This article was originally published on Pacific Forum, and it is now republished with authority. Read the original right below.
Every action must advance America, secure its potential, and promote its prosperity, according to Marco Rubio’s clear plan of action for US foreign policy.
Washington is faced with a corporate puzzle in the Pacific Islands: What tools does the US use to meet the Trump administration’s goals while also taking into account the region’s unique circumstances and aspirations?
A rulebook that speaks to both Trump’s perspective and local interests is revealed by examining four areas of statecraft—diplomatic, intelligence, defense, and economic. While some criticize the Trump administration’s foreign policy’s “unpredictability” and “unpredictability,” clear patterns now exist: China is a major global threat to US interests, its use of “hard power” predominates over” soft,”” cost-cutting,” and allies should bear more of the burden.
The Trump administration has focused on readjusting trade ties politely to address deficits and create friendlier working conditions for American firms. This method has produced a distinct change: economic and financial institutions like the Department of Commerce are taking center stage. However, the functions of US political resources are inherently related to how well these organizations can negotiate and collaborate with other nations.
The US has failed to establish a strong diplomatic presence in the region despite growing and interest from Pacific nations increasing relationships with the US. In a place where personal relationships are of utmost importance, this is an apparent blind spot. Sending Commerce Department officials to important Pacific countries could boost business and maintain America’s standing.
Also, the election and verification of US diplomats to the Pacific Islands must be made quickly by the president and congress. The embassy status is still vacant, but the US Embassy in Honiara reopened in January 2023. This was a simple space to fill in the Solomon Islands, a nation where China has political ties that are at least three times the size of the US, but where the US did not.
The US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy includes a significant component of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (” Quad” ), just like the first Trump administration. The US can increase its involvement in the Pacific while working with Australian, Indian, and Japan to increase its burden-sharing commitment.
In 2023, The Quad announced a number of initiatives aimed at addressing local problems of common concern, including climate change, sea security, and economic growth. A political reputation that is comparable to the importance of the Pacific Islands in terms of strategy is required by the US.
Beyond politics, sharing intelligence is crucial to protecting US protection interests. The Freely Associated States ( FAS ), which include the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia, are on the front lines of combating China’s extensive, hostile influence. The United States may provide more assistance from its intelligence services in identifying illegal behavior in the PRC and supporting local law enforcement.
Sharing information about the threat of bad Foreign effect even aligns with Pacific objectives. For example, US wind activity and trends surveillance can improve disaster preparedness and resilience by putting money into early warning systems, facilities adaptation, and technical assistance.
Additionally, the US might collaborate with partners to raise awareness of the local maritime website. It is a crucial security issue that the United States can help address because illegal, undetected, and undetected fishing is threatening Pacific , food supplies, and economies.
12 Pacific Island nations have shiprider agreements with the US that increase local power by hosting local law enforcement on US Coast Guard vessels to guard their EEZs. The Pacific Islands are a target for international security problems in the Pacific Islands, which have potential spillover effects for the United States.
These plans are limited because the Pacific’s size and capacity are both large and confined. In the Pacific Islands, reallocating property or prepositioning cutters are among the most cost-effective ways to combat this.
Although the United States may work strongly with the Freely Associated States, the Blue Pacific does not. These cracks can be filled by Australia and New Zealand.
The Director General of New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Survey recently intensified and highlighted the region’s increased knowledge assistance. The US may also arrange for its own intelligence researchers to work at the Pacific Fusion Center, a regional institution that is funded by Australia.
The US has a long history of serving as a security company in the Pacific Islands on the defense entrance. The United States maintains and extends for the FAS security rights and responsibilities through the Particles of Free Association.
Recent security agreements with Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and other countries have strengthened the United States ‘ presence in the area, acting as a counterweight to China’s growing existence, while assisting Pacific needs through development and improved cooperation in disaster relief efforts.
Yet, the US is not the only protection force on the ledger’s area. Both Australia and New Zealand are playing more of a role in the Pacific Islands.
Australia has just resumed discussions with Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and Australia’s and Papua New Guinea, regarding protection agreements. The US will have to work closely with these partners to avoid overlap and ensure a comparable approach, especially now that Australia has signed significant security agreements with Nauru, Tuvalu, and Tuvalu.
How the US’s involvement with the PICs hasn’t been discussed without considering the elephant in the room: how the US’s involvement in the freeze and destruction of USAID has not only damaged the US’ reputation as a companion after years of strengthening, but it has also given China a fantastic opportunity to increase its impact. Although international support is not the only economic factor to take into account, it is one of the most crucial forms of commitment.
Luckily, the FAS and Papua New Guinea restarted their efforts to provide disaster relief and some old munitions. Also, when foreign aid is refunded, programs in the Indo-Pacific appear comparatively less likely to be put on the cutting block. Policy makers are still unsure about how the US can financially interact with the PICs in a more directly mutually advantageous way as a result of the foreign aid freeze.
This isn’t just about giving money; it’s about investing in mutual advantages. The US may strengthen its relationship with PICs while pursuing its own proper interests by putting economic development, climate resilience, and small-scale infrastructure as top priorities.
Because they already have a interest in or want to get more involved in these kinds of foreign support and creation financing projects, the US can work with allies and partners.
The United States ‘ relationship with the Pacific Islands provides a critical opportunity to connect its strategic interests with those of the region while addressing broader issues of concern. There are several ways for the US to expand its presence and impact in the Pacific, despite challenges like the ice on foreign support.
The US may defend its security interests and counteract Chinese expansion by employing diplomatic channels, improving intelligence sharing, expanding law enforcement and coast guard cooperation, and developing financial partnerships.
A wise, cost-effective technique that strikes a balance between the aspirations of the US and the Pacific Islands will be crucial to creating a resilient and profitable future for both parties.
Jonah Bock , ( jonahbock@aspi .org ). Australian Strategic Policy Institute USA ( ASI)   is a senior research assistant with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute USA, where he studies issues involving Pacific island nations with a particular focus on the Freely Associated States.
Kaitlyn Flynn, (kaitlynflynn@aspi .org ), is a guest. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute USA employs an analyst volunteer named  . She recently interned at the US Department of State as an intern for the Office of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.  ,