Japan is working to build a Tomahawk-like weapon, aiming to reach further, faster, and on its own terms as China and North Korea’s missile threats come to an end and US stocks are running out.
This month, Naval News reported that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries ( MHI ) and Japan’s Ministry of Defense ( MOD ) signed a 32.3 billion yen ( US$ 219 million ) contract to create a new” Surface-to-Ship/Surface-to-Surface Precision Guided Missile” ( SURFA ).
Through improvements in range, precision advice, and aircraft capabilities, the weapon aims to improve its anti-ship and anti-ground efficiency.
Development is expected to start in 2024 through 2032, making use of improvements made by Kawasaki Heavy Industries ‘” New Anti-Ship Missile for the Defense of Remote Islands” and MHI’s Model 12 surface-to-ship weapon improvements.
The weapon has aerodynamic wings and a fuel-efficient website, which makes extended parallel journey possible, similar to the US Tomahawk. Targeting accuracy and penetration abilities will be improved by intelligence satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ).
This security initiative highlights Japan’s strategic shift to disagreement weapons as it intensifies its efforts to combat China’s sea aggression and North Korea’s weapon advances. Important project details, including engine design, are still undetermined, according to an official from Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency ( ALTA )   ).
The action complements Japan’s more aggressive military development plan, with tensions spread throughout East Asia fueled by the need. In response to rising challenges from China and North Korea, Japan announced in October 2023 that it planned to purchase 400 US Tomahawk weapons.
In order to highlight China’s evolving missile threat to Japan, Newsweek reported in March 2025 that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force ( PLARF ) had deployed advanced missile systems capable of piercing Japan’s ballistic missile defenses.
The ground-launched cruise missiles CJ-10 and CJ-100, as well as China’s DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, pose considerable challenges to Japan’s island.
These rockets have ranges of 1, 500 to 2, 500 kilometers and are located in the northern provinces of Jilin and eastern Shandong, covering Japan’s four main islands. Moreover, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is in use in Anhui province, increases China’s range of attacks by 4, 000 km.
In addition, USNI reported in January 2025 that North Korea’s test of its hypersonic missiles that quarter indicates its goal to improve its corporate punishment features. The weapon was reported by state media,” The missile traveled 1, 500 km at Mach 12 and traveled in a “dual top” before falling into the Sea of Japan.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff from South Korea and Japan’s MOD provided conflicting information, with data that showed a maximum range of 1,100 kilometers and the presence of the alleged next peak.
However, Japan’s decision to create a similar indigenous weapon may have been influenced by the challenges facing US Tomahawk weapon production. In a March 2025 post from 1945, Reuben Johnson points out that the US Navy is experiencing a severe lack of Tomahawk cruise missiles as a result of rapid consumption levels exceeding creation skills.
Over 80 rockets were used in a single day in latest issues, including the 2024 Yemen strikes. A” just-in-time” production model that limits surge capacity adds to business challenges caused by fluctuating procurement needs and insufficient production prices.
Efforts to increase production through exports have not yet had considerable impact. Also, inconsistent demand has resulted in bottlenecks in crucial components like rocket motors, further putting off replenishment. Recent production costs are insufficient, with orders from 2023 estimating that only five missiles will be delivered each month by 2025.
In a report released in January 2023 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS), Seth Jones points out that the US spent 400 Tomahawk missiles in just three weeks of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, with a replacement missile from a Tomahawk Block V taking 25 months.
This ability stock decline may leave much room for friends like Japan. However, Masashi Murano claims in a March 2024 article by the US Studies Center ( USSC ) that upgrading the Type 12 to a longer-range, more powerful missile presents a number of technical challenges.
A longer-range, better-than-ever Type 12 would require a satellite data link and its existing guidance system to update its flight path in real-time, allowing for time-sensitive targets like transporter-erector-launchers ( TELs ).
Additionally, an upgraded Type 12 may require different type of warheads to crater runways and obliterate bunkers and other hardened targets. China and North Korea are even likely to have strong threats, which would require the purchase of electronic warfare drones that can imitate the names of their adversary’s threats.
Murano also points out that Japan has limited manufacturing capacity for such munitions and that the long-range hit systems it is developing are costly. However, Japan needs to view much in order to take.
Christopher Woody makes clear in a March 2025 Breaking Defense article that Japan’s reliance on the US for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ) is still significant, with gaps in its “kill chain” capabilities necessitating US support for target detection and tracking. This leaves the chance that the US will resign when Japan had most require them.
Importantly, the temporary suspension of US knowledge sharing with Ukraine in 2025 made it clear how powerfully significant such actions can be for a country’s defenses, prompting US allies to reevaluate their reliance on US military resources and technology.
In the case of Ukraine, the demise of US intelligence services led to Russia’s ability to retake important chunks of Kursk, upending Ukraine’s policy of using Russian country as a bargaining device for peace negotiations.
Withdrawing a decision like this may give Japan the plain but challenging choice to develop its own independent counterstrike capabilities without relying on the US, or to continue adopting US technology while reducing the chance of abandonment.
In a report for the Institute for International and Strategic Studies ( IISS) in January 2024, Veerle Nouwens and others point out that while Japan has launched a reconnaissance satellite and has pledged to launch small satellites for target detection and build over-the-horizon ( OTH) radars, it will likely continue to rely on the US for these capabilities due to the complexity and cost of the associated equipment.
Woody points out that the Trump administration’s transactional approach to relationships has strained US-Japan relationships deeper, with needs for more Chinese security funding and criticisms of Japan’s contributions to the empire.
Although Japan has pledged to double defense spending to 2 % of GDP by 2027, these plans are hampered by political and economic issues, including public opposition to tax increases. The check will be whether Japan’s missiles can travel farther than US promises, as it shifts from dependent to deterrence.