Likely to lead South Korea, Lee holds left’s foreign policy views – Asia Times

Lee Jae-myung is likely to get the impromptu national vote scheduled for June 3 in response to President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment as president of the Republic of Korea. &nbsp, A Gallup&nbsp, poll&nbsp, released in April indicated Lee enjoys a support level of 34 percentage, while his highest-rated foe languishes at 9 percent. &nbsp,

Lee represents the progressive Democratic Party ( DP ), while Yoon was a conservative. &nbsp, Typically, a modify in South Korea from a traditional to a left-of-center government would have the ability to substantially stir up international relations in Northeast Asia.

Liberal Koreas tend to be comparatively cordial toward North Korea and China, which in turn causes conflicts with the US.

Kim Dae-jung, who served as South Korea’s president between 1998 and 2003, opposed the conservative US policy toward North Korea, opting instead to implement the now-infamous” Sunshine Policy” of offering economic benefits, including a key$ 500 million settlement to arrange a conference meet with Kim Jong-il, in an effort to calm Pyongyang’s animosity toward the ROK. &nbsp,

Roh Moo-hyun, Kim’s son, criticized the US strategy of using financial sanctions to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and he criticized the country’s approach to seeking “equidistance” between China and the US. He also criticized the US method.

The traditional Yoon, in contrast, was exceptionally supportive of the US plan despite being contentious and finally a disappointment abroad. &nbsp, His” Strategy for a Free, Quiet, and Rich Indo-Pacific Place” closely resembled the Biden Administration’s” Indo-Pacific Plan” published a few months earlier. &nbsp,

Yoon spoke out against North Korea without making any comments about China, which was in line with US jobs. &nbsp, He promised a foreign policy anchored in the same democratic norms Washington was therefore promoting. Despite Korea’s persistent historical disputes with Japan, the US government was particularly appreciative of Yoon’s determination to enhance corporate cooperation with Tokyo.

In response, Yoon to Lee’s transition to the president will cause a significant change in South Korea’s foreign policy, according to many spectators. &nbsp, They see the ROK at a” crossroads“, with some concluding a Lee government would” send shockwaves&nbsp, through East Asia’s delicate balance of power” or even create” a&nbsp, nightmare scenario“.

But, Yoon to Lee’s transition would probably be a vibration rather than an earthquake.

To be sure, Yoon’s perspective and Lee’s differ. &nbsp, The DP&nbsp, argues&nbsp, that Yoon unnecessarily damaged relations with China and Russia in his effort to please Washington.

Lee criticized Yoon for unduly antagonizing China, the nation that purchases about a third of South Korea’s export, during the National Assembly elections in March 2024. Because they dislike South Korea, Taiwanese people don’t purchase items made there. &nbsp, Why are we bothering]Beijing ]”? he asked, “he.” Why is it important to us what happens in the Taiwan Strait? &nbsp, Doesn’t we simply take care of ourselves”?

Why is it important to us what happens in Taiwan Strait? Don’t we only take good care of ourselves, as they say?

Lee Jae-myung

Lee opposed the US and other governments ‘ political sanctions against the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games. He also supports the implementation of extra US THAAD anti-missile chargers in South Korea.

Lee is also less pro-Japan than Yoon. When the Yoon government declined to press the Japanese government to pay for the forced laborers ‘ wages, Lee&nbsp described Yoon as” submissive and subservient.”

Former President Moon Jae-in’s strategy of pursuing rapprochement with North Korea through the use of sanctions relief has been supported by Lee, with the stipulation that sanctions may be resented if mutual DPRK concessions are not made.

While Yoon said South Korea may provide destructive military aid to Ukraine as a result of North Vietnamese soldiers fighting on Russia’s area, Lee has made clear he did not.

Lee is opposed to a trilateral military alliance that includes Japan, and claims that this could be “very dangerous” as a result of the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan over ownership of the Dokdo and Takeshima Islands. &nbsp,

In practical terms, however, Lee’s proposed policy toward Japan is not dramatically different from Yoon’s. Lee stated during his speech announcing his presidential candidacy that he believes it is “important” to” strengthen trilateral cooperation with Japan,” rather than formally allying with Japan.

