The management of novel US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering different options to stop Iran from being able to develop a nuclear weapon.
These include renegotiating a second atomic package, pursuing a policy of “maximum force ” against Tehran by ramping up sanctions and conducting strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
These discussions follow a report released in November 2024 by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ), which found Iran was dangerously close to enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels.
The statement also said that Iran was planning to fit more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich more uranium. There are, nevertheless, problems associated with each of the three options available to Trump.
1. Renegotiating the radioactive offer
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, was negotiated under the administration of Barack Obama in 2015. Signed by Iran and several world powers, the offer placed limits on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.
Iran was required to minimize its uranium stash by 98 % and maintain its levels of uranium enrichment at 3. 67 %. This is substantially below the amount needed to create a weapon.
However, Trump withdrew from the Iran deal during his first term as president, saying it was “horrible ” and “one-sided. ” He argued it lacked identification steps and did much to suppress Iran’s support for extremist groups. He also remarked that it failed to address the regime’s growth of nuclear weapons capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
There is help for a renegotiated deal within several policy lines in Washington. But there has been a sharp increase in anti-American attitude in Iran over recent decades, which has reduced the likelihood of Tehran returning to the negotiating table.
Opinion surveys released after Trump’s departure from the Iran deal in 2018 showed that 70 % of Iranians thought Tehran does not make any more concessions to the US for a potential nuclear deal.
The death of Iranian military chief General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 has more eroded Trump’s picture in Tehran. Soleimani, who the Pentagon said was “responsible for the deaths of thousands of American and coalition company members”, was killed by an American drone attack near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq.
This anti-American attitude has been exacerbated through blazing remarks from Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He vowed “severe revenge ” on those responsible for Soleimani’s death and pronounced the US as “criminals. ” In the past, Khamenei has even labeled Trump’s behaviour as “ugly and nasty. ”
2. Ramping up punishment
Iran has a deep-rooted historic dislike to Western and, more particularly, American identity. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has cemented a foreign legislation view of viewing the “American-led imperial order ” in terms of “global pride. ”
This concept has been reflected by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which controls Iran’s nuclear programme. In a social media post in 2020, it said Iranian nuclear experts were “ready to experience the force and unilateralism of the US federal relating to the use of atomic energy. ”
Trump’s plan of highest pressure on Iran during his first term only strengthened Tehran’s thinking on American hegemony. Various Iranian officials condemned the US-led sanctions as “economic terrorism ” and criticized Washington ’s “thirst for war. ”
The Iranian government has also frequently used the punishment to attract public assistance for its authority. In April 2024, Khamenei urged the Persian people to view sanctions as an attempt to force Iran to cooperate with “colonizing, imperial plans ” and submit to “tyrannical needs. ”
There are some indications that this communications has worked. In a 2024 survey of 2,280 Iranian citizens, more than 69 % of respondents expressed support for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Imposing additional sanctions is likely to strengthen Iran’s antagonism to the US, complicating efforts to revise a nuclear deal.
The plan will probably be undeterred by the returning of Trump’s maximum-pressure strategy, even if it leads to new restrictions from other countries. Iran’s nuclear programme has demonstrated extraordinary endurance over the years.
Tehran now has more than five kilograms of improved uranium at its disposal. And the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, estimated in July 2024 that Iran is now capable of producing “one bomb’s fair of fissile material ” in “about 12 weeks. ”
3. Dramatic Persian services
The last option being considered by Trump’s group is proactive strikes on Iranian nuclear services. This option may reflect a departure from the historic US scheme of containing Tehran through financial coercion. It would also likely result in a major escalation of conflicts between the two countries.
To understand the risks associated with US defense activity in Iran, consider the events of the past several decades. In October 2024, Israel carried out a series of attacks on Iran in retribution for a storm of Egyptian attacks on its place. This involved a hit on a nuclear arms research center near Tehran known as Taleghan 2.
The Egyptian rulers were quick to respond with some aggressive political claims. Ayatollah Khamenei vowed “a tooth-breaking response ” against Israel and its ally, the US. His assistant, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that “if an philosophical risk arises, Iran may modify its nuclear theory. ” Khamenei issued a fatwa, or spiritual judgement, against the use of nuclear weapons in 2003.
US strikes on Iranian earth are definitely not out of the problem. In October 2024, Trump expressed aid for Jewish retaliation against Iran. He urged Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear system first and “worry about the rest later. ” Scares like these simply encourage Iran to tear from its spiritual order of no producing and using nuclear arms.
More than debating hardline policies to prevent Iran’s nuclear programme, America’s approach should be to watch and wait. This would be important in assessing whether Iran, whose business has been crippled by sanctions, leans towards China and Russia for business or comes up to the negotiating table for a minute nuclear deal.
Aniruddha Saha is young research fellow in Politicians, University of Oxford
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