The New York Times reports that US officials are planning to propose an “armistice ” for Ukraine, allegedly similar to how the Korean War ended in 1953. Nevertheless, an Armistice Partnership like the Asian one does not coincide with Russia’s targets and perhaps can’t be achieved if limited to a ceasefire.
The 1953 agreement was reached after hard discussions that involved the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former Soviet Union and United Nations troops. Its key rules were:
- suspending opened conflicts;
- withdrawing all military forces and products from a 4,000-meter-wide area, establishing the Demilitarized Area as a cushion between the troops;
- both sides will not enter the air, ground or sea areas under control of the other;
- an design for the release and resettlement of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and
- a Military Armistice Commission ( MAC ) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.
The Asian ceasefire is then 72 years older. For the most part, it has prevented opened conflict involving North and South Korea.
The demilitarized area, or DMZ, in Korea is around 160 km long and 2. 5 yards broad. Running through the DMZ is a Military Demarcation Line ( MDL ) which is where the opposing forces were when an armistice was reached.
The DMZ does not expand to the Yellow Sea which was not included in the ceasefire. The DMZ itself does not follow the 38th parallel northeast which was the limit agreed by the US and the USSR at the end of World War II, although sections of the DMZ follow the 38 horizontal.
Other than the Yellow Sea issue ( including a number of islands that are heavily militarized ), the DMZ is reasonably close to a final border should North and South Korea ever normalize their relations and sign a peace treaty.
The North Koreans have hinted, from time to time, that they are seeking a peace agreement ( and especially US recognition and US security assurances ), while the issue in South Korea is far more divisive and uncertain, fearing that normalization could undermine stability in South Korea and lead to a deal where US and allied forces would be withdrawn.
The Ukraine problem is regional, military and political. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in September 2022 and Crimea in 2014. While the edges of Crimea are usually well recognized, the edges of the four regions are not so obvious.
Based on the official Ukrainian Oblast names, Russia does not completely handle any of these lands and battle is going on as the Russian army appears to be aiming at occupying as many place as possible before negotiations start. Assuming that a deal may be made on territories, there are a number of concerns that are more complicated.
Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of any boundary line, deal between Ukraine and Russia, whether important utilities can be restored and utilized such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power advanced, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and port and storage facilities on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, the location of long-range weapons and the presence of NATO forces on Ukraine’s soil.
More problems include the position of Ukraine’s military forces, Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO, types of security offers, oil and gas transport and associated sanctions on Russia.
An armistice would need to cover the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk area ( Russia has liberated about 50 % of the Kursk incursion, but it could take months before the Ukrainians are finally pushed out if the war continues ).
When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, United Nations Forces were stationed in South Korea, and Chinese “volunteers ” were in the North. Ukraine is different: officially there are no NATO forces ( strictly defined ) in Ukraine, although the Russian army is in Ukraine.
Numerous reports say that a number of NATO countries ( UK, France and even Germany ) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine when an Armistice is agreed and to offer Ukraine security guarantees. One concern is that an Armistice tracking pressure and an Armistice military rollout that would provide security guarantees to Ukraine are not the same thing.
Under the original Minsk agreements ( 2014, 2015 ) the OSCE ( Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ) was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements. OSCE sent spectators, hardly an army. OSCE therefore had 57 people including Russia and Ukraine. Essentially the bargain was to finish conflicts and to give freedom to Luhansk and Donetsk ( although both may be lands inside Ukraine ). The package was not implemented.
Russia’s battle objectives, as we understand them, include not only acknowledgment of the conquered areas but the disarmament of Ukraine and an arrangement that Ukraine will not become a NATO part. Whether this includes security guarantees with major NATO countries is not clear. It is hard to see how an Armistice Agreement could be concluded without addressing these issues.
The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice, that would include some sort of buffer zone, essentially freezing the conflict and conceding some Ukrainian territory on a de facto, but not de jure basis. In this context, such a deal on these broad terms would be similar to the 1953 Korean Armistice.
Obviously, the Russian outlook does not align with the one under development in Washington. Russia is not looking for an armistice but for a comprehensive deal with the US and NATO.
A temporary Armistice Agreement (essentially a ceasefire in place ) might be possible if it was linked to agreed political steps, but it seems unlikely to be accepted as any long-term solution. Biden administration informants have hinted at a 10-year or even 20-year pause, but that idea does not have much traction for Russia as it would allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and its weapon stockpile.
President Trump has some cards to play. He could send more aid to Ukraine to prolong the conflict but it is doubtful this is Trump’s aim. He can offer sanctions relief to the Russians, even some accommodation with NATO.
At the same time, the new administration knows how fragile Ukraine itself is, with its military losing one battle after another, short on manpower, encountering popular resistance to the enforced draft, and suffering high casualties.
It is hard to predict where any of this will go but President Trump has signaled his desire to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin, starting with a phone call in the days ahead. Trump will table the idea of an Armistice Agreement: the Russians will demand considerably more.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.