The” two-track” diplomacy Lee favors would pursue strategic cooperation while also and distinctly pursuing justice for the Korean victims of Japan’s past misdeeds. &nbsp, Lee&nbsp, told&nbsp, The Economist&nbsp, he does not viscerally hate the Japanese. He claimed that while he was in Japan, he was shocked by the Japanese people’s diligence, sincerity, and courtesy. He also claimed that politics ultimately distorted the Korean people’s perception of Japan.

Lee supports granting South Korea operational control of its own armed forces during the Korean War, but he doesn’t want to see US military installations being evacuated. Although he once used the phrase” US occupying forces”, he later explained he was referring to the period immediately after the Second World War. He now states,” This is not an occupying force, but an ally.”

Lee wants to talk with North Korea to ease tensions, but this does not put him in conflict with the new Trump Administration. &nbsp, Trump himself&nbsp, says-he-intends-to-reengage-with-n-korean-leader.html” target=”_blank” rel=”noreferrer noopener”>says&nbsp, he wants to re-engage with Kim Jong-un. Lee claims that he is “very grateful” for this, and even suggests that he might suggest that Trump be considered for the US president’s Nobel Prize.

Lee would follow Roh’s equidistance policy and work toward preserving the security relationship with the US while upholding a strong economic partnership with China. If the US-China cold war were to grow, that would prove challenging. &nbsp, But this would not distinguish Lee from his predecessor.

Yoon’s alliance with the US against China was arguably more rhetorical than substantive, aside from advancing trilateral cooperation, including Japan. For instance, Yoon’s government declined to speak out directly against China over its harassment of Philippine vessels close to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, and Yoon also declined to meet with US Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi the day after her 2022 visit to Taiwan.

From the standpoint of Korean conservatives and many in the US policy-making community, a left-leaning Korean government is prone to pursuing a North Korea policy that increases the South’s vulnerability to DPRK exploitation or aggression. The danger arises when Pyongyang acts in bad faith and outmaneuvers Seoul during negotiations. &nbsp,

That possibility is now much reduced, however, because the North is relatively uninterested in bargaining. Its nuclear and missile programs are ongoing, reunification is not on the table, Kim Jong-un has no desire to hold a summit, and Pyongyang has not attempted to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

For the DPRK government, Seoul has mainly been useful only as an intermediary for seeking concessions from the US. But Kim appears to have largely passed away. Kim has since developed a successful partnership with Russia after being badly burned at the 2019 Hanoi summit with Trump. &nbsp, Lee might have little opportunity to show magnanimity to Pyongyang even if he wants to.

In the end, Yoon and Lee would not be more likely than Lee to start nuclear. According to a recent poll, three out of four South Koreans want nuclear weapons. &nbsp, In 2023 Yoon threatened to acquire tactical nuclear weapons in response to the North Korean nuclear buildup, although he backed off after receiving US assurances as part of the&nbsp, Washington Declaration.

A South Korea with nuclear weapons would in fact send a” shockwave” through the area. Unintentional catastrophic escalation in a DPRK-ROK conflict would become more likely. &nbsp, The US and South Korean governments would reconsider the necessity of the bilateral alliance. Japan would probably also deploy nuclear weapons, according to sources.

However, Yoon to Lee’s change in leadership would not reduce the likelihood that anything like this would occur. &nbsp, The Democratic Party no longer considers nuclear weapons a taboo topic, but it currently goes no farther than&nbsp, favoring&nbsp, nuclear latency, not actual deployment.

We can easily assume that South Korea-Japan’s modest strategic cooperation would continue under a hypothetical Lee presidency while ROK-DPRK relations would continue to deteriorate. China would attempt to exploit a rumored opportunity to get the ROK out of the US Bloc, but this campaign would have its limits because South Koreans still value the US alliance. &nbsp, Seoul and Washington would agree in principle on working toward new talks with Pyongyang.

Thus, the region would experience a change in South Korea’s international relations, but not a significant reversal.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the Honolulu East-West Center.