Saudi Minister of Economy and Planning Faisal Al-Ibrahim , told , the World Economic Forum during next month ‘s , Davos Summit,” We’ve been invited to the BRICS, related to how we’ve been invited to many other international channels in the past previously. Before making a decision, we evaluate many different features of it, and we are currently in the middle of that.
Saudi Arabia has a good reason to postpone joining the BRICS informally.
It was posited , these  , in January 2024 when the country second revealed that it hadn’t still accepted the group’s official membership invitation, saying this “is due to Western views about this relationship, Iran’s role in the Red Sea Crisis, and Israeli-US stress”, which still holds true.
Regarding the primary, Saudi Arabia would probably feel uneasy about having its name and regional product appear in the a slew of agenda-driven promotional materials that portray the BRICS as an anti-Western ally.
The Kingdom used to be firmly in the Western station but has taken a website from India’s reserve in recent years by , multi-aligning , between them and what Russia then calls the ,” World Majority“.
Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Salman ( MBS ), whose character and vision were praised by Russian President Vladimir Putin in late 2022, were the subject of this grand strategic review, which was published at the time. It is understandable that MS doesn’t want to spread the false impression that he is leaving the West.
Given Saudi Arabia’s desire to formally join an organization in which its historical rival is a member despite the recent support that the latter has given to the Kingdom’s Houthi enemies, the second reason about Iran’s involvement in the Red Sea Crisis is still relevant.
Moreover, Iran also supports Hamas, whose sneak attack on October 7, 2023 abruptly delayed work on the , India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor , ( IMEC ), which was supposed to make Saudi Arabia a key node in Euro-Asian trade.
The final reason builds on the aforementioned and includes joint pressure from its fellow Israeli-American IMEC investors, who were upset that Saudi Arabia should join a group of which Iran is a member as the West Asian Wars between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis were raging.
Even though the two main ones in Lebanon, Gaza, and Lebanon have since officially ended, neither would look favorable toward Saudi Arabia joining the BRICS, which could threaten its ties to both.
Due to everything that has happened since IMEC’s announcement in 2016 and the fact that it is expected to be an integral part of his” Vision 2030” grand strategic plan, MBS wants to revive it as soon as possible in order to completely transform his nation’s socio-economic systems.
That’s not possible without a large degree of US involvement and Israel’s cooperation, the latter of which requires formal Saudi recognition of the Jewish State, possibly explaining Bibi’s concessions on Gaza.
By officially joining the same organization in which their shared Iranian foe is already a member, and doing so immediately after Trump comes to power amid reports that he’ll reimpose his “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic, it might lead to both abandoning IMEC.
Saudi Arabia receives tangible economic and financial benefits from the US and Israel, but the BRICS have not, as explained above, provided any of its members with any whatsoever.
Additionally, Trump is under the , false impression , ( subsequently debunked , by Indian Minister of External Affairs Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ) that BRICS is focused on de-dollarizing and wants to create a new currency to rival the dollar, so he’d predictably overreact if Saudi Arabia decides to formally join now.
That could stifle MBS ‘ ambitious IMEC plans, which are one of the centerpieces of his” Vision 2030″ grand strategic plan. He is therefore unwilling to accept such risks in exchange for utterly nothing from the BRICS.
It, therefore, makes perfect sense why Saudi Arabia is dilly-dallying on formally joining BRICS since it presently enjoys all the , knowledge-sharing and elite-networking benefits , brought about through its partial participation without any of the political or economic risks inherent in being a full member.
MBS can, therefore, maintain his Kingdom’s careful multi-alignment between the West ( which includes Israel in this formulation ) and the” World Majority” by indefinitely delaying a decision on this either way.
This , article , was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , here.