Donald Trump’s resumption of office on January 20, 2025, is commonly believed to represent a significant shift in American foreign policy and a shift in diplomacy’s process.
Trump’s favoritism, which includes threats and rhetoric directed at foreign leaders, now seems to have paid off in helping to create a fragile peace agreement in Gaza. The offer was negotiated by Joe Biden and his team in cooperation with Trump’s coming management.
But analysts suggest Trump’s harsh comments on January 7 that” all hell had split lose” if the hostages weren’t immediately released were truly a threat to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, to get something done immediately. And this made the Israeli authorities obligated to make a bargain.
In his first name, Trump used this sharp confrontational language. And his most recent threats to conquer Canada, purchase Greenland, and retake control of the Panama Canal suggest it does occur again. That might not be all that positive, especially for US traditional friends.
Elon Musk, one of Trump’s closest confidants, is also explicitly haughty about his attempts to overthrow the UK and Germany, in an ostensible effort to bolster a global coalition of populist leaders.
Add to that a promised agreement with Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine, a resumption of the maximum-pressure battle against Iran, and a doubling down on confrontation with China, and you have the ingredients for a basic revision of US foreign policy.
Three distinct characteristics stand out as early indicators of the potential shape of the Trump foreign policy. First is the emphasis on the Northern hemisphere. Trump’s goal appears to be reaffirming US dominance in American affairs while also removing any perceived corporate flaws.
While Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal have dominated the articles, there are also repercussions for US ties with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Trump’s pull as secretary of state, Marco Rubio, being known for his aggressive approach.
Trump may inaccurately hype up China’s role in the Panama Canal, but Beijing has unquestionably increased its ( mostly economic ) footprint in Latin America. A Chinese-funded deep-water harbor in Peru has raised US safety concerns.
Mexico’s funding by China has opened a significant backdoor into the US market, making Mexico the US’s largest trading partner. In 2024, Latino exports of goods to the US stood at just under US$ 467 billion, compared with China’s$ 401 billion.
Trump is likely to use a combination of disturbing rhetoric, tariffs, and social pressure to lower the pressure in the Northern hemisphere.
His allies in Congress have now introduced a bill to “authorize the President to get to enter into discussions with the Kingdom of Denmark to stable the acquisition of Greenland by the United States” in an early indication of how seriously the incoming administration takes the matter.
The administration’s shifting emphasis on regional cooperation is the second key component of the emerging Trump international policy philosophy. Europe and the Middle East are the two primary focus regions in this environment.
Ukraine conflict deal
One of Trump’s important objectives is to focus on China and “un-unite” Russia and China while fulfilling the promise to end the conflict in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, he insists that the incoming administration continue to prioritize transatlantic security while also urging US allies to increase their defence spending.
It simply doesn’t want to be the one making the majority of the money. And Trump has a point: Washington currently shoulders 68 % of all NATO expenditure, compared with European members ‘ 28 %.
Trump’s strategy for the Middle East is supported by the same analysis of US-mediated deals that promote US passions while allowing for a reduction in pledges.
A little clearer path to correcting relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is now possible thanks to a peace between Israel and Hamas, which does help the release of Jewish victims. This is still dependent upon an Israeli wink towards Palestinian sovereignty, but when this materializes, Israel’s ties with the rest of the Muslim world will also increase.
This will allow Washington to begin its maximum-pressure battle against Tehran and shift the stress of containing Iran to a likely more efficient and able coalition of US allies in the region.
What future for China?
While Trump’s approach to the Northern hemisphere and to Washington’s potential relations with Europe and the Middle East are largely unambiguous, there are a lot of questions about his China plan. With the exception of Elon Musk, who has considerable business interests in China, his national security group is typically viewed as aggressive toward Beijing.
Trump himself oscillates between obnoxious and cordial speech. One of his arguments for reaffirming US control of the proper waterway is that it is under the purview of China. He also spelled out Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ability to assist with a bargain in Ukraine and yet invited him to his inauguration.
Trump may be available to a package with China – and China, in turn, has signaled involvement in this as well. While Xi did not go the commencement, his vice-president, Han Zheng, does.
Even though their 2020 deal did little more than put an end to an escalating trade conflict, Trump and Xi have a track record of making deals. The negotiations on that agreement took two years, leaving many of the tariffs in place as of Trump’s first word, though occasionally at a lower rate.
Similar events might occur right now, with Trump honoring one of his campaign promises to raise taxes on Chinese products while also starting discussions on a new deal with Beijing.
In all likelihood, this is Trump’s final term as president. For the next two decades, at least, he controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He has every incentive to make good on his promises – and faces some, if any, restrictions. He sees himself as a disrupter, and his MAGA center expects him to be just that. Instability is all but guaranteed.
However, it is unclear whether Trump’s idea of a more stable global order with clearly defined spheres of influence for the US, China, and perhaps Russia will come to light, let alone whether such a result would be preferable.
The University of Birmingham’s Stefan Wolff is an assistant professor of global security.
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