Myanmar’s third year of post-coup civil war is currently rife with rumors of an imminent insurgency victory.
The Arakan Army ( AA ) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) have made historic battlefield gains in Rakhine and Kachin states, respectively. These came after the Three Brotherhood Alliance ( 3BA ) seized the Northern Shan state capital of Lashio in August. In various ethnic hinterlands, the junta’s State Administration Council’s ( SAC ) forces are clearly in retreat.
Now, into the convoluted conflict reporting field comes the one-year” Military Progress Report” from the exiled, anti-junta National Unity Government’s ( NUG) Ministry of Defense ( MoD ). At first glance, the January 4 record is a clean record of a long fight, one possibly being won against the coup-installed program.
The NUG’s counting of 2024 military gains requires careful analysis of how these numbers are produced, what they mean for armed resistance in the future, and what the SAC might lose if it is overused in different ways.
The NUG claims their three major achievements since forming in 2021 are: 1 ) the creation of multiple People’s Defense Forces ( PDF), 2 ) “establishment of controlled and liberated territories”, and 3 ) the overturning of the military regime’s administrative structure and “formation of people’s governance systems”.
Despite confusing the distinct difference between” control” and “governance”, there is truth to all of these claims. The report claims that the NUG derive legitimacy from two sources:” ( 1 ) De Jure: Authority granted by the people’s mandate, ( 2 ) De Facto: Authority stemming from territorial control and popular support”.
Although it’s unclear whether the MoD completely comprehends both those terms, it assumes more widespread assistance on the ground than it probably does.
The report’s debatable information centers on the remarkable territorial gains achieved. “( T ) he PDF and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organizations ) control a total of 144 townships ( out of 330 in all of Myanmar ). Among these, 95 towns ( 48 townships ) are fully” liberated” and under revolutionary governance. Innovative fights continue in an extra 79 settlements, according to the report.
” The regime’s power has diminished to just 107 districts. In proportion, revolutionary forces and cultural revolutionary pushes control 44 % of the country’s settlements. 24 % of all conflicts are effective. According to the report from the NUG MOD, the junta only has power over 32 % of Myanmar, which reveals its inability to maintain rule over the majority of the country.
However, this global break suggests the MoD may become cooking the books. The main problem is the fusion of innovative actors into a single top. The report frequently confuses the “EROs” and” PDFs,” a rebranding of the more conventional ethnic armed organizations ( EAOs ) as “revolutionary forces.”
These are never mentioned by name in the report, but they include the AA, KIA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ( MNDAA ), theTa’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) and many others. Many of these seasoned ethnic rebels have a weak, at best, relationship with the NUG and don’t actually obey the NUG’s MoD.
More down in the document, the MoD clarifies that the NUG/PDF controls only eight of those 95 freed towns, breaking down the work divisions. Eleven borders buying settlements” were freed from coup power “along the edges with China, Bangladesh, India and Thailand: the NUG PDFs took none of them. A claimed 741 SAC foundations were overrun during 2024, with PDF’s taking 162 of them in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, Bago and Tanintharyi parts.
173″ Central bases “were captured, including two Regional Military Commands in Rakhine and north Shan position. The vast majority of these martial profits were made by EAOs and their friends. The NUG so engages in a form of” stolen courage” by claiming military benefits it had had no or very little to do with.
The study’s dying depend section is also dangerous. It claims 14, 093 SAC troops were killed and 7, 363 injured in 2024. The document fails to provide a detailed account of how these figures were compiled and what resources were used, aside from the doubtful character of these numbers in comparison to the typical 3: 1 victim ratio in most conflicts. Some EAOs are typically cautious about such conflict information and won’t release enemy combatant kill statistics.
How were these precise figures compiled by the NUG? However, revolutionary-side victim listings are a glaring mistake.
The number of SAC sympathizers to the NUG is a contestable area. Under its” People’s Embrace “program, the NUG claims that 14, 760 SAC personnel have switched sides, but of these, the majority are Myanmar Police Force ( MPF). 3, 872 military officers have defected since 2021, with 567 joining the” Embrace “program in 2024.
