Eight years ago, the United States had a new president, Donald Trump. This writer wrote some advice for the then-new ambassador headed to Japan – and then, four years later, sent more suggestions for President Biden’s then-unnamed top envoy to Tokyo.
Now President Trump is back and a new ambassador, George Glass, will likely be confirmed and sent to Tokyo.
In the spirit of foisting off – on a bipartisan basis – unasked-for advice, I offer my counsel again. And if past is prologue, it won’t be the first time this writer’s advice has been ignored.
February 27, 2025
Dear Ambassador ……..,
You will no doubt study up on the issues and receive more briefings than you can absorb, but here is some unsolicited advice anyway:
You’ll hear that the US-Japan relationship is the “most important bilateral relationship, bar none.” It is. You’ll also hear that “it has never been stronger.” You might ask, “Compared with what?”
Strong doesn’t mean it’s strong enough.
Is it deterring the PRC? Not if you consider aggressive Chinese behavior. And if it’s not deterring, can we fight together and defeat the People’s Liberation Army? Maybe not, even though the Japan-US defense alliance is 65 years old.
The US-Japan relationship is an old one and we get along well enough. But Japan’s longstanding pathologic dependence on the United States for its defense weakens the entire structure.
There is of course more to the relationship than the military angle, but that is the most important part. Here are a few things to consider.
Don’t pick a fight with Japan over host nation support funding – as your boss, Mr. Trump, has in the past suggested he would — even if Japan can afford to pay ten times more. Tell Japan to keep its money and spend it on Japan Self Defense Force training and decent housing for the troops.
Most of all, America needs a Japan that can fight. That means more combat power from the JSDF, and it needs to better align and integrate this combat power with US forces. The JSDF needs to improve and it needs to be able to operate much better with US forces.
Just because things are better than they were ten years ago – when even saying the JSDF might need to fight a war gave too many alliance managers on both sides the vapors – doesn’t mean things are anywhere near where they need to be.
The JSDF and Japan itself are not ready to fight a war – no matter what you are told. A few good niche capabilities (submarines, anti-submarine warfare, missile defense and outer space) aren’t enough.
A more capable and powerful military reduces Japan’s dependence on the US military, relieves the burden on US forces defending Japanese interests farther afield and potentially augments overstretched US forces in the region.
And don’t forget the political knock-on effects of more effective Japanese forces, solidly linked and able to operate with US forces. China was counting on splitting the US and Japan alliance. American and Japanese forces operating together makes this much harder to do.
Less than the sum of its parts
The Japanese military looks impressive on paper, but is less than the sum of its parts. A main problem is that the three Japanese services are mostly incapable of operating together.
The JSDF is standing up a Joint Operational Headquarters in March 2025. Finally. But this is at least 25 years late and it will take time for it to get its footing.
There is also the problem of the MSDF and ASDF being about half the size they need to be to accomplish required missions.
The JSDF missed recruitment targets by 50% last year (yes, 50%) and routinely misses them by 20%. That tells you all is not well.
Can US and Japanese forces do real-world, short-notice operations? You ought to ask.
You might also ask why US forces often have to leave Japan in order to train to defend Japan?
So when you hear that “the relationship has never been stronger” – don’t think it’s strong enough.
‘It’s too difficult’
In response to the above need for a more capable JSDF, expect to hear that “it’s too difficult.” In fact, you’ll hear this in response to many suggestions you might make – and not just about defense.
“Too difficult” means that a Japanese person somewhere (or the Asahi Shimbun newspaper) might complain. You might point out to the Japanese government that explaining to US voters why American servicemen must die for a Japan that won’t do its share is also “too difficult.”
Be prepared for some of your embassy staff to make the “too difficult” case on Japan’s behalf. There are several sub-themes of “too difficult” that you should be aware of:
- “Japan’s Constitution won’t allow (fill in the blank).” Read the Constitution – and article 9 in particular.) Yes, read it. It’s long since been re-interpreted out of any connection to its plain meaning, but it has become Japan’s go-to excuse when it doesn’t want to do something. Sort of like a Monopoly ‘get out of jail free’ card. Japanese are not snowflakes and can and will do whatever they need to do.
- “Japanese are pacifist.” If so, it’s a curious form of pacifism that is happy to have Americans exterminate Japan’s enemies – and insist the US use nuclear weapons if necessary. So much for Japan’s “nuclear allergy.” And, yes, the Japan Self Defense Force is indeed a military – despite having “self-defense” in its name
- “There’s a Japanese election coming.” Japanese claims of “too difficult” are often made with a request to help out the government just the one time, since “there’s an election coming.” The bait is that after the election the Japanese will do whatever it is that is too difficult just now. However, there’s always an election coming – and there’s always help needed, just this one time. This bait and switch racket has been going on for decades. Why? Because it works.
A big pile of money
Here’s some good news. Japan announced a couple years ago that it would double defense spending over the next five years or so. That’s good – though the yen is worth much less now than when the increase was announced. That’s a challenge.
