Central Asia beware: You may be Putin’s next target after Ukraine – Asia Times

Central Asia beware: You may be Putin’s next target after Ukraine – Asia Times

The Kremlin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is a declaration of royal conquest in an effort to recover the country’s former royal heyday. Since there is little hope for the future for Russians, the Kremlin may look to the past for ideas. Ukraine is not just a neighboring status, but a missing element in a great historical puzzle, the key to the Russian empire’s reconstruction, for Vladimir Putin.

New comments made by US Middle East minister Steve Witkoff have caused warnings all over Europe as a deeply troubling indicator of Donald Trump’s long-in-motion hinge to Russia. Instead of urging the attacker to cease its war, Trump first took a more aggressive approach toward the target, pressuring Ukraine in a way suggestive of a mafia-style mattress.

Witkoff echoed many Kremlin remarkations about Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which has worried German and Russian leaders, in an appointment with Tucker Carlson. He praised Putin, called him “gracious” and” smart,” and suggested that US-Russian discussions had made unanticipated improvement.

Witkoff even downplayed the regional issues surrounding Russia’s invasion of four Russian provinces, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, implying that Russia had a correct to these lands.

Witkoff struggled to recall the names of the four areas that have been under Russian power since the 2022 war to show his utter ignorance. Even though Crimea was occupied and annexed by Russia in 2014, he falsely included it on the record. He dismissed concerns of more Russian development, claiming that NATO may prevent a replicate of World War II-style anger. &nbsp,

Following his five-hour meet with Putin, Witkoff went back to Moscow and continued to suggest that Ukraine should provide more territory to Russia in order to achieve “permanent peace.” He even suggested the offer may open the door to renewed US-Russia connections through business opportunities, framing it as a broader effort to stabilize the area.

Once more, Witkoff demonstrated that he is far beyond his comfort zone when it comes to high-stakes politics. &nbsp,

When Russia rolled its vehicles across Ukraine’s edges in 2022, the information to all former Soviet republics was unmistakable: Vladimir Putin intended to restore the Russian Empire and bring the earth back decades to do it. Putin praised the tsar’s victories and suggested that, like his predecessor, he was also reclaiming what was “rightfully” Russia’s just a few months later. &nbsp,

This imperial vision has long roots. Putin referred to the Soviet Union’s collapse as the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century in his 2005 speech. He is running out of time to realize his vision at the age of 72. The war in Ukraine is, for him, not just about territory– it is about legacy. If that is what it takes to bring Ukraine to heel, he appears willing to see the Russian state bleed and possibly collapse.

Putin’s reign as Ukraine’s ruler is predated by Russia, and it won’t end with him unless Russia is defeated on the battlefield. The idea that Ukraine belongs within Moscow’s sphere of influence has been a persistent feature of Russian political thinking, even under supposedly democratic leadership in the 1990s.

These worries extended to the period immediately following the invasion. Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first elected president, reportedly considered conducting a nuclear strike to stop Kyiv from dissolving permanently after the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Though the threat was never carried out, it revealed how deeply rooted the Kremlin’s anxiety over Ukrainian sovereignty truly was.

Yeltsin claimed that Russia had the right to review its borders with any neighboring nation that wished to leave the Soviet Union, with particular reference to areas of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

By 1994, Russia had already begun attempting to regain control of Crimea, which promoted separatist sentiment and political unrest. The tension never fully dissipated.

Then, in 2003, tensions rekindled as a result of Russia’s decision to build a dam in the Kerch Strait over a Ukrainian island, causing concern in Kyiv over an attempted land grab. It was a clear attempt to contest Ukrainian authority. Though the crisis was eventually defused, it foreshadowed the future Russian aggression in Crimea.

Russia’s strategy changed from economic pressure to outright aggression when Ukrainians marched against closer ties with the EU in 2013. The acceleration of Russia’s efforts to end the international system and the post-Cold War order itself was marked by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the spawning of war in eastern Ukraine.

