Since its return to power in 2021, Afghanistan’s Taliban have struggled to enhance their rebel movement into a functioning state. Beneath an outward show of unity, the conservative government is plagued by deep-rooted disunity, economic incompetence and growing common dissatisfaction.
According to researcher Mabin Biek, writing for The Cipher in an article titled” Taliban’s Internal Power Struggle: A Program on the Brink”, the team’s greatest philosophical threat may not be another international action but rather its own internal injuries.
If left unchecked, these units could expand the Taliban’s collapse and fall Afghanistan into yet another continuous problems.
One of the most pressing problems facing the Taliban government is its inability to maintain unity among various groups. Under the management of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the activity has become more centralized around his Noorzai cultural center. That cultural preference is known to possess alienated another major Taliban leaders.
Unlike the later Mullah Omar, who commanded broad admiration and united disparate parties, Akhundzada has struggled to achieve the same level of power. Instead, his apparently rigorous management style has deepened the identity-based problem lines that run through the Taliban’s rates.
Important figures like Mullah Yaqoob and Mullah Baradar each control their own electricity bases in the Taliban, giving rise to various centers of influence that are clashing over policy and resources.
These tensions are heightened by ethnic and tribal affiliations, which have become more pronounced now that the Taliban are attempting to govern in a united fashion rather than fight a geographically dispersed insurgency.
The unity once shown during the Doha talks that brought about an end of the war has since largely dissipated and has been replaced by jockeying for power within the movement’s upper echelons.
Compounding these leadership struggles is the Taliban’s poor economic management. Afghanistan’s economy was already fragile and heavily reliant on foreign aid and remittances before the Taliban’s takeover.
Now, with limited sources of legitimate funding, the regime relies heavily on revenues from mining operations often controlled by influential figures such as Haji Bashir Noorzai and from heavy taxation of ordinary citizens.
The result is an ever-widening gap between the elite and the general Afghan public. Inflation continues to rise as the local afghani currency’s depreciation in January, driven in part by the suspension of USAID, has made basic goods, including food, more expensive.
In a ham-fisted attempt at capital controls, the regime in January banned the transfer of more than US$ 5, 000 through airports and$ 500 over land borders.
In February, a dispute over border construction led to the closure of the Torkham crossing with Pakistan, disrupting the flow of goods, mainly food items, and leaving 5, 000 trucks stranded at the border.
Simultaneously, the Taliban’s hardline policies, especially their restrictions on women’s rights, have stifled the prospect of foreign investment or robust external economic partnerships. Western and other international donors remain wary of working with a regime that refuses to moderate its stance, further straining an already dire economic situation.
Another factor fueling the Taliban’s instability is its refusal to relax strict social and political controls. Despite repeated calls from international organizations and neighboring countries, the group has tightened restrictions on civil liberties, media freedoms and women’s education.
These measures have effectively isolated Afghanistan from the global community, making it virtually impossible for the Taliban to gain diplomatic recognition or access vital outside financial resources.
Potential partners such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) states have shown limited willingness to engage with a government that is widely viewed as regressive.
Even countries that historically maintained ties with the Taliban are hesitant to offer more than minimal support, fearful of an international backlash and wary of association with the regime’s extremist policies.
Recent developments in Washington reflect growing international concern over how external funding might be propping up the Taliban. Republican Senator Tim Sheedy has spearheaded the” No Taxpayer Funding for Terrorists Act”, which aims to prevent American federal aid from reaching Afghanistan.
Citing reports that weekly shipments of approximately US$ 40 million have been directed to the country’s central bank, US lawmakers fear that these funds could be funneled to extremist elements, effectively or de facto fuelling terrorist activities.
Former Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged that, in some instances, advanced American weaponry has ended up in the Taliban’s hands. Such revelations have intensified calls under the Trump 2.0 administration for decisive action to cut off financial resources that terror-prone insurgent factions could exploit.
The proposed US legislation enjoys bipartisan support, reflecting a shared goal of ensuring no US taxpayer money ends up bolstering the Taliban or affiliated extremist groups.
While external factors such as reduced foreign aid add strain, the Taliban’s primary challenges stem from within. Persistent factionalism, failure to deliver essential public services and harsh social policies are all undermining the regime’s legitimacy and room to maneuver.
At the same time, opposition groups, both domestic and exiled, are finding fertile ground to organize as dissatisfaction with the Taliban mounts.
Extremist rivals like the Islamic State are exploiting the Taliban’s weaknesses to expand their influence. Regional neighbors, worried about spillover effects, may also covertly support alternative power centers or resistance movements.
If the Taliban cannot adopt more inclusive policies, stabilize the economy and address growing public grievances, it may soon face a perfect storm that pushes its fractured regime to the brink of collapse.
For a country that has endured decades of conflict, another failure in governance is a grim prospect. Ultimately, the Taliban’s future hinges on whether they can reform from within before its fractured rule implodes and plunges Afghanistan into another cycle of violence and turmoil.
Muhammad Burhan is a research analyst at Quaid e Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan.