Under the Trump presidency, the future of US-Spain relationships appears to be moving along a way to fix a proper conundrum. On the one hand, the American and Spanish security and intelligence communities communicate a genuine desire to enhance and deepen their bilateral safety agreement.
For Madrid, that stems from the strategic calculus that it is better to hedge with the United States to avoid overdependence, misalignment, and uncertainty in Spain-European Union ( EU) relations. For Washington, that stems from the social essential for greater corporate independence in Europe and increased burden-sharing in North Africa and the Sahel.
On the other hand, the Americans and Spanish find themselves on opposite sides of the political debates over the spending targets for North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) member states, ongoing military operations by the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the impact of Silicon Valley on democracy.
The concern for both countries is that it is clear that there are significant events on the horizon, quite as NATO Summit 2025 and South Africa ’s massacre circumstance against Israel trials, that will provide huge policy windows for the Trump administration and the 119th United States Congress to work on their problems.
The US National Security Council may, therefore, try to take some stress out of the program by engaging in strategic partnership control in a way that strikes the right stability between political grievances and geopolitical interests on both sides.
One option that they should consider is to immediately relocate select military units from Naval Station Rota ( Spain ) to Ksar Saghir Naval Base ( Morocco ). That includes the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe. That move do have distinct advantages.
Second, it may solve a communications magnification concern for the White House. Next, it would take an earlier message to the Government of Spain that the strategic relationship is in danger of a break. Third, it would provide a mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between Morocco and the United States, which will be necessary if the Trump administration chooses to abandon the strategic partnership with Spain.
Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, there has generally been a strong bilateral security relationship between Spain and the United States. In terms of security cooperation, the Government of Spain has regularly deployed its armed forces to fight alongside the United States and other NATO member states.
Examples include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The Government of Spain has also deployed its armed forces to conduct large-scale non-traditional security operations with the United States and other NATO member states. Examples include Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.
In terms of global posture, Spain hosts an important node in the American overseas basing network. Naval Station Rota ( NS Rota ) is a critical node for logistical support and strategic presence in Europe and Africa. Among other things, NS Rota hosts Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team ( FAST ) Company Europe.
FAST Company Europe is responsible for providing security forces for strategic weapons and rapid response and forward-deployed expeditionary anti-terrorism security forces in large parts of Europe and Africa. This includes evacuations of US diplomatic posts in times of crisis.
That said, there have been some major hiccups in the strategic partnership along the way. One occurred during the first Trump administration. That was over the extension of NS Rota. At the time, the Government of Spain sought to use that extension as leverage in bilateral trade negotiations. That did not go over well with The White House.
Strategic autonomy
Although the prime minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, once declared that he is “a militant pro-European, ” the Government of Spain has found it difficult to pursue its national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference solely through the European Union ( EU) and NATO.
His problem is that Spain’s national security and foreign policy interests are not fully aligned with the national security and foreign policy interests of other major European and NATO powers ( e. g. , France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey ). To compound matters, Spanish citizens tend to have extremely unrealistic preferences for their government on matters of national security and foreign policy.
Examples include a strong desire for the establishment of a common foreign policy and a “true European army. ” As a consequence, the Sanchez administration faces a multidimensional challenge that is preventing his government from being able to “claim” what it perceives to be Spain’s rightful place in the international system.
Under the Trump administration, this dilemma presents a strong incentive for the Sanchez administration to try to pursue national interests and adopt a foreign policy of its preference with much less dependence on either the EU or NATO. That begs the question of how best to achieve such strategic autonomy given the scarce resources at Sanchez’s disposal.
One option would be for his administration to pursue greater strategic autonomy through increased hedging in North Africa and the Sahel. At present, most European countries are single mindedly transfixed on events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Spain is watching the balance of power shift radically in North Africa and the Sahel with great apprehension. On the descent are the French, who have now been effectively expelled from their former colonial possessions across the Sahel.
This has left a strategic void throughout the region that other powers have sought to exploit in different ways. Some are internal powers like Algeria and Morocco. Others are external powers such as China, Israel, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
In Italy and Spain, this power struggle is viewed as a serious risk to their national security and foreign policy interests. The Sanchez administration, therefore, needs to try to mitigate these risks. Despite Sanchez’s personal animosity toward President Trump and “ultra-Right wing American billionaires, ” the most obvious option would be to try to broaden and deepen its strategic partnership with the United States.
The problem is that the Trump administration does not respond well to world leaders who launch public attacks on his supporters. Nor does the National Security Council want to repeat the past mistakes of the Elysee Palace.
The Trump administration faces its own strategic conundrum. The White House knows that there is a clear and present strategic imperative to fill the power projection void that currently exists in North Africa and the Sahel. However, it does want to take on more financial burdens for American taxpayers in the process.
Faced with this two-way pull, the Trump administration has a strong incentive to search for allies and partners who are willing and able to assume a large part of the burden at their own expense. Finding the right allies and partners will prove difficult, though.
