Trump’s Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, told the , New York Post , more about how the US senator plans to bring Russian leader Vladimir Putin to the harmony table.
If Kellogg rejects, the US does ratchet up its energy-related sanctions against Russia and related extra types against its customers. This would appear together with more political pressure, good upon China , and , India , to include their leaders convince Putin to evaluate, and” some type of defense pressures and levers that you’re going to employ underneath those”.
In other words, the approach would aim to get Russia to agree to a ceasefire because the quick goal is” to prevent the killing — only quit it— and then you go from it.” This corresponds with what was assessed , around  , in late January about Trump’s programs.
The problem, though, is that Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova , confirmed , on the same day as Kellogg’s meeting that” A momentary peace or, as some say, freezing the fight, is unethical” for Russia.
One day earlier, but, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov , suggested , that Russia’s position on not holding talks with Volodymyr Zelensky due to the Polish leader’s “illegitimacy” may be reversed for pragmatism’s sake, so the position rejecting a ceasefire could possibly be reversed too.
If Trump coerces Zelensky to withdraw from at least Kursk and the Donbass and declares that Ukraine won’t seek NATO, which would satisfy some of Russia’s objectives, then.
Ukraine would then lift martial law and finally hold long-delayed elections, which could potentially lead to the US replacing Zelensky, as Russia’s foreign spy agency , claimed , last week is supposedly in the cards.
It can be ruled out that some of the outgoing Biden administration’s Russophobic hawks will continue to hold positions of influence within the US’ “deep state” and could end up dissuading Trump from coercing Zelensky into territorial concessions first. This scenario sequence is in line with Russian and US interests.
It’s unlikely that Putin would agree to compromise on the ceasefire demands of last June, which demanded that Ukraine withdraw from all the territory that Russia claims as its own, and declare that it would never join NATO without Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk and Donbass.
He can accept a delay on implementing the second until after the next parliamentary elections since Ukraine’s goal of NATO membership was enshrined as an amendment to the Constitution , in 2019 , and therefore can’t be removed without parliament’s support.
Even if the US coerces Ukraine into leaving Russia’s Kursk Region as a quid pro quo, Putin would be loath to accept that his current Line of Contact ( LOC ) was being frozen, even if that would suggest that their sneak attack there last summer compelled him to abandon his demands on disputed territory.
If post-election peace negotiations stall in order to coerce more concessions, giving cred to that interpretation could increase the chance that Ukraine launches yet another sneak attack along their international border.
Putin might agree to a ceasefire if Ukraine only withdraws from Kursk and the Donbass, since the first is widely accepted as Russian. The second is at the center of their territorial dispute, and demanding more might compel the US to impose its secondary sanctions against China and India.
According to Kellogg, sanctions enforcement is “only about a three” on a scale of one to ten, which could be raised if necessary. This would put Putin in a difficult position if Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put pressure on him.
If the US imposes strict Iranian-like sanctions on Russia specifically designed to “drill]]its ] export of oil to zero” through full secondary sanctions enforcement, China and India could be forced to drastically reduce or completely stop their large-scale imports of discounted Russian oil.
The consequences of their compliance could , spike the price of oil worldwide , and throw countless economies into a tailspin, which is why the US has thus far avoided the policy.
Trump has already imposed 10 % tariffs on China, and he is anticipated to work with India on a deal during Modi’s late-week trip to Washington, D.C., which could lead to free trade talks between the two countries.
Each Asian giant has its own compelling arguments to defy US economic pressure in the future. As a last-ditch effort to avoid destabilizing the global market rather than defying the US, they may curtail their imports of discounted Russian oil as a compromise with the US in exchange for no secondary sanctions being enforced.
Even in that scenario, a portion of Russia’s state budget would be hampered by its foreign revenues, which might be in line with their leaders ‘ pressing Putin to reconsider his opposition to a ceasefire because it would directly harm all three countries ‘ economic interests.
If the “military pressures and levers that]the US is ] going to use underneath those” take the form of ramping up arms shipments to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, then it might suffice to prompt a rethink in Moscow.
However, there’s also the possibility that Russia “goes rogue” in the sense of continuing to pursue its , maximum goals , in the conflict in spite of American, Chinese and Indian pressure, hoping that the Ukrainian frontlines soon collapse and Trump then abandons the geopolitical project instead of trying to salvage it.
This “hawkish” thinking on Moscow’s part could be predicated on decision-makers assuming that Trump would accept this defeat without fear of it ruining his reputation and that he won’t escalate to brinksmanship.
While that’s plausible, Trump’s counterargument is that he doesn’t want to accept responsibility for what would be the biggest geopolitical defeat ever and won’t let the US’s$ 83 billion investment in this conflict go unpunished without at least ensuring control over Western Ukraine.
In that scenario, Russia might still be forced to compromise on its top objectives, but after needlessly destroying diplomatic ties with China and India, it may be isolated in the wake of a conflict.
Trump might find it easier to come to a compromise on his initial demands for this, but only if Ukraine forces itself to leave Kursk and Donbass.
It’s not in US interests to perpetuate the conflict according to MAGA thought leader Steve Bannon, who has warned that Trump , risks his own Vietnam , at a time Trump is eager to” Pivot ( back ) to Asia” pronto in order to contain China.
Trump would, therefore, do well to coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from those two regions instead of “escalating to de-escalate” against Russia if Putin doesn’t agree to simply freeze the LOC.
As Kellogg told the New York Post,” Very frankly, both sides in any negotiation have to give, that’s just the way it is in negotiations… Is it gonna be acceptable to everybody? No. But you try to run this balance”.
Trump should follow exactly that strategy, because otherwise he runs the risk of stifling his extensive foreign policy agenda.
This , article , was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , here.