Japan and Australia have agreed to co-develop long-range weapons, a move aimed at simultaneously checking China’s growing defense might in the Indo-Pacific, The Mainichi reported.
The deal was reached at a meeting this month in Melbourne between Richard Marles, the head of Australia, and Minoru Kihara, the Chinese defence minister.
Kihara and Marles discussed the military operations of China, including a new Chinese spy plane’s infiltration of Asian airport.
The two officials also discussed Japan’s recent acquisition of counterstrike features and Australia’s purchasing of long-range weapons. However, talks are continuing on Japan’s ask to use Australia’s great continent as a testing ground for its weapons under development.
In regards to the type of missile that Japan and Australia will develop, Janes mentions that both are focused on the US Tomahawk boat weapon, which both have pledged to purchase for their exterior soldiers.
Both nations have agreed to sell 200 missiles through Foreign Military Sales ( FMS ) with the US. The Janes statement says Japan plans to deploy the Tomahawks on its Aegis-equipped ships, while Australia intends to equip its Hobart-class ships and Hunter-class battleships with the weapons.
This expanding cooperation in long-range missile capabilities is in line with proper evaluations that emphasize the transformational role of these weapons in contemporary warfare.
Fabian Hoffman claims in a May 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that long-range strike ( LRS ) weapons like the Tomahawk can have significant strategic effects in combat by directly aiming at the adversary’s national power and ability to resist.
Hoffman notes that LRS arms fulfill four different tactical features: counter-population, proper surveillance, counter-leadership and counterforce. He claims that these roles, independent of tactical or operational engagements, allow states to destroy the will and capability of adversaries at the geopolitical level.
He mentions that using LRS weapons to disrupt enemy logistics, management, and defense forces, it can produce significant outcomes without primary wedding on the battlefield.
Hoffman points out the growing use of LRS arms beyond nuclear-armed says, suggesting that smaller forces may now put larger enemies at hazard, altering punishment and increase relationships in both nuclear and conventional contexts.
This move reflects a wider trend among US supporters as Japan and Australia work to strengthen their long-range hit capabilities to store regional threats and improve deterrence.
In a February 2021 RAND event, Satoru Mori and Shinichi Kitaoka said Japan’s merger of counterstrike features, such as the Tomahawk, is portion of its evolving defense strategy.
Mori and Kitaoka argue that Japan should acquire limited offensive capabilities focused on countering threats posed by China’s military rise, notably its anti-access/area denial ( A2/AD ) strategies.
They contend that Japan’s classic, purely defensive missile defense may no longer be sufficient, necessitating the development of the capability to launch equal counterstrikes in concert with the US.
In the event of an invasion, Japan would be able to reach crucial military infrastructure, including missile launch sites and control centers, to strengthen its deterrence posture, according to them.
But, Mori and Kitaoka point out that this action is necessary to preserve regional security and counterfactual growing threats, particularly from China, which has recently spent significantly more money on defense.
In the same event, Scott Harold noted that introducing the Tomahawk would change the standard” shield-spear” relationship within the US-Japan empire, with Japan taking a more unpleasant position. He contends that a worldview shift could undermine US control over an increase of a conflict with China.
In a March 2023 essay for The Conversation, James Dwyer explains why Australia needs Tomahawks, as the state has lacked long-range hit skills since decommissioning the F-111 in 2010.
He points out that the F-111 had a range of about 6, 000 km, but its successors, especially the F/A-18F and the F-35A, have significantly shorter amounts of 2, 700 and 2, 200 km, both.
He adds that these are the straight-line flight ranges of these aircraft, which would be significantly reduced in a combat situation.
Dwyer points out that Tomahawks would make it possible for Australia’s ships and aircraft to launch missiles from a safer range and to deter adversaries by threatening specific targets, which would prompt them to reconsider their plans for hostile actions.
He claims that the Tomahawk would give Australia A2/AD capabilities, enabling it to attack a neighbor who was attempting to impose a naval blockade or close off strategic chokepoints like the Malacca Strait.
According to Dwyer, the Tomahawk would also enable interoperability with important allies like the US and Japan, enabling them to carry out joint operations if necessary.
However, Dwyer points out the hefty US$ 879 million price tag for 220 Tomahawk missiles, US$ 385 million for 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System ( HIMARS ) launchers and US$ 1.47 billion for 200 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles ( LRASM).
He also suggests that Australia’s Tomahawk acquisition may spark an arms race in the Pacific. By strengthening conventional deterrence, the US, Japan, and Australia’s trilateral defense alliance demonstrates a coordinated strategy for addressing China’s regional goals.
In a report from August 2024 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS), Mori points out that trilateral defense cooperation between the US, Japan, and Australia is essential to thwarting any potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan.
The coalition’s objectives, according to Mori, are to demonstrate that China ca n’t forcefully unify Taiwan, highlighting the importance of conventional deterrence over nuclear capabilities.
He mentions that Australia and Japan, classified as Tier 2 and Tier 3 partners, respectively, would support US-led efforts to dislodge potential Chinese invasion forces, enhance resilience and impose costs on China.
Mori claims that the most important part of this strategy is Japan’s recent decision to strengthen its defenses. He claims that this would free US forces from focusing on Taiwan’s defense and make Japan play a bigger role in both offensive and defensive operations.
Further, he identifies critical areas of trilateral cooperation, mentioning intelligence sharing, missile defense and cyber resilience.
Mori adds that the three countries must coordinate joint military development and production while establishing a consistent stance through regular diplomatic and defense gatherings.
He points out that this trilateral collaboration is essential to bolstering conventional deterrence and preventing over-reliance on US nuclear weapons, which could lead to an even worsening conflict if deterrence is unsuccessful.