For decades Japan spent about half of what it needed to spend on defense – assuming that the Americans would fill in the gaps.
So the promise to double defense spending is good – though remember that this doesn’t make up for the years of underfunding (and lack of political support) that left the JSDF a stunted force.
One retired Japanese admiral refers to the “new” money as a big pile of sugar that will attract ants (defense contractors), who will make it disappear.
Japan’s got money but doesn’t know what to spend it on. Officials can rattle off a list of equipment and hardware they’re buying or building – but can’t explain how it fits into a coherent defense scheme.
Give them some advice. The Japanese are not mind readers, and knowing what you need to fight a war isn’t intuitive – especially for a JSDF that wasn’t allowed to think clearly about warfighting for decades.
‘Severe fiscal condition’
This is a standard Japanese excuse for being unable to budget more for defense. You’ll hear it still – despite the promise to spend more.
Don’t fall for it.
Insist that Japan spend what is necessary. And that especially includes money for JSDF training and exercises and improved terms of service for JSDF personnel. The aforementioned “jointness” costs nothing – only requiring doctrine, practice and a changed mindset.
Japan has plenty of money, even if its credit card is maxed out. Just like the United States, when it needs cash for things other than defense it finds it.
Bottom line: the world’s third largest economy has money – but the Japanese government fears the Ministry of Finance more than it fears the US government.
‘But China will complain’
You’ll hear this a lot and from your own people as well, especially if the “it’s too difficult” line isn’t persuading you. The point is, China will complain about anything that Japan (and the US) might do short of surrendering.
Japan has been a model of responsible international behavior and consensual government for 70 years now. Japan is a threat to nobody. It lacks the manpower, hardware, know-how and, most importantly, the desire to threaten its neighbors.
And there’s more to Asia than China and Korea. Get around the region a bit and you will find that the Japanese are well regarded just about everywhere else in the region. A billion plus Indians well disposed toward Japan ought to count for something.
If you hear “it’s too difficult” or “but China will complain” from your staff, I think you’ve found just the right Foreign Service officers to put on “walking the Ambassador’s dog” detail or planning the embassy Christmas party.
One more thing: When it comes to China you’ll find that Japan has, in its ruling class, just as many people as the US has who think the PRC will become a friend if we just accommodate them. Many of those people make money from the PRC, and a few of them really believe it.
Abe was good but he’s gone
Shinzo Abe was a once-in-a-generation Japanese statesman. He may not have liked the US all that much, but he wisely kept quiet and looked after Japan’s broader interest – in staying close to the United States and under the US defense umbrella. He also started reshaping Japan’s attitudes towards defense – and even fighting.
Now we’re back to the days when Japanese prime ministers come and go in quick succession, and after a few months it’s hard to remember they were even there. PM Shigeru Ishiba may not even be there by the time you arrive.
So don’t make the prime minister your sole focus. A lot can be done via other channels.
A word about gaiatsu (foreign pressure): This usually applies to trade matters, but it works just as well with defense policy – and Japanese reformers who want the JSDF to be a better ally will appreciate the help.
However, if you or the US government will be talking tough to the Japanese – and you might need to, given the tenacity of the “too difficult” and “severe fiscal condition” crowd – do it quietly. Be prepared for the Japanese to shop around for somebody in the US government who will take up their arguments. So a united front on your side is important.
And remember then-PM Kakuei Tanaka’s advice in 1970 when the Americans were hemming and hawing about asking to put an aircraft carrier in Yokosuka: “Tell us what you want, and don’t back down.”
That was sound advice. The Americans promptly forgot it.
Linking Japan and US forces
Except for the shining example of the US Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), American and Japanese forces still don’t operate well together and would be hard pressed if they had to fight a war together.
Go down to Yokosuka Naval Base at your first opportunity and see what the two navies have quietly accomplished. Apply what you see to the overall defense relationship.
The Japan-US Defense Guidelines were revised a few years ago (by Prime Minister Abe) and allow Japan and the US to do whatever is necessary to establish genuine operational linkages. For example, the guidelines call for an “alliance coordination mechanism” – aka the ACM.
The ACM is not an actual place where US and Japanese officers sit side-by-side coordinating activities necessary for the defense of Japan and surrounding areas. Really.
So ask what concrete progress has been made to link US and Japanese forces. Is a standing, permanently staffed joint headquarters in the works? If you hear it is being discussed – ask ‘by when’. If it is more than six months away…and you’re told “it’s too difficult,” blow a gasket.
When will USFJ become a real joint operational HQ instead of being the guys who apologize whenever there’s a flap with Japan? This is being discussed, but it needs to happen soon. You might ask.
The hotel taxi
The idea that the US might actually have to fight to defend Japan was mostly an academic exercise until late 2008, when China started throwing its weight around in the East China Sea.
Fighting and dying on Japan’s behalf, especially “over some rocks” (the Senkaku Islands), is not a vote getter in Washington, DC. And the parents of the American servicemen who are expected to offer up their young men and women to die for Japan will be outraged – not least, once they hear young Japanese are not joining up to serve and fight.
