Germany  , just opened , its first permanent military base abroad since World War II , amidst the competition  , for leadership of , post-conflict Europe , between itself, France and Poland.
Located in southern Lithuania near the Belarusian borders and in contact to Russia’s Kaliningrad Region, it’s strategically positioned to provide Germany enormous effect in shaping Europe’s potential security architecture. That’s because Germany is now a direct stakeholder in Central &, Eastern Europe’s ( CEE ) security.
This development improvements many related strategic objectives. For instance, it poses a problem to Poland’s work to present as the Baltic States ‘ most dependable European alliance, given that Germany now has a bottom in one of those countries, exactly the one that connects Poland to the other two.
On that subject, Germany and Poland agreed to create a “military Schengen” in early 2024 to facilitate the movements of soldiers and products, which makes it easier for Germany to supply its Ukrainian center.
This alliance may consequently be expanded to encompass Latvia and Estonia, especially after the German Parliament , confirmed the centrality , of the” Baltic Defense Line” to the republic’s eastern protection plan.
Germany’s Lithuanian base could, therefore, pair with its , envisaged military buildup , and an expanded “military Schengen” to compete more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics. That might, in turn, result in Germany subordinating Poland to become the dominant military player in CEE.
Germany’s new base in Lithuania doesn’t just pose a challenge to Polish interests, even if Warsaw won’t openly admit as much. Some Polish officials might even support a more important regional security role for Berlin.
Any hypothetical Russian military action against Lithuania, including if Moscow tries to carve out a so-called” Suwalki Corridor” from Belarus to Kaliningrad, could serve as a tripwire for the EU’s de facto leader to become militarily involved in the crisis.
To be sure, Russia hasn’t signaled any intent to blitzkrieg through Poland or much weaker Lithuania en route to its Baltic exclave. Nor has anyone cogently suggested why it would do so, considering this scenario would almost certainly lead to a continental conflict and perhaps even World War III if the US becomes involved.
Nevertheless, it still worries many Europeans and thus influences how they formulate policy, with Germany now poised to play a greater role in such discussions, given its direct stakes in deterring or responding to this scenario.
And, finally, the two preceding objectives of Germany competing more robustly with Poland for influence in the Baltics and having a greater say in” Suwalki Corridor” contingency planning are meant to ensure that it’s included in any Russian-US deal over Europe’s future security architecture.
Putin’s late 2021 request for the US to return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act by withdrawing Western troops and military infrastructure from the former Warsaw Pact countries can’t now be achieved without Germany’s participation.
Every other NATO member’s eastern deployments , are rotational,  , even though they function as permanent. Yet the US and Germany’s are officially permanent, which is a different legal status that’s considered more serious by Russia.
This doesn’t automatically mean that Germany will be included in the Russian-US talks, not even in the capacity of representing the EU, but just that Berlin can now serve as more of an obstacle than anyone else to them possibly clinching a grand deal over European security without any European nations ‘ input.
This , article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , here.