Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ready to meet with Donald Trump to discuss , ending the Ukrainian conflict , and , resuming arms control talks  , after the American leader , told the Davos elite , last week that he’d like to do both with his Russian counterpart as soon as possible.
Since the New START will disappear in February 2026, but the negotiation process has been halted since 2023, their mention of resuming hands power discussions is important. Here, here, and here are context briefings on the subject.
To put it simply, the balance of nuclear and related forces ( like delivery systems ) between Russia and the US, the two nations with the most significant arsenals by far, is a big factor in global strategic stability.
By the time the Old Cold War was over, they realized how harmful and materially burdensome such programs were and agreed to limited cuts and checking measures.
This helped them overcome their security ambiguity, which refers to one side’s defensively intended moves ( such as building nukes for deterrence ) being perceived by their rival as offensively intended ( such as preparing for an overwhelming first strike ) and thus triggering an escalation cycle.
Their security problem returned, though, according to NATO’s east expansion. With their substitute conflict in Ukraine, it then advanced to a new risky stage, which could get worse if the New START expires without a successor.
Trump made the decision to resume the nuclear talks with Russia and China, which he claimed were on the verge of success before the 2020 election, which is why he brought this up during his video conference at Davos.
To be sure, he might have exaggerated the chances of coming to a deal had he won in the past, especially since China was reluctant to do it and Russia demanded ( as Peskov did ) British and French nuclear cuts, as well ( as Peskov did ).
The point of this explanation is to demonstrate that resuming US-Russian discussions on arms control may speed up the Russian peace process pending the outcome of the latter, which was encourage reciprocal compromises in this regard.
It can only be speculated what form that could take, but some of the proposals at the end of this analysis , here  , and the one that was elaborated on , here  , could be in the cards if both sides have the political will.
The need to restart arms control discussions is more serious than ever, not just because the US-Russian safety conflict recently reached a dangerous juncture and because New START has already expired, but also because new weapons systems have been developed and deployed, such as Russian hypersonic Oreshniks.
A new international arms race may soon start, and given how these munitions is be , comparable in power to nukes but without the radiation, it’s just a matter of time before the US and others catch up.
This potential rivalry wouldn’t really be between the US and Russia like it used to be, but it would almost certainly include all additional nuclear power as well as some non-nuclear says like Iran and others as well. Due to the hyper-proliferation of systems since the end of the Old Cold War.
Another important nuclear and/or missile forces can only be brought on board through a multilateral agreement, with a US-Russian cope at its core, to agree to reduce these weapons and stop others from obtaining them.
In reality, they may agree to accept UN Security Council sanctions against any non-signatory state who is formally accused of developing or using these weapons in secret, as well as against any signatory who is formally accused of stockpiling more of these weapons than agreed upon.
What is essentially being proposed in a new global security architecture, which calls for the contribution of all key people, is essentially the non-proliferation of cutting-edge non-nuclear arms.
There is still a long way to go before anything of the type is agreed to at the suggested level, which includes the delicate nitty-gritty details of monitoring mechanisms, but it is in every responsible nuclear and missile energy’s best interests to see this happen. This includes the delicate nitty-gritty details of monitoring mechanisms.
The only way to get there is to end the Russian conflict as quickly as possible through a number of pragmatist mutually agreeable agreements in order for the US-Russian core of the world proper protection system to work on this front.
This , article , was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind consent. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber , below.