China ’s fresh non-nuclear hydrogen bomb is designed to destroy sustained power to terrify Taiwan’s soldiers and split their resistance in urban war.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported that Chinese scientists successfully detonated a non-nuclear hydrogen bomb in a controlled field test, citing a peer-reviewed study published last month in the Chinese-language Journal of Projectiles, Rockets, Missiles and Guidance.
Developed by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s 705 Research Institute, the system uses mg hydride—a solid-state gas storage material previously engineered for off-grid power applications—as its principal part.
During stimulation, reverberations break the stuff into micron-scale contaminants, releasing hydrogen fuel. This fuel ignites into sustained fire and reaches temperature exceeding 1,000 degree Celsius.
Unlike regular TNT blasts, which produce a simple, really high-pressure wave, China ’s novel weapon creates a lower top blast pressure but sustains its fireball for over two hours, causing extended infrared damage and enabling directed energy results.
Researchers emphasized the weapon’s military applications, ranging from common heat forecast to precision-target death, facilitated by its stable network response mechanism.
The production of magnesium hydrogen, longer restricted to facilities, saw a breakthrough with the beginning of a high-capacity grow in Shaanxi state earlier this year, capable of producing 150 lots annually. However, certain details about the exam site or operational tactics remain unclear.
The faculties of China ’s magnesium hydroxide weapon appear operationally similar to those of a thermobaric tool. These weapons disperse a huge cloud of energy that ignites upon contact with air, producing a high-temperature fire and a deadly wave that can reach bunkers and buildings. These arms are especially effective in urban war.
Russia’s use of its TOS-1 thermobaric rocket launcher in Ukraine offers a glimpse into how China may use its new bomb in Taiwan, using enormous blasts to eliminate infantry in buildings, starve occupants of oxygen and inflict damaging internal injuries.
In a June 2024 article for The National Interest ( TNI), Peter Suciu mentions that Russia’s urban warfare tactics using the TOS-1 appeared to emphasize that the best way to take out infantry in buildings is to prevent them from getting out, and that those who get out are too severely injured to continue fighting.
China may face a similar situation in Taiwan should an invasion of the latter bog down into an urban war of attrition. In the 2022 book Crossing the Strait, Sale Lilly mentions that China ’s urban warfare tactics are guided by the principle of “killing rats in a porcelain shop, ” emphasizing the brutality of such operations while exercising caution to prevent the destruction of cities.
Further, Lilly points out that besides the height of Taipei’s skyscrapers, the city ’s underground infrastructure, including parking garages, shopping centers and subway stations, dramatically expands the area available for urban warfare.
Such infrastructure may play a vital role in Taiwan’s attritional defense. E Sean Rooney and other writers mention in an October 2024 Proceedings article that if Taiwan were forced to defend itself without the US, its urban environment would provide an ideal defensive environment, as massed fires against urban targets would create more rubble and defensive positions, requiring China to hold both aboveground and underground layers in a laborious advance.
Rooney and others also say that China using mass fires against urban areas could generate an international backlash and turn international popular opinion against it.
While thermobaric weapons could be effective in such an environment, they could also cause massive collateral damage. However, as China claims its new bomb has a controllable chain reaction and a weaker blast force than TNT, it hints at the weapon’s power being scalable to address such concerns.
Alternatively, China may also take a page from the US “shock-and-awe ” tactics in Afghanistan, using its new bomb as a psychological weapon.
Michael Schmitt and Peter Barker mention in an April 2017 Just Security article that the US Massive Ordnance Air Blast ( MOAB) weapon, originally designed to be used against large troop formations or hardened aboveground bunkers, was thought to have a potent effect on Islamic State ( IS ) morale due to its reported 1. 6-kilometer blast and the fact its detonation creates a mushroom cloud similar to a nuclear weapon.
Schmitt and Barker note that the MOAB was effective against IS cave and tunnel networks, with the pressure wave killing or injuring the occupants and collapsing the system.
They say that the MOAB could cause an adversary to abandon certain operations, such as underground warfare, forcing them to expose themselves. Additionally, they mention that such a potent weapon sends a powerful message to adversaries, signaling resolve and other strategic messaging.
In the case of China and Taiwan, Afghanistan’s cave and tunnel networks may not be too dissimilar from Taiwan’s underground defenses. A MOAB-type weapon — leveraging sustained blast and thermal effects — could be particularly effective against small frontline strongholds like Kinmen and Matsu.
Taipei’s urban setting and dense civilian presence contrast markedly with isolated cave networks, which pose minimal collateral damage risks. Since China would most likely want to minimize collateral damage, avoid massive urban battles and contain international backlash if it attempts to invade Taiwan, it may use its new bomb as a psychological weapon in conjunction with a blockade.
Using such a weapon against Kinmen and Matsu could rapidly degrade defender capabilities, particularly in confined underground spaces where sustained thermal effects and pressure waves would be most devastating.
Still, the extent and speed of defensive collapse would depend heavily on factors such as weapon yield, defensive preparations and the effectiveness of air defense neutralization efforts.
The purported sheer power of China ’s new bomb, alongside the potential for rapid neutralization of Kinmen and Matsu’s defenders, would be a prelude to landing operations to eliminate surviving resistance and seize the islands.
However, a shock-and-awe island seizure of Kinmen and Matsu and a blockade of Taiwan may be a low-risk, low-reward strategy. Capturing Kinmen and Matsu is not the same as seizing Taiwan. While the loss of Kinmen and Matsu and resulting shortages could impose severe psychological and logistical pressure, Taiwan’s leadership has demonstrated resilience in past crises.
Strong international support, including US military intervention, could bolster Taiwan’s resolve, making outright capitulation unlikely even after heavy initial setbacks.