Both governments must defang, in advance, the argument that the China lobbyists will make – that Japan thinks it can call up US forces to die for it just the way it would whistle up a taxi outside a hotel.
Japan needs to show in every possible way that it’s pulling its weight. Otherwise, expect serious political opposition in Washington when push comes to shove. “Japan is doing everything it possibly can” will not persuade many Americans outside the State Department or the Pentagon.
Be prepared for a surprise as you may sometimes get the impression from Japanese officials that they are doing the US a favor by allowing Americans to fight (and die) on Japan’s behalf.
Does Japan have any good defense options that don’t involve close ties with the US? No. And it has no options at all that don’t involve nuclear weapons. You will need to make your case clearly and often.
And a word about Taiwan:
You will hear Japanese say, “Taiwan’s defense is Japan’s defense.” That’s true. But ask what Japan actually plans to do to defend Taiwan or to help the American forces? If the plan is to wing it when the time comes – or to leave it up to the Americans – recall the earlier advice about blowing a gasket.
Which Japanese?
Japanese do not all think alike. Among Japanese officials, politicians, and the media there is a range of opinions about defense and the US-Japan defense relationship – just as there is in the United States.
Get out and talk to as many Japanese as possible – not just the usual suspects deemed suitable to talk to an ambassador.
Alliance managers – Japanese and American? Some are good. Some are not. And some (on both sides) aim to keep you on a leash. They consider avoiding trouble – not making things better – the only thing on their job description.
Probably the larger number of Japanese recognize the need for an improved military capability, much bigger defense budgets and seamless ties to the US forces.
Others see no need to do more, viewing the Americans as “guard dogs” (yes, the term slips out now and then with older pols when in their cups late at night) who just need to be given some water and a bone and set loose in the front yard. A smaller number are reflexively anti-military, and some are resentful of the US presence – a reminder of how World War II ended.
If you need a break from the Tokyo elite, get out and meet younger Japanese military officers and jieikan (regular troops). Even most Japanese know little about these people. Japan’s service members are some of the most impressive Japanese. Get to know them.
Fortunately, the Japanese public is intelligent (and still reads newspapers) – and when things are explained to them, they understand and support Japan’s defense requirements better than many Tokyo politicians and bureaucrats do.
Regarding Okinawa
Okinawa is not a seething hotbed of anti-militarism and anti-Americanism that requires us to walk on eggshells. Every elected mayor on Okinawa is considered “pro-military.” That tells you a lot.
US handling of Okinawa issues has been largely incoherent for the last 30 years. That’s another matter, however.
Okinawa is Japanese territory and the Japanese central government is responsible for doing what is necessary to ensure US operations on the island. The government’s failure to take on a small but noisy Okinawan opposition – one that is raking in huge amounts of money in central government payouts (have your staff do the math to calculate the jaw-dropping amounts) – is the ultimate problem. Okinawa is not America’s fault.
Have your staff count the number of times the government has promised to keep its promise (to keep its promise to keep its promise) to build a replacement for Futenma Air Station.
As for the Henoko solution being the only possible solution: Don’t be afraid to ask why this is so – and even better, ask how the decision to build a really long heliport to replace the functions of Futenma’s 10,000-foot runway was arrived at?
One wishes a fraction of the effort that’s gone into solving (or not solving) the Okinawa real estate problem over the last 30 years had been applied to creating a competent Japanese military fully linked to US forces. It’s never too late to start.
The Marines have finally begun moving from Okinawa to Guam under the Defense Policy Review Initiative.
Rethink this.
The people who are happiest about US forces leaving Okinawa are in Beijing.
DPRI was agreed to in 2006. Northeast Asia was a very different place then. The PRC wasn’t nearly the military threat it is today – and the China threat was little considered, if at all, when DPRI was decided.
As you can see, it wasn’t chiseled in stone atop Mount Sinai.
Best wishes Mr. Ambassador.
You will watch history being made, and indeed, might even make it yourself. If at the end of your assignment things are in as good shape as when you began, you will earn a gentleman’s C.
Your predecessor did well. Perhaps he took more credit than he should have for things the Japanese did on their own accord. And he squandered goodwill pushing social justice theories on a Japan that wasn’t interested. But he deserves at least a B, maybe a B+. That’s not bad.
Unfortunately, the People’s Republic of China’s military build-up during the last four years deserves an A+. The Chinese smell blood.
A grade of C this time around will just be a gentleman’s F. But if the JSDF is better able to fight a war, including being able to conduct joint operations, and if it really can operate with US forces, you’ll have done something good and will be remembered for a good long while.
Colonel Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer whose decades of experience in the
Indo-Pacific include serving as reserve head of intelligence for Marine Forces
Pacific. As the first Marine advisor to the Japan Self-Defense Force, he helped to
create Japan’s amphibious force. He is the author of the 2023 book When China Attacks: A Warning to America.