Donald Trump, does he not want to capitulate Russia, or is he? Whether President Trump is in Washington or his secretary of defense Pete Hegseth and evil president J. D. Vance are traveling in Europe and adopting the tale alliance-management tactic of demeaning your associates at every opportunity, the information regarding the conflict in Ukraine have been as mingled and perplexing as ever.
Whatever the truth, two things are clear:
- Nothing can or will be settled until conversations really begin between the sufferer, Ukraine, and the enemy, Russia – but pre-emptive stress, anger or sadness are meaningless.
- As a long-term, strong, ambitious, and capable partner for Ukraine will be required if Europe wants to safeguard its own security.
This is not a novel discovery. In a world where their post-war partnership with the United States is at best suspended or at worst destroyed, European leaders must find the best way to safeguard their countries ‘ interests.
This implies that making appealing or making concessions to Donald Trump is counterproductive and time wasting. Europe needs to show power, no obsequiousness, to both of the authoritarian bullies it is faced with: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
Of course, Europe is divided. However, it usually is, which is why the European Union is important and why even the Union frequently needs to form alliances of the prepared rather than a compromise.
Despite having a number of splinters throughout the Ukrainian battle, the EU has accomplished a lot. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker compiled by Germany’s Kiel Institute, between January 2022 and end-December 2024 Western countries and organizations provided €132 billion worth of defense, humanitarian and financial aid to Ukraine ( compared with €114 billion from the United States ). A more €115 billion in upcoming funding has already been promised.
Russian officials and experts are calm about their government’s situation. Ukraine could and would continue to fight if America were to remove its support and Russia were to fail to put an end to its anger. It would most likely continue to lose property, but merely slowly, as it did last year. The loss of long-range British weapons systems that could be used to harm Russia’s supply lines and weapons stocks would be its main draw, but it hasn’t, in any case, had enough to make a significant difference.
The Ukrainians also ring calm about the conditions necessary to reach a peace agreement: they are aware that they have no chance of joining NATO for at least as long as Trump is in office and that they would have to take Russia’s current employment of about 20 % of their country, including Crimea.
But, very fairly, they are not willing to lose any more country, and no willing to accept any limitations on their sovereignty and independence. And they want their partners to offer trustworthy security guarantees to deter a pending Russian war in order to make any deal workable.
This is not a popular thing to say so close to Germany’s February 23 national elections, but the infamous term of then-Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2015 ( referring to a wave of immigration from Syria ) is now fitting for Ukraine:” Wir schaffen auf” – We can do this.
Europe has the power to intervene and give Ukraine the assistance it needs to strengthen its position in the negotiations and protect its safety.
If Ukraine needs to continue fighting and if the Americans don’t offer any more assistance, it can initially pledge to do so.
The stocks of munitions and weapons in Europe are too small for them to significantly affect the war, but their supplies may be enough to avert a Russian threat of fighting without the United States.
Let’s not forget that Germany’s refusal to offer its Corolla missiles last year was the biggest obstacle to providing long-range weaponry next year. A new president and administration may view European security with more vigor.
During peace agreements, the biggest prefer Europe can provide is to promise to send troops to Ukraine to maintain its long-term protection.
The misconception that these forces cannot possibly be supplied by Western forces is widespread. The reality is that security forces can be modest at first and grow over time; after all, if there really is a offer, the chance of a Russian attack would be smaller.
It would be possible to build an initial power consisting of 5, 000 men from each of Italy, Germany, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, France and Poland, for example, and to use those nations ‘ air pushes to maintain “no-fly areas” of the kind that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was asking for in 2022.
As European defense spending grows — which this week’s proposal by Ursula von der Leyen to exempt defense “investment” from the fiscal constraints of the euro-area’s” stability pact” would assist — those forces based in Ukraine can be increased, subject to Russia’s conduct.
If a ceasefire is agreed, the rebuilding of Ukraine’s devastated towns can begin, and it will be costly. The ceasefire would also have the potential to significantly improve Ukraine’s economy and attract people from all over the world, so this should not be seen as just a cost to the EU taxpayer. In the end, the tragic truth of post-conflict reconstruction is that it can be profitable, at least if the conflict is truly over.
Without making these promises sound like concessions to Trump, Europe can make them and assume these responsibilities because they are desirable on their own terms. Additionally, they will give Europe influence over other aspects of the currently hostile transatlantic relationship.
In all aspects of the relationship, it will be vital to show strength. Trump’s 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Europe should be replaced with identical tariffs on American imports. He claims that he wants to impose what he refers to as “reciprocal tariffs.” In that situation, the EU should replace every tariff that America imposes with a similar one for a product that the US protects, of which there is a lot.
The current situation is that both America and Europe impose high levels of agricultural protection in their own unique ways, with average tariffs of 4-5 % on imported non-agricultural goods.  ,
The Digital Services Act ( DSA ), the means by which the EU regulates the major online platforms like Facebook, Google, TikTok, and X, is likely to face the biggest opposition.
Elon Musk, one of the billionaires who wants Trump to use leverage over tariffs and Ukraine to compel the EU to abandon the DSA, will be the biggest beneficiary of the attack. It would be disastrous for Europe to do so. A bully like Trump only reacts with force.  , Wir Schaffen Das, Europe: we can do this.
Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the , Japan Society of the UK, the , International Institute for Strategic Studies , and the , International Trade Institute.
On Bill Emmott’s Global View, Bill Emmott’s Substack, you can find this English translation of an article that La Stampa first published in Italian. It is republished with permission.