s official trade and continued to supply food and fuel to keep the regime afloat.

Pyongyang pals up with Putin

Yet over the past few years, more of North Korea’s imports, notably oil, have come from another source: Russia.

North Korea and Russia had been close allies during the Cold War, but ties cooled after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s.

More recently, a shared hostility toward the US and the West in general has brought the two nations closer.

Moscow’s international isolation following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its deteriorating ties with South Korea in particular have pushed it toward Pyongyang. North Korea has reportedly supplied large quantities of ammunition to Russia, becoming a critical munitions supplier in the Ukraine war.

Though both governments deny the arms trade – banned under United Nations sanctions – North Korea is thought to have received fuel, food and access to Russian military and space technology in return. On March 8, 2025, North Korea unveiled a nuclear-powered submarine that experts believe may involve Russian technological assistance.

By 2024, Russian forces were using around 10,000 shells per day in Ukraine, with half sourced from North Korea. Some front-line units were reportedly using North Korean ammunition for up to 60% of their firepower.

Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Photo: Wikipedia

High-level visits have also increased. In July 2023, Russia’s defense minister, Andrey Belousov, visited Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, followed by Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia in September for a summit with President Vladimir Putin.

In June 2024, Putin visited Pyongyang, where the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement, including a pledge that each would come to the other’s aid if attacked.

Soon after, North Korea began sending troops to support Russia. Intelligence from the U.S., South Korea and Ukraine indicates that Pyongyang deployed 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers in late 2023, marking its first involvement in a major conflict since the Korean War. Russia reportedly pays at least US$2,000 per month plus a bonus. For Pyongyang, this move provides not only financial gain but also combat experience, useful in case war ever reignites on the Korean Peninsula.

Why China is worried

China, too, has remained on friendly terms with Russia since the war in Ukraine began. So why would it feel uneasy about the growing closeness between Pyongyang and Moscow?

For starters, China views Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow as a challenge to its traditional role as North Korea’s main patron. While still dependent on Chinese aid, North Korea appears to be seeking greater autonomy.

The strengthening of Russia-North Korea ties also fuels Western fears of an “axis of upheaval” involving all three countries.

Unlike North Korea’s confrontational stance toward the West and its neighbor to the south, Beijing has offered limited support to Moscow during the Ukraine war and is cautious not to appear part of a trilateral alliance.

Behind this strategy is a desire on behalf of China to maintain stable relations with the US, Europe and key Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea. Doing so may be the best way for Beijing to protect its economic and diplomatic interests.

China is also concerned that with Russian support in nuclear and missile technologies, Pyongyang may act more provocatively — through renewed nuclear tests or military clashes with South Korea. And this would only destabilize the region and strain China’s ties with the West.

A defiant and provocative Pyongyang

The timing of the alleged spy drama may offer further clues regarding the state of relations.

It came just a day after North Korea officially confirmed it had deployed troops to aid the Russian war effort. It also announced plans to erect a monument in Pyongyang honoring its soldiers who died in the Ukraine war.

The last spy case like this was in June 2016 when Chinese authorities arrested a North Korean citizen in the border city of Dandong. It reportedly followed Pyongyang informing China that it would permanently pursue its nuclear weapons program.

The China-North Korea relationship deteriorated further when North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in September 2016, prompting Beijing to back UN Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang.

Again, this time North Korea shows little sign of bending to China’s will. On April 30, Kim oversaw missile launches from North Korea’s first 5,000-ton destroyer, touted as its most heavily armed warship.

None of which will help ease Beijing’s concerns. While China still sees Pyongyang as a critical buffer against US influence in Northeast Asia, an increasingly provocative North Korea, fueled by a growing relationship with Russia, is starting to look less like a strategic asset — and more like a liability.

Linggong Kong is a PhD candidate in political science at Auburn University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Asia needs a sustainability paradigm authored by Asians – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

The international order that was once the foundation of economic growth and was largely shaped by the United States is waning. That is, the geopolitical time that America imposed on the rest of the world is coming to an end.

A new star of power is emerging in its place, with Asia at the vanguard. The systems guiding” green development” stay firmly rooted in the ancient order’s worldview despite this change in economic and political weight.

The Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs ), ESG standards, and climate finance policies continue to be based on preconceived notions made by the Global North: technocratic, metric-heavy, and frequently disassociated from the lived realities of the Global South. Asia is expanding, but the concepts remain unchanged, which is the dilemma of our time.

