Russian President Vladimir Putin was proclaimed a “great Buddhist prophet” by Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in a statement that was both crazy and revealing in February.  ,
The deeper motivation was evident, even if some of the statement was caused by hyperbole: Myanmar’s troubled junta leader was sorely seeking legitimacy from a great energy, even if it required outrageous praise. However, neither his actions nor words accurately reflect his truth.
Min Aung Hlaing is in charge of a government that, according to some estimates, controls less than 30 % of Myanmar’s country. The Three Brotherhood Alliance is one of the ethnic armed groups that has led the Myanmar military to surrender on a number of sides.  ,
Meanwhile, the opposition’s National Unity Government ( NUG) is gaining worldwide support as various resistance movements increasingly coordinate their offensives.  ,
Despite all of this, the coup-installed State Administration Council ( SAC ) junta, which has been in power for four years, holds back promises of new elections this year that are unpopular, fair, or legitimate.
a desperate need for business
The president’s words in Moscow were a calculated walk, no just flattery. Russia, one of Myanmar’s some trustworthy military suppliers, provides diplomatic support to the UN.  ,
By using Buddhism, which Putin has no enduring connection to, Min Aung Hlaing attempted to portray Russia’s aid as being somehow predetermined, transcending the social here and now.
Putin, on the other hand, only offered vague promises of ongoing participation. If something, the Soviet leader, who is currently mired in Ukraine, opinions Myanmar as a second-guess priority rather than a lover.  ,
Min Aung Hlaing is clinging to Moscow despite the fact that China, the government’s other key international supporter, plays a more transactional and difficult sport. Beijing gives the junta diplomatic and economic support, but it also maintains ties with Myanmar’s racial armed groups, ensuring its effect regardless of who gains.
In light of the junta’s growing losses on the battlefield, which is making it necessary to appoint retired officers and grant expedited citizenship to foreigners who want to enlist, that’s an exceedingly open question.  ,
The Tatmadaw ( Myanmar military ) has never encountered such a large and well-organized armed resistance, according to security analyst Anthony Davis, a contributing author to Asia Times.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN), which is widely criticized for its stillborn Five-Point Consensus for addressing the crisis, is now shifting its position in response to rising concerns about a humanitarian crisis that will shock the region.
Notably, the regional bloc has no longer pushed for fresh elections and instead has suggested an immediate ceasefire as the only practical course to stability.  ,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been the most outspoken critics of the dictatorship, with Jakarta leading back-channel discussions to put a halt to conflicts.
Min Aung Hlaing has nonetheless indicated that he has no intention of renouncing a ceasefire, probably because he believes that military rule is his only way to survive. His most recent refusal of ASEAN’s demands for compromise suggests that Myanmar’s conflict will continue also beyond 2026.
According to Professor Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington,” Min Aung Hlaing’s unwillingness to sacrifice is not just a social miscalculation; it’s a guarantee that Myanmar’s separation does continue.”
Vanishing sign
Aung San Suu Kyi’s impact is on the decline as Min Aung Hlaing’s conflict continues.
She was previously assumed to be the unavoidable head of Myanmar’s democratic transition, but she now languishes in prison and has little chance of a social revival without the collapse of the regime. Her health is officially deteriorating while the coup keeps her in near-total isolation, at the age of 78.
Suu Kyi’s launch from confinement, in contrast to previous military reprisals, did not mobilize the antagonism in the same way.
However, the resistance movement has moved beyond her and is now being led by more recent, radical groups who view armed struggle as the only practical way to political change, as opposed to the peaceful protest Suu Kyi recently received a Nobel Peace Prize.
Who will succeed Suu Kyi, if people, is the bigger issue. Despite the fact that new faces of the pro-democracy movements have emerged, none of them possess Suu Kyi’s uniting power.
In the long run, her absence has created a management vacuum that could further sever the government’s grip. A new era of dried opposition officials who emerge from the government’s scorched-earth conflict zones are now more possible to shape the country’s future.
This real presents a double-edged weapon for Min Aung Hlaing.
On the one hand, Suu Kyi’s declining impact weakens the standard opposition. On the other hand, her presence eliminates the one person who, at least theoretically, might be able to negotiate a deal that he may soon need in the wake of battle losses.
Min Aung Hlaing’s situation is obvious: he is engaging in a war that he cannot win, alienating foreign actors he cannot afford to lose, and furthering a legitimacy problems that his recent election announcement for later this year hasn’t even remotely handle.
And yet, his attempt to portray strength through grand declarations in Moscow or stirring battlefield rhetoric at home fails to cover up underlying difficult truths: the older general’s future is extremely uncertain, his delusions of grandeur are growing increasingly uncertain, and the Tatmadaw’s grip is slipping, the junta’s survival is in danger, and his future is in doubt.