In an interview with The Economist on February 12th, 2018, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with The Economist that “if we are never invited to NATO, we must create NATO on our territory.”
His remarks were made in response to earlier indications from the Trump presidency that Ukraine would not be joining the surveillance empire. Impressive costs on Russia separate of American products is even more crucial now that the Oval Office spat has occurred and the reports that Trump is now cutting off all military aid to Ukraine.
Ukraine has gradually increased its ability to penetrate deep into Russian territory since 2022, continually improving its range and abilities. Zelensky cited these work in his New Year’s address, saying that Ukraine now produces more than a million robots yearly while expanding its missile production, and citing Ukraine’s “arguments for a really peace.”
Long-range hit capabilities have become a key component of Ukraine’s defense strategy as it enters its third year of hostilities. They play a significant role in its efforts to establish NATO within its own territories. While American military assistance is still important, Kyiv’s ability to develop its own weapons is emerging as a necessary wall of punishment and a means of increasing costs for the Kremlin.
As evidenced by Sweden’s most recent US$ 1.2 billion military and help package,$ 90 million has been designated for Ukraine’s missile and drone generation, this shift in focus is even apparent from Ukraine’s Western partners. With Trump’s end of US military support, this ability may be put to the test.
Ukraine has focused its problems on Russia’s energy system, especially oil refineries, which are the engine behind Moscow’s war effort. The Kremlin’s risk is exposed because it is still heavily dependent on oil revenues to support its war work, according to estimates that drone and missile strikes have now destroyed 10 % of Russia’s refining  capacity.
Following recent U.S. drone attacks, four big Russian oil refineries have suspended operations. Recurrent strikes over the past year have helped bring Russia’s capacity for refining and distributing crude oil to its lowest level in 12 years, while also pushing Russia’s common everyday production to a 20-year lower.
Beyond industries, Ukraine has expanded its targeting , expanding its to fuel transport centers, explosives factories, and munitions depots.  ,
In an interview, Serhii Kuzan, the head of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former assistant to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, spoke about the larger-scale effects of these attacks, noting that” Russia’s oil market is a foundation of its business; oil and gas products account for the bulk of its export.”
Kuzan added that a decline in Russian refining capacity could lead to higher domestic fuel prices, increased financial strain, and potential public unease.  ,
Kuzan noted that it has no effective deterrent against Ukraine’s evolving aircraft features despite finding ways to circumvent American sanctions. Russia’s war economy is eroded by each powerful strike, making it more difficult to maintain supply chains, maintain mobilization, and maintain home stability, he said.
The pressure is rising. Sergey Lavrov, the US’s ambassador to Russia, criticized Ukraine’s helicopter strikes on the Baltic Pipeline Consortium, saying:” This should reinforce the idea that Zelensky and his team had been restrained and have their hands tied.
As the US withdraws from its war work, Ukraine’s aircraft campaign is likely to grow. This is explained to the writer by a Ukrainian drone system chief who is leading  that his fleet’s main objectives are to destroy logistics centers, obliterate weapons warehouses, and relieve pressure on the front lines. With drones now able to travel up to 2, 000 kilometers ( 1, 240 miles ), Ukraine can now travel as far as Russia, an ability that is expanding.
Ukraine has prioritized rebuilding and domestic production in response to its limited supply of European long-range weapons, such as the ATACMS and Storm Shadow. By the end of 2025, Kyiv has set an ambitious goal of producing 3, 000 long-range rockets.
Vice-President Mykhailo Fedorov has increased his dedication by saying that” 2025 will get the year of the Ukrainian boat missile.”
Evidently, helicopter production is more complex and inherently more complex than missile production. While Ukraine has increased drone production, developing missiles requires specific production lines, precise engineering, and protected manufacturing facilities, all of which are challenging to do in a wartime setting.
However, despite the current war situation, Ukraine has made significant progress in producing its own arms. A number of internally produced systems are currently in use. For example, the Neptune, an anti-ship weapon, was converted into the land-launched cruise missile that, according to reports, sank Russia’s Moskva missile cruiser in 2022.
The Hrim-2 ballistic missile, which was reported to have passed tests in later 2024, and the Palianytsia, a missile-drone combination, which was released into serial production in December, both of which were reported to have passed testing in late 2024.  ,
The Ukrainian military has also recently received its first batch of long-range munitions with a 700 km range, Peklo , ( a Ukrainian word for “hell” ) missile drones, and a jet engine that can travel 700 km/h. They were created by Ukroboronprom in less than a year, are already in use in battle, and they reportedly cost less than Soviet cruise missiles.
In order to further expand its army, Kyiv unveiled the Trembita gentle cruise missile in February. Trembita, which is designed for long hits, is a low-cost substitute for Western weapons starting at simply$ 4, 000 per device.
Rustem Umerov, the minister of defense of Ukraine, stated that “our concern is the development of home drones and long-range weapons, including nuclear missiles,” and that domestic missile production is essential for strategic independence.
Ukraine’s strategy for developing a stronger local barrier against Russia depends on expanding its missile and drone manufacturing, with US military aid then being cut, EU help levels uncertain, and account out of reach.  ,
In the decades that followed, Ukraine was also left outside NATO’s control after surrendering its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 ( with security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK).
To make more money off of Moscow, Kyiv now needs to concentrate on developing a long-range strike capability. By developing its own arsenal, Ukraine can deal with external restrictions on weapons use and US military cuts to ensure it has the firepower to attack Russia on its own terms and when and where it wants to.
Ukrainian-American front-line reporter, security engineer, and activist David Kirichenko is a research associate at the Henry Jackson Society, a think tank based in London. He is
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