When it was originally crafted, the declared purpose of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was to “assist the economies of sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic relations between the United States and the region.”
However, there appears to have been a significant reframing of that purpose in the aftermath of the Russian arms trafficking allegations leveled against the South African government by the US ambassador to that country, Reuben Brigety.
That episode revealed that the greatest value of AGOA is that it provides a relatively effective mechanism for coercing African governments to align with US national-security and foreign-policy interests, especially when it comes to major-power competition with China and Russia.
At least, that seems to have been the key takeaway for some influential members of Congress.
This social reconstruction of AGOA makes sense when one considers contemporary international political realities.
The ‘China threat’
This year, the US director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, gave testimony on global threats to the Senate Intelligence Committee. In that testimony, she declared that the Communist Party of China not only “represents both the leading and most consequential threat to US national security and leadership globally.”
She added that “its intelligence-specific ambitions and capabilities make it for us our most serious and consequential intelligence rival.”
When presented with such an unequivocal assessment, it is not surprising that members of Congress place tremendous value on foreign-policy interventions that help the US government counter the malign influence of China and its strategic partners on the African continent.
It also makes sense when one considers contemporary domestic political realities in the United States.
Over the last few years, Congress has sought to strengthen its oversight of the government’s response to the activities of China and Russia on the African continent. Although the region is seldom a foreign-policy priority, the pursuit of such oversight plays well in a domestic political arena where 67% of Americans say that one of these major power competitors “poses the greatest threat” to the United States.
Among other things, AGOA requires the president of the United States “to monitor and annually review the progress of each sub-Saharan African country in meeting the foregoing eligibility criteria in order to determine if a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country should continue to be eligible, and if a sub-Saharan African country that currently is not a beneficiary, should be designated as a beneficiary.”
These requirements ensure that AGOA opens regular policy windows for members of Congress to exercise legislative oversight on Africa policy established by the executive branch.
This includes questioning the strategic approach of the government toward countering the malign influence of China, Iran and Russia in particular African states. South Africa recently served as a case in point.
African states have their own interests
In the light of these contemporary political realities, a more coercive conceptualization of AGOA may make sense. However, they are not the only contemporary political realities that matter. African governments have other options when it comes to their bilateral trade and investment relations.
The United States is not the only game in town. Nor has it ever been, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
If the US government starts to demand that AGOA beneficiaries fully align with US national-security interests such as the diversification of global supply chains, reduction of dependence on major-power competitors, and countering the influence of malicious foreign actors who promote “repressive models of governance,” it is almost certain that a number of African governments will self-select out of trying to participate in the program on the grounds that it undermines their core national interests.
Those at highest risk include regional economic powerhouses (for example, Ethiopia or South Africa) that maintain close relations with BRICS member states.
Members of Congress are almost certainly aware of this risk. It seems reasonable to assume that some are willing to accept it. Some may even see AGOA eligibility as a useful tool for forcing African governments to choose sides between the United States and its major-power competitors in extreme circumstances.
Some appear to be willing to accept this. Some may even see it as an unrealized benefit. They might want to use AGOA as a function to force African governments to choose sides between the United States and its major-power competitors in extreme circumstances.
That would be a high-stakes game. The question is whether President Joe Biden’s administration would ever be willing to play it.
One line of argument would say no. Such a move would be incongruent with the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. It also would be much less pragmatic than one might expect given recent statements by the senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council, Judd Devermont.
Another line of argument would start with the acknowledgement that the United States is about to enter an election year. Biden is expected to contest that election, in which, given the opinion polling, no candidate will want to look soft on China and Russia in front of the electorate, and no member of Congress will want to pass on an opportunity to undermine the other party’s candidate’s record on major power competition.
Those naive assumptions not only complicate matters for the White House. They also complicate matters for African governments. In such an environment, African governments will find it harder to assess where the red lines are drawn on AGOA eligibility requirements.
They will find it harder to detect when and where those red lines are moved. And they will find it harder to predict when and where they will move in the future.
Over the next year, the US government will need to manage carefully the challenge posed by these political uncertainties to the stability of the AGOA system. The AGOA Forum, which kicks off this week in Johannesburg, will provide senior officials with an opportunity to kick-start that risk-management process.
They will need to make the most of it.