If Putin should succeed, Russia would not just grow in size but gain immense strategic depth and economic leverage. Moscow would be able to increase its military, industrial base, and strategic infrastructure, increasing its strength and reach. A strong Russia would emerge stronger, more aggressive, and much harder to contain.

The implications of a Russian victory would extend far beyond Ukraine. Central Asian nations like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have made more efforts to distance themselves from Russia, both politically and linguistically.

While Kyrgyzstan initially reacted favorably to a large influx of Russian refugees fleeing conscription, the surge rekindled concerns about renewed Russian imperial influence. In response, many young Kyrgyz are embracing their native language as an act of resistance and identity reclamation. Kyrgyz is now required to be used in government under new laws, and grassroots efforts to promote the language are taking off, particularly among urban youth. &nbsp,

Much the same is happening in Kazakhstan, where efforts to revive the Kazakh language have accelerated, including a shift away from the Cyrillic script. In 2021, Uzbekistan made its own transition to the Latin alphabet, indicating a glaring departure from Russian cultural influence.

What’s stopping Putin from making a similar claim in Central Asia after he claimed to defend the invasion of Ukraine by claiming to protect Russian speakers in the Donbass? Could he one day argue that Russian speakers in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan also need “protection” and send in tanks under that pretext? After all, how many people believed that Russia would annex Crimea in 2014 or launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022?

Similar imperial rhetoric has been used by Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev against Kazakhstan, which he called an “artificial state” in 2022, not just against Ukraine but also against Kazakhstan.

Despite initial hopes that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would push Kazakhstan to pivot toward the West, Moscow’s influence in that country has actually deepened. Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev has used symbolic language to formally declare his independence, such as speaking in Kazakh during official visits, but his reliance on Russia continues to be significant.

During the unrest in 2022, Russia assisted Tokayev in holding onto the presidency. Since then, economic ties have strengthened, with record levels of bilateral trade, joint energy projects and Russian stakes in strategic resources like uranium.

The promised reforms toward a more democratic” New Kazakhstan” have largely stalled, giving way to growing authoritarianism, as Kate Mallinson, associate fellow in the Chatham House program for Russia and Eurasia, pointed out. Russia continues to have a strong position in Kazakhstan’s future despite China’s declining influence and expanding China’s presence.

But the Central Asian nations have attempted to distance themselves from Moscow politically, refusing to back its invasion of Ukraine or recognize Russian-claimed territories. In response, Russia has switched to soft power sources like humanitarian aid, cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and significant development funding.

With over 350, 000 Russian” compatriots” in Kyrgyzstan and deep institutional ties through the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union, Russia is investing heavily in maintaining its foothold. However, if Russia secures its desired outcome in Ukraine, which will free up resources for other fronts, that calculus could change quickly.

Putin keeps stifling any actual ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. He toys with Trump, who shows little interest in seriously addressing the war. Puntin wracks up concessions without making any concessions. Witkoff is by no means the only US official to chime in on Kremlin points.

For now, Trump continues to state he is “pissed off” and&nbsp,” not happy”, but there are still no concrete actions against the Kremlin to force the Russians to the table for an immediate ceasefire. Former US ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst stated that” While Putin has clearly stalled Trump‘s efforts to reach a ceasefire of any kind, he has not been punished for that in any serious way.”

Putin is likely to use a lot of force to influence a upcoming Trump administration, especially one that works by assuming that it can create a reverse Kissinger-China relationship. Such strategic naivety risks handing Moscow exactly what it wants: division among countries in the West, giving Russia more free reign in its empire-rebuilding projects. &nbsp,

Putin is unlikely to stop there if he is permitted to claim victory in Ukraine or reach a peace deal that effectively reduces it to a vassal state. Now in his seventies, with his imperial ambitions slipping out of reach, Putin may grow more reckless in pursuit of legacy.

Once Ukraine is under its control, the Kremlin elite will have a chance to focus their energies on Central Asia and resurrect Russia’s imperial project there. Regardless of the cost, Moscow continues to work hard to reintroduce the world to the 19th century.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. He can be found on X @ DVKirichenko.