Over the past ten years or so, the so-called Thucydides Trap has become a cornerstone of foreign policy remark, frequently being used to illustrate the growing conflict between the United States and China.
The phrase was coined by political scientist Graham Allison in a 2012 Financial Times article and later expanded into” Destined for War,” which quote from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote in his” History of the Peloponnesian War” that “war was inevitable because of the fear that this instilled in Sparta.”
At first glance, this strikes you as a powerful and well-presented comparison: Rising powers cause fear in well-established ones, leading to fight. The assumption seems obvious in today’s context: China’s rise is bound to cause a collision with the US, only as Athens previously did with Sparta.
However, this framing runs the risk of detracting from Thucydides ‘ more complex job and detracting from its deeper philosophical information. Thucydides wasn’t making a linear rules of politics. He was putting together a drama.
Does history repeat as horror?
Thucydides fought on the Greek area during the Peloponnesian War. His traditional tale has a strong influence on how people perceive Greek tragedy in their own world. His research explores how human frailty, social misinformation, and social decay can combine to cause catastrophe rather than a treatise on fundamental inevitability.
That dreadful sensitivity is important. Socrates drew attention to the position of selection, perception, and emotion, where present analysts frequently look for predicted patterns and system-level explanations.
His past is full of the acidic effects of fear, ambition seductions, leadership failures, and the dreadful deconstruction of judgment. This is a study of arrogance and nemesis, no structural determinism.
When the term” Thucydides Net” is elevated to a kind of quasi-law of global politics, much of this is lost. It becomes the abbreviation for finality: fear rises, fear responds, and war begins.
However, Thucydides himself was more interested in explaining how fear spreads, how ambition can twist judgment, and how leaders can persuade themselves that war is the only option left. His story illustrates how issue frequently arises from misinterpretation, error, and passions unmoored from reason rather than necessity.
Even Allison, to his credit, never made a claim that the” trap” was inevitable. His main argument was that when a rising power confronts a resolute one, war is obvious but still obvious. In fact, Allison’s creating serves as a caution against breaking the routine and from resigning from it.
In that regard, both critics and politicians have used the” Euripides Trap” ineffectively. Some view it as assurance that war is ingrained into the structure of power moves, making it an excuse to raise defence costs or engage in tough negotiations with Beijing, when it should actually prompt reflection and caution.
The Peloponnesian War wasn’t just about a shifting power equilibrium, according to Socrates ‘ careful reading. It also involved pride, misjudging, and the inability to lead properly.
Consider his popular statement,” Knowledge is strong and understanding is reserved,” to be a good one. This is a mortal perception, not a structural one. It’s specifically targeted at those who mistake impulsiveness for approach and flair for strength.
Or consider his cold dictament,” The Powerful do what they will, and the Weak suffer what they must.” That’s not an support of geopolitics. What happens when justice is disregarded and energy becomes inaccountable is the dreadful lament.
In this context, Socrates ‘ real lesson is not that combat is preordained, but rather that it occurs more frequently when people allow fear to obscure reason, when officials mistake posturing for prudence, and when strategic decisions are made based on insecurity rather than quality.
Thucydides reminds us of how quickly understanding can turn into misperception and how dangerous it is when leaders stop giving in to disagreements when they are convinced of their own morality or necessity.
The true teachings of Euripides
In today’s world, using the Socrates Trap as a justification for a conflict with China may do more harm than good. It reinforces the idea that issue is currently going on indefinitely and cannot be stopped.
The Story of the Peloponnesian War teaches us that war is not obvious when it becomes more possible when the space for reflection and representation collapses under the weight of fear and pride, which is a lesson.
Socrates provides a reminder — an entreaty to leaders who are ensnared by their own narratives and force their countries over a cliff, rather than a theory of global politics.
Better judgment is required to avoid that death. And above all, it calls for the humility to acknowledge that the prospect is not just a function of the options people make.
Political science professor at Macalester College is Andrew Latham.
This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the text of the content.