A poor US manufacturing base, uncertainty from a second Trump administration, and a reluctance to share nuclear technology are the reasons Australia’s nuclear underwater interests are under attack by the AUKUS security agreement.
US SSNs could serve Australian and US SSN missions in the region, according to a report released by the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) in October.
Such an arrangement would be similar to existing ones between the US and some of its NATO and other allies on significant naval assets such as aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, SSNs, amphibious warfare ships and non-naval capabilities such as nuclear weapons, space-based capabilities and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ).
There are a number of other options for planned SSNs for Australia, according to the CRS report. These include forwards cycles of US and UK SSNs to Australia, three to five US SSN operations outside of Australia, or Australia spending money that were originally intended for SSNs in other assets, such as B-21 bombers and another long-range hit plane.
The report discusses additional variations of these options, including the possibility that Australia would continue investing in US and indigenous underwater construction capacity while American SSNs continue to build their Asian SSNs.
Another change that the report mentions is that Australia was continue investing in other martial resources to support a US-Australia division of labor while US SSNs may continue to perform American SSN missions continuously.
The CRS record warns that if Australia’s SSN plans under AUKUS reach a cost-death circular, it could decrease Australia’s money for other military features, adversely impacting Australia’s barrier capabilities versus China.
Contrary to the site’s earlier hype enthusiasm, the CRS record may indicate a major change of heart for AUKUS regarding SSNs for Australia.
One of these factors might be a sagging US submarine construction base. A 2023 US Congressional Budget Office ( CBO ) report mentions that the US faces significant challenges in its submarine production base, directly impacting the AUKUS’s submarine-sharing goals.
According to the CBO report, US submarine production struggles with cost overruns, construction delays, and missed deadlines. It notes that this is compounded by a 50 % projected increase in submarine construction workload over the next decade, as the US Navy aims to produce five types of submarines simultaneously, including Virginia-class, SSN ( X ) and Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN).
The report says the high cost of implementing the US Navy’s 2024 shipbuilding plan, driven by surging submarine expenses, exacerbates these issues. It proposes that submarine construction will surpass historical funding levels, putting the AUKUS’s goal of having SSNs by the 2030s in jeopardizing.
Uncertainty over a second US Trump administration’s stance on AUKUS has compounded doubts about Australia’s SSN acquisition ambition.
David Andrews mentions Donald Trump’s return to the White House in a November 2024 article for The Conversation that raised significant questions about the AUKUS agreement‘s future. Andrews points out that the Australian government has expressed concern that Trump may attempt to renegotiate or revoke the deal.
He mentions that this concern stems from Trump’s history of demanding greater financial contributions from allies, as seen in South Korea, Japan, and NATO, with AUKUS possibly being subjected to similar demands. According to Andrews, the AUKUS agreement allows any party to withdraw with a 12-month notice, which depends on political will.
In keeping with that, Australian Greens defense spokesperson David Shoebridge stated in August 2024 that AUKUS places the US and UK above responsibility. According to Shoebridge, the agreement includes numerous exit clauses that allow the US and UK to back out of Australia without receiving compensation and hold Australia accountable in the event that the formers ‘ SSN technology fails.
Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, the head of the AUKUS submarine program, was reportedly contacted by ABC News in July 2024 to ask if Australia would be reimbursed if the US didn’t deliver nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS agreement.
Senator Shoebridge allegedly inquired about the US$ 4.7 billion ( US$$ 3.3 billion ) payment during an Australian Senate estimates hearing in order to find out whether there is a refund clause. Mead reiterated the US’s commitment to providing two Virginia-class submarines by the early 2030s, but he avoided addressing the implausible issue of non-delivery.
Andrews notes bipartisan support for AUKUS in the US Congress, but Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy approach and potential demands for more Australian contributions raise questions about the stability of the agreement.
Australia’s refusal to cooperate with the US and the UK on nuclear power may also serve as a stumbling block to its SSN ambitions, which will prevent the construction of the nuclear infrastructure required to run SSNs.
ABC News reported in November 2024 that Australia has declined to join a UK and US-led pact to accelerate civilian nuclear energy development, citing the technology’s inapplicability to the country.
Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles stated in the report that developing nuclear energy would be Australia’s most expensive option for electricity because the nation lacks a civilian nuclear industry. It states that the UK and the US had initially anticipated Australia to sign the deal, but the Australian government ultimately backed it, focusing instead on switching to renewable energy sources.
While AUKUS’ SSN ambitions are lofty, some analysts believe that its rationale may be ambiguous, impractical, and militarily unsound. Sam Roggeveen cites AUKUS critics in a March 2024 article, where neither the Morrison nor Albanese governments can explain in detail what the SSNs are intended to accomplish.
Roggeveen points out that the discussion has primarily been focused on hazy definitions of “deterrence” without having a thought-provoking discussion about how best to achieve it.
He makes the claim that he had doubts about the Australian Labor Party’s sincerity in backing AUKUS, saying it was more a matter of political calculation than genuine conviction. He also emphasizes the project’s financial burden, which could lead to cost overruns and program delays, potentially straining other defense budgets.
Roggeveen also points out concerns about the potential impact of a second US Trump administration, including worries that Trump might not support it. Notably, he wonders whether the AUKUS SSN project is a wise idea, suggesting that Australia should use its geographic distance to avoid attempting to project military power into China’s near seas.