Governments and businesses are frantically trying to connect themselves with international conservation standards across the region. Environmental ratings are being reported, and SDG goals are being incorporated into national plans.

Asia appears to be a concept student on the outside. But if you look deeper, a disturbing pattern emerges: sustainability has become more about signaling line than actual transformation.

Some nations view the SDGs and ESG as adherence checklists rather than as situational changes. The end result is a flood of ESG-washing, carbon colonialism marketed as an “energy transition,” and a flurry of projects that claim to be sustainable but neglect to address inequality, natural degradation, or native culture erosion.

This is not an attempt at passion. It is an illogical attempt.

Conservation systems now also embodie the DNA of Bretton Woods logic: they are growth-focused, finance-driven, and run by organizations where the Global South has less actual words.

Yet well-intentioned tools like climate financing frequently come with rules that reflect the risk desires of European investors and not the priorities of line communities.

Asia’s diversity is seldom acknowledged as a source of sustainability, especially its postcolonial wisdoms, biological traditions, and shared ways of living. Otherwise, the area is used as a testbed for additional models like carbon trading, natural taxonomy, and blended finance.

These tools may include price, but they run the risk of becoming the new tools for interdependence rather than emancipation when imposed without version.

If Asia continues on this way, it might succeed in appearing lasting while failing to create systems that are resilient, only, and rooted in regional significance.

Asia needs to regain its tale and reinvent sustainability on its own terms in order to break completely. Instead of rejecting the international mission, the focus should be on reimagining it. That is, conservation may move beyond natural GDP growth and carbon measures.

The concept of balance, between people and nature, between one person and a group, between material and spiritual, has long been a part of some Asian nations. These are living philosophies that can help shape a richer, more grounded type of development, not romantic treasures.

Numbers are adored by international structures. However, not all that things can be accurately assessed. ESG scores and SDG dashboards may accurately represent the tenacity of regional economies, the dignity of indigenous management systems, or the strength of a neighborhood. Asia has define success by its own indicators, ones that reflect life, not only compliance.

Courageous institutions are also required to transform a borrowed construction into an intrinsic movement. Governments, civil society, and businesses must take challenges: to test alternative designs, to challenge imported standards, and to defend the viability of domestic improvements.

No longer is it important whether Asia can uphold international standards for conservation. The actual question is whether Asia’s earth is prepared to compete with it.

Asia does not need to turn into a superpower in a shattered world. It doesn’t need to “win” the conservation culture. What it can offer, in fact, is much more strong: a fresh compass that places dignity, relationality, and regeneration before egotism, extraction, and aesthetic green branding.

This model has already been sown. Asia is never a plain stone; it is a place with concentrated disaster governance in the Philippines, collaborative farming in Vietnam, and eco-spiritualism in Bhutan. It is a source of undiscovered living solutions.

Lack of recognition is what poses the greatest obstacle, not the lack of versions. Changes in meaning may determine the post-hegemonic world more than just shifts in energy.

Sustainability must become a question of civilization in this search for new foundations. It cannot continue to be a management tool of international finance. Who defines the value of maintaining? Whose awareness is important? Whose coming do we guard against?

Even the most greenest of future may be built on the same aged exclusions if these questions remain unanswered or worse, only those at Davos or on Wall Street get them answered. But if Asia dares to speak from its origins rather than just its increase, it might be able to provide what the rest of the world desperately lacks: a soul-based conservation.

Setyo Budiantoro is a member of Fair Finance Asia’s expert council and a MIT Sloan IDEAS Fellow 2024 and a Nexus Strategist at The Prakarsa.

Resolution 68: real reform or elite buffer in Vietnam? – Asia Times

By: Bolen C

On: May 7, 2025

In: Asia

Some Asian businesspeople have praised the Vietnamese Communist Party’s statement of Resolution 68 as a significant step toward ensuring good competition, ensuring good competition, and codifying lawful precepts.

Crucially, those constitutional changes include a ban on voluntary law enforcement, a preference for legal remedies over criminal penalties, and the presumption of innocence. All of these are essential to the operation of a current market supported by the rule of law.

But beneath that business enthusiasm lies a crucial question: Is this a headless, pretended-to-be-real liberation for all secret business, or is it merely a headless, Marxist Party-connected, and wealthy?

Resolution 68, which was announced earlier this month, did not emerge in a womb. The” Views on Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Economy” were released by the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in July 2023.