There might be some interest in the NATO bloc from Turkey. There might also be some interest in the Major Non-NATO Ally bloc from Israel, Morocco, and Qatar. And there might be some interest in the Gulf Cooperation Council from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
However, all of these options come with strings attached. Some also come with daggers drawn. Whatever choice is made, none would be seen as a perfect substitute for the United States in the eyes of the Spanish military and intelligence agencies.
Some will not have sufficient power to be able to stabilize the region. Others may have sufficient power but their national security and foreign policy interests will not be well-aligned with the Government of Spain and the Spanish Royal Family.
If the Trump administration offloads the alliance burden inherited from the French onto others, then it is reasonable to expect that the Sanchez administration will pursue secondary against those American burden-sharing partners.
That would interject more complexity into US-Spain relations, which would run the risk of further destabilizing the strategic partnership.
American grievances
The problem with multi-level hedging is that there is already a lot of tension in US-Spain relations without it. On the American side, this largely stems from two major grievances.
First, there is strong opposition against the failure of the Sanchez administration to act on spending targets for NATO member states. In 2024, the Government of Spain reportedly spent a meager 1. 3 % of its gross domestic product ( GDP ) on defense expenditures. Without adjustments, that puts Spain “dead last ” among NATO member states.
That reality stands in sharp contrast to the 5 % target that has been set by President Trump. Second, there is equally strong opposition against the choices made by the Sanchez administration about how to respond to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.
Over the last year, the Government of Spain has recognized the State of Palestine. It has intervened in the South African genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice ( ICJ). And it has reportedly blocked “American-flagged ships from using its ports because it believed the vessels were carrying military equipment to Israel. ”
These moves have infuriated both Israel and the United States. As evidence, the Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz sent the following message to the Spanish prime minister on X: “Hamas thanks you for your service. ” In the coming months, the Spanish response is likely to draw renewed criticism from the Trump administration and 119th Congress for these moves.
The Government of Israel has asked members of Congress to put as much pressure as possible on South Africa to drop the case. Now, there are efforts well underway to impose Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on South African elites who have committed corruption and human rights violations. That includes providing material support to Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.
If the first day of the second term of the Trump administration is any indication, winter is coming hard and fast for US-Spain relations too. Speaking at a technology industry conference, Prime Minister Sanchez went on the offensive against the “Silicon Valley techno caste” that he claims threatens democratic institutions.
According to Sanchez, Elon Musk and others are “trying to exercise absolute power over social media in order to control public discourse and as a result, government action in the west. ” For that reason, Sanchez urged other world leaders to “rebel and consider alternatives. ”
On the other side of the Atlantic, President Trump appeared to take his own jabs at the Sanchez administration. During a press conference at the Oval Office, Trump referred to Spain as “a BRICS nation. ” He then issued what appeared to be a thinly veiled threat: “Spain. Do you know what a BRICS nation is? You’ll figure it out. ”
Whatever the message President Trump was trying to convey, it ’s safe to assume that coercive measures against Spain are being discussed over the NATO spending thresholds and ICJ case in The White House and 119th US Congress. One should expect that those options will include some in-kind response to Sanchez’s attacks on Trump supporters.
If so, then the Trump administration could try to take a page out of the playbook for South Africa– a BRICS member state – and use Magnitsky sanction requests to try to expose Spanish elites who have committed corruption.
Proactive relationship management
With a cold front fast approaching, time is running out for both sides to course correct before there is a severe breakdown in the strategic partnership.
On that note, the Trump administration should take the initiative and immediately start imposing graduated pressure on the Sanchez administration to more fully align with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
One way to send such a signal would be to immediately relocate a small number of Rota-based military units to Morocco. These units should include FAST Company Europe. Such a move would have the following benefits.
First, it would mitigate the following risk. If there was an attack on a US diplomatic or military footprint by Hamas or another Iranian-backed terrorist organization within the areas of responsibility of the US Africa Command or US European Command, then the US Department of Defense might have to deploy FAST Company Europe from NS Rota.
That, in turn, might spur criticism from American and Israeli foreign policy experts who believe that the Sanchez administration has frustrated their efforts to eliminate these very organizations.
Second, it would send an unambiguous signal to the Government of Spain that the strategic partnership is in jeopardy. However, that signal would be so loud that it deafens both sides. That would open the door to conflict resolution efforts that might help to salvage the future of US-Spain relations.
Third, forward-deployed crisis response operations would provide a useful mechanism for broadening and deepening security cooperation between the militaries, foreign services and intelligence agencies of Morocco and the United States. For the Trump administration, that makes sense either way. Morocco is becoming an even more important security partner for Europeans and the United States “in the crisis-ridden Sahel. ”
However, it could also prove pivotal if the Trump administration makes the decision to freeze the strategic partnership between Spain and the United States.
Michael Walsh is an Affiliated Research Fellow at the Lasky Center für Transatlantische Studien at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.