As spectators warn that this growing war of attrition could lead to the region becoming a full-fledged conflict, Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in extremely controversial cross-border skirmishes for nearly a year. That destructive scenario has come close to being a reality over the past few days.
First came Israel’s voicemail and walkie-talkie attack, an extraordinary abuse on Hezbollah’s communications that wounded hundreds of the firm’s operatives. Following that, an important Hezbollah leader, Ibrahim Aqil, was killed in an attack that also claimed the lives of some civilians and other top Hezbollah commanders.
Hezbollah has responded by expanding the range of its rockets ‘ geographic targets, which include both human areas north and east of Haifa and military installations.
As a researcher on Lebanon and Israel, I have followed the interactions of this retention battle since October 8, 2023, the day after Hamas launched an extraordinary and deadly assault on Israel, which responded by bombarding the Gaza Strip. In support of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah next began firing rockets into north Israel.
Despite the high speech and common risks of death, until recent days neither Israel nor Hezbollah, nor the latter’s partner Iran, have shown an interest in a full-scale battle.
All parties are aware of the possible devastation of such a scenario for themselves: Israel has the military might as well as it did in Gaza, and perhaps a weak Hezbollah could launch thousands of missiles at Jewish strategic sites, including water supply lines and energy hubs, as well as offshore gas rigs.
Rather, they have exchanged fire and blows along their common front, with somewhat agreed-upon dark lines regarding the physical range of problems and attempts to avoid consciously aiming at citizens.
Israel’s recent attacks in Lebanon may have caused the website of this retention to turn into a fresh, much more serious condition, putting the area in the midst of a complete conflict. A conflict like this would wreak havoc on Lebanon and Israel and could even scuttle Iran and the United States into directly opposing each other.
In doing so, it would further the obvious goal of Hamas militants, who killed around 1,200 Israelis on October 7 in the trust that a brutal Jewish attack would entice more groups in the area.
A risky “new period”
Hassan Nasrallah, the director general of Hezbollah, has argued that Hamas and Israel must reach a ceasefire agreement before his business will continue to be under fire. In recent months, but, Israel has taken the issue in the same way.
The country’s defence secretary, Yoav Gallant, described the planned strikes on Hezbollah goals as a “new phase”, adding that the “center of gravity” in the battle was moving northeast into Lebanon. The Israeli government has added “return of the occupants of the northeast safely to their homes” as a new war goal.
The abuse on Hezbollah’s communications structure targeted the group’s operatives but hit some human bystanders, leaving Lebanese in horror, stress, anger and desperation.
It demonstrated Israel’s tactical military advantage over Hezbollah. Never before have there been any unprecedented penetration into the command and rank-and-file structures of the organization in a conflict or war.
It targeted Hezbollah in its most vulnerable locations, even exposing its involvement with Iran. The Iranian ambassador in Lebanon was one of the injured victims of the pager explosions.
The Israeli government’s decision to try to alter the rules of this dangerous game of reprisals and counterrepresals was another signal that the killing of Akil had occurred. It is obvious that Israel’s intention is to press Hezbollah to accept rather than the uneasy status quo that for nearly a year has predominated this attrition war.
Spinning out of control
Following the pager attack, Nasrallah delivered a depressing and defiant speech. He acknowledged that this operation severely damaged Hezbollah, but he also referred to the Israeli attack as a continuation of “multiple other massacres committed by the enemy over decades.”
By doing so, he placed it within a well-known historical narrative that many Lebanese and Palestinians find to be unaware of because Israel is a criminal organization that regularly massacres innocent civilians.
Nasrallah added that he remained unwavering about his commitment to Hamas in Gaza.
Nasrallah also reiterated a point he had made in earlier peaks of this ongoing conflict: that retribution is coming, the only issue being timing and scale. In addition, he claimed that Israeli actions have” crossed all red lines” and could amount to a declaration of war. Nasrallah made the implication that he might still not be interested in waging a full war by doing this.
Israel, on the other hand, appears less circumspect. Israel’s leaders appear willing to take the chance of an escalation that might spiral out of control after almost a full year of contained tension with Hezbollah.
What is the motivation behind Israel’s actions, and how can that be determined? Israel has n’t displayed a coherent strategy with clear political objectives since October 7, as the Biden administration has pointed out.
Instead, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s critics suggest that their main motivations are his own political survival and the continued exercise of power as the head of state, tying Israel’s interests to his own.
uniting the” axis of resistance”
So where does this leave Nasrallah as he weighs Hezbollah’s response, surely in consultation with Iran? It’s difficult to imagine that Hezbollah would want to scale down, stop its cross-border attacks and retreat away from the Israeli border, or abandon its commitment to Hamas in Gaza after receiving such devastation from Nasrallah’s organization.
On the other hand, choosing to go to full-fledged war after avoiding it for a year poses a risk because Nasrallah and his supporters in Tehran are well aware of the high costs a war would have for Hezbollah, Lebanon, and possibly Iran.
If Hezbollah started a war against Israel right now, it would begin its most significant development since its establishment in 1982. But it would do so despite the organization’s crippled communications systems and few members of its leadership, some of whom had worked side by side with Nasrallah for decades and collaborated to increase the organization’s military might.
In some respects, Israelis under Netanyahu’s leadership, and Lebanese in a country increasingly held hostage by Hezbollah’s interests, face similar predicaments: Their well-being is being sacrificed for other priorities.
After 11 months of pursuing policies that put them in more danger, Netanayhu’s recent statements about concern for Israeli citizens in the north sound hollow. He also opposes a Gaza ceasefire deal that would also put an end to Hezbollah and Israel.
Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into a war that has caused significant destruction in areas of the country that are already under severe political and economic strain.
Nasrallah’s speech described Hezbollah’s predicament as that of all of Lebanon– while sending a veiled threat that dissent would not be tolerated. Many Lebanese are undoubtedly supportive of the Palestinian cause and opposed to Israel’s occupation of Gaza. They may however balk at the notion that their own well-being must be sacrificed in the process.
In the meantime, Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader and mastermind behind the October 7 massacre, may well be looking on at the unfolding events between Israel and Hezbollah with satisfaction.
His strategy was to start the unification of all members of the so-called” axis of resistance,” which includes Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed organizations in the hope of a regional war against Israel. A year later, we are closer than ever to that scenario.
University of Notre Dame professor of history and peace studies Asher Kaufman
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