Although South Asia has experienced some political bulwarks, New Delhi’s most recent move may have spelled out a risky new chapter of geographical brinkmanship.
India unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty ( IWT ) with Pakistan, a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation for more than 60 years, on April 23 just one day after a deadly terrorist attack in the Kashmir-administered region, killing 26 people.
The decision was made in addition to the closing of a significant border crossing, the termination of Pakistani citizens ‘ regional immigration privileges, and the deterioration of diplomatic ties. With liquid at the center of what started out as a drama at Kashmir’s Pahalgam hill station and then having the opposite effect, it is quickly turning into a political crisis.
Kashmir Weight, a violent organization that claims responsibility, is a common name in a region full of acronyms and confusion.
However, India has taken a number of punitive measures that target Pakistan’s monetary arteries and, more dangerously, its waters lifeline without providing any practical evidence of external involvement.
Fears of an escalation are now growing in Islamabad, according to press reports. Social insiders and national security officials worry that India might consider engaging in punishing military action once more, in a similar vein to the Pulwama-Balakot incident in 2019, in which 40 Indian paramilitary staff were killed in an attack on which India responded with cross-border strikes.
Pakistan then launched its own airstrikes, and for a quick, menacing moment, the region sank on the verge of a full-fledged conflict between two nuclear powers.
Major military and civilian officials from Pakistan’s government met for an emergency meeting of its National Security Committee on April 24. The meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar called out India’s actions as “premature and provocative,” noting that no evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attack has been made public.
The Indus Waters Treaty itself, however, is the true powder tank.
The convention has been a unique, resilient bridge between two nuclear-armed foes, as it was mediated by the World Bank in 1960. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab river, which account for nearly 80 % of Pakistan’s water supply, are distributed according to their rules.
However, the Indus Waters Treaty is not a typical diplomatic deal. Because it is a part of global laws, it cannot be. Pakistan can make a compelling argument that it is in the international community’s best interest to preserve partnerships made through meticulous politics.
This is philosophical, not just a political complexity. The Indus program is a major source of power for all four of Pakistan’s counties. Pakistan’s vulnerability is normal, absolute, and agricultural with few other sources, most prominently a few Afghan rivers.
Not only for Pakistan but for the entire place, the increase is deeply disturbing. More than any other asset, water reveals the power imbalance between upstream and downstream says in South Asia.
India’s decision to “hold the treaty in abeyance,” a legitimate grey area without any real precedent, creates a disturbing example. In a time of grief and anger, it weaponizes a shared tool, undermining both local norms and international legislation.
For its part, New Delhi has not been overly diplomatic about its long-standing frustration with the convention. It fully sent a notice to Islamabad last year asking for a revision of the terms, which Pakistan quickly rejected.
The coercive “abeyance” of this week appears to be an illegal attempt to put Pakistan on the defensive. Beyond the constitutional posturing, there is a more nuanced calculus, known as financial attrition.
Analysts believe that India’s overall intention is to stifle Pakistan’s now depressed economy, especially its agriculture, which is largely dependent on the Indus River system.
Practically speaking, withholding water may require a large amount of equipment on a scale that isn’t currently in place. Even if these projects were started soon, they may require years and billion to be realized.
Also, symbolism has the potential to be effective. Yet symbolic techniques may have long and short tempers in South Asia, where recollections are long and emotions are small.
And what guarantees do the region’s smaller North Asian countries, like Bangladesh and Nepal, have?
A collective message from South Asia’s louder regions, such as Dhaka, Colombo, and Kathmandu, is now desperately needed to convince New Delhi and Islamabad of their obligations to the wider South Asian area.
The continent cannot afford for diplomacy to be stricken by fractious politics, and rivers to be used as retaliators.
Muktadir Rashid serves as Bangla Outlook, a media website based in Dhaka.