The date of February 12, 2025, will forever be remembered as the day the NATO-Russian substitute war in Ukraine actually ended.
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth started everything off by , declaring , that: Ukraine didn’t visit NATO, the US doesn’t think that Ukraine is regain its pre-2014 borders, the US hasn’t deploy troops to the conflict zone, the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities it otherwise, but the US didn’t extend Article 5 guarantees to Union forces there.
Donald Trump, US President Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin, Russian President, spoke for the first time since the former took office. Trump called Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky to brief and likely coerce him as he allegedly promised Putin, and they agreed to start peace talks right away.
Trump also , suggested , that he’ll soon meet Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit each other’s countries as part of the peace process. Here are some briefings that cover the larger picture:
* January 3:” Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal“
* January 17:” The Merits Of A Demilitarized’ Trans-Dnieper ‘ Region Controlled By Non-Western Peacekeepers”
* February 3:” Territorial Concessions Could Precede A Ceasefire That Will Lead To New Ukrainian Elections”
* February 4:” Trump’s Interest In Ukraine’s Rare Earth Minerals Might Backfire On Zelensky”
* February 7:” Trump’s Special Envoy Shed More Light On His Boss ‘ Ukrainian Peace Plan”
A dozen compromises are suggested for each side in the first analysis of creative energy diplomacy to advance their negotiations. In fact, the policy per Hegseth is that the US should not grant Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine, so it’s possible that some others will follow.
Additionally, Trump just remarked about , how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he’s planning the “phased leadership transition” via new elections as was also proposed in that piece.
Which of these additional suggestions might soon become US policy, with the same being said for the ones that Russia might put into practice, such as agreeing to a few restrictions on its side of the DMZ that will likely be put in place by the end of this process.
What are the five main issues that will affect the outcome of Russian-US peace talks with Ukraine’s leaders, diplomats, and any experts who might be invited to participate in the initiative through Track II talks:
* Territorial parameters
Where will the new Russian-Ukrainian border fall next, and that is the most urgent issue that needs to be resolved. Hegseth’s suggestion that Trump might coerce Zelensky into resuming its territorial conflict in Ukraine suggests that his forces might fall as far as Zaporizhzhia city as a result of his remarks about Ukraine’s inability to restore its pre-2014 border. It’s unlikely at this time that Russia would be able to control that city and the parts of its new western Dnieper.
That’s because Trump might not want to take the flak that would follow giving Russia a city of over 700, 000 whose residents didn’t vote in September 2022’s referendum. West of the river, in particular, are included in Russia’s new regions.
Instead, he might suggest a UN-supervised referendum to resolve this aspect of their territorial dispute once the fighting has stopped, while also allowing Russia to keep formally claiming those areas. That might be enough pragmatism for Putin to concur.
* DMZ terms &, peacekeeper roles
The DMZ’s terms and the role of the peacekeepers who would likely be deployed there after this are the next two issues to be addressed.
Hegseth’s claim that the US won’t grant Article 5 guarantees to EU forces could deter them from playing a significant role, which would require the UNSC resolution to approve, in any case, per Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia, because they’ll be legitimate targets. Non-Western ones are thus much more agreeable.
As it turns out, the majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western nations, so they could potentially be deployed there under a UN Security Council mandate, according to Nebenzia’s suggestion, and possibly even lead to the total exclusion of any Western peacekeepers if it’s decided that none will contribute to this mission.
It’s unclear exactly what they will be able to or not do, but that directly leads to the next issue because their terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US for this resolution to pass.
* Demilitarization &, denazification
Two of Russia’s main goals in its ,” special , operation”  , are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to do by militarily coercing Ukraine into this per the terms established in , spring 2022’s draft peace treaty, though that didn’t succeed due to the UK , and Poland.
It’s unthinkable to think that Trump will permit Russia to deploy its armed forces throughout the entirety of Ukraine in order to accomplish this, since it can only be accomplished through similar diplomatic means involving Kyiv’s consent.
UN peacekeepers might have a role to play in monitoring and putting into action any final agreements made to demilitarize and denounce Ukraine. This could include inspecting suspected illegal arms sites and all of Ukraine’s cross-border traffic ( including at its ports ), as well as having the authority to require changes to its media coverage and curriculum.
After the conflict is over, Ukraine will only be able to remain demilitarized and denazified in this way.
* Sanctions relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but the argument can be made that “deal-master” Trump wouldn’t ever agree to do this all at once, instead preferring to draft a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice or peace treaty.
This might take the form of the suggestion that some Russian exports to the EU could resume in the first phase as a trust-building measure.
Russia’s policymakers might decide that a phased plan is preferable to accept if that’s all Trump is comfortable offering rather than nothing at all, even though Russia would prefer that they all be immediately lifted.
Trump would do well, though, to engage in the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s oil exports by sea, too, since that could convince Moscow’s policymakers that he’s serious about relieving pressure on Russia. Putin would be able to sell the deal on phased sanctions relief at home in part because of this.
* New security architecture
According to the security guarantee requests it shared with them at the time, Russia considered drafting a new European security architecture through bilateral agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021.
In retrospect, these were intended to diplomatically address their security difficulty, which was fueled by NATO’s continued expansion eastward following the Old Cold War, particularly its clandestine expansion into Ukraine, in place of the special operation that Putin had secretly planned when that failed.
Since that time, separate, comprehensive discussions on this must begin right after any agreement they reach on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO’s eastern military buildup, Finland and Sweden’s new memberships, Russia’s hypersonic , Oreshniks, their , deployment to Belarus, Russia ‘s , deployment of nukes there too, the , future of the New START , that expires next year and the , new space arms race, et al. Agreeing on a new security architecture will, therefore, stabilize the world.
The path to success will undoubtedly be very difficult because Russia and the US must resolve some contentious issues, but their leaders have shown that they are willing to negotiate in good faith.
Given the circumstances, neither side is likely to accomplish their full goals, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, and each will do everything in their power to accomplish this goal. In the best case scenario, there will be a just and lasting solution that will truly address the root causes at the heart of the conflict.
This , article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , here.