Taiwan hypersonics aim for deep strikes on the mainland – Asia Times

Taiwan’s latest hypersonic weapons allow for precise long-range attacks on China’s critical infrastructure and military installations, a significant improvement in the self-governing region’s defence strategy amid rising tensions with Beijing.

Many media outlets reported last month that Taiwan is developing hypersonic missiles with ranges greater than 2, 000 km that can strike targets strong into northern China.

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST ) has previously mass-produced the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile, with a 1, 200–2, 000 mile range, and is working to improve it into the Ching Tien fast cruise missile.

Taiwan officially began producing the Ching Tien supersonic cruise missile in late 2024 and then apparently sent small quantities to Taiwan’s Air Force and Missile Command. In the future, Taiwan aims to build 10 sets of wireless devices with 20 weapons at Pingtung County, south of the island, according to reports.

The Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile’s move from bunker-style launch platforms, according to reports, may improve strike and survival abilities. The Chinese government considers 12×12 vehicle trucks from Bohemian company Tatra as key start vehicles, while US-made Oshkosh M983 trucks are an alternative.

The Ching Tien weapon line, first deployed last month, represents Taiwan’s annual strategic tool capable of reaching target as far as Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. The project, reportedly part of an NT$ 13.5 billion ( US$ 411 million ) budget under the codename” Feiji No 2″, underscores Taiwan’s push to bolster deep-strike capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, the NCSIST makes use of local expertise to achieve fast speeds by developing sophisticated materials and rocket engines to further refine the missiles. This program is in line with Taiwan’s strategic move toward more portable and repeatable defense systems.

Asia Times has recently reported on Taiwan’s long-range weapon jobs. Taiwan has unveiled the Hsiung Feng IIE ( HF-2E ) long-range cruise missile, targeting critical Chinese installations and cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

This weapon, with a documented range of up to 1, 200 meters, demonstrates Taiwan’s intent to store probable marine barricades and preemptive attacks by China.

Developed by the NCSIST, the HF-2E employs advanced navigation and propulsion systems to achieve high accuracy, comparable to the US Tomahawk missile. Despite US opposition, Taiwan has reportedly tested the Ba Dan ballistic missile and advanced with the Yung Feng supersonic cruise missile.

Additionally, Taiwan aims to increase annual missile production to nearly 500 units, focusing on indigenously manufactured systems to ensure strategic autonomy.

In a 1945 article this month, Christian Martin mentions that the missile’s range gives Taiwan the ability to strike deep into mainland China, potentially targeting key energy infrastructure such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports, petroleum refineries, gas power plants and nuclear power plants.

Martin says that these sites, located primarily on or near China’s west coast, are within the Ching Tien’s reach, making them potential targets in the event of a conflict.

He points out that Ching Tien’s deployment sends a powerful message to China, highlighting Taiwan’s ability to seriously damage critical infrastructure and avert a potential invasion or crippling blockade.

Further, Ian Easton mentions in a decade-old report for Project 2049 Institute that Taiwan’s military has built a robust counterstrike doctrine targeting vulnerabilities in the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) reconnaissance-strike network.

Easton points out that Taiwan maintains precision strike capability to disrupt PLA command centers, communication hubs, and infrastructure while focusing on interdiction of critical nodes.

According to Easton, Taiwan’s doctrine prioritizes intelligence-driven, politically calibrated strikes focusing on PLA assets such as command centers, airbases and naval facilities.

He points out that Taiwan is testing advanced unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV ) to combat PLA radar and missile sites while integrating unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ) systems for surveillance, electronic warfare, and targeting support.

Easton mentions that the Taiwanese Navy fires subsonic and supersonic missiles against maritime and coastal targets while ground forces use heavy guns and rocket artillery that can overfly the area.

He says these systems collectively enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter and counter PLA operations, highlighting a strategic shift towards resilient, precision-guided and technologically advanced deterrence measures.

The Ching Tien, alongside Taiwan’s other missiles, may form the backbone of a proposed “pit viper” strategy, emphasizing counterstrike capabilities to deter aggression by threatening China’s key cities and infrastructure.

Such strikes may also be used as psychological warfare. By bringing the war to Russia through long-range strikes deep in Russian territory, Taiwan may be a ladle from Ukraine’s playbook in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Ukraine has hoped that these strikes will end the” social contract” between the Russian leadership and its citizens, particularly in cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg. According to a social contract, the Russian leadership may continue to support the war as long as it keeps the conflict out of the lives of the people.

Taiwan may take note of the fact that Taiwan may be aware that the wider war effort and the apparent impact of these Ukrainian strikes have been limited by Russian public opinion. Despite the high casualties of Russian soldiers, these strikes may have provided a compelling argument for the country’s leaders to continue supporting the war.

In the same way, the Chinese government might use Taiwanese strikes to argue its support for a Chinese invasion and annexation of Taiwan. In the event that a potential decapitation operation against Taipei’s leadership fails, leading to a drawn-out conflict with the US and its allies who support Taiwan, China may need this support.

In February 2024, Asia Times reported that the PLA might need a minimum of 300, 000 to 400, 000 soldiers to seize Taiwan following swift air and missile strikes aimed at eliminating Taiwan’s leadership.

However, in the event that these decapitation strikes fail, the PLA may need to enlist as many as 2 million troops to take control of Taiwan, which will ensure numerical superiority to Taiwan’s defending forces.

The possibility of retaliation strikes against mainland China has sparked debates against and against an invasion.

In a December 2019 RAND dissertation, John Meyers asserts that advocates are right to target high-value Chinese assets, including missile sites and command centers, to deter US losses in a potential conflict.

On the other hand, Meyers claims that critics point out that China’s nuclear arsenal poses a significant escalation threat because even brief strikes could be misinterpreted as the start of a larger campaign, increasing the possibility of nuclear retaliation.

Moreover, he mentions that critics argue that striking the homeland of a nuclear-armed state could severely damage US credibility, violate international norms and alienate allies, complicating global support. He adds that critics warn of the dangers of a lingering conflict because China might retaliate in a conflict it views as existential.

Detractors highlight their escalatory nature and strategic risks, according to Meyers, while supporters argue that these strikes are necessary to restore operational balance. He points out that the discussion raises a crucial issue for US military planners: balancing the risks of geopolitical fallout and nuclear escalation.