There have been a lot of security announcements just about buying new products, building up Australia’s production capabilities, creating local jobs, fresh legislation to help AUKUS and perhaps a new defense chief.
These merely reflect the Department of Defense’s hectic schedule, which involves a lot of money, and that officials enjoy announcing excellent information. But, the latest information related to Australia’s National Defense Strategy this week is of a different form.
The new National Defense Strategy‘s title emphasizes that all Australians are responsible for protecting themselves, not just the Australian Defence Force ( ADF) professionals.
It also takes the long perspective, well into the next generation. The plan will be updated every two times to keep up with changes in the Indo-Pacific and replace the occasional protection white papers. It was accompanied this week by an Integrated Investment Program, which lays out where A$ 330 billion ( US$ 212. 9 billion ) will be spent over ten times.
These two presentations set the program for a high-spending, sizable Department of Defense in a time of significant war in Europe and the Middle East, a sizable increase in Chinese arms production, and growing doubt about potential conflicts over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
The new federal framework, which aims to hinder and stop hostile troops from attacking Australia, emphasizes the importance of the “strategy of denial” in light of these global challenges.
More mundanely, both of these documents, up totaling nearly 200 pages, are the government’s means of controlling the sprawling Department of Defense. More explicitly, they set out the Albanese government’s perspective on security policy in period for the next national vote.
As such, both the eloquence in the files and the anticipated expenditures have near-term private reasons, as well as long-term geostrategic types.
Maybe the core of the approach is, surprise or not, the nuclear submarine consolidation program under the AUKUS ally with the US and UK. As time goes on, the underwater program is extremely dominating security in terms of governmental interest, budget allotment, industry development and workforce allocation.
But there are five other “immediate priorities ” tacked onto this one very big acquisition:
- buying and creating long-range weapons
- building up north protection base infrastructure
- improving labor pay and circumstances
- boosting technology
- deepening Indo-Pacific alliances.
The security sector may most interessieren the Integrated Investment Program as it works to secure fresh multi-year goods and services deals, as well as state governments who want to have the funds used directly on jobs.
A common spending file like this is a good idea. It was first introduced by the John Howard authorities, at least in part to ensure that security projects would remain on time while facing scrutiny from the general public.
Since then, these kinds of investment papers have offered more and fewer details. This may be done to maintain safety, but it also limits the publication’s relevance and the potential for additional criticism, thereby lessening the scope of accountability for the huge amounts of public cash spent.
Less intensity, more longer-term preparation
The ADF will be more focused on its activities in the waters that are directly to the north of Australia as a result of the plan and investment plan.
The government has reduced the army’s heavier causes, cut a marine project for water raise ships, and delayed purchasing more F-35 fighter aircraft to support this move to a more maritime target.
Nevertheless, over time, the future army will be more mobile and amphibious, the navy’s fleet will be modernized, the air force will get sophisticated long-range missiles and the nation’s cyber capabilities will be enhanced.
Such changes, though, take time. In ten years, Australia may have just received one second-hand former US Navy nuclear submarine, but little else will have changed from now. Given the growing security concerns in the area, this government and its predecessor made a number of rhetorical remarks urging speed. However, neither government took actions suggesting such urgency.
Defense Minister Richard Marles quietly indicated that short-term improvements to the defense were now less necessary two weeks before the release of the new documents. He claimed that this kind of concentration “lacks wit.” ”
No middle power in the Indo-Pacific is solely capable of creating or deploying the size or breadth of military forces that powers like China and the US can.
Australia’s challenge lies in the future beyond this. And in this regard, we must invest in the capabilities of the ADF’s future.
Shortcomings of the strategy
However, despite the overall design direction that appears logical and has supporting budgets laid out, there are still questions about whether this newly focused ADF is feasible. Military forces are more than hardware. Well-trained people are essential to their effectiveness.
The strategy is pleasingly honest in noting a shortfall of around 4,400 ADF personnel, some 10 % of its total workforce. Although this issue has been well known for a while, only minor adjustments have been made.
It’s unlikely that our forces will be able to perform at their peak this decade because ADF personnel require a lot of training to achieve a high level of combat proficiency. Due to the absence of crews, new equipment is reportedly being purchased.
Unintentionally, the strategy and investment plan’s personnel shortfall issue raises yet another unexpected flaw. These documents appear to disregard the rapid technological advancements and operational innovations being demonstrated during the conflict in Ukraine.
These include attack, reconnaissance and electronic jamming drones, highly effective ground-based air defense systems and an artificial intelligence-enabled surveillance system that allows no one to hide.
There is a chance that the Integrated Investment Program and the National Defense Strategy will lead to an ADF that is better suited for 2015 than 2025 and that will likely be dated a bit in 2035. The future is about to arrive, but these plans do n’t really show it.
Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow, Strategic Studies, Griffith University
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.