This suggests a collapse, even as several thousand soldiers have been captured, mainly by EAOs, during heavy battle in many wars. Despite the unquestionable demise of the military in so many areas, the SAC continues to exist.
The NUG report claims that” ( t ) he junta’s conscription campaigns have also largely failed”, after the Military Service Law was enacted in February. Yet many rounds of instruction have already been completed, with some 20, 000 volunteers.
However, the report reflects some early triumphalism that persisted over the previous year and slammed predictions that the main area of Mandalay was being “encircled and poised to get” liberated.
The notable accomplishments include the successful penetration of Mandalay through the Shan-Mann offensive and the defense of Pinlebu town by the nearly 1, 000 SAC troops ( sic ). Now, the frontline has reached the outskirts of Mandalay, the next largest city, while essential protective zones such as Naypyidaw, Yangon, Taungoo and Meiktila are under normal attacks.”
It is accurate to say that the resumption of Operation 1027 in June of 2024 was an important advancement that resulted from deploying NUG-aligned troops into higher Mandalay. However, many of these gains, particularly in Madaya town, had been reversed in the final months of 2024 as a result of SAC strikes and the rollout of ground forces.
Pyin U Lwin, a big defense area close to Mandalay, did not experience the magnitude that was predicted in the middle of the year as a result of a combined power of PDFs and EAOs.
Pinlebu‘s arrest is mentioned in detail, too. The city in the northern Sagaing area is 400 kilometers away from Mandalay, making it almost a “frontline” target ( though the nature of” frontlines” in Myanmar’s conflicts differs from region to region ). Following the coup, the area was one of the first to start an armed uprising against the Myanmar military.
Numerous PDFs have made numerous attempts to take total control, and the KIA has made numerous efforts. This was finally achieved in October, after 53 days of heavy battle, which the NUG claimed at the time included 670 heat attacks and some 5, 000 weapons dropped. Most of the town’s people of more than 7, 000 had much fled.
Kawlin, which was captured by the PDFs in soon 2023 and retaken by the SAC after three times, is only 50 meters away. The city was almost totally destroyed in the back-and-forth battle.
The NUG record likewise fails to mention how much of Region, and most of northern Myanmar, has become an horrific environment. There are an estimated 1, 258, 000 internally displaced persons ( IDPs ) in Sagaing alone, out of 3.5 million nationwide, according to the United Nations. The Myanmar monitoring group Data for Myanmar documents that 106, 000 homes have been destroyed in ( mostly ) SAC arson attacks since the coup, 74, 000 just in Sagaing.
The report asserts that of the nine key transit routes, some of which are highways teetered by armed groups with an indeterminate chain of command, “dominate” ( which is a bold claim ).
It’s questionable whether they are motivated by surveillance or removal of fees and straight-up stealing. Despite the establishment of NUG managerial structures and the success of their efforts, violent disorder frequently prevails.
By any measure, the NUG MoD’s achievement has been remarkable, from its roots in 2021 to then being a regional military business. Yet information such as this” Defense Development “privileges data braggadocio over humanitarian considerations.
For instance, the section on “liberating” towns” fails to mention the risky and laborious realities of landmine and booby trap clearance, unexploded ammunition ( UXO ), collecting of the dead, both civilians and combatants, rebuilding community relations, and accommodating to what in many ways might be an” alien “new authority, such as the MNDAA in Lashio.
The document does include a snappy slogan, as the MoD’s strategic program is” All Highways Guide to Naypyidaw. However, these paths may vary as the EAOs’ and the expelled NUG’s goals start to vary.
The NUG needs to prepare for this truth. It could do this by recognizing the tremendous suffering of the people in their functional areas and giving its fellow revolutionary organizations the due credit for their military victories.
Independent scientist David Scott Mathieson is engaged in fight, charitable, and human rights issues in Myanmar.