That statement was made at a gentle time when China’s financial engines were slipping under the weight. After massive reprisals on large, privately held tech firms like Alibaba, firm confidence had deteriorated.

The Taiwanese government changed its position, highlighting the significance of the private sector to the region’s push for development, after acknowledging that a stifling regulatory burden and social uncertainty were stifling private-sector dynamism.

China’s record from 2023 aimed to rekindle confidence and stability, but it also signaled that the Communist Party was attempting to maintain a strong hold on the market.

By 2025, Vietnam’s monetary flood had also changed. Nguyen Phu Trong’s dying in 2024 and To Lam To Party’s arrival marked a significant shift in Vietnam’s management structure and outlook.

However, Vietnam’s private sector expanded rapidly but faced long-standing challenges, including limited resources, legal uncertainty, and fragile business confidence, partly as a result of the government’s crackdown on supposedly corrupt politicians and businesses.

Foreign literature

Resolution 68 draws heavily from China’s handbook, praises the importance of the private sector, and offers a more business-friendly culture. However, Vietnam’s version goes yet further, promising a stronger legitimate weapon than China’s.

Article 11 of China’s 2023 report makes explicit recommendations for preventing inside corruption and makes acts like misappropriation and bribery illegal. Additionally, it highlights efforts to improve Party operations in private companies and confirms the premise that all companies must operate in accordance with Party principles.

In addition, Vietnam’s Resolution 68 urges private firms to uphold business ethics, morality, and social responsibility. However, in Vietnam, corruption is seen as a two-way road, and it is imperative that people officials stop extorting and destroying private companies.

In this double messaging, the state is both an enforcer and a partner, aiming to promote both a private-led growth and a regulatory framework. The main issue between the two guidelines, however, is how they handle legal challenges.

China’s record promises to stop unnecessary interference with business during legal proceedings. It emphasizes “protecting the property rights and interests of private companies and businesses in accordance with the law” and vows to stop overreach through broad property freezes or arbitrary protection.

However, it falls short of removing the possibility of legal trial. Owing process and proportionality are important, but legal liability persists when determined.

The Vietnami Resolution 68 is more ambitious. Part 2.3 states:

Civil, financial, and managerial measures should be used to address both civil and economic violations.
Legal actions should be totally avoided where the law permits both legal and non-criminal management.
Remediation should be prioritized and seriously weighed in lawful decisions, even when prosecution is required.
It is against the law to engage in voluntary business injury.
And the idea of ignorance is vehemently promoted.

This is not a gentle shifting. Vietnam’s record not only tries to minimize legitimate disturbance, but it also makes criminal sanctions a last resort even in situations where legal results are uncertain.

Transformation for whom?

These principles appear to be in line with international standards for consistency and proportion. A good legal method emphasizes civil rights and the protection of the presumption of innocence.

However, Vietnam’s political-business climate muddies the lakes. In an atmosphere also fueled by wealthy record and favoritism, these legal protections may still offer concern and better protection to effective state or state-linked conglomerates. Even if these reforms lead to a more level playing field for small and medium enterprises.

The new constitutional shield may eventually remain out of reach for many businesses unless you are one of the key players with political connections.

Moreover, overprotecting big businesses presents systemic risks. Protecting these businesses from total legal scrutiny creates moral hazard, or worse. If these megacorporations fail, the condition could be forced to participate in cheap bailouts, destabilizing the entire economic system in a” also big to fail” scenario.

Vietnam, one of the top” China 1″ destinations for global manufacturers, is already attracting international investors ‘ attention for its commitment to stability and predictability.

Resolution 68’s pro-business claims may lessen worries for home businesses, but international investors, especially those who are conscious of China’s decades-long trend, may remain closely monitoring how it’s carried out. Even if the outlook for short-term mood improves, any overt defence of aristocracy interests may undermine confidence in Vietnam’s long-term legal standing.

By any standard, Resolution 68 is a brave decision. It promises to reduce bureaucracy, guard home rights, and modify the legal system in ways that are more suitable for contemporary Vietnam.

However, Vietnam’s solid pro-business stance raises an obvious question: Is this the start of real legitimate reform or is it just a cunning way to protect the connected while appearing present and pro-business to the outside world?

Vietnam’s entrepreneurs and foreign observers should tread carefully when predicting whether this most recent wave of reforms actually level the playing field or just strengthen the system’s existing ones and hierarchies.

Leo Tran writes about global strategy, trade, and international affairs. His writing has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also writes for Vietnam Decoded.