Donald Trump claims that he wants to put an end to the conflict in Ukraine. It’s worthwhile to inquire as to what kind of “peace” he envisions and to whom it may really be a benefit. There is already a law for Trump’s high-stakes relationship with North Korea during his first name, for someone looking for insight into how his most recent political bargain over Ukraine might turn out.
If history can be used, Trump-Putin deals may be edgy, ambiguous, and finally pointless, only like his diplomatic relations with North Korea.
Trump’s interactions with Kim Jong Un were a workshop in artistry. His talks with North Korea did not lead to any significant political breakthroughs, but they did lead to some amazing images and wonderful firsts, including a US president gathering a North Vietnamese leader for the first time, a handshake and a first-ever DMZ crossing into North Korea, and a , a serious departure at the Hanoi Summit.
Although each of these events was portrayed as ancient, the end resulted in no longer-existent peace on the Korean Peninsula, no lessening the threat to Northeast Asia or the rest of the world.
The crucial question is now: Will Trump’s approach to Moscow follow the same pattern as his one with Pyongyang as he pledges to send peace to Ukraine and looks forward to direct conversations with Putin? Will public discussions about Ukraine turn out to be spectacles more than serious political efforts? And most significantly, who will profit if peace is achieved?
Trump oversaw personalized agreements with Kim Jong Un from 2017 to 2019. The process transitioned from escalating language and panic to an abrupt pivot, which culminated in a number of summits with spectacular photo-ops, a tempting but lifeless agreement, and finally the collapse of negotiations.
Trump heightened conflicts in 2017 by threatening to “fire and indignation” against” Little Rocket Man” from North Korea and appointing a “bigger nuclear box” for his office. Trump made his intentions known as the world prepared for war, but as inter-Korean relationships improved and he announced his intention to communicate, he abruptly reversed course.
North Korea and North Korea agreed to “work toward denuclearization” at the Singapore Summit in 2018, but the deal lacked details, identification procedures, and any responsibility from the United States to raise restrictions. Trump declared success during joint military exercises with South Korea after halting them, claiming that the danger had vanished.
It didn’t, either.
The Hanoi Summit ended in disaster a year later. Trump agreed to a waiver of punishment for Kim’s request to destroy his nuclear arsenal in the area of Yongbyon. Trump left the table with the intention of imposing himself and reaffirming both the destruction of nuclear weapons and the closing of another weapons services.
Donald Trump entered North Korea at the demilitarized area in what was commonly viewed as an effort to rekindle interest in a procedure that had already failed in June 2019. The next move was real drama. His staged, extremely publicized prank made headlines, but soon after, North Korea resumed its missile tests, demonstrating how much Trump’s summitry had changed on the ground.
The teaching may be obvious: Trump thrives on movements and a string of lavish performances but lacks the tolerance for sustained, administrative discussions. Trump is then prepared to use the same solution in Ukraine.
His politics with Moscow may have been influenced by his ineffectiveness as it was with North Korea because it was substance-light and optics-heavy. Trump might carry a mountain with Vladimir Putin in Riyadh or Geneva, where they might announce a ceasefire and shake hands. Without any true protection mechanisms, the ceasefire itself may only include flimsy protection guarantees for Ukraine.
Trump could in exchange for a lifting of Russian sanctions or halting military support for Kyiv, properly cementing Moscow’s territorial gains. Russia could bolster its hold on eastern Ukraine while pretending to participate in one-on-one politics, merely as North Korea did after Singapore.
Trump’s real problem is not whether a peace deal will be forged, but whether it will continue, or will it just be another example of Singapore where the opposing side rewards while the other party benefits in vain.
The main distinction is that Kim Jong Un is no Putin. Putin does not need Trump for validity, but Kim did. North Korea was a secluded government with minimal influence. In contrast, Russia has a worldwide network of allies, a war-time business, and a proper desire to keep its aggression.
In contrast to Kim, Putin is seeking agreements rather than reputation. Putin does not need Trump to defend his battle; he needs regional power, sanctions pleasure, and fractures within the American alliance, as Kim and Kim did with Trump to reach an agreement to improve his political and economic standing. Putin will gain a lot more from Trump than Kim ever did.
The Korean Peninsula is presented in a different context than the European dynamics. Moon Jae-in, the president of South Korea, tried to influence US policy by presiding over inter-Korean relations and urging Washington to adopt a more disciplined strategy during the negotiations.
However, South Korea quickly realized that Trump could not be relied upon to bring about a breakthrough with Pyongyang. Seoul was powerless as a result of Trump shifting his focus away from sustainability to reality television, where security conditions and a strong North were at odds with.
Europe should take note of South Korea’s experience and not let it repeat Seoul’s error. If Europe doesn’t assert itself right away, it runs the risk of becoming isolated and unable to influence future negotiations that will define its own security.
Trump’s and Vance’s statements thus far suggest that Seoul and Washington would support European allies. A Trump-Putin deal may be impacted by Korea’s passing, which may indicate how ignored Europe will be.
French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer have made similar visits to Washington, demonstrating how important it is for Europe to grasp the urgency of the situation. They must act right away if they want to influence Ukraine’s future. Europe must accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the EU, increase its defense spending, and increase military production and aid beyond seizing Russian assets. The era of passive diplomacy is over.
The free world needs a new leader, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s chief diplomat Kaja Kallas said in response to the rift between President Zelensky and Trump in the White House in late February. It’s up to us, Europäers, to take on this challenge. Europe has the option to lead or to be led. The message is clear: It’s time to “man up” ( not” Moon up” as South Korea did ) or be erased from history.
Tereza Novotna PhD is a political scientist and analyst with a focus on EU-Asia affairs, global security, and European External Relations. She is a senior affiliate researcher and lecturer at the Free University of Berlin, a senior associate research fellow at EUROPEUM, a member of 9DashLine for Korea, and a Pacific Forum non-resident Kelly fellow. Her commentary has appeared in publications like the Bulletin of the East-West Center Washington , 38 North, The Diplomat, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, , NK Pro and , Bulletin of the East-West Center Washington , and others.