China’s opening of a smooth, sail-less mini-submarine indicators a bold step in stealth warfare. It raises questions about the boat’s worth in a possible Taiwan siege and whether the ship’s large quantity can exceed excellent concerns in undersea combat.
A new submarine form was just unveiled at the Guangzhou Shipyard, a place untied from underwater building, according to Naval News this quarter.
The vehicle features a peculiar, ultra-modern design with big X-form thrusters and no sail. This growth, revealed through satellite pictures, underscores China’s ability to build submarines in privacy, contrasting with the clarity of American maritime jobs.
The submarine, around 45 feet long and 5 m wide, differs from the Kind 041 small nuclear submarine and the” Paralympic” mini-submarine.
Its layout suggests it could be an extra-large uncrewed underwater car (XLUUV), possibly the nation’s largest, or a crewed vehicle optimized for deep water procedures.
Although China is known to have constructed a sailless mini-submarine in 2018, the vessel’s size, which is estimated to be 50 feet long and lacks bomb tubes, suggests that it may be a test design.
Advanced cunning and fight abilities are demonstrated by the lack of a ship, the presence of torpedo tubes, and a potential towed sonar array.
The standard sail on a submarine is removed to make it less radar and sonar visible. Additionally, it lowers its report to improve its speed and operating efficiency while lowering hydraulic pull, turbulence, and noise.
Additionally, using large X-form thrusters boosts agility, providing agility and balance for navigating difficult underwater environments while supporting secrecy.
Regarding weapons, China’s new submarine has frigate tubes for launching missiles against area and land targets and for engaging enemy vessels.  ,  ,
It may also be capable of minelaying to disrupt enemy navigation, supply routes, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance ( ISR ) and insert special forces into Taiwan’s frontline islands of Kinmen and Matsu or on secluded beaches on the main island.
In the Taiwan Strait, which is almost 150 feet deep and 180 km across, little submarines like China’s new design may offer operating advantages.
William Toti mentions that the Taiwan Strait makes ships more vulnerable to monitoring and problems, complicating deceptive steps, and limiting the effectiveness of conventional underwater techniques in an article from December 2023 Proceedings.
Further, the strait’s narrowness positions submarines close to anti-submarine warfare ( ASW) assets, heightening detection risks amid escalating naval capabilities and military exercises.
Despite those constraints, small submarines thrive in shallow waters thanks to their stealth, agility and ability to merge with seabed clutter, says Liborio Palombella in a June 2024 Naval Review article.
According to Palombella, these submarines’ smaller size results in quieter acoustic signatures, enabling close navigation to the ocean floor and improved maneuverability in narrow waters.
He mentions that this stealth and agility give them a significant tactical advantage over larger, conventional submarines, which find operating effectively in harsh conditions like the Taiwan Strait challenging.
Additionally, smaller submarines may cost less to build than larger ones, reducing undersea threats without the expense of larger ones. The adage “quantity has a of its own” lends itself to China’s enormous shipbuilding base.
Sarah Kirchberger, in a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute ( CMSI) report, says that China’s submarine industrial base has significantly modernized, enabling larger-scale production of conventional submarines, particularly at the Wuchang and Jiangnan shipyards.
Kirchberger says China’s investments in modular construction, advanced shipyard expansions and integration of military-civil fusion strategies have enhanced output.
However, she notes that weaknesses in propulsion systems and submarine quieting remain, limiting China’s ability to match Western and Russian designs. She points out that closer ties with Russia might help China close these gaps.
China’s new small submarine, along with its larger conventional and nuclear-powered ones, may play a critical role in a possible blockade of Taiwan to starve the self-governing island into submission.
Bonny Lin and other authors claim that China could impose sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan’s major ports, obstructing maritime traffic, in a report from August 2024 for the Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ).
Further, Marek Jestrab mentions in an Atlantic Council paper from December 2023 that Chinese submarines could secretly attack Taiwanese-owned merchant vessels sailing through the South China Sea before denying involvement in the attack.
According to Jestrab, such a course of action could quickly sink the intended target and stoke concern for the shipping sector as a result of the risks and losses it poses.
However, China’s rapid submarine production may lack the rigorous quality assurance standards of the US Navy’s SUBSAFE program, raising concerns about reliability and survivability.
The US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Report mentions that despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, China’s submarine force is expected to grow by 65 units in 2025 and 80 units in 2035, thanks to a massive increase in construction capacity.
Reports of a possible pier-side sinking of a Type 041 nuclear-powered submarine in June 2024 highlighted potential design, construction, or maintenance issues.
The same concerns may extend to China’s mass production of small, conventionally powered submarines, which, though produced in large numbers, may suffer from similar oversight gaps.
Moreover, China still has to account for Taiwan’s ASW capabilities. In a report from December 2014 for Project 2049, Ian Easton and Randall Schriver mention Taiwan as having a network of seabed sonar listening points that they had developed with the US.
These posts, according to Easton and Schriver, are comparable to the US SOSUS system, which extends from Taiwan’s northeast coast to the Senkaku Islands and its southern coast to the Bashi Channel to the Philippines.
These underwater sensors are used to track ship and submarine movements through the First Island Chain, according to them, and are connected to the US Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ( JMSDF).
Taiwan plans to add six ASW frigates and a local submarine force to its arsenal. Its first submarine, the ROCS Hai Kun, is undergoing testing and seven units will be built.  ,
As China ramps up the construction of stealthy new mini-submarines, the real test isn’t just numbers—it’s whether these vessels can evade Taiwan’s defenses and the US ‘ ASW capabilities and survive the fast-evolving realities of modern